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Th is work analyzes the legitimacy of energy supply network unbundling 
measures  exceeding the current legal unbundling requirements) as threatened or 
proposed by the European Commission on the basis of European economic 
regulation competences.
Apart from threatening to order the divestiture of energy networks of individual 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, the Commission originally 
proposed to either impose energy transmission network ownership unbundling 
(OU) or “deep” independent system operation (“deep” ISO), which would give 
independent energy transmission system operators exclusive investment decision 
and commissioning powers.
In addition, the current draft  Electricity and Gas Directives contain as a third 
option the implementation of independent transmission operators (ITOs). 
Because this option is merely a stricter form of legal unbundling, it is not the 
subject of the analysis here as to what extent the further legislative unbundling 
measures OU and “deep” ISO are in breach of economic fundamental rights as 
protected in Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the European Union.
A. EC competences in competition law and sector regulation
Ordering the divestiture of individual vertically integrated energy supply networks 
on the basis of the Commission’s competition law enforcement powers would be 
disproportionate to the objective sought, which is to restore competition in an 
internal energy supply market. Legal ownership unbundling or divestiture and 
“deep” independent system operation of energy supply networks would, if at all, 
only be of marginal benefi t to consumer welfare. For electricity, the benefi t largely 
depends on the existence of suffi  cient generation. With respect to gas, it is shown 
that regulation in tandem with competition law enforcement suffi  ces.
With regard to EC legislation, assuming that it was in principle legitimately based 
on the harmonization competence of Article 95 EC to introduce further 
unbundling measures as originally proposed by the Commission, the EC 
legislature would in fact not be allowed to exercise this competence for several 
reasons. Th e primary reason is that this would be a breach of Article 295 EC 
because the EU is not competent to legislate in the area of property ownership 
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allocation. Further, the fundamental freedom of the free movement of capital 
according to Article 56 EC would be compromised because the current draft  
Directives in prohibiting vertically integrated energy production and supply 
undertakings of one Member State from investing into ownership unbundled 
energy transmission network operators of other Member States cannot be justifi ed 
with public policy and security reasons or overriding interests.
B. Evolution of energy supply sectors in Germany, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands
Th e energy supply sectors in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands have 
developed rather distinctly and display rather diverging stages of energy network 
unbundling.
Th e Netherlands are and remain a natural gas exporting country for the time 
being. Th e Dutch energy supply industry has always been (predominantly) state-
owned (i.e. including municipalities and provinces); all energy networks are state-
owned and as such subject to regulation. New legislation has recently been passed 
ensuring that this remains the case for the time being.
Th e UK has only recently turned from a natural gas exporting to an importing 
country. Th e energy supply industry in England, Wales and Scotland (Great 
Britain) is equipped with suffi  cient electricity generation and was privatized some 
two decades ago, the electricity sector in England and Wales vertically separated 
ab initio (at least with respect to transmission) and the gas sector in Great Britain 
vertically integrated but separated voluntarily about a decade aft er privatization. 
A great deal of work was needed before regulation began to work eff ectively (in 
particular in the gas sector but also in electricity wholesale). Since privatization, 
it has not forced further unbundling upon its energy sector except for creating an 
independent GB electricity transmission system operator with some infl uence on 
investment.
Germany, which has never possessed signifi cant natural gas resources, has always 
been heavily reliant on coal as primary energy source. Germany’s energy supply 
sector has always been in private hands or in the hands of municipalities, which 
enjoy a certain degree of autonomy as a result of Germany’s federal structure. 
Liberalization has taken almost a decade culminating in the late introduction of 
a sector-specifi c regulatory authority in July 2005, which has made considerable 
progress ever since (with incentive regulation introduced in 2009).
Executive Summary
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C. Constitutional law and fundamental rights protection
Th e diff erent developments in market structure are also a consequence of the 
contrasting constitutional settings of Germany, the UK and the Netherlands and 
the diff erences in fundamental rights protection.
In the UK and the Netherlands, the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) is in principle the fundamental rights standard, against which national 
legislation is to be measured. In the UK and the Netherlands directly applicable 
EC legislation is to be measured against EC fundamental rights.
In the UK the ECHR is only (to a limited extent) applicable via the Human Rights 
Act 1998 whereas in the Netherlands the ECHR is part of the national legal order 
as is, in principle, EC law.
In Germany, national legislation is measured against the requirements of the 
German Constitution; directly applicable EC legislation as well as EC Directives 
are not measured against German constitutional law as long as they live up to a 
similar fundamental rights standard as is aff orded by the German Constitution.
In the UK, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has historically led to the 
submission of the judiciary to Parliament to the extent that Acts of Parliament are 
not reviewed under English law. A further consequence of this doctrine is the 
acceptance that fundamental rights have always been subject to unfettered 
interference by Parliament normally based on political bargaining. Th is 
constitutional setting has certainly been conducive to the success of UK style 
energy supply sector regulation.
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgericht, which 
safeguards the German Constitution and thus also reviews Acts of Parliament, 
has developed and enforced a rather detailed fundamental rights protection, 
which directly infl uences German style (energy supply) sector specifi c regulation, 
which focuses stricter on the rule of law than on regulatory bargaining.
Th e Netherlands fi nds itself positioned half-way between the UK and Germany in 
that national legislation can also be reviewed albeit only against the standard of 
the ECHR and not against the standard of the national constitution Grondwet.
In Germany, the analysis of the applicability of fundamental rights to further 
unbundling measures as proposed by the Commission, or more specifi cally, any 
possible implementation of such measures into German law, leads to the conclusion 
that ownership unbundling would be a disproportionate expropriation and 
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“deep” independent system operation would be a regulation of ownership 
amounting to expropriation, which would also be disproportionate.
In the UK, the complete transfer of the investment decision and commissioning 
powers of the two vertically integrated electricity transmission network owners 
in Scotland would mean a deprivation of property in the form of a de facto 
expropriation while complete ownership unbundling would be a deprivation of 
property in the form of an expropriation according to the ECHR as applied in the 
UK via the Human Rights Act 1998.
In the Netherlands, the vertical integrated energy supply undertakings wholly 
owned by municipalities and provinces in principle enjoy fundamental rights 
protection under the ECHR whereas the public shareholders do not. It is, however, 
shown that any recourses to such protection would be of no avail. Th is is because 
under the ECHR, the deprivation of property in the form of (de facto) expropriation 
of the vertically integrated energy distribution networks would be unlikely to be 
classifi ed as disproportionate as long as suffi  cient compensation is paid, which 
however would be of no use to the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings 
owned by subdivisions of the Dutch State given that such compensation would 
just circulate within the (Unitary) state organization.
Measuring the two original Commission proposals against the fundamental 
rights protection as aff orded by the ECJ, ownership unbundling is classifi ed as a 
deprivation of property in the form of an expropriation and “deep” independent 
system operation a deprivation of property in the form of a de facto expropriation, 
both of which would be disproportionate.
Further, the acceptance in the Commission proposals and in the current draft  
Directives that the mere transfer of publicly owned energy transmission networks 
to a part of the state organization separate from the part, which is responsible for 
the publicly owned vertically integrated energy supply undertaking would fulfi l 
the unbundling requirements of the new legislation amounts to a manifest breach 
of the principle of equality because it would signifi cantly disadvantage private 
undertakings.
As regards the question of whether public owners and shareholders and vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings (partly) owned or controlled by public 
institutions such as municipalities and provinces can claim fundamental 
protection, one has to distinguish between the situation in Germany, that under 
the ECHR and that under EC law.
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In Germany, it is argued here that both municipalities, which possess a special 
status within the federal state organization because their institutional existence is 
constitutionally guaranteed, and the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings (partly) owned by them (in public and public private undertakings 
of public and private law) would enjoy protection of their (economic) fundamental 
rights under the German Constitution in the specifi c context of pursuing a 
competitive economic activity of energy supply.
Under the ECHR, it is established that municipalities as governmental 
organizations according to Article 34 ECHR are not protected. It is, however, 
further argued here that vertically integrated energy supply undertakings would 
be protected if they possess legal personality (no matter whether under public or 
private law) as long as their legal personality is recognized under national law and 
as long as they do not exercise public authority; both characteristics distinguish 
them from belonging to the state organization.
In the EU, fundamental rights protection solely depends on whether undertakings 
seeking such protection pursue an economic activity and take part in the 
competitive process, no matter whether it possesses legal personality. Th us, public 
and private undertakings are likely to enjoy protection.
When it comes to eff ective fundamental rights protection, it seems that the 
German BVerfG off ers the higher standard compared to the ECtHR and in 
particular the ECJ.
Th e proportionality test as applied by the BVerfG in Germany, has been developed 
into a very detailed and elaborate process of balancing the various opposing 
interests at stake in the case of interference with fundamental rights and has been 
strictly and eff ectively applied in Germany also in the context of reviewing 
parliamentary legislation.
Th e fair balance test used by ECtHR by contrast albeit similar in structure to 
the proportionality test rarely considers fundamental rights interferences 
disproportionate, which as has been explained before seems to be attributable to 
two reasons: fi rst, to date the provision of adequate compensation appears to have 
had a signifi cant infl uence on the proportionality of state measures under review 
and, secondly, the Court accepts that the Member States and local authorities are 
usually better equipped to judge the proportionality of fundamental rights 
interferences of measures they enforce.
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Although EC (case) law includes a proportionality test similar in structure to the 
test applied in Germany, on the basis of the case law under review here of, the 
three courts the ECJ seems to aff ord the least eff ective fundamental rights 
protection because it hardly ever fi nds fundamental rights interference 
disproportionate, particularly so in the area of economic fundamental rights such 
as the right to property.
D. Selection of conclusions and outlook
Economic (and technical) evidence shows that more eff ort should be put into 
promoting generation, which if done properly would even make the extension of 
energy transmission network interconnection less urgent, which in turn would 
weaken one of the main arguments put forth in favour of further unbundling.
When one looks into what further unbundling does for the European energy 
supply markets, energy transmission network ownership unbundling delivers 
only marginal benefi ts for the creation of an internal and competitive energy 
supply market and the consumers’ benefi t. In addition, its benefi ts for increased 
investment are, to say the least, unclear. Security of energy supply is better served 
by other policies, namely by installing more (independent) generation capacity, 
which also has a greater impact on the development of competition than further 
network unbundling. What is more, further energy transmission network 
unbundling would, contrary to its purpose, unlevel the playing fi eld in the 
European energy supply markets even further.
Further unbundling measures as envisaged by the original Commission proposals 
and even more by the current draft  Directives, i.e. inclusive of the ITO model, is 
likely to intensify vertical integration of energy production and retail. Th e third 
energy package deepens regulatory diff erences in the Member States; diff erences 
in energy supply market structure in the various Member States might become 
even greater. Further network unbundling of public and private vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings carries the same label (“ownership 
unbundling”), but could eff ectively mean less intrusive unbundling for public 
undertakings thus leading to unequal treatment of the public and private energy 
supply companies (and thus unequal interference with their respective economic 
fundamental rights), which would also aff ect their investment opportunities in 
Member States which have enforced ownership unbundling.
It is, however, shown that properly regulated TPA implemented via competition 
law enforcement, which may also include the connection of generation, is one of 
a combination of measures, which can achieve the goal of a more competitively 
working internal energy supply market in a proportionate way.
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One of such measure is the release of gas and/or electricity generation considering 
that liquid energy wholesale markets or independent generation and independent 
import contracts (hub trading) with gas producers combined with access to gas 
import pipelines (pipeline capacity trade independent of gas take obligations) are 
actually more eff ective and effi  cient than energy transmission network ownership 
unbundling to achieve an internal and competitive energy supply market and 
also considering that the European Union does not have the competence to 
regulate in this area as it falls into the remit of the Member States’ to regulate their 
national energy production sectors.
Another such measure is the tightening of the regulatory regime already in place 
in order to clarify ambiguities and to narrow down margins of interpretation. 
Uniform requirements for the extension of electricity and gas transmission 
interconnectors in all Member States and the promotion of merchant transmission, 
including by way of predictable and uniform licence conditions to enhance the 
availability of energy throughout the European Union, is another prerequisite for 
the development of energy supply competition in the EU. Further, stronger 
regional cooperation is required as envisaged by the current draft  Directives 
including the strengthening of ERGEG.
Th e imposition of further unbundling measures on the European energy supply 
industry with such far-reaching consequences for the (economic) fundamental 
rights of the intended targets of such measures cannot be done by simply 
disregarding the common constitutional traditions of the Member States or 
merely assuming the application of the “lowest common denominator” of 
fundamental rights protection.
Th e ECJ should eff ectively develop and enforce a fundamental rights standard in 
the European Union, which is based on the common constitutional traditions of 
the Member States. As the “constitutional” court of the European Union with 
corresponding judicial powers, which are supposed to ensure the compliance of 
EU institutions with EC law including EC fundamental rights, its role is more 
akin to that of national courts than to that of the ECtHR.
Eff ective fundamental rights protection by the ECJ would in turn enhance the 
national acceptance of the supra-national legal order, which would in turn 
enhance the democratic functioning of the EU, and would encourage greater 
cooperation at EU level with respect to the completion of the internal market. It 
would further secure the rule of law at EC level by restraining political bargaining, 
which is sometimes far removed from its democratic foundations. It would also 
make the Commission and the Parliament aware of their role in not only guarding 
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the Treaty’s objective to of constructing the internal market but also the Treaty’s 
other objective, which is to respect common constitutional traditions.
Similar to the signifi cant infl uence which the UK approach to energy supply 
sector regulation has had on EC energy supply sector regulation, the German 
approach to a structured (economic) fundamental rights protection should 
signifi cantly assist the EU in making its approach to fundamental rights protection 
more robust and eff ective.
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In March 2000, the so-called Lisbon Agenda solemnly declared as a new strategic 
goal of the European Union for the next decade “to become the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”1 In 
order to achieve this goal, the European Council announced an overall strategy, 
part of which is “stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness 
and innovation and […] completing the internal market”. Th is would require 
economic reforms in order to reap the benefi ts of market liberalization. Th e 
European Council considers it essential to apply fair and uniform competition so 
that businesses can thrive and operate eff ectively on a level playing fi eld in the 
internal market.2 Th e European Council accordingly asked the Commission, the 
Council and the Member States, “each in accordance with their respective 
powers”, inter alia “to speed up liberalisation in areas such as gas, electricity, 
postal services and transport [with the] aim […] to achieve a fully operational 
internal market in these areas.”
When presenting the preliminary fi ndings of the Energy Sector Inquiry, which is 
based on data material of 20053, Neelie Kroes, the incumbent European 
Commissioner in charge of competition policy, emphasized on 16 February 2006 
that the European electricity and gas markets showed a high degree of market 
concentration.4 Related thereto, new entrants were prevented from entering these 
markets by way of vertical foreclosure. She complained of a lack of market 
integration in Europe and a lack of market transparency and concluded that a 
well-functioning and transparent market mechanism for setting prices was 
largely absent. Commissioner Kroes concerns about the structure of the market 
1 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000.
2 One major aim with respect to the creation of a so-called level playing fi eld is the prevention 
of cross-subsidization or cross-subsidies; in greater detail, see B Willems, E Ehlers, ‘Cross-
subsidies in the Electricity Sector’, (2008) CRNI 101.
3 In greater detail, see Communication from the Commission, ‘Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 
of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)’, 
COM(2006) 851 fi nal, Brussels, 10.1.2007.
4 N Kroes, ‘Towards an Effi  cient and Integrated European Energy Market – First Findings and 
Next Steps’, European Commission Conference, Energy Sector Inquiry – Public Presentation 
of the Preliminary Findings, Brussels, 16 February 2006.
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centred on the “bundling of generation, supply, pipelines and grids, and 
distribution.” She therefore welcomed the move “towards full structural 
unbundling”, which would “allow a more effi  cient market to develop” claiming 
that “[r]egulation would be made less complex and more eff ective.” Referring to 
her remit in this context, she then went on to say that competition enforcement 
“dances not alone, but in step with regulation.” “Regulation opens the market – 
and competition policy makes sure that the opened markets really work.” “And 
when it comes to redefi ning the dancefl oor – […] fundamental restructuring of 
the energy marketplace – both dancers need to step into motion. Andris Piebalgs 
[the European Commissioner responsible inter alia for the regulation of the 
energy markets] and I myself are fully committed to just that.”5
In its Communication of 10 January 2007 setting out “[a]n Energy Policy for 
Europe”6, the European Commission states that Europe needs “to deliver 
sustainable, secure and competitive energy.”7
Th e Commission continues: “A real Internal Energy Market is essential to meet 
all three of Europe’s energy challenges:
– Competitiveness: a competitive market will cut costs […] and stimulate 
energy effi  ciency and investment.
– Sustainability: […] transmission system operators must have an interest in 
promoting connection by renewable, combined heat and power and micro 
generation, stimulating innovation and encouraging […] non-conventional 
supply.8
– Security of supply: an eff ectively functioning and competitive Internal Energy 
Market can provide major advantages in terms of security of supply and high 
standards of public service. Th e eff ective separation of networks from the 
competitive parts of the electricity and gas business results in real incentives 
for companies to invest in new infrastructure, inter-connection capacity and 
new generation capacity, thereby avoiding black-outs and unnecessary price 
surges.”9
5 Comment added.
6 Communication from the Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, COM(2007) 1 fi nal, 
Brussels, 10.1.2007.
7 Emphasis added. For a review of this trias of challenges, see E Ehlers, ‘Th e Amsterdam and 
Berlin Fora and the Forum Process in European Energy Policy’, in M Roggenkamp, U 
Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Report IV, 2007, chapter 6.
8 Evaluating the interest to connect distributed generation (i.e. electricity generation connected 
to the distribution networks) from an interdisciplinary legal and economic perspective, see G 
Brunekreeft  and E Ehlers, ‘Ownership Unbundling of Electricity Networks and Distributed 
Generation’, (2006) CRNI 63.
9 Emphasis added. For a very recent economic social cost and benefi t analysis of ownership 
unbundling in the electricity supply sector, which also evaluates the “real” incentives to 
Introduction. Setting the Scene
Intersentia 3
As these objectives have not yet been achieved according to the Commission10, it 
has identifi ed inter alia the following measures for implementation:
– “a full Independent System Operator (where the vertically integrated company 
remains owner of the network assets and receives a regulated return on them, 
but is not responsible for their operation, maintenance or development) or
– ownership unbundling (where network companies are wholly separate from 
the supply and generation companies).”11
Th e Commission claims that “[e]conomic evidence shows that ownership 
unbundling is the most eff ective means to ensure choice for energy users and to 
encourage investment.”12 Further, correlating to the new unbundling measures 
mentioned before, the Commission endeavours to make regulation more eff ective 
invest in new infrastructure, see G Brunekreeft , ‘Ownership Unbundling in electricity markets 
– a social cost benefi t analysis of the German TSO’s’, EPRG Discussion Paper 08–16, 2008, and 
UNECOM Discussion Paper DP 2008–05, 2008. See also G Brunekreeft , 
‘Eigentumsentfl echtung, Deep-ISO, der Dritte Weg – wohin führt die Reise der europäischen 
Energiemärkte’, (2008) ZfE 177.
10 See Communication of the Commission, ‘Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market’, 
COM(2006) 841, Brussels, 10.1.2007, and the Sector Inquiry, n. 3. Perceived as one of the main 
obstacles is the “systemic confl ict of interest inherent in the vertical integration of supply and 
network activities” (see the Sector Inquiry, n. 3, nos 52–3), namely the preference of group or 
related companies, see further n. 53, on the one hand and the lack of willingness to invest for 
fear of increased competition on the other.
11 In order to ensure that the incentives for the owner and/or operator of the energy networks 
are not distorted by the interests of connected supply undertakings, the Commission deems it 
“necessary to decisively reinforce the current inadequate level of unbundling [of the energy 
networks].” See the Sector Inquiry, n. 3, no. 54. Th e Commission claims that owernship 
unbundling already exists for electricity in Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and for gas in 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; in 
all cases, the unbundled transmission system operators (TSO) are also the owners of the 
energy networks they operate. See, however, J-C Pielow, ‘Unbundling I: EU-Rechtsvergleich’, 
in Löwer (ed.), Neue rechtliche Herausforderungen für den Strommarkt, Bonner Gespräch zum 
Energierecht, 2008, and ‘Erfolgsstory “Ownership Unbundling”? Anmerkungen aus 
rechtsvergleichender Sicht’, (2008) RdE 345, showing that this is a rather simplistic view and 
in places even inaccurate. In this respect see also infra chapters 5 and 6 on the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands.
12 See the Sector Inquiry, n. 3, no. 55. Emphasis added. Until today, the Commission has however 
hardly tabled any evidence in this respect. Some indications can be found in P Lowe, I 
Pucinskaite, W Webster, P Lindberg, ‘Eff ective unbundling of energy transmission networks: 
lessons from the Energy Sector Inquiry’, (2007) 1 Competition Policy Newsletter 23; all the 
authors work for the European Commission. But see NERA Economic Consultants, ‘Structure 
and Performance in Europe: A Review of the Report for DG COMP’, Energy Regulation 
Insights, Issue 33, April 2007, reviewing a report of London Economics (commissioned by the 
European Commission) on the ‘Structure and Performance of Six European Wholesale 
Electricity Markets in 2003, 2004 and 2005’ (February 2007). London Economics alleges that 
the European electricity market works insuffi  ciently. Also critical A Ockenfels, 
‘Marktmachtmessung im deutschen Strommarkt in Th eorie und Praxis – Kritische 
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by claiming that “[t]here is a relation between unbundling and regulation. 
Markets in which there is less than ownership unbundling require more detailed, 
complex and prescriptive regulation. In such circumstances national Regulators 
need in particular more intrusive and burdensome powers to prevent 
discrimination. However, disincentives to adequately invest in networks without 
ownership unbundling cannot in any event be fully addressed by Regulators.”13
A. MOTIVATION OF RESEARCH
Th e unbundling measures mentioned above and in particular the full structural 
separation or unbundling of the energy transportation networks from electricity 
generation and energy supply shall be the topic of this work. Th e research off ered 
here is motivated by recent draft  legislation as well as by Commissioner Kroes’ 
threat to break up so-called vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, 
which contain both energy transportation infrastructure and energy supply 
businesses. All of this will be judged in the light of economic theory and empirical 
evidence, the latter of which is only just beginning to emerge.
I. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND CONTINUING 
TOPICALITY
On 19 September 2007, the Commission tabled two proposals for Electricity and 
Gas Directives prescribing further unbundling measures for the electricity and 
gas supply sectors of the EC14 Member States, which evolved from the above 
mentioned announcements; they are part of a draft  package of fi ve pieces of third 
generation energy supply sector legislation for the promotion of further 
liberalization of the European energy markets, which envisages the restructuring 
of the energy supply industry as well as the tightening of regulatory oversight 
Anmerkungen zur London Economics-Studie’, (2007) 9 et 12. See further Brunekreeft , EPRG, 
n. 9, pp. 8–9.
13 See n. 12. In this respect, the Commission has also not tabled any evidence. Th e doubtfulness 
of this argument is elaborated upon infra, Part 1 Chapter 2.
14 Th e draft  legislation at issue here is based on the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated version), OJ 2006 C 321 E/37, 29.12.2006. Th e measures envisaged are to be 
enforced throughout the European Union. In the context of analyzing fundamental rights 
issues, reference is made to the Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), OJ 2006 C 
321 E/5, 29.12.2006. Apart from referring to specifi c EC legislation, or to provisions of the EC 
or EU Treaties, EC and EU are used interchangeably. Any Protocols referred to in this work 
are to be found in OJ 2006 C 321 E/187, 29.12.2006.
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under the lead of the European Commission.15 Th ese proposals are supposed to 
adjust current legislation, in particular the internal electricity and gas market 
Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC (thereaft er “2003 Energy Directives”, 
“2003 Electricity Directive” or “2003 Gas Directive”), which explicitly exclude an 
obligation of ownership unbundling.16
Under the groundbreaking heading “Energising Europe: A real market with 
secure supply”17, complete ownership unbundling of the electricity and gas 
networks is favoured so that “no supply or production company active anywhere 
in the EU can own or operate a transmission system in any Member State of the 
EU” (and vice versa).18 Consequently, ownership of transmission assets would 
have to be transferred to completely independent third parties, which would also 
exclusively operate these networks. In other words, this is about the separation of 
all network functions from the other activities of the energy supply undertakings 
(ESU); any infl uence whatsoever of the previously vertically integrated ESUs on 
the operation of the networks would be prohibited; supply and generation 
companies would no longer be allowed to exercise any direct or indirect control 
over the independent network operators (and vice versa).19 Consequently, 
15 See Commission of the European Communities, Proposals for a Directive amending Directive 
2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2007) 528 
fi nal, 2007/0195 (COD), for a Directive amending Directive 2003/55/EC concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas, COM(2007) 529 fi nal, 2007/0196 (COD), for a 
Regulation establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, COM(2007) 
530 fi nal, 2007/0197 (COD), for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, COM(2007) 531 
fi nal, 2007/0198 (COD), and for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, COM(2007) 532 fi nal, 
2007/0199 (COD), Brussels, 19 September 2007; all proposals are introduced by the same 
Explanatory Memorandum. See further Commission of the European Communities, Impact 
Assessment accompanying the legislative package on the internal market for electricity and 
gas, COM(2007) 528 fi nal, COM(2007) 529 fi nal, COM(2007) 530 fi nal, COM(2007) 531 fi nal, 
COM(2007) 532 fi nal, Commission Staff  Working Paper (SEC(2007) 1179), Brussels, 
19 September 2007, in the following also referred to as “RIA”.
16 See Article 15(1) 2nd sentence Directive 2003/54/EC of 26 June 2003 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, OJ 2003 L 176/37, 
15.7.2003 (“2003 Electricity Directive”), and Article 13(2) 1st sentence Directive 2003/55/EC of 
26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC, OJ 2003 L 176/57, 15.7.2003 (“2003 Gas Directive”).
17 See IP/07/1361 (19.9.2007); emphasis added.
18 Explanatory Memorandum, n. 15, p. 7. Emphasis added. Th is is to replace the legal, operational 
and accounts unbundling already in place, see Article 10, 12, 15 et seq., 18 et seq. Electricity 
Directive 2003, Article 9 et seq., 13 et seq., 15, 16 et seq. Gas Directive 2003.
19 Th e same person(s) would not be allowed to exercise, solely or jointly, any control over any 
supply undertaking and hold (controlling or blocking minority) interests in or exercise 
(controlling or blocking minority) rights over any transmission system operator or any 
transmission system and vice versa, i.e. control over a transmission system operator 
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ownership unbundling à la Commission of the energy transportation function 
would look as illustrated in Figure 1.20





Generation Network undertaking (owning networks)
Supply
(retail)
> blocking minority 
of Holding
(Forced) transfer
                    of shares or assetsHolding
< blocking
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As an alternative solution to the above, the Commission has proposed the 
Independent System Operator model, according to which “vertically integrated 
companies […] retain the ownership of their network assets, but [which] requires 
that the transmission network itself is managed by an independent system 
operator – an undertaking or entity entirely separate from the vertically 
integrated company – that performs all the functions of a network operator.”21 
precludes the possibility of holding (controlling or blocking minority) interests in or 
exercising (controlling or blocking minority) rights over an energy supply undertaking. 
Th us, any infl uence over the composition, voting or decisionmaking of the bodies of both 
transmission system operators and supply undertakings would be prohibited. Th e proposed 
Energy Directives refer to ‘control’ as used in Article 3(2) Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 
20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation), OJ 2004 L 24/1, 29.1.2004. See also, for an interpretation of ‘control’, Bechtold/
Bosch/Brinker/Hirsbrunner, EG-Kartellrecht, Kommentar, 2005, Article 3 FKVO, nos 12 et 
seq., and the recent ‘Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings’, OJ 
2008 C 95/1. Article 8(1) of the proposed Electricity Directive and Article 7(1) of the 
proposed Gas Directive, n. 15, prohibit any holding of an interest in one activity when the 
other is controlled.
20 Th e Commission also considers the unbundling requirements of its proposals suffi  ciently 
observed if a Transmission System Operator (TSO), which is vertically integrated in an ESU 
in public ownership, is transferred to another publicly owned legal person. See Explanatory 
Memorandum, n. 15, p. 6. See in greater detail infra, Part 2 Chapter 7 on the European Union.
21 Explanatory Memorandum, n. 15, p. 5. Emphasis added.
Introduction. Setting the Scene
Intersentia 7
Here as well, however, energy supply and production companies would not be 
allowed to own shareholdings which enable them to exercise control over the 
Independent System Operator (ISO).22 Th e diff erent types of ISO are illustrated 
in Figure 2.
Even the alternative solution of introducing ISOs would require that vertically 
integrated transmission network owners in the Member State where the ISO 
model has been introduced are not only not allowed to operate transmission 
networks anywhere else in the EU, but as they pursue production or supply 
activities, they would equally not be allowed to own and pursue such activities in 
Member States where ownership unbundling has been enforced instead of ISOs.23 
Similarly to the favoured option of ownership unbundling, this means that 
existing network activities would have to be sold or vice versa.24
22 Th e proposals prohibit persons controlling energy supply activities (incl. network property), 
to be at the same time invested in a transmission system operator, see Article 10(2)(a) of the 
proposed Electricity Directive and Article 9(2)(a) of the proposed Gas Directive, n. 15. On the 
other hand, it seems that minority shareholdings in both activities are admissible as long as 
they are not controlling and not capable of blocking decisions, see p. 6 of the proposals’ 
Explanatory Memorandum, n. 15. Th e network operators would be the primary interface to 
network users. Th ey would be solely responsible for the network operation and electricity 
generation dispatch in the electricity networks, and for developing the network they operate, 
i.e. for planning (including any authoritsation procedures), construction and commissioning 
of infrastructure (i.e. either from the network owner or presumably by way of tender from 
third parties). Th e latter would include maintenance and extension of the energy networks 
they operate and new network investment. see Article 10(5) of the proposed Electricity 
Directive and Article 9(5) of the proposed Gas Directive, n. 15. ISOs with such far reaching 
powers are also commonly called “deep” ISOs, see in this respect also J-C Pielow, G 
Brunekreeft , E Ehlers, ‘Legal and Economic Aspects of Ownership Unbundling in the EU’, 
(2009) JWELB, published on 11 May 2009, also with further references.
23 Although Recitals 10 and 11 of the proposed Energy Directivea, n. 15, refer to system operators 
only, Articles. 8(1), 8(2), 10(2)(a) and 10a of the proposed Electricity Directive in conjunction 
with p. 7 (1st para.) of its Explanatory Memorandum, for instance, might be read in this way; at 
least the wording is ambiguous in this respect. Th is conclusion seems also to be supported by 
the proposed Energy Directives’ referral to the EU wide applied term of control, see n. 19.
24 Th is would, for example, be the case for companies such as E.ON of Germany for its activities 
in the UK.
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Figure 2. Th e diff erent types of independent system operation classifi ed according to 
the extent of powers operators possess
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Finally, the proposals explicitly provide for a so-called share split25, which under 
certain circumstances can lead to full ownership unbundling by way of forced 
sale, and which the Commission has adopted with the aim of accommodating 
several Member States and in particular Germany.26 Th is option stipulates that 
the current shareholders will receive for their share in the vertical integrated 
energy undertaking as it stands now (i.e. including the networks) two separate 
shares in a newly incorporated and completely independent network company, 
which also owns the networks, and in the remaining supply and/or production 
company. Th e share split as envisaged by the Commission would look as 
illustrated in Figure 3. Th e proposals prescribe in this context that if aft er the 
share split, one of the then two shareholdings were a controlling stake27, this or 
the other shareholding would have to be sold within a certain period.28
25 See Explanatory Memorandum, n. 15, p. 5, and Recital no. 11 of the proposed Directives. See 
also S Th omas, ‘A critique of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment on the legislative 
package for electricity and gas’, PSIRU, University of Greenwich, London, November 2007, 
criticizing the share split as an ill-thought through option.
26 See W Möschel, ‘Widerstand gegen EU-Vorschläge’, F.A.Z., 10.01.07, and ‘Die Entfl echtung ist 
kein Allheilmittel’, F.A.Z., 19.09.07.
27 As regards details on control, see n. 19.
28 Article 8(4) of the proposed Electricity Directive.
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At the end of January 2008, a third option was tabled by a group of eight Member 
States led by France and Germany called the “Th ird Way” or “Eff ective and 
Effi  cient Unbundling”29, which compared to the Commission’s proposals is 
merely a stricter form of legal unbundling. It proposes the holding of the diff erent 
energy supply activities, in particular energy transportation, in separate legal 
entities. Th e main feature of this option is the transfer of the vertically integrated 
network company into the legal form of a public limited company or similar, 
which owns the energy transmission networks, and which together with 
supplementary requirements is supposed to strengthen the independence of 
network operations from the remainder of the vertically integrated energy supply 
group of undertakings.30
On 10 October 2008, the Council of Energy Ministers agreed a compromise 
allowing for all three options to be off ered to the Member States.31 Consequently, 
since the “Th ird Way” (in the meantime renamed into Independent Transmission 
29 See Euractiv, ‘Eight EU states oppose unbundling, table ‘third way’’, 1 February 2008, which 
links to the original ‘third way’ proposal.
30 F Säcker, ‘Das “institutionelle Design” des Independent System Operator’, presentation at FGE 
Tagung 2007, Aachen, 20 September 2007, and ‘Th e ‘deep’ independent system operator – A 
German perspective on implementing an eff ective and effi  cient unbundling of TSOs’, (2008) 3 
EREM 19.
31 See SPIEGEL, ‘EU-Energieminister ordnen Gas- und Strommärkte neu’, 10 October 2008. See 
also Euractiv, ‘Paris and Berlin win EU energy liberalisation deal’, 9 June 2008, ‘Parliament 
insists on splitting energy giants’, 19 June 2008, and ‘Parliament backs ‘third way’ for gas 
market opening’, 10 July 2008. On 23 March 2009, the European Parliament and the Czech 
EU Presidency reached an agreement on the third energy package, which apart from some 
changes in detail left  all three unbundling options off ered to the Member States on 10 October 
2008 intact, see Euractiv, ‘EU strikes deal on energy market liberalisation’, 25 March 2009. 
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Operator (ITO)) simply tightens the legal unbundling requirements already in 
place, not much will change for the time being as it leaves it to the discretion of 
the Member States, which option to implement.32 However, the compromise also 
contains a revision clause, according to which the success of this third generation 
package of energy legislation will be reviewed two years aft er its implementation.33 
Th is is what keeps this research highly topical in that the issue of ownership 
unbundling is likely to feature on the political agenda again soon; then, however, 
it would seem unlikely that a compromise solution such as the “Th ird Way” will 
be accepted again.
Th is compromise was approved by the European Parliament with some amendments in detail 
on 22 April 2009, see further nn. 33 and 95 infra and accompanying text.
32 Th e “Th ird Way” will not be discussed any further here; it will, however, play some role in Part 
2 Chapter 4 on Germany. For an evaluation, see E Ehlers, ‘EEU: Is the “Th ird Way” the Way 
Forward?’, presentation at EURELECTRIC Discussion Workshop “Th e 3rd Energy Package: 
Alternative models for System Operation, Regional Integration and Unbundling”, Brussels, 
31 March 2008, and Brunekreeft , (2008) ZfE 177, n. 9. Also not discussed here is the “Scotland” 
clause of the draft  Electricity and Gas Directives, n. 33 infra, which is not a fourth unbundling 
option but just the confi rmation that the electricity sector unbundling in Scotland (rightly) 
fulfi ls the minimum requirements of the draft  Directives. On Scotland, see in greater detail 
Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great Britain.
33 See Articles 47(3)-(5), 49(1) draft  Electricity Directive, Articles 51(3)-(5), 53(1) draft  Gas 
Directive; according to these draft s, the Member States have 18 months aft er their entry into 
force to implement them plus an additional two years until the Commission reviews the 
eff ectiveness of the “Th ird Way” or “Eff ective and Effi  cient Unbundling”, or as it is now called, 
the “Independent Transmission Operator” (ITO). Th e complete draft s as approved by the 
European Parliament on 22 April 2009 (and fi nally adopted unamended by the Council of the 
European Union on 25 June 2009, see Council of the European Union, ‘Council adopts 
internal energy market package’, Press Release 11271/09 (Presse 191), Luxembourg, 25 June 
2009) are available as follows: European Parliament legislative resolutions of 22 April 2009 on 
the Council common position for adopting (1) a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC (14539/2/2008 – C6-0024/2009 – 2007/0195(COD)), P6_
TA-PROV(2009)0241 (ITRE no. A6-0216/2009), (2) a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and 
repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (14540/2/2008 – C6-0021/2009 – 2007/0196(COD)), P6_
TA-PROV(2009)0244 (ITRE no. A6-0238/2009), (3) a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 (14546/2/2008 – C6-0022/2009 – 
2007/0198(COD)), P6_TA-PROV(2009)0243 (ITRE no. A6-0213/2009), (4) a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks and repealing regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 (14548/2/2008 – 
C6-0023/2009 – 2007/0199(COD)), P6_TA-PROV(2009)0245 (ITRE no. A6-0237/2009), and 
(5) a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (14541/1/2008 – C6-0020/2009 – 2007/0197(COD)), P6_
TA-PROV(2009)0242 (ITRE no. A6-0235/2009).
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II. THREAT TO BREAK UP INDIVIDUAL VERTICALLY 
INTEGRATED ENERGY SUPPLY UNDERTAKINGS
Another, complementary, motivation of looking into further unbundling of the 
energy supply industry in the EU arises from Ms Kroes’ comments cited above. 
Th ese comments raise the question whether and to what extent there is any scope 
and need for ordering the structural remedy of “full structural unbundling”, 
divestiture or, in more legal terms, legal ownership unbundling of energy 
transportation networks (gas pipelines and electricity grids) from vertically 
integrated energy undertakings as corrective competition law enforcement ex 
post, i.e. when such dominant undertakings abuse their position and, thus, 
Article 82 EC applies.
Both, the legal uncertainty produced by lengthy negotiation of further 
unbundling legislation and by the threat of the European Commission acting as 
executive competition law enforcer, has already led to a situation where large 
players such as the German E.ON and RWE have “voluntarily” committed to sell 
some of their energy transportation networks in Germany, electricity 
transmission and gas transportation, respectively34, which follows the patterns of 
the experience made by British Gas in the mid 1990’s, when it took the voluntary 
commercial decision to break up its vertical integration in the light of ever 
tightening regulation.
III. GROWING EVIDENCE IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH OF 
DOUBTFUL SOCIAL BENEFIT
Apart from extensive criticism, especially from German legal scholarship, of 
the Commission’s legislative proposals35, attempts to further unbundle the 
industry on EU and Member States level36 albeit sensible according to economic 
34 Th is happened in the fi rst half of 2008 in the context of the investigation by the Commission 
into anti-competitive practices of these companies. For more detail, see Part 1 Chapter 2, n. 
252.
35 More recently, J-C Pielow, E Ehlers, ‘Ownership unbundling and constitutional confl ict; a 
typical German debate?’, (2008) 3 EREM 55; T Mayen, ‘Eigentumsrechtliche Entfl echtung der 
Energieversorgungsnetze’, (2008) RdE 33; S Storr, ‘Die Vorschläge der EU-Kommission zur 
Verschärfung der Unbundling-Vorschrift en im Energiesektor’, (2007) EuZW 232; U 
Büdenbender, P Rosin, ‘Pro und Contra Ownership Unbundling in der Energiewirtschaft ’, 
(2007) and 20. Some support for ownership unbundling can be found in S Haslinger, 
‘Grundrechtsverletzung durch ownership unbundling’, (2007) WuW 343.
36 For instance in the Netherlands. In this regard the elaborations in Part 2 Chapter 6.
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theory37 also take place amidst growing empirical economic evidence that such 
endeavours are not per se economically benefi cial. Economists have formulated 
considerable reservations against ownership unbundling38; they point out in 
particular that the expectations for more competition and more interconnector 
capacity as a consequence of ownership unbundling may be too high. Moreover, 
they also stress that the benefi ts will come at a cost; on balance, it is unclear 
whether it actually pays off .39
Th us, with empirical economic evidence gaining momentum and the economics 
of the energy supply sector being claimed as the basis for further unbundling, 
this discipline is of pre-eminent interest to this work.
B. STRUCTURE OF NETWORK-BOUND ENERGY 
SUPPLY
Th e term “vertical integration” has already been used. In the context of energy 
supply, this relates to the various activities within the so-called energy supply 
37 See, for example, M Pollitt, ‘Ownership Unbundling of Energy Networks’, Forum: Vertical 
Unbundling in the EU Electricity Sector, (2007) Intereconomics 292, and ‘Th e arguments for 
and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks’, CWPE 0737 and EPRG 
0714, August 2007, both with further references. Ambiguously in this respect, M Mulder, V 
Shestalova, M Lijesen, ‘Vertical separation of the energy distribution industry – An assessment 
of several options for unbundling’, CPB Document No. 84, 2005.
38 See, for instance, J Haucap, ‘Th e Costs and Benefi ts of Ownership Unbundling’, Forum: 
Vertical Unbundling in the EU Electricity Sector, (2007) Intereconomics 301. See also G 
Brunekreeft , E Ehlers, ‘Does Ownership Unbundling of the Distribution Networks Distort 
the Development of Distributed Generation?’, TILEC Report, December 2005, and 
Brunekreeft /Ehlers, n. 8; B Baarsma, M de Nooij, ‘An ex ante welfare analysis of the 
unbundling of the distribution and supply companies in the Dutch electricity sector’, 
Discussion Paper no. 52, SEO, April 2007 (also available as UNECOM Discussion Paper DP 
2008–02). See also G Brunekreeft , E van Damme, ‘De Splitsing van de Energiebedrijven’, 
TILEC Report, May 2005. For further guidance on the interference of ownership unbundling 
with the current technical structure of the sector, see M Finger, R Künneke, ‘Th e need for 
coherence between institutions and technology in liberalized infrastructures: the case of 
network unbundling in electricity and railways’, MIR-Report-2006–009, College of 
Management of Technology, Lausanne, October 2006. Very critical as regards the situation in 
the English gas market and rebutting the Commission’s idealistic view of the English 
ownership unbundled energy market model, SERIS, ‘Th e advantages of full ownership 
unbundling in gas transportation and supply: how the European Commission got it wrong 
about the UK’, Sheffi  eld, June 2006.
39 Cf., for instance, Brunekreeft , EPRG/UNECOM, n. 9. Th e consequence of ownership 
unbundling may even lead to less coordination of investment, i.e. wrong place, too late, too 
early, too much. Th ere is also reason to believe that the network will become oversized. See in 
greater detail, Part 1 Chapter 2.
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chain. In a simplifi ed and schematic manner, energy (electricity and gas) supply 
is structured vertically as follows (see also Figure 4 below)40:
– Gas supply (chain): Th e upstream or wholesale market consists of gas 
production and/or import (by way of pipelines or liquefi ed natural gas 
(LNG)).41 Th is gas is fed into physical (long distance transmission into shorter 
distance distribution) gas pipelines (also by way of LNG terminals where the 
liquefi ed gas is converted into gasifi ed gas) or storages (for supply at a later 
time).42 Th ereaft er, the gas so transported is fed out of the pipelines/storages 
on the downstream market consisting of supply/retail to customers (to include 
end-consumers).43
– Electricity supply (chain): Th e upstream or wholesale market consists of 
electricity generation (from a wide range of primary resources such as gas, 
nuclear, oil, coal, and renewable sources such as hydro and wind). Th e 
electricity is fed into physical (long distance transmission into shorter 
distance distribution) electricity grids. Th e electricity so transported is fed 
out of the (transmission or distribution) grids on to the downstream market 
consisting of supply/retail to customers (to include end-consumers).
40 From the position of a market, which is part of a supply chain (consisting of at least three 
diff erent markets), an upstream market is the direct or indirect input into such market (to 
which the upstream market such as electricity generation thus needs (connection and) access), 
whereas a downstream market is the market, for which such market is the direct or indirect 
input, see Willems/Ehlers, n. 2.
41 Although this area of gas supply is not the subject of this work, long-term supply contracts in 
this area are considered harmful to competition on the one hand, but also conducive to supply 
security on the other. See Part 1 Chapter 2, n. 223. According to the European Commission, 
‘Sector Inquiry under Art 17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas and electricity markets’, Preliminary 
Report, Brussels, 16 February 2006, p. 3, the lack of liquidity as result of long-term contracts 
between gas producers and incumbent importers makes it diffi  cult for competitiors to access 
gas upstream.
42 Gas can also be stored by way of so-called line-pack, i.e. within (unused) pipelines, which is 
normally short-term.
43 Long-term supply contracts in this area do play a role in this work when it comes to the 
evaluation of anticompetitive behaviour by vertically integrated ESUs; they do, however, not 
feature prominently in this work. For a solution to this problem, see, for instance, the decision 
of the German competition authority Bundeskartellamt (BKartA), 13 January 2006, B 8 – 
113/03 – 1, ‘E.ON Ruhrgas i. S. “Langfristige Gaslieferverträge”’. See in greater detail n. 752 
and accompanying text. See also the brief explanations by M van der Woude, ‘Recent 
Developments in EU Competition Law: Busy Times’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), 
European Energy Law Reports IV, 2007, chapter 1, p. 11.
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An important feature of electricity is its non-storability44 and the fact that, 
contrary to gas, it cannot be steered along a certain path or grid line of the 
44 Unless, for instance used to fi ll water reservoirs, which when releasing water produce 
electricity. Th is has, for instance, been one of the motives for building the NorNed electricity 
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electricity grid.45 Gas, to the contrary, is a primary energy source (as opposed to 
electricity, as secondary source) and can be stored unlike electricity. Th e gas 
market depends on large-scale investments in infrastructure (as does the 
electricity market) and long-term (upstream) gas supply contracts from a handful 
of suppliers mostly outside the European Union, such as Russia and Norway 
(which belongs to the European Economic Area).
Interconnectors are highly relevant in national markets, which are divided into 
more than one energy transmission network area, as is the case in Germany and, 
more importantly, are necessary to achieve an internal market in energy supply 
within the EU; they function as joints between diff erent gas and electricity 
systems: they connect import or upstream pipelines/grids to national transmission 
pipeline/grid networks46, transmission pipeline/grid networks of diff erent EU 
Member States, and, as for instance in Germany, diff erent transmission pipeline/
grid networks within the same Member State, and transmission pipelines/grids 
to distribution pipelines/grids within one Member State.47
C. ENERGY NETWORK UNBUNDLING: STAGES 
AND DEFINITIONS
In the current discussion about EU energy market liberalization, the term 
unbundling is oft en used to describe the way forward in the creation of an 
transmission cable interconnecting the Netherlands and Norway, which imports Norwegian 
electricity at daytime only to export night excess electricity from the Netherlands to Norway, 
which uses this electricity to fi ll its water reservoirs. On the NorNed cable, C van der Lippe, P 
Meijer, ‘A Regulator’s View on the NorNed Cable – A Missing Link?’, in M Roggenkamp, U 
Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Reports IV, 2007, chapter 14.
45 Electricity network operators have to constantly keep the frequency of electricity in the 
electricity network system in balance, i.e. electricity supply (by way of generation) and 
demand, which includes network losses arising from transmission of electricity over longer 
distances. Similarly, gas network operators also have to balance the system in order to 
maintain adequate pressure in the pipelines to move the gas.Electricity and gas network 
operators thus must to some (limited) extent participate in electricity and gas trading, 
respectively.
46 Th e physical infrastructure of the electricity grids and gas pipelines, which as has just been 
said, transport electricity or gas supplied from generation plants or production sites to 
customers, are connected within networks.
47 See K Talus, T Wälde, ‘Electricity Interconnectors: A Serious Challenge for EC Competition 
Law’, (2006) Competition and Regulation in Netowrk Industries (CRNI) 355, on cross-border 
interconnection being a separate product market, which can either serve as a substitute or 
alternative for electricity generation or as interconnection of two national electricity 
transmission grids. See also D Balmert, G Brunekreeft  and J Gabriel, ‘Independent System 
Operators – die Investitionsfrage’, UNECOM Discussion Paper DP 2008–04, 2008.
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internal market and more competition in the European energy supply sector. 
Many see unbundling in a wider context, which includes the competition law 
based doctrine of essential facilities or indispensible infrastructures, which 
mandates access to essential infrastructures in individual cases.48 Oft en, the 
regulation of access to the energy networks, which provides for so-called Th ird 
Party Access (TPA), is also discussed as an inseparable supplement to 
unbundling.
It is important to note though that network access regulation and unbundling 
are two separate regulatory instruments. Th e introduction of more intrusive 
forms of unbundling as regards the structure of energy supply undertakings 
(ESUs) is usually the consequence of allegedly insuffi  cient regulation of network 
access.49 Unbundling as the subject matter of this research is understood as the 
structural reorganization of vertically integrated ESUs, in particular its network 
infrastructure, which covers electricity grids and gas pipelines, on which this 
work focuses, as well as Liquefi ed Natural Gas (LNG) facilities and gas storage. It 
is supposed to supplement network access regulation in order to achieve 
transparency in the operation of vertically integrated ESUs, which in turn should 
enable non-discriminatory energy network access. In addition, unbundling is 
perceived as an adequate tool to prevent hidden or internal cross-subsidization in 
the vertically integrated ESU, which in turn is alleged to cause distortion of 
48 See in greater detail, Part 1 Chapter 2.
49 Which becomes particularly obvious in the energy sector. In 1996 and 1998, when the fi rst 
generation of Energy Directives (Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity (“1996 Electricity Directive”), OJ 1997 L 
27/20, 30.1.1997, and Directive 98/30/EC of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas (“1998 Gas Directive”), OJ 1998 L 204/1, 21.7.1998) established 
relatively weak network access regulation, the institutional side in terms of regulatory 
supervision was rather underdeveloped, and TPA was the result of a negotiation process. In 
the telecommunications sector, by contrast, network access and price regulation was 
introduced together with a regulatory authority equipped with more eff ective regulatory 
instruments, see P Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European 
Telecommunications, 2000, L Hancher, ‘Th e New European Energy Policy. Future challenges 
– future regulatory frameworks?’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law 
Reports IV, 2007, chapter 5. As a consequence, unbundling measures have been largely 
confi ned to accounts unbundling, which is defi ned infra. More generally, it can be said that 
the more intrusive network access regulation is, the less intrusive forms of unbundling have 
to be employed and vice versa.
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competition on related up- and downstream markets50 as well as a lever of market 
power into these markets (monopoly leveraging).51
I. MANDATORY UNBUNDLING AS INTERFERENCE WITH 
STRUCTURE OF UNDERTAKINGS
Unbundling52, or separation, means the restructuring of traditionally vertically 
integrated supply undertakings featuring network inputs in the form of 
infrastructure necessary to supply customers and end consumers with services 
like telecommunications, energy, postal or rail transport services. When 
liberalization started, the European energy (electricity and gas) supply industry 
was traditionally characterized by state monopolies or undertakings, on which 
the State had conferred a legal monopoly. Th ese undertakings were active in all 
areas of energy supply, from electricity generation and gas production to 
operating (oft en their own) system of grids and/or pipelines, and trading and 
supply. In other words, the European energy supply sector has been characterized 
by vertically integrated undertakings.53
50 Which means markets grouped around the network facility or input and being part of the 
relevant supply chain, in the case of electricity and gas upstream (wholesale) generation/
production and downstream supply, retail or operational activities, see also section B. See also 
with regard to related markets in general, i.e. up- and downstream, the Commission Decisions 
(IV/34.174) of 11 June 1992 – B&I Line plc v Sealink Harbours Ltd and Sealink Stena Ltd 
(“Holyhead”) – Interim measures, (1992) 5 Common Market Law Reports (C.M.L.R.) 255, and 
(IV/34.689) of 21 December 1993 – Sea Containers v Stena Sealink – Interim measures, OJ 
1994 L 15/8, 18.1.1994 .
51 See, however, Willems/Ehlers, n. 2, who doubt that cross-subsidization on its own without 
further accompanying anticompetitive practices or being embedded in such is something to 
worry about.
52 For further terminology and defi nitions in the context of unbundling, see OECD, 
‘Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition’, Paris, 2001, pp. 12–19. Th e separation into 
reciprocal parts, ibid., pp. 16–7, and the separation of non-competitive components into 
smaller parts, ibid., pp. 17–8, are not applicable in the context of European energy supply 
markets liberalization.
53 Meaning an undertaking or a group of undertakings (thereaft er ‘undertakings’) whose mutual 
relationships are defi ned in Article 3(2) Merger Regulation, n. 19, and where the undertaking/
group concerned is performing at least one of the functions of transmission or distribution (in 
case of gas also liquefaction of natural gas (LNG) or storage), and at least one of the functions 
of production/generation or supply of natural gas/electricity. From this it follows that three 
constellations of vertical integration are possible, e.g., a combination of generation/production, 
transmission and/or distribution (and/or LNG and/or storage) and supply, a combination of 
production/generation and/or transmission and/or distribution and a combination of 
transmission and/or distribution and supply.
 Mutual relationships as defi ned in Article 3(2) Merger Regulation means control (see already 
n. 19) conferring the possibility of exercising decisive infl uence on an undertaking. Further, 
the 2003 Energy Directives defi ne ‘related undertakings’ as affi  liated undertakings (within the 
meaning of Article 41 of the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on 
the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, OJ 1983 L 193/1, 18.7.1983), and/or 
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A core feature of unbundling is the interference with the structure of an 
undertaking, which is eff ected by a pre-defi ned separation of formerly integrated 
components. Th e intensity of such interference depends on the specifi c form of 
unbundling chosen.
Unbundling is therefore rather distinct from granting access to the energy 
networks or regulating its terms and conditions. Unbundling in the context of 
energy supply market liberalization is exclusively concerned with the 
restructuring of undertakings with the aim of hiving off  their networks, which 
are (generally perceived as) natural monopolies54, in order to create or support 
competition in those non network activities, which albeit potentially competitive 
were artifi cially held by monopolies, i.e. the upstream markets of electricity 
generation and gas production, and the downstream markets of energy trading 
associated undertakings (within the meaning of Article 33(1) Directive 83/349), and/or 
undertakings which belong to the same shareholders.
 Th e defi nitions of vertically integrated and related undertakings can be found in Article 2 nos 
20, 22 Gas Directive 2003 and Article 2 nos 21, 22 Electricity Directive 2003. Both Directives 
also allow combined transmission and distribution (and LNG and storage in the case of gas) 
operators, as well as horizontally integrated undertakings comprising of (commercial) gas 
and electricity (and other non-electricity and non-gas) activities.
54 A natural monopoly exists when it is economically or physically impractical (or undesirable) 
for more than one entity to perform a service in a given market, or in more economic terms, if 
a single supplier can serve a relevant market more cost-effi  ciently than several suppliers. 
Consequently, the cost function in the relevant area of supply is sub-additive. Sub-additive 
means that unit costs are falling with output level. Examining the cost side of networks, 
bundling economies based on economies of scale and scope stand out, which can cause a 
single network supplier to supply more cost-effi  ciently than several suppliers. See G Knieps, 
‘Wettbewerb auf den Ferntransportnetzen der deutschen Gaswirtschaft  – Eine 
netzökonomische Analyse’, (2002) ZfE 171, 172; P de Bijl, E van Damme, P Larouche, 
‘Regulating Access to Stimulate Competition in Postal Markets?’, TILEC Discussion Paper 
DP 2005–026, August 2005, p. 11. M Motta, Competition Policy, 2004, p. xviii, defi nes 
situations in which a natural monopoly persists as markets where fi xed costs are so high that 
no more than one fi rm would profi tably operate. Natural monopolies typically occur in 
industries where a proportionately large capital investment is required to produce a single 
unit of output. See also J Tirole, Th e Th eory of Industrial Organization, 1988, pp. 19–21. Firms 
controlling a natural monopoly are widely perceived as dominant undertakings in the sense 
used in Article 82 EC, which play a predominant role in the Part 1 Chapter 2 of this work. 
Knieps, ibid., however, classifi es only so-called monopolistic bottlenecks as dominant. A 
monopolistic bottleneck facility exists if, fi rst, a facility is indispensable in order to reach a 
customer, hence if there is no second or third such facility, i.e. no active substitute. Th is is the 
case if on the basis of bundling economies, there is a natural monopoly situation. Secondly, at 
the same time, the facility cannot be duplicated at a reasonable cost in order to competitively 
discipline the active supplier, i.e. there is no potential substitute available. Th is is the case if 
the cost of the facility are sunk or irreversible and, as a consequence, there is no functioning 
second hand market for this facility, Knieps, ibid., pp. 172–3. See also L Hancher, ‘Case C-7/97, 
Bronner v. Mediaprint’, (1999) CML Rev. 1289, 1300, 1304–5. By applying this to the German 
gas transmission networks, Knieps, ibid., concludes that these do not display monopolistic 
bottleneck characteristics and, thus, should not be classifi ed as dominant.
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and supply to costumers and end consumers, to which the energy networks are 
essential inputs.55
II. FORMS OF UNBUNDLING
Th ere are several forms of unbundling, which can be distinguished with respect 
to their eff ects on and intensity of interference with the structure of ESUs.
1. Unbundling of accounts
When unbundling of accounts is required, ESUs have to keep separate accounts 
internally for both their transmission and distribution activities, as they would 
be required to do if the activities in question were carried out by legally separate 
undertakings.56 Th is means in turn that the ESU can keep its current business 
model and legal form, only the internal structure of its accounting changes. For 
each of its transmission and distribution activities respectively, a separate and 
full balance sheet and a profi t and loss statement have to go into the annual 
accounts of the ESU. Revenue from ownership of the energy networks must be 
specifi ed in these accounts. Additionally, gas supply undertakings have to specify 
in their internal accounting the rules for the allocation of assets and liabilities, 
expenditure and income as well as for depreciation, without prejudice to national 
accounting rules, which they have to follow in drawing up separate accounts.57
Th e unbundling of accounts can be compared with the segmentation oft en 
displayed in group annual accounts. Th e basic idea behind this form of 
unbundling, which demands the breakdown of individual supply activities, is to 
create transparency of the internal processes of ESUs including the uncovering 
of cross-subsidization.
2. Organizational or functional unbundling
Th is kind of unbundling is more intrusive than accounts unbundling and 
prescribes the restructuring of individual but integrated activities of ESUs into 
separate activities. Th is means that the activities, which are accounted for 
55 Th e integration of up- and downstream electricity and gas supply, or in other words between 
energy wholesale and retail businesses, exclusive of energy networks can also be called 
“vertical integration”. And although this sort of vertial integration plays some role when 
looking into the consequences of possible competition law enforced divestiture of energy 
networks (Part 1 Chapter 2), it is, similarly to long-term contracts (LTC), see n. 43, not subject 
of this work.
56 Article 19(3) Electricity Directive 2003, Article 17(3) Gas Directive 2003.
57 Article 17(5) Gas Directive 2003.
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separately, have to be organized wholly or in part in separate departments. Such 
departments remain within the ESU and do not have to be spun off  as subsidiaries. 
Consequently, they are still controlled and directed by the management of the 
ESU.
Usually, these departments must obey confi dentiality, i.e. they are not allowed to 
exchange information and have to pursue their tasks without communicating 
with each other. Th is sort of unbundling is called informational unbundling or 
“Chinese walls”.
Th e purpose of informational unbundling is to prevent one department from 
using commercially advantageous information of another department of the 
same ESU to the detriment of third parties, thus being able to discriminate 
against them. Organizational or functional unbundling does not only serve as a 
control mechanism against discriminatory behaviour like accounts unbundling, 
which can only uncover internal cross-subsidization ex post, but it is also 
supposed to actively stop discriminatory conduct.
Th us, organizational unbundling is oft en introduced together with accounts 
unbundling. By doing this, both fi nancial discriminations such as internal cross-
subsidizations and other forms of discriminatory conduct are in theory 
prevented.
3. Legal or corporate unbundling
Legal or, as the OECD calls it58, corporate unbundling goes even further. Here, 
the internal separation of departments does not suffi  ce; they have to be 
incorporated as legally independent subsidiaries. Such legal separation is 
supposed to prevent the cooperation between the departments so separated and, 
thus, internal cross-subsidization. As a result, the activities so separated have to 
report their annual accounts independently, not just internally as in the case of 
accounts unbundling. Th e advantage of legal unbundling is legal independence, 
which allows the choice of diff erent valuation methods within the respective 
balance sheets, and clear segmentation of the diff erent activities of vertically 
integrated ESUs.
On the other hand, even with legally unbundled activities, it remains possible to 
exert commercial infl uence on individual subsidiaries and to urge them to 
coordinated conduct; the degree of such potential infl uence varies depending on 
the interrelationship of the subsidiaries amongst each other and, more 
importantly, with their holding company.
58 See n. 52.
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Legal unbundling of network operation (together with management unbundling, 
see below) is the degree of unbundling prescribed by the second generation of 
Energy Directives (of 2003).59
Legal unbundling of the network activities of ESUs can basically be pursued in 
two diff erent ways: either the legal ownership of the networks is transferred to 
the network operation subsidiaries (oft en referred to as “fat” legal unbundling), 
or it remains elsewhere in the group (oft en referred to as “slim” or “lean” legal 
unbundling).60
4. Management or operational unbundling
Whereas legal unbundling is merely the formal requirement of operating the 
energy networks in a subsidiary separate from the remaining vertically integrated 
energy supply undertaking, every aspect exceeding legal unbundling of the 
network operations required by the 2003 Energy Directives, i.e. the designation of 
personnel to the network operation subsidiary, the boundaries, within which the 
vertically integrated ESU can exert infl uence on the network operation subsidiary, 
the company law related supervision and direction powers, the allocation of 
responsibilities and competencies and the extent of control of the networks 
operations are exclusively a matter of operational or management unbundling. As 
legal unbundling in itself is not suffi  cient because the ESU would not be prevented 
to put the network operation and the other supply activities in the same hands in 
terms of management, personnel and decision-making rights.61
Management or operational unbundling involves the obligation of ESUs to 
employ those of the management and personnel who are predominantly 
preoccupied with activities relating to energy network operations, within that 
specifi c network operation division. Th is should enable those staff  to act 
independently from the other supply activities of the ESU, and a guarantee is also 
required that such personnel and the personnel of the reminder of the ESU are 
treated equally.62
59 Article 10(1) (transmission) and 15(1) (distribution) Electricity Directive 2003, Article 9(1) 
(transmission) and 13(1) (distribution) Gas Directive 2003.
60 For the use of this terminology, see I Brinkman, ‘Th e Unbundling of Gas and Electricity 
Distribution Grids in the Netherlands – the Pros and Cons of a Controversial Policy Intention’, 
in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Report II, 2005, chapter 10, p. 149, 
and Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37, pp. 79 et seq.
61 J Eder, ‘Entfl echtung §§ 7 und 8 EnWG’, in Danner/Th eobald (eds), Energierecht – Kommentar 
– Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaft sgesetz), 2006, B1 § 7 
EnWG I nos 3 and 4. Operational (as opposed to organizational) unbundling without legal 
unbundling would confl ict with the overall responsibility of the general management of the 
vertically integrated undertaking.
62 Cf. Article 10(2b) (transmission) and 15(2b) (distribution) Electricity Directive 2003, 
Article 9(2b) (transmission) and 13(2b) (distribution) Gas Directive 2003. Operational 
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Further features of operational unbundling are refl ected in the 2003 Energy 
Directives, which stipulate that persons responsible for the management of the 
networks may not participate in such organizational parts of the integrated 
energy supply undertaking as are directly or indirectly responsible for the day-
to-day operation of the other supply activities of the ESU. Th e energy network 
operator shall have eff ective decision-making rights, independent from the 
integrated ESU, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop 
the network. Such rights should not prevent the existence of appropriate 
coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management 
supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets in a 
subsidiary are protected.63 Th is shall in particular enable the parent company to 
approve the annual fi nancial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the network 
operator and to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It 
shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day 
operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction 
or upgrading of networks, that do not exceed the terms of the approved fi nancial 
plan, or any equivalent instrument (fi nancial independence).64
Th e requirements of legal and operational unbundling complement one another 
but do not overlap. Both forms of unbundling serve the purpose of having the 
network operations within a vertically integrated ESU administered by a largely 
independent network division.
5. Forms of ownership unbundling
a. Introduction
In the current discussion, i.e. on the basis of the 2003 Energy Directives65, which 
require the legal unbundling of energy network operations66, ownership 
unbundling lacks clear defi nition. Th e term ownership unbundling is used in 
diff erent contexts and oft en refl ects particular demands placed upon the 
unbundling generally includes all measures serving the internal separation of integrated 
activities, i.e. those measures, which serve the strict separation and independent accountability 
of the activities concerned. Personnel of the activity concerned only report to the management 
of the respective internal activity.
63 Obviously a scenario of combined legal and operational unbundling.
64 Articles 10(2) (transmission) and 15(2) (distribution) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 9(2) 
(transmission) and 13(2) (distribution) Gas Directive 2003.
65 Th at is, directly unchallengeable. Th e question of a possible implicit assessment of voidness of 
the 2003 Energy Directives, i.e. within court proceedings where the subject matter requires, 
inter alia, this assessment will not be discussed.
66 Th e following discussion is based on the assumption that energy network operations are 
already or will soon be transferred to a separate legal entity within the vertically integrated 
energy undertaking. Th e fact that the 2003 Energy Directives contain de minimis exceptions 
to the legal unbundling requirement will be disregarded.
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operation of energy networks. Th e variety of meanings attached to the term 
ownership unbundling when used in such contexts oft en imply diff erent levels of 
interference with the ownership of energy networks. From the viewpoint of a 
vertically integrated ESU, various levels of interference with its ownership of 
networks can be distinguished. Th e following forms of ownership unbundling 
are arranged in the order of decreasing intensity of interference67:
b. Separation of network undertaking68 from remaining energy supply group
aa. Nationalization of network undertakings
Th e most rigid form of ownership unbundling is the nationalization of network 
undertakings or the taking-over of such undertakings by the State in order to 
transfer them to third parties unrelated to the energy supply group (thereaft er 
“group”).69 Unless selling their networks to the State voluntarily, the State can 
only deprive network owners or their shareholders of their networks by way of 
formal expropriation70, i.e. by law or based on law, in order to nationalize (or 
redistribute) their networks. Th is form of ownership unbundling is characterized 
by the total loss of ownership. Th e network owner, who faces such deprivation71, 
would not even be able to choose the purchaser of the network. Th is and the 
following form of deprivation are the further unbundling measures the European 
Commission aims at in their legislative proposals.
bb. Disintegration of network undertakings by forced sale
Th e forced sale or mandated divestiture to third (private) parties to disintegrate 
the energy networks from the other energy supply activities of production/
generation and supply would be an alternative route to the nationalization of the 
energy networks.
Th is strict form of ownership unbundling would not only involve the separation 
of the legal ownership of the networks from the legal ownership of production/
generation and supply but also its transfer to an undertaking, which is wholly 
independent from the group. Th is means that the ownership in both the network 
67 As to the degree of interference in ownership rights, see section C. III. infra.
68 Comprising of network ownership and network operation. Depriving vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings of the legal ownership of their energy networks but allowing 
them to operate these networks would not alleviate the competition concerns and is thus not 
discussed here.
69 Group in this context means the vertically integrated ESU itself and its owners/shareholders 
including any ultimate owners/shareholders.
70 Th e term “expropriation” is explained in Part 2.
71 Th e term “deprivation” is explained in Part 2.
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undertaking and the group is not allowed to be held by the same shareholders. 
Th e aim of this form of ownership unbundling is the disintegration of the 
ownership of the energy networks and their operation on the one hand from that 
of energy production/generation and supply on the other.
Th e core intention of this measure to prohibit the direct or indirect holding of 
shares in, or control in the form of a decisive infl uence on, the undertaking active 
in network operation and the group active in production/generation and supply. 
Such a prohibition also covers immediate and intermediate shareholdings up to 
the ultimate shareholder level. A combination of network operation, production/
generation and supply under the same holding would therefore be prohibited. 
Additionally, the network operation would also have to own the network it is 
operating.
As regards the possible admission of cross-shareholdings72, diff erent levels of 
restriction would be possible: the strictest form would be the absolute prohibition 
of any cross-shareholdings. Th is would only be possible in the context of 
nationalization. In the case of a listed public limited company, for example, (a 
certain percentage of) shares (is) are usually free fl oat, thus any restrictions 
preventing one of the shareholders from holding cross-shareholdings would be 
rather diffi  cult to achieve, or at least to control.73
Less rigid and thus easier to control would be a prohibition on majority or 
controlling or blocking minority cross-shareholdings only. Th e aim would be to 
allow only majority shareholdings in production/generation and supply or 
network operation and minority shareholdings in the network undertaking or 
vice versa (or even stricter, following the Commission proposals, by not allowing 
more than minority shareholdings in both activities)74, such that the minority 
shareholding is not a blocking minority. It would also have to be ensured that de 
facto infl uence cannot occur, for instance in shareholders’ or annual meetings.75
72 Cross-shareholding in the given context means the mutual shareholding between undertakings 
pursuing activities within the vertical energy supply chain (group prohibition).
73 See in this respect the NationalGrid and its licence prohibitions, Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great 
Britain.
74 Th e majority/minority combination would, according to the Commission’s share split 
proposal mentioned in section A I supra, result in the compulsion of the holder of a majority 
and a minority stake to sell one of his stakes within a certain period of time.
75 A defi nition of de facto infl uence can be found in Article 3 (3) Merger Regulation: “Control is 
acquired by persons or undertakings which: (a) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights 
under the contracts concerned; or (b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights 
under such contracts, have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom (emphasis 
added).” Equally, “collusive” or joint control or blocking minorities of several holders of 
minority stakes (similar to club ownership), which in themselves are neither controlling nor 
blocking would also have to be prevented. See also nn. 19, 53.
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Forced sale diff ers from expropriation in that the former does not deprive the 
owner of its ownership directly by way of State action with the consequence of an 
immediate transfer of ownership to the State. Th e owner can choose the purchaser 
(unless being forced to sell to a national network operator, see below) and 
negotiate the purchase price.
However, the forced sale is only a milder alternative to expropriation on the face 
of it. Th e choice of a purchaser is actually the only right the owner retains. It 
must sell within a time frame imposed by law; there is no choice of the most 
advantageous point in time. Th us, the owner bears the full risk. Th e sale of the 
network and use of the price achieved is the only property right retained. 
Additionally, because the owner is forced to sell, potential purchasers might take 
advantage of this situation and try to buy the network for an inadequate price.
It is for these reasons that forced sales are explicitly dealt with in the same way as 
expropriations, since there is, as in the case of ownership separation by way of 
expropriation, no alternative exercise of ownership rights possible.
cc. National transmission system operator owning energy networks
Th e concept of national energy network operators is usually only concerned with 
the transmission grid and pipeline system. In the Netherlands, for example, state-
owned TenneT is the national electricity transmission system operator whereas 
state-owned Gas Unie runs the national gas transmission pipeline network. 
Slightly at variance is the Great Britain (GB – England, Wales and Scotland) 
electricity transmission system operator National Grid plc, which since 
privatization owns the transmission grids in England and Wales but not in 
Scotland. On the other hand, since 2002 a subsidiary of the same company owns 
and operates the gas transmission grid throughout Great Britain. Th ese energy 
transmission system operators are normally not involved in the operation of the 
energy distribution networks, except, again, for National Grid, which also 
operates some of the gas distribution pipelines in GB.
A special feature of this particular variation of ownership unbundling is that the 
energy networks concerned are operated by one single undertaking. Within this 
concept the degree of ownership unbundling can vary depending on whether the 
national energy network operator also is the actual legal owner of the networks 
and who the shareholders of such a network undertaking are.
Requiring the national network operator to become the legal owner of the energy 
networks means that the vertically integrated ESUs owning such networks would 
be forced to transfer them, which would correspond to the form of ownership 
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unbundling discussed before.76 Th is normally also means that the ESUs would 
lose the sole control over the networks they used to own. Th is would also be the 
case if the current network operators became shareholders of the national energy 
network operator. Although they might receive shares in the national energy 
network operator in consideration for the transfer of their networks, such 
shareholdings are likely to be minority shareholdings only, with the consequence 
of losing the sole control of the networks they previously owned and controlled 
alone.77
Another variation would be that the national energy network undertaking does 
not have to be the legal owner of the national energy transmission networks but 
is solely responsible for the independent operation of such networks. As a result, 
the right to use these networks is conferred upon such an undertaking by law or 
at least the right to control the operation of these networks (such as the power to 
give directions or to interfere with the use of the networks), or the network owner 
would be obliged to grant such rights on a contractual basis. Th us, the current 
network operators could formally remain owner of the networks but their right 
to use and control the networks would be further limited (compared to the 
current state of legal unbundling). Such a solution has been favoured for the 
electricity transmission networks in Scotland. Th e Commission takes this idea 
further by proposing, as an alternative to ownership unbundling, the 
establishment of “deep” ISOs (see already in section A(I) above), which are also 
solely responsible for deciding and organizing (new) investment into the energy 
networks they operate.78
c. Forms of ownership unbundling within an energy supply group
Th e second generation of Energy Directives (of 2003) clarifi es that the 
implementation of legal unbundling does not require the transfer of the legal 
ownership of assets of the networks from the vertically integrated ESU to the 
76 Apart from the fact that in the previous model, the ESU theoretically has, within a certain 
time limit, a choice as regards the fi nding of a purchaser of the network.
77 In Germany, the four current electricity transmission network owners are planning to 
establish one national transmission operator under club ownership, see Spiegel, 
‘Stromversorger planen gemeinsames Stromnetz’, 23 September 2008. On club ownership, see 
OECD, n. 52, pp. 13–4.
78 In the Netherlands, by contrast, large parts of the electricity and the complete gas transmission 
networks are in the hands of the State and also operated by state-owned operation companies. 
Many of the remaining electricity transmission networks (from 110 kV upwards) not owned 
by the State directly but by vertically integrated undertakings owned by municipalities as 
subdivisions of the State, are, however, also under operation of the state-owned electricity 
transmission network operator TenneT, which in turn is responsible for network extension 
and investment. See in greater detail, Part 2 Chapter 6 on the Netherlands.
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undertaking operating the networks.79 Only the network operations and the 
essential decision making rights with respect to the networks have to be 
transferred to such an undertaking, which can still be affi  liated to the remainder 
of the vertically integrated energy supply group.
Ownership unbundling in this context could mean that the still integrated 
network operation undertaking80 also has to be the legal owner or economic 
“owner”81 of the networks.82 Four scenarios are possible:
(1) Th e undertaking operating and being the legal owner of the network is 
required to be separated from the vertically integrated ESU (no cross-
shareholdings allowed) but may be owned by shareholders both 
undertakings have in common.83
(2) Th e undertaking operating the network and being the economic “owner” of 
the network is required to be separated from the vertically integrated ESU 
(no cross-shareholdings allowed) but may be owned by shareholders both 
undertakings have in common.84
79 Article 10(1) 2nd sentence Electricity Directive 2003. Th is gives an indication of what the EC 
legislator considers ownership unbundling to be.
80 Assuming that network operation is legally unbundled.
81 “Economic” unbundling is a term used in current Dutch energy legislation and referred to in 
the so-called splitsingswet (Wet van 23 november 2006 tot wijziging van de Elektriciteitswet 
1998 en van de Gaswet in verband met nadere regels omtrent een onafh ankelijk netbeheer, 
(2006) Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 614), see Part 2 Chapter 6 on the 
Netherlands. Economic ownership is defi ned in the Dutch Electriciteitswet 1998 (Electricity 
Act 1998 – “E-wet”) as amended on 14 July 2004, (2004) Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden 443, Artikel 1(1)(aa), and the Gaswet (Gas Act – “G-wet”) as amended on 14 July 
2004, (2004) Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 444, Artikel 1(1)(u), as the 
entitlement based on a legal relationship to all rights and competences with respect to a good, 
with the exception of the right to deliver (transfer the title to the good), and the responsibility 
for all obligations with respect to that good including the assumption of the full risk of a 
change in value or total loss of the good, without the good having been delivered (“[…] 
economische eigendom: het krachtens een rechtsverhouding gerechtigd zijn tot alle rechten en 
bevoegdheden ten aanzien van een goed, met uitzondering van het recht op levering, en het 
gehouden zijn om alle verplichtingen ten aanzien van dat goed voor zijn rekening te nemen en 
daarmee het volledige risico van waardeverandering of tenietgaan van het goed te dragen, 
zonder dat het goed geleverd is. […]”). Th is is to some extent comparable to equitable benefi cial 
ownership or trusts as known under common law, or to Sicherungseigentum or Treuhand 
under German law. Important to note here, however, is the complete independence of the 
economic “owner” from the legal owner.
82 Depending on the details of the organizational requirements imposed upon the vertically 
integrated ESU (organizational or functional unbundling, see supra), the network undertaking 
could be a subsidiary, sister undertaking or even the parent of the production/generation and 
energy supply undertaking(s) within one group of vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings.
83 Such (ultimate) shareholders are either natural persons, or the State or public entities or 
subdivisions of the State such as municipalities.
84 Th us, the formal legal title, which (in theory) still attaches to the remaining ESU, would only 
be of little value. Th is is envisaged by the Dutch splitsingswet (see Part 2 Chapter 6 on the 
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(3) Th e shares in the vertically integrated undertaking operating and being the 
legal owner of the network are required to be held by a neutral trustee, who 
could even be appointed by the regulatory authority85; the infl uence of the 
shareholders would thus be signifi cantly reduced or even eradicated 
safeguarding the independence of (the board(s) of) the vertically integrated 
network undertaking from the shareholders’ interference: the shareholders 
would lose any (direct) supervisory oversight over the management of the 
network operator, which operates with their assets and fi nancial means. 
Although the trustee would be accountable to them, the only direct power 
they would retain with respect to the undertaking they own is the right to 
receive dividends.
 As a longer-term solution, this variation might confl ict with company law, 
more specifi cally corporate law as usually vertically integrated energy 
undertakings are incorporated as (public or private) limited companies (if 
not state integrated public bodies), because of the permanent separation of 
participation rights from the shareholding. Consequently, this form of 
unbundling might have to entail the amendment of company law if as is 
normally the case in corporate law such a separation of powers is forbidden 
under the relevant Member State company law legislation.86 It leaves the 
formal ownership of the networks and any profi ts made in the vertically 
integrated undertaking but essential decision-making rights would transfer 
to the trustee.
 Usually, the trustee would exercise the shareholders’ rights he holds in 
shareholders’ meetings. Additionally or alternatively, he would (participate 
in) the appointment of supervisory board members (in a two-tier company 
law system such as Germany) or non-executive directors (in one-tier 
company law systems such as the UK), or be installed as supervisory board 
or non-executive director himself (he may or may not be a trustee of the 
shareholders’ rights at the same time).
 Th e “Th ird Way” of further unbundling mentioned in section A(I) above 
would come close to this scenario. Th e incompatibility of this scenario with 
corporate law, however, is an issue, which, as long as it does not go beyond 
the legitimate regulation of the right to property, should not pose too great 
a problem to the legislature because corporate law in itself is predominantly 
the regulation of property. Th is is explained in greater detail in Part 2 
Chapter 4 section V on Germany.
Netherlands). See also n. 75.
85 Th is variation is what the OECD calls operational unbundling, see OECD, n. 52, pp. 14–5, 
defi ning it as separation of ownership and control.
86 Cf. J Baur, K Pritschke, S Klauer, Ownership Unbundling, 2006, p. 34.
Introduction. Setting the Scene
Intersentia 29
(4) Th e vertically integrated undertaking currently just operating the network 
are required to be the legal owners or at least the economic “owners” of the 
networks they are operating but are allowed to remain within the vertically 
integrated ESU.
As can be observed, ownership unbundling can also implemented in the form of 
restrictions of ownership rights, which exceed the restrictions imposed by legal 
unbundling. Th is means that any exertion of infl uence, which still exists in the 
form of supervisory powers, on the legally unbundled network operator is 
reduced even further.
III. THE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING AND 
THEIR DIFFERING DEGREE OF INTERFERENCE WITH 
ENERGY NETWORKS OWNERSHIP
As the fundamental right to property is the focus of this work’s evaluation of the 
interference of the various forms of ownership unbundling with fundamental 
rights, the main components of the right to property from an economic or 
business perspective are now briefl y outlined to appreciate the intensity of their 
interference with this right.
1. Scope of right to property87
First of all, the right to property comprises the private owner’s right to use the 
property and to dispose of such assets, i.e. the right to use and the right to dispose. 
Further, the property right comprises of the right to deal with the property 
however the owner pleases and to exclude third parties from any interference. 
Th us, the right of the owner to do whatever he pleases is a right with positive 
eff ect, for instance to chose the form of ownership transfer, to give up ownership, 
to encumber property and to control its use, to possess, use or not use, to change, 
consume of destroy the property. Th e corresponding right to exclude any 
interference by third parties with the asset owned, in contrast, is a right with 
negative eff ect and mainly concerns interferences like seizure, destruction, 
damage or use by third parties.
With regard to energy networks, the positive eff ect just described means that the 
owner(s) are free to dispose of the network or parts thereof to a self-chosen 
purchaser, to burden it and use it as collateral, to use it and to determine the 
construction, extension, change and decommissioning. Th e same is true for any 
87 See Depenheuer in Tettinger/Stern, Kölner Gemeinschaft skommentar zur Europäischen 
Grundrechte-Charta, 2006, Article 17.
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shareholding in a subsidiary (making the shareholder the owner of the subsidiary), 
which is responsible for operating the network within the vertically integrated 
ESU. Th e owner’s right to use the property himself is particularly refl ected in the 
right to receive the profi ts made, (within the limits of company law) to freely 
determine the internal structure of the undertaking, to decide about the use of 
invested capital, the company’s organization, to discharge its management 
(board), and to implement internal rules such as the articles and memorandum 
of association and the directions concerning the day-to-day business.
Th e negative eff ect of the right to property primarily concerns the assets which 
belong to the network. Here, the freedom to exclude third parties from using the 
network is of importance, or at least the determination of the rules for third party 
access. Th e latter freedom has already been signifi cantly restricted by network 
access regulation and, more generally, by the competition law prohibition on 
abuse of one’s dominant position. As the owner’s right to use his property is of 
commercial importance in that the right to profi t from the asset is derived from 
this right, the regulation of network access charges also aff ects property rights.
A further power contained in the right to property is the right to exercise control, 
in particular the control powers of shareholders of the company they hold shares 
in, i.e. the power to determine how to proceed with the company’s property. 
Control can be defi ned as the capacity to exercise decisive infl uence on an 
undertaking88, on its strategic commercial behaviour. Consequently, the right to 
exercise control overlaps to some extent with the owner’s power to dispose of and 
use its assets, as the latter two powers do with each other.
From an economic perspective, the following essential characteristics of the right 
to property can thus be established:
– the right to have control over the property as a consequence of the positive 
right to deal with the property however the owner pleases;
– the right to use the property, for instance by way of deriving profi t from it; 
and
– the right to dispose of the property, i.e. to sell this property to third parties of 
the owner’s choice.
2. Eff ect of various forms of ownership unbundling on ownership rights
As we have seen above, legal unbundling already interferes directly with the 
control and determination rights of the owner(s) of the network or the network 
88 See the defi nition of control in the context of the Merger Regulation, nn. 19, 53.
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undertaking in that a particular corporate structure is required, i.e. the network 
operation has to be transferred to a separate company, and in that this company 
moreover must be granted a certain range of independent decision-making 
rights. However, as a matter of defi nition, the interference of ownership 
unbundling with property rights exceeds the interference of legal unbundling.
Ownership unbundling leads to diff erent restrictions on the elements of the right 
to property outlined above, i.e. the powers to use, to control and to dispose of the 
property. Not every variation of ownership unbundling interferes with every 
element of the property right but might just restrict some of them.
a. Separation of network undertaking from energy supply group
Th ese forms of ownership unbundling place restrictions on all three elements of 
the right to property: the right to dispose of the property is interfered with 
because the actual owners of the network or the network undertaking are 
required to give up the direct or indirect ownership of the network or the majority 
shareholding in the network undertaking. Th ese owners are forced to dispose of 
the network assets or shares in the network undertaking. As a result, the rights to 
use and control the property are also substantially restricted or even lost. Th e 
right to receive dividends and to participate in the profi ts made in the course of 
operating the network is reduced because of the reduced or even lost ownership 
of the network undertaking. Th e owner is forced to give up all or his sole or 
majority rights with respect to the network. Th is becomes the more obvious if 
control as defi ned in the EC Merger Regulation89 is made the criteria for the way 
and the extent to which the network has to be sold.
Nationalization, as the gravest interference with the right to property, results in 
the loss of the right to disposal, the right to exercise control and to an almost 
complete deprivation of the right to use the property. What remains of the latter 
right is a claim against the State to pay compensation.
In the fi rst variation of ownership unbundling (i.e. the form of creating a national 
transmission system operator owning the energy networks), all three parts of the 
property right are restricted as well. Again, the disposal of the network is 
mandated, and the current sole or majority rights to use and control the network 
are reduced to minority participations.90
89 See n. 19.
90 Th e other variation of a national network operator is diff erent in that the ownership of the 
network can stay with the current owner, which means that the right of disposal is not 
necessarily restricted. Only the rights to use and control have to be transferred to the national 
network operator. Financially, the right to use the network stays with the current owner 
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b. Forms of ownership unbundling within an energy supply group
If, in the context of ownership unbundling within the group, the only requirement 
additional to mandatory legal unbundling is that the network undertaking must 
be the owner of the network, all three parts of the right to property are interfered 
with although in a substantially reduced manner.91 Unless the current network 
owner is not the network operator, it is required to dispose of the network by 
transfer to a separate undertaking. Th is undertaking, however, can be part of the 
group. Th e right to control is thus restricted insofar as the former owner now 
only exercises, if any, indirect control over the network, i.e. by way of controlling 
the undertaking onto which the network property has been transferred.
If one does, however, not strictly focus on the person who has so far been the 
owner of the network when assessing the intensity of intervention, but looks at it 
from a commercial point of view, then the interference with property rights is 
less intrusive than is the case with the forms of ownership unbundling outlined 
before. Th is is because all ownership rights stay within the vertically integrated 
group. Th e profi ts made by the network undertaking still fully belong to the 
vertically integrated group. Any restrictions on property rights in the context of 
this form of ownership unbundling are thus mainly attributable to the mandatory 
legal unbundling and the regulation of the network access charges.
Th e variations in section C(II)(5c)(1)-(3) entail restrictions on all three elements 
of the right of property. Again, a disposal is required because all three variations 
require either the network assets or the shares in the network undertaking to be 
transferred to the shareholders (of the vertically integrated ESU), or at least the 
shareholders’ right to participate in decision-making in case of appointing a 
trustee. If (the holding of) a vertically integrated ESU has the shares in the 
network undertaking, the disposal is accompanied by the loss of the rights to use 
and control the network. Th is restriction, however, appears to be less intrusive in 
as far as, fi nancially, the right to use would remain with the (ultimate) shareholders 
and the right to exercise at least some control would continue to exist (either 
directly at (ultimate) shareholder level or indirectly through a holding placed 
between the (ultimate) shareholders and the network undertaking).92 In the 
because the profi ts deriving from the operation of the network stay with the owner, which is 
substantially diff erent from the Dutch “variation” of economic “ownership”, see n. 75 and n. 
78 and accompanying text; see also last paragraph of next subsection (b). But the remainder of 
the right would have to move to the network operator, which must have the power to give 
detailed directions as to the way the network is to be used and operated.
91 See variation in section C II 5 c (4) supra.
92 Th e term “deprivation” is explained in Part 2.
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trustee variation though, the rights to use and control would again be signifi cantly 
restricted.
3. Summary
It has been established that the forms of ownership unbundling, which only 
restructure the ownership relationships within the group, are the least intrusive 
and come close to legal unbundling. Consequently, they appear not to interfere 
too gravely with the right to property, at least when looking at it from a 
commercial point of view. By contrast, where ownership unbundling substantially 
restricts all three parts of the right to property, this normally means the 
deprivation of property93 and thus a grave interference with the right to property. 
Nationalization, in this respect, is certainly the most rigid form of intervention, 
whereas other forms such as forced sale or transfer of ownership to a national 
network operator interfere less strongly with the right to dispose of the network 
property.





Separation of network 
undertaking from group
(nationalization, forced sale, 












Control excluded excluded restricted
Use – excluded but purchase price
– excluded but compensation
– excluded (but purchase 
price) or restricted
restricted unchanged
Disposal – forced sale net outside 
group
– expropriation





93 See, however, the extensive analysis of the Dutch variation of economic “owernship” (nn. 75, 
78 and accompanying text) and its fundamental rights relevance in Part 2 Chapter 6 on the 
Netherlands, in particular with respect to the eligibility of public ESUs to fundamental rights 
protection.
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE
Th e research presented here is structured into three parts, which will answer the 
following questions:
Part 1: Economic Regulation
Under the principles of EC economic regulation, can legal ownership unbundling 
in principle be enforced in the energy supply sector on the basis of EC competition 
law? In the context of energy supply sector regulation, can the EU invoke its 
harmonization competence as set out in Article 95 EC to legislate for further 
unbundling of the energy supply industry in the EU?
In this fi rst part, the economic rationale behind EC economic regulation and 
thus also European energy market regulation will be outlined and complemented 
by economic theory underlying European energy market regulation and followed 
by the evaluation as to whether (primary) EC competition law can justify the 
enforcement of legal ownership unbundling in the European energy supply 
industry.
Interlinked with the previous issue, within the context of economic regulation of 
the European energy supply industry, the further question will have to be 
answered at this stage whether further unbundling, which exceeds the current 
requirements, can be legislated for on the basis of the EU’s harmonization 
competence of Article 95 EC.
Part 2: Fundamental Rights
Under the assumption either that there indeed is such an enforceable 
harmonization competence or that the EC Member States under review here 
introduce further unbundling measures of their own volition, the second part 
discusses fundamental rights issues. In this context, the following question will 
be answered: Does unbundling of their energy supply sectors exceeding the 
current requirements clash with the (economic) fundamental rights of the 
constitutions of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and with 
the fundamental rights protection as aff orded by the European Union?
In the light of Part 1, Part 2 evaluates whether energy supply sector specifi c 
regulation as economic regulation, which in general is a legitimate restriction of 
(economic) fundamental rights, in the specifi c case of unbundling measures, 
which exceed the current unbundling requirements, is in line with the 
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fundamental rights protection aff orded by the EC Member States under review, 
and as aff orded by the EU itself.
Conclusions: Drawing (Comparative) Lessons
Th e analysis in the second part of this research leads us to the comparison of the 
individual results, which answers the question of what conclusions can be drawn 
for the legitimacy and the prospects of energy supply sector regulation in the 
EU.
Outline
Following the order of the research questions, Part 1 of this research fi rst outlines 
in chapter 1 the theoretical economic rationale behind, and the objectives of, EC 
economic regulation of the European energy networks, more particularly the 
internal and competitive market objectives of the EC Treaty as safeguarded by 
the European Commission. Th ereaft er, chapters 2 and 3 deal, respectively, with 
EC competition law enforcement of energy network ownership unbundling and 
the legislative introduction of further energy transmission network unbundling 
measures in the EU, which exceed the current unbundling requirements (“further 
unbundling”), both of which belong to ex post EC economic regulation of the 
European energy supply industry in that they both regulate existing structures 
and rights.
Based on the assumption that the behaviour and structure of the European 
energy supply industry as a typical network industry94 is comprehensively (not 
necessarily perfectly) regulated, chapter 2 will evaluate whether and to what 
extent the European Commission as executive organ of the European Union 
possesses the general competition law competence to enforce ownership 
unbundling in the European energy supply industry in order to achieve the 
objective of competitive energy supply in the European Union. Th e potential 
competition related confl icts arising between (not necessarily vertically 
integrated) energy network owners and network access seekers and the reasons 
on which such confl icts are based are explained. Th e distinction and relationship 
between sector-specifi c regulation (based on EC secondary legislation) and the 
application of EC competition law (enforcing the primary competition law 
provisions of the EC Treaty) is explained. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
the (remedial) proportionality as fundamental principle underlying EC economic 
94 For the purposes of this work, network industries or utilities can be defi ned as those being 
based on a fi xed distribution networks whereby distribution means, in more general terms, 
transportation of an input.
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regulation and on the importance of including economic effi  ciency in any test of 
such principle to see whether the enforcement of ownership unbundling of 
individual energy networks is proportionate. In this context, the preconditions 
set by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice for 
mandating network access in individual cases of refusal by energy network 
owners to grant access (also called Th ird-Party Access or TPA) will be explored. 
Further, an abstract cost and benefi t framework and empirical (quantitative) 
economic evidence will be examined to round up the assessment of proportionality 
of competition law based measures to safeguard non-discriminatory TPA, in 
particular by way of divestiture or legal ownership unbundling.
As energy supply is a network-bound industry, which requires sector-specifi c 
regulation, chapter 3 of Part 1 outlines briefl y the evolution and latest status of 
European energy supply policy and legislation, including the institutional 
framework, which regulates and supervises the European energy supply industry. 
Th is outline includes some details on the approval by the European Parliament 
on 22 April 2009 of a new legislative package of EC energy supply sector legislation 
(so-called third generation internal energy market legislation), which will enter 
into force aft er passing the Council of Energy Ministers still before or shortly 
aft er the European Parliament elections in June 2009.95 As the latest agreement 
also allows for ownership unbundling and against the background that energy 
regulation is situated within the broader context of economic regulation in 
Europe, the question will have to be answered as to why in other network sectors 
such as railway, telecommunications and postal services, such far reaching 
unbundling of the networks has not been required. Th ereaft er, chapter 3 deals 
with the competence issue with respect to new energy supply sector legislation, 
which arises against the background that an explicit competence for an EC 
Energy Policy does not yet exist. Taking for granted that further unbundling 
measures can in principle be based upon the harmonization competence in 
Article 95 EC96, it will be discussed in greater detail whether this competence 
can actually be exercised. Here, Articles 295 (rules governing the system of 
property fall into the exclusive remit of the EC Member States) and 56 EC 
(fundamental freedom of free movement of capital) will feature prominently.97 
95 See already nn. 31 and 33. Th e package as approved by the European Parliament will most 
likely not be amended in substance any more. Cut-off  date of this work is 1 January 2009. Any 
later legal or factual changes and amendments such as the one just mentioned have been taken 
into account to the greatest extent possible.
96 Other possible competences are not discussed. In this respect, see J Baur, A Lückenbach, 
Fortschreitende Regulierung der Energiewirtschaft  – Eine kritische Stellungnahme zu den 
Kommissionsvorschlägen zur Änderung der Binnenmarktrichtline Erdgas (98/30/EG), VEnergR 
105, 2002.
97 Th e investment regime of the Energy Charter Treaty 1994 (in particular Article 13) will not be 
part of the analysis. Th e Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral investment and trade 
treaty (in force since April 1998), signed or acceded to by fi ft y-one countries (all EU Member 
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Th ereaft er and on the assumption that the European Union indeed possesses an 
exercisable competence to pass further unbundling legislation, such exercise 
must also comply with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality according 
to Article 5 EC.
Part 2 is based on the assumption either that there indeed is such an enforceable 
harmonization competence or that one of the EC Member States under review 
here introduces further unbundling measures on their own volition. In the light 
of the results of Part 1, Part 2 evaluates whether energy supply sector specifi c 
regulation in the specifi c case of unbundling measures, which exceed the current 
unbundling requirements, is in line with the protection of economic fundamental 
rights such as the right to property and the freedom of economic activity (and to 
choose and pursue an occupation) as aff orded by the constitutions of the EC 
Member States Germany, United Kingdom (Great Britain) and the Netherlands, 
and fi nally for the European Union itself with the fundamental rights protection 
as aff orded by the European Union.
Th e basic structure of the evaluation of the three Member States under scrutiny 
here98, which are dealt with in chapters 4–6 of Part 2, follows the following 
patterns: fi rst, the evolution and structure of network-bound energy supply will 
be outlined accompanied by the sketching of the sector-specifi c regulation 
applicable (sections II). Important in the context of this research is the 
States are individual signatories and thus bound to the ECT’s obligations directly) plus the 
European Community and Euratom (as of September 2008) and ratifi ed by all but fi ve 
signatories (Australia, Iceland, Norway, Belarus and the Russian Federation, the last of which 
have accepted provisional application of the ECT).
98 Th e three Member States Germany, the UK (more particularly Great Britain) and the 
Netherlands have been chosen because they exemplarily show the fundamental diff erences in 
regulatory approaches pursued by the EU Member States and because they represent the 
diff erent and wide-ranging degrees of energy market liberalization eff orts in the EU. Th ey 
also cover a wide range of constitutional systems and approaches in the EU, i.e. monistic and 
dualistic constitutional systems on the one hand, and approaches to sovereignty on the other, 
i.e. absolute parliamentary sovereignty in the UK, a constitutional court as guardian of the 
constitution in Germany, and the surrender of national sovereignty to the international legal 
order (at least in theory) in the Netherlands. Th e predominant cause for the dogmatic depth of 
German fundamental rights protection seems to be the existence of a constitutional court in 
Germany protecting Germany’s very own fundamental rights standard. Th e concerns 
resulting therefrom, which are publically acknowledged in the current debate on ownership 
unbundling, cause experts for energy supply regulation outside Germany considerable 
headaches and disbelief. One aim of this research is therefore to make the German objections 
more transparent and easier to comprehend. Th e Scandinavian countries, which are at the 
forefront of developing an integrated regional market as a fi rst step towards a fully integrated 
European energy market, would justify a research project in its own as does Central-Eastern 
Europe, which comprises of new Member States at the beginning of liberalizing their energy 
markets. France and Belgium (currently in the process of building a regional market with the 
Netherlands, Germany and Luxemburg) and the Southern European Member States all have 
their own peculiarities, which would not integrate well in this research project.
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constitutional setting in each of the three Member States (sections III) as it shows 
in which fundamental legal environment further unbundling legislation is 
situated. Here, it will become apparent what fundamental rights standard applies 
in each of the three countries, how “open” each constitution is to European 
integration in terms of accepting the supremacy of the legal order of the European 
Union as established by the European Court of Justice and whether national 
constitutional law is at all applicable to unbundling legislation introduced by the 
EU. For Germany and the Netherlands, the constitutional role of municipalities 
is particularly important as these state sub-divisions are heavily involved in 
network-bound energy supply. Based on the constitutional setting of each of the 
three countries, the principal fundamental rights issues arising in the context of 
further unbundling legislation (sections IV) is discussed with a focus on the 
fundamental right to property. Th is framework of an individual Member State’s 
fundamental rights protection is then applied to the specifi c unbundling 
measures envisaged (sections V). For all three countries and for the Netherlands 
in particular, the compliance of possible further unilateral measures with EC law 
requires some consideration (section VI).
Highlighting issues specifi c to the individual Member State under scrutiny here, 
in chapter 4 on Germany the role of the constitutional court in Germany as 
regards the review of the validity of EC legislation in the German jurisdiction 
(Solange & Maastricht case law)99 as well as the status of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (in short European 
Convention of Human Rights or ECHR)100 in Germany will have to be discussed 
in the context of the constitutional setting (section III). Particular attention has 
also to be paid to the rather detailed and eff ective protection of the right to 
property under the German Constitution and to the question related thereto 
whether public or public-private subjects (i.e. undertakings under the infl uence 
or controlled by public bodies) can enjoy such protection. Th is will be part of the 
discussion of the fundamental rights issues arising in the context of further 
unbundling legislation (section IV). Also relevant in the particular German 
context is the further unbundling alternative of “Eff ective and effi  cient 
unbundling” (or the “Th ird Way”), which is also touched upon when the 
established framework of fundamental rights protection is applied to further 
unbundling measures (section V).101
99 BVerfGE 37, 271; 73, 339; 89, 155.
100 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (as 
amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13).
101 Section V, which naturally also discusses the proportionality of further unbundling measures, 
is, in this respect structured slightly diff erently than the proportionality assessment in Part 1 
Chapter 2 and the proportionality considerations in the other chapters of Part 2. Here, the 
focus is on the question of what is possible in the specifi c German context.
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In chapter 5 on the United Kingdom (more particularly Great Britain), when 
clarifying in the context of the constitutional setting (section III) the fundamental 
rights standard applicable in the United Kingdom in the light of parliamentary 
supremacy, the relationship between EC law and its fundamental rights standard, 
and national law (which, to a large extent, renders the ECHR applicable in the 
UK) is of relevance. It is in this chapter 5 that the ECHR protection of the right to 
property will be discussed (section IV). Th ese elaborations are then complemented 
in the corresponding section of chapter 6 on the Netherlands by analysing the 
(likely) position of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the issue 
whether public entities such as municipalities or private undertakings controlled 
by them should enjoy the protection of the fundamental right to property. As 
private undertakings controlled by municipalities hold the energy distribution 
networks in the Netherlands, and are now prevented by legislation from selling 
these networks, the interpretation of Article 295 EC as rendered in Part 1 chapter 
3 will also become relevant in section VI of chapter 6 when the compliance of 
further unilateral unbundling measures with EC law is discussed.
Finally, in chapter 7 of Part 2, the European Union comes back into the picture 
aft er the fundamental rights protection in the context of further unbundling 
legislation in the Member States Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands has 
been discussed. Here, the fundamental rights issues arising in the context of the 
further unbundling legislation as initially proposed by the European Commission 
in September 20007 will be discussed (section II) against the background of the 
protection aff orded on an EU level, which also takes the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (ECFR) into account as the EU institutions have 
submitted themselves to this catalogue of fundamental rights. Of particular 
interest are three issues: fi rst whether public undertakings (are likely to) enjoy 
fundamental rights protection, secondly the enforcement practice of the 
European Court of Justice with respect to the proportionality of legislative 
measures, and thirdly the fact that there appears to be unequal treatment of 
private and public undertakings as regards the unbundling requirements 
proposed.102 Section III will then apply the framework of fundamental rights 
protection as set out in the previous section to the actual unbundling measures 
proposed by the Commission in its proposals of 19 September 2007.
Th e fundamental rights discussion in Part 2 ties in with the assessment of the 
proportionality of ownership unbundling as remedy in a competition law 
enforcement context in chapter 2 of Part 1. What needs to be appreciated, 
however, is that the proportionality test as a common theme of this Part 2 comes 
in another guise. It is no longer an issue of whether the ownership unbundling is 
a proportionate remedy but rather whether sector-specifi c legislation for 
102 See n. 20.
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ownership unbundling passes the proportionality test. Whereas in the context of 
Part 1 chapter 2, the European Commission acts as executive in individual cases 
with a rather narrow discretion, here the Parliaments of the Member States and 
the European Union act as legislature with respect to the whole sector and a wide 
margin of appreciation. Whereas in Part 1 Chapter 2, structural remedies are 
reactive to existing abusive behaviour (if established), in Part 2 sector-specifi c 
legislation is preventive and to some extent prospective or anticipatory as regards 
the developments in the sector concerned. For the proportionality test in both 
Parts, it is also important to appreciate that further unbundling intervenes ex 
post, i.e. into existing structure and rights, and heavily relies on the economic 
rationale of economic energy supply sector regulation, which prominently 
features economic effi  ciency as a balancing factor.103
An important aspect to extract from the elaborations on the proportionality test 
as applied in the various jurisdictions and contexts is whether albeit similar in 
structure, the proportionality test is also enforced in a similar fashion as regards, 
for instance, the margin of appreciation aff orded to the acting institutions and 
the actual balancing of the various interests to be taken into consideration in 
order to aff ord eff ective fundamental rights protection. As regards the actual 
balancing of various interests in the context of the protection of the right to 
property, the weighing of the general interest or the Sozialbindung of property104, 
as it is called in Germany, will also require closer scrutiny. It needs to be 
determined whether economic regulation, which is typically regarded as mere 
regulation of the right to property (or the freedom of economic activity) in order 
to be accepted in the general interest by the subject of the right to property, is 
able to legitimately allow for the deprivation of the entire right to property105, or 
in other words, to completely suppress the private interest for the benefi t of the 
general interest.
From Part 2, this research leads over to the Conclusions where lessons from the 
analyses of the fi rst two Parts are drawn in order to determine conclusions for 
the legitimacy and the prospects of energy supply sector regulation in the EU.
Section A recapitulates the fi ndings as regards the EU competences with respect 
to imposing further unbundling (in particular ownership unbundling) on 
vertically integrated European energy supply undertakings in the area of EC 
competition law and EC sector-specifi c regulation. Section B compares the 
103 Th us, the relevant considerations remain largely the same.
104 “Sozialbindung of property” approximately translates as the social obligation of property 
ownership or as the attachement of property to public welfare or as the duty of property to 
also serve the general interest (and not just the private interest) or the importance of property 
for social coherence.
105 Th e term “deprivation” is explained in Part 2.
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evolution and current structure and regulation of the energy sectors in Germany, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands. Section C makes a comparison of the relevant 
constitutional laws in Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the 
European Union with respect to fundamental rights protection (and its 
eff ectiveness) against further unbundling; the issue of the protection of public 






It is the aim of the fi rst part of this research to uncover the rationale behind the 
economic regulation of energy supply networks in the EU (chapter 1), which lies 
the foundation for exploring in chapters 2 and 3 whether “full structural” or legal 
ownership unbundling (or divestiture) of energy supply networks can be 
accomplished in the EU by means of, respectively, general competition law 




RATIONALE BEHIND ECONOMIC 
REGULATION OF EC ENERGY 
SUPPLY NETWORKS
Th e rationale behind European energy network regulation can best be inferred 
from the relevant objectives of the EC Treaty and the relevant task and activities 
described therein. Th ese objectives fi nd their expression in the Lisbon Agenda, 
which introduces this work.
Article 2 EC sets out as the task of the European Community “to promote 
throughout the Community” the ultimate objective of “a harmonious, balanced 
and sustainable development of economic activities, […] sustainable and non-
infl ationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment […].” Th is is to be achieved “by establishing a common 
market and an economic […] union and by implementing common policies or 
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4 [EC]”; the establishment of a common 
market is an interim goal and is an essential element of the Community’s mission 
as set out at the beginning of this paragraph.106
Th e Lisbon Agenda of March 2000107 ambitiously adds to this in terms of timing 
and furthering the objectives set out in Article 2 EC by envisaging the European 
Union becoming “[within the next decade] the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”
Th e most important cornerstones today108 (for the establishment) of a common 
market are market integration109 with a view to creating an internal market110 
which refl ects the fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, 
106 Von Bogdandy in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. I, Article 2 EGV.
107 See Introduction, n. 1 and accompanying text.
108 Apart from the customs union as set out in Article 23 EC.
109 Originally purely economic, market integration today also includes non-economic elements 
as is refl ected in some of the common activities set out in Article 3 EC, see in greater detail, 
von Bogdandy in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. I, Article 3 EGV.
110 Articles 3(c) and 14 EC.
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services and capital) guaranteed by the EC Treaty, and the implementation of a 
system of competition ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted.111 It can thus be said that the common market objective connects the 
fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty and its competition rules.112 Or, to put it 
diff erently, it is the competition law rules’ objective to safeguard the internal 
market. Th e enforcement of competition law and the fundamental freedoms of 
the EC Treaty as integration tools thus belong to the constituting principles of 
the economic order of the EU.
Accordingly, the European Council when announcing the Lisbon Agenda calls 
for “stepping up the process of […] completing the internal market”. It considers 
it essential to apply fair and uniform competition so that businesses can thrive 
and operate eff ectively on a level playing fi eld in the internal market. Th e 
European Council thus wants “to speed up liberalisation in areas such as gas 
[and] electricity to achieve a fully operational internal market in these areas.”
I. COMPETITIVE INTERNAL ENERGY SUPPLY 
MARKETS
Th e major objectives behind the competition law rules, i.e. competition policy, in 
the EU113 are to increase consumer welfare and to ensure an effi  cient allocation 
of resources114, and to promote the development of competition and market 
integration within the EU by aff ording every market participant a level playing 
fi eld115, i.e. the same initial opportunities, which can also be translated into 
111 Article 3(g) EC.
112 In this vein, see ECJ, C-202/88 – Frankreich v Commission, (1999) ECR I-1223, 1269, no. 41. 
Th is connection can also be regarded as interdependency, i.e. competition in the common 
market can only function if there is a functioning internal market where the fundamental 
freedoms are guaranteed; vice versa, the internal market can only function and with it the 
fundamental freedoms if the competitive process in the common market is functioning.
113 Motta, n. 54, pp 17 et seq., for other policy objectives such as defending smaller fi rms and 
fi ghting infl ation.
114 Consumer welfare as a goal of the competition policy of the EU is in contrast to the economists’ 
view that the increase of economic welfare should be the goal, see Motta, n. 54, pp. 18–22; D 
Schmidtchen, ‘Effi  zienz als Leitbild der Wettbewerbspolitik: Für einen “more economic 
approach”’, German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Paper 3, 2005, pp. 39–40. See 
also J Basedow, ‘Konsumentenwohlfahrt und Effi  zienz – Neue Leitbilder der 
Wettbewerbspolitik?’, in his presentation at the 13. Internationale Kartellkonference in 
München on 27 March 2007 who sets consumer welfare as competition policy goal of the EU 
in contrast to the traditional German view that competition as such should be protected. See 
further, J Brodley, ‘Th e economic goals of Antitrust: effi  ciency, consumer welfare, and 
technological progress’, (1987) New York University Law Review 1020.
115 See B Baarsma, M de Nooij, W Koster, C van der Weijden, ‘Divide and rule – Th e economic 
and legal implications of the proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and supply 
companies in the Dutch electricity sector’, (2007) Energy Policy 1785.
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safeguarding fair and equitable or non-discriminatory behaviour by all market 
participants.116
Th ese objectives are to be achieved by economic regulation117, which consists of 
general competition law enforcement and sector-specifi c regulation.
Sector-specifi c regulation fulfi ls in the context of competition policy and in 
particular with respect to formerly state regulated industries, the function of 
liberalizing or opening the corresponding market for competition and promoting 
competition in the relevant market place.
As part of economic regulation more generally, sector-specifi c regulation also 
fulfi ls the task complementary to and overlapping with the competition policy 
objectives, which is to promote the internal market by implementing and 
safeguarding the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty.
In industries, which consist of a monopolistic (infrastructure) core, such as 
energy supply and telecommunication services, a further tool of sector-specifi c 
regulation (which is again complementary to the objectives of competition 
policy), is the pursuance of non-economic objectives to achieve additional 
politically desirable goals or public policy considerations, such as social and 
environmental goals.118
116 Motta, n. 54, p. 26, is, however, sceptical as regards levelling the playing fi eld when it means 
the safeguarding of equal outcomes of market competition, because it would harm investment 
and innovation, and, in general, the more successful market participant. Similarly, some 
major objectives set out here might potentially confl ict with others, such as ensuring the 
effi  cient allocation of resources on the one hand and equitable behaviour on the other.
117 P Larouche, ‘A Closer Look at Some Assumptions Underlying EC Regulation of Electronic 
Communications’, (2002) Journal of Network Industries 129; de Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, 
n. 54, p. 4.
118 Oft en to the detriment of the competitive process. EC sector-specifi c regulation deals with a 
number of issues common to network-bound sectors such as telecommunications and energy, 
which seem to require continuing regulation, even when these sectors otherwise work 
competitively: licensing, pricing and transparency, access and interconnection, public service 
obligations, universal service and convergence. As to the latter, see P Slot, A Skudder, 
‘Common Features of Community Law Regulation in the Network-Bound Sectors’, (2001) 
CML Rev. 87, and Larouche, n. 117.
 Convergence means that the same service can be carried out over any transmission network, 
for instance in the case of electronic communications services over fi xed or mobile, 
telecommunications or cable TV, satellite or terrestrial. Convergence is increasingly becoming 
an issue in the energy markets as well. Technology has allowed large industrial customers to 
demand coverage of their “energy” requirements rather than constraining them to the 
exclusive use of either gas or electricity. Although this mainly concerns diversifi ed energy 
resources, it has got some implications for its transport as well as the ability to switch from gas 
networks to electricity networks and vice versa.
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Th e various objectives of sector-specifi c regulation are also complemented by the 
imposition of public service obligations on providers of general (economic) 
interest119, a category to which energy supply undertakings belong; in the specifi c 
energy supply related context, the relevant considerations include energy supply 
security120 and reliability121, which are both economic and non-economic in 
nature.
Th e parallel existence of competition policy, internal market, non-economic and 
public policy objectives for sector-specifi c regulation is complemented by 
overarching policy goals concerning all economic activities in the EU such as 
consumer protection.122
 Public Service Obligations and Universal Service is specifi cally referred to in Articles 3 of the 
2003 Energy Directives. Public Service Obligations (PSO) refer to specifi c requirements 
imposed on the providers of services of general interest to ensure that certain public interest 
objectives such as public security issues (such as technical energy supply security, security of 
energy supply etc.) and environmental protection are met. “Services of general interest” 
derives from “services of general economic interest” (SGEI), which is used in the EC Treaty, 
and is broader as it covers both market and non-market services which are classed as being of 
general interest and subject to specifi c public service obligations. Community legislation on 
services of general economic interest, although being sector-specifi c, contains a number of 
common elements that can be drawn on to defi ne a Community concept of services of general 
economic interest including in particular universal service.
 Th e concept of universal service refers to a set of general interest requirements ensuring that 
certain services are made available at a specifi ed quality to all consumers and users throughout 
the territory of a Member State and at an aff ordable price. It has been developed specifi cally 
for some of the network industries (e.g. telecommunications, energy, rail transport, and postal 
services). Th e concept establishes the right for every citizen to access certain services 
considered as essential and imposes obligations (USO) on industries to provide a defi ned 
service at specifi ed conditions, including complete territorial coverage.
 See European Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2003) 270 
fi nal, Brussels, 21.5.2003, pp. 7, 16, 35. For telecommunication, see P Larouche, 
‘Telecommunications’, in D Geradin (ed.), Th e Liberalization of State Monopolies in the 
European Union and Beyond, 2000, p. 42; A de Streel, ‘Th e Protection of the European Citizen 
in a Competitive E-Society: the New E.U. Universal Service Directive’, (2003) Journal of 
Network Industries 189. For energy, see also L Hancher, ‘Revising the European Community 
Internal Energy Market’, in P Vass (ed.), Th e Development of Energy Regulation – A Collection 
of Reviews, May 2003, chapter 11, pp. 218 et seq.
119 See also n. 118.
120 Energy supply security in this context means secure availability of energy in terms of primary 
energy sources and electricity generation.
121 As the energy supply sector is network-bound, energy supply reliability in the context given 
means reliable energy transportation to the customer via energy transportation networks in 
terms of suffi  cient capacity and technical maintenance. Th e Commission seems to make no 
distinction between energy supply security and reliability, subsuming both investment in 
infrastructure and in generation under security of supply, see Communication from the 
Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, n. 6.
122 See R Whish, Competition Law, 5th ed. 2003, p. 18.
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1. SECURE AND RELIABLE ENERGY SUPPLY MARKETS: 
THE INVESTMENT ISSUE
Of great importance in the context of the economic regulation of EC energy 
supply, and more specifi cally of the energy networks, is a particular component 
of the internal market rationale123, and this is the objective of establishing and 
maintaining secure and reliable energy supply markets. For a functioning 
internal market in which the trading of network-bound energy can take place 
anywhere in the European Union, the national energy networks above all require 
suffi  cient network interconnection capacity for an internal market energy 
network to evolve as well as suffi  cient energy network capacity. Suffi  cient network 
and interconnection capacity is also a necessary prerequisite for competition to 
fl ourish in the internal market, and for energy supply security, i.e. suffi  ciently 
available energy throughout the EU124, as well as for energy supply reliability, i.e. 
easing or even avoiding network constraints.125 In particular electricity network 
interconnection oft en also serves as a substitute (or competitor) for electricity 
generation.126
More energy transportation infrastructure investment as a necessary prerequisite 
for a competitively working internal energy supply market as one of the 
foundations of the (EC) economy, in which energy supply is secure and reliable, 
naturally requires investment by network owners, operators controlling the 
networks they operate or (potential) third party network investors. Th e task of 
European economic regulation, which comprises of competition law enforcement 
and sector-specifi c regulation, is to regulate energy networks in a way which 
promotes such investment.
123 Which, complementary and overlapping with the competition policy objective, is to establish 
and promote the internal market by way of enforcing and safeguarding the fundamental 
freedoms of the EC Treaty.
124 As regards suffi  ciently available energy throughout the EU, it also seems (at least) equally 
important that suffi  cient generation capacity is available.
125 Th e German sector-specifi c regulatory agency Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), 
‘Monitoringbericht 2007’, 29 June 2007, however, notes that the impact of foreign generation 
capacity on competition is, at least for Germany, which belongs to one of the largest energy 
supply markets in the European Union, rather small because electricity transport over long 
distances also entails losses in quantities transported. Pielow/Brunekreeft /Ehlers, n. 22, p. 5 
(note 25), point out that increased interconnector capacity in order to enhance competition in 
the internal market changes electricity fl ows and increases the trade of electricity, which is 
likely to increase the pressure on the electricity networks, which might prejudice network 
reliability.
126 See only Balmert/Brunekreeft /Gabriel, n. 47. Th e NorNed cable might serve as an example; it 
connects the electricity transmission networks of the Netherlands and Norway, which at 
daytime feeds electricity produced by Norwegian water storages into the Dutch grid whereas 
excess electricity produced in the Netherlands at night helps pumping the water back into the 
Norwegian water storages. In greater detail, van der Lippe/Meijer, n. 44.
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2. COMPETITIVE ENERGY SUPPLY: COMPETITION 
WHERE POSSIBLE, REGULATION WHERE NECESSARY
As indicated above, the energy supply industry is a network industry, which is 
based around the natural monopolies of energy transportation network 
infrastructures127, which in turn are oft en still part vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings. Th e network infrastructures are an indispensable or 
essential input for energy supply undertakings active in the related (potentially) 
competitive energy supply markets up- and downstream (i.e. gas production, 
electricity generation and energy retail) to enter and operate in those markets. 
Consequently, competitive energy supply depends on the non-discriminatory 
behaviour of the controllers of this monopolistic core of the energy supply 
chain128, in particular in the case of those energy supply undertakings, which do 
not own energy transportation networks. It seems that there is a “systemic 
confl ict of interest inherent in the vertical integration of supply and network 
activities”129, which is perceived as one of the main obstacles to the competitive 
functioning of energy supply. Th is confl ict is said not only to entail the risk of 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings to prefer each other (i.e. 
members of their own group) when it comes to energy network access but also to 
result in a lack of willingness to invest in energy network infrastructure for fear 
of increased competition on the related up- and downstream markets.130
127 Normally also monopolistic bottlenecks, in electricity in general as well as in gas distribution; 
for gas transmission, see Knieps, n. 54.
128 Which, for technical and legal (mostly environmental and licensing) reasons, will continue to 
be the case for the time being, in contrast to, for instance the telecommunications sector 
where technological progress is on its way to enabling telecommunication services to fi nd 
alternative routes (by technical means such as Voice over IP (VoIP), television cable, radio 
spectrum and mobile telephony) to customers thereby taking traditional physical means to 
transmit these services, such as the local loop (or, as oft en referred to, the last meter to the 
customer), their natural monopoly character away. See P de Bijl, ‘Structural Separation and 
Access in Telecommunications Markets’, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2004–011, Tilburg 
University, 2004. See also the quotation from Slot/Skudder, n. 118 , in n. 143 infra.
129 See n. 3, nos 52 and 53. For the plausibility of this principal claim, see Pollitt, n. 37, and 
Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37 (in particular in the context of network industries).
130 Th is argument is also called strategic investment withholding, see Brunekreeft  in his 
Discussion Paper, n. 9. Th e underlying assumption is that in a given electricity supply area 
with constraints on the interconnector to the outside, there is an incumbent vertically 
integrated energy supply undertaking. Expanding the interconnector would increase the 
import capacity into the supply area and would thus allow third parties to supply electricity in 
this area, which would increase competition with the incumbent. Th erefore, because of its 
interest in protecting its position in generation, the vertically integrated incumbent would 
have inadequate incentives to expand the interconnection. An unbundled network operator, 
on the other hand, would not have an incentive to protect a generation business and would 
thus render the necessary investment into the network it is operating. However, the “strategic 
investment withholding” argument is limited. First, much depends on whether the vertically 
integrated incumbent is long or short in generation in relation to retail. If it is short of 
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Against this background, the Commission seeks to impose regulatory obligations 
in circumstances where the development of competitive markets is at risk, which 
is generally the case in network industries in transition from a non-competitive 
to a liberalized competitive structure. Accordingly, regulatory obligations should 
be imposed where eff ective competition and national and Community 
competition law remedies are not suffi  cient to address the problem: “[i]n markets 
where there continues to be large diff erences in negotiating power between 
undertakings, and where some undertakings rely on infrastructure provided by 
others for delivery of their services, it is appropriate to establish a [regulatory] 
framework to ensure that the market functions eff ectively.”131 Th us, with respect 
to ensuring functioning competitive markets, obligations imposed by (national) 
regulatory authorities are supposed to be limited to those areas where remedies 
available under competition law cannot achieve the same results in the same 
time-scale.132
generation in relation to electricity retail to customers, then the incumbent is likely to have an 
interest to increase interconnector capacity in order to be able to purchase electricity. 
Secondly, a vertically integrated incumbent with excess generation capacity and low variable 
costs will want to export electricity for which it needs interconnector capacity. Th irdly, given 
that interconnector capacity can lead to more imports or to more exports, if interconnector 
capacity is used for more exports, competition is likely to increase globally, but inside the 
supply area (considered in isolation) competition is likely to decrease (because of suffi  cient 
generation there and/or lack of imports). Lastly, even if the strategic investment withholding 
argument holds in theory, in practice there are other investment limitations, which are likely 
to be more severe: Finding a suitable location and obtaining permission to build new 
interconnection capacity (or network capacity in general) faces many obstacles to overcome, 
not least because the resistance of the local population. See, in greater detail, Brunekreeft , 
ibid.
131 See, for instance, Recital 6 of Directive 2002/19/EC of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access 
Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/7, 24.4.2002, on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive). Note at this early stage 
that this is about eff ective but not necessarily effi  cient competition and functioning of the 
markets.
132 Mainly because of their ex post application, see further infra, n. 144 and accompanying text. 
However, as regards the time-scale issue, it should be appreciated that both the application of 
competition law and of sector-specifi c regulation can be time-consuming, at least with respect 
to its enforcement as the enforcement decisions in both cases are normally subject to time-
consuming judicial review. Th is is only diff erent in cases such as unbundling, which if 
introduced by sector-specifi c legislation is usually done by way of legal instruments, which are 
only indirectly reviewable, i.e. in cases where a regulator’s decision is related to such 
unbundling.
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II. COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION: SCOPE 
AND EFFECT
As just indicated, the European Commission believes that only the restructuring 
of the energy supply industry by way of further unbundling, in particular 
ownership unbundling of the energy transmission networks, would remove the 
inherent incentive for vertically integrated energy supply undertakings to 
discriminate against competitors up- and downstream as regards network 
access133, promote necessary investment in particular into energy transmission 
network and interconnection capacity (but also in generation) in a non-
discriminatory way and make energy supply more transparent.134
Against this background, and aft er the outline of the rationale behind European 
economic regulation, and more specifi cally energy network regulation, it is now 
worthwhile to see how the energy networks can be regulated, i.e. to distinguish 
scope and eff ect of competition law enforcement and of sector-specifi c regulation 
in this regard135, in order to appreciate whether competitive internal energy 
supply markets can only be achieved, as the European Commission claims, by 
restructuring the European energy industry.
For the purposes of this work, a distinction is drawn between the application of 
competition law ex post (following allegedly anti-competitive occurrences) and 
sector-specifi c regulation ex ante (before any evidence of anti-competitive 
behaviour and/or in order to prevent events136 considered detrimental to the 
competitive process and/or in order to promote the development of the 
133 Th ird Party Access (TPA) is already comprehensively regulated, see in greater detail Part 1 
Chapter 3.
134 See n. 6 and Recital 7 of the proposed Electricity Directive, n. 15. Th e Commission claims that 
“[e]conomic evidence shows that ownership unbundling is the most eff ective means to […] 
encourage investment.” In this regard, see n. 3, no. 55. See also Pollitt, n. 37.
135 For general elaborations on the distinction between European competition law and regulation, 
in particular in network industries, see J Temple Lang, ‘Competition Policy and Regulation: 
Diff erences, Overlaps, and Constraints’, presentation at conference ‘Balancing Antitrust and 
Regulation in Network Industries: Evolving Approaches in Europe and United States’, Paris, 
January 2006.
136 Such as cross-subsidization, which in itself seems never to be illegitimate; only practices such 
as margin squeezing (explained infra), which may feature cross-subsidization, are anti-
competitive and thus illegal, see in more detail, Willems/Ehlers, n. 2, with further references. 
Cross-subsidization is thought to be detrimental to the development of competition in 
markets such as the energy supply markets, which were previously run by established 
incumbents and closed to competition. Th e fact that incumbents were able to build up their 
dominance (in potentially competitive market segments) and (network infrastructure) 
monopolies puts them – at the outset of liberalization – in an advantageous position. Th us, it 
is said that legitimate cross-subsidies would “harm” the “level playing fi eld” for new market 
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competitive process).137 Ex ante regulatory intervention would thus address 
market imperfections, which are thought either to exist already or likely to 
happen on the basis of a more abstract, theoretical analysis.138
In addition to distinguishing these two bodies of law according to the timing of 
their application, it is important to distinguish them with respect to their 
constitutional foundation and their application to the economy.
entrants; they would also prevent incumbents from operating effi  ciently under competitive 
conditions. For a sceptical view, see Willems/Ehlers, ibid.
137 It should be stressed, however, that EC competition law is not generally just an ex post 
framework; a number of signifi cant decisions are taken on an ex ante basis, such as clearances 
under the Merger Regulation. Apart from promoting security of energy supply (briefl y 
explained in section I 1 supra) by sector-specifi c regulation, which is set out in chapter 3 
section II infra, supply security can also be promoted by competition law enforcement in 
individual cases, which will not be elaborated on further in this work. An example for ex ante 
competition law enforcement in a merger setting is the merger between E.ON of Germany and 
MOL of Hungary, which was approved by the Commission aft er extensive merger remedies 
(by way of undertakings) had been conceded by the merging companies, see only van der 
Woude, n. 43, pp. 16–7, such as voluntary ownership unbundling of gas transmission 
infrastructure, gas wholesale and gas storage activities in Hungary and a gas release 
programme in order to enhance liquidity (availability) of gas in the market for the benefi t of 
competition in this area. Security of supply issues also play a role in ex post competition law 
enforcement such as when long-term contracts up- and downstream, see n. 43, or (network) 
capacity hoarding are targeted. As regards the long-term contract issues, see also van der 
Woude, ibid., pp. 10–1, and G Kühne, ‘Long-term Gas Contacts in Germany: An Assessment 
of the German Competition Authority’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European 
Energy Law Reports III, 2006, chapter 4.
 Decisions which would be qualifi ed as ex ante are actually taken on the basis of historical data 
on the sector and ex post decisions oft en have ex ante elements. Even the “purest” ex post 
competition law case, where a fi rm is under scrutiny for past behaviour with documented 
eff ects on a well-known relevant market, will oft en involve some ex ante aspects in the 
remedies, which are meant to prevent future recurrences of anti-competitive behaviour. 
Further, competition law decisions under Article 81 and 82 EC (especially where interim relief 
is involved) actually fall between ex ante and ex post, in that the market is known, the allegedly 
anti-competitive behaviour is known, but its actual eff ects on competition are not fully 
known, since the intervention aims to prevent these eff ects from occurring. In the end, the 
distinction is best understood as a matter of degree: ex ante intervention takes place on the 
basis of a larger number of analytical assumptions and extrapolations than ex post 
intervention, which is based on a more solid evidentiary basis. See in greater detail, Larouche, 
n. 117.
138 Ex ante sector-specifi c regulation can also have ex post eff ects as was and would be the case 
with the unbundling prescribed by the 2003 Energy Directives and envisaged by the draft  
Energy Directives, n. 33, respectively. Th is is because unbundling in whatever form interferes 
with the structure of the undertakings active in the energy supply sector and thus the sector 
itself, which aff ects the undertakings and the sector ex post. As the focus of this work is on 
unbundling as a structural measure envisaged for the energy sector, only such ex post 
intervention will therefore be looked into, either on the basis of competition law enforcement 
or sector-specifi c regulation.
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In the European Union, the EC Treaty has provided a peculiar structure of 
economic regulation, which enables two bodies of law, i.e. general competition 
law and sector-specifi c regulation to co-exist.139 Whereas EC competition law as 
primary EC law applies to all economic sectors in the EU, sector specifi c 
regulation based on secondary EC law adopted by Community institutions on 
the basis of Treaty provisions is either directly applicable or implemented by the 
Member States into the national legal order (such as EC Regulations and 
Directives, respectively) and applies to a specifi c sector only.140 Consequently, 
sector-specifi c regulation (and case law of the Community courts) cannot exclude 
the application of EC competition law.141
139 Th e reason why in the EU competition law and sector specifi c regulation are not regarded as 
incompatible may also be due to the fact that network-bound services such as energy supply 
and telecommunication were originally carried out by direct public-sector provision, which 
did not require sector-specifi c regulation. Th e confl ict was then not so much a collision 
between a stand-alone regulatory scheme and competition law but rather between public-
sector undertakings and competition law. However, public sector undertakings were oft en 
exempted from the application of competition law, see also n. 136, as was for instance the case 
in Germany for energy supply under (repealed) s. 103 of the Law against competition restraints 
(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) and protected by so-called demarcated 
energy supply areas, in which mostly municipal or regional energy supply undertakings 
enjoyed sole supplier status, i.e. a local monopoly, see also infra n. 654 and accompanying text. 
S. 103 GWB was dropped in 1998 in the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Law 
against competition restraints) of 26 August 1998 (revised version (Neufassung) published on 
15 July 2005, BGBl. I, p. 2114). Th e application of competition law to such undertakings is 
refl ected in Article 86 EC. As liberalization, which is in part motivated by economic and 
competition policy, replaces direct State intervention (in the form of direct provision of 
services (of general economic interest) such as energy supply) with sector-specifi c regulation, 
it does not appear unusual that competition law continues to apply to the so liberalized sector 
even in the presence of sector specifi c regulation. See further P Larouche, ‘Contrasting legal 
solutions and the comparability of EU and US experiences’, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 
2006–028, Tilburg University, November 2006.
140 Cf. Larouche nn. 117, 139. As to the institutional setting, see further infra in this subsection. 
National sector-specifi c regulation induced the European Commission to increase their 
eff orts to harmonize the national regulatory systems for network-bound sectors. An important 
issue in this context are the responsibilities within a Member State as regards the execution of 
sector-specifi c regulation. When considering the extent and application of sector-specifi c 
regulation as opposed to general competition law in network-bound sectors such as energy 
supply, the nature of such sectors has historically created diverse constitutional, administrative 
and institutional frameworks and systems with considerable government intervention, which 
is further complicated by the oft en very active involvement of Länder and provinces (as in 
Germany and the Netherlands) as well as other regional authorities and municipalities (as in 
Germany), which has also repercussions on the unbundling of these sectors. Th is involvement 
has resulted in public service obligations varying in diff erent Member States. Such obligations 
are largely left  at the discretion of the Member States, ECJ, C-280/00 – Altmark Trans, (2003) 
ECR I-7747. It has also oft en resulted in the holding of shares in the undertakings active in 
such sectors as well as the creation of “golden shares” meant to protect national industries 
(including in the area of energy supply) from hostile takeovers; the issue of “golden shares” is 
further discussed infra in the context of Article 56 EC.
141 Apart from the narrow exception of Article 86(2) EC, which concerns undertakings entrusted 
with “services of general economic interest” (see n. 118; the EC agricultural sector also allows 
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On the other hand, as the EC Treaty does not exclude the existence of sector 
specifi c regulation, such regulation must be designed in a way to avoid confl icts 
with the provisions of the EC Treaty. Th e Treaty thus employs harmonization 
mechanisms such as Article 95 EC in order to make national sector-specifi c 
regulation compliant to the EC Treaty, whose predominant goal is, as has been 
shown above, the creation of a competitive internal market.
In the context of EC energy supply market regulation, this was done by way of 
Directives and Regulations142, which were based on EC Treaty provisions 
concerning the internal market – in the case of the internal market Directives on 
Articles 47(2) (right of establishment), 55 (services) EC and on Article 95 EC 
(harmonization of national legislation with a view to realizing the internal 
market), and in the case of the Regulations, on Article 95 EC. Th e value which 
harmonized sector-specifi c regulation adds in a European context is its 
application to all participants in a particular economic sector, whereas EC 
competition law only applies in individual cases.
A further distinction in this context is the fact that competition law relies on a 
small number of general provisions, such as Articles 81 and 82 EC, applied to 
protect the competitive process as the means to achieve the competition policy 
goals set out in section I above, whereas sector-specifi c regulation consists of a 
more specifi c set of legislative provisions (which are usually greater in number 
than the provisions of competition law), detailing the rules of the competitive 
game in the sector concerned.
for certain exceptions, see Article 36 EC), the key provisions EC competition law, Article 81 
and 82 EC, cannot simply be ignored by the Community institutions. Th e ECJ has never 
allowed any economic sector, in particular not a regulated one, to obtain a complete exemption 
from the application of EC competition law, neither has the Council nor the Commission. See 
Larouche, n. 139, p. 10 and notes 44, 45 there. Th is contrasts the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in re Trinko, Verizon Communications v Law Offi  ces of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004), where the Court takes the view that where “a regulatory structure designed to deter 
and remedy competition harm exists,” there will only be little scope for competition law 
intervention. Th e Court holds that where a regulatory structure has been established to 
remedy the risks of competitive harm, the additional benefi ts from competition law 
enforcement are likely to be limited. Th e background to this decision is the fact that Trinko’s 
competition law based suit followed the local (telecommunication) exchange carrier Verizon’s 
agreeing to implement several regulatory remedies to cure its anticompetitive behaviour, 
which led the Court to comment on the relationship between competition law and sector-
specifi c regulation. For a discussion of this case, see N Petit, ‘Circumscribing the Scope of EC 
Competition Law in Network Industries? A Comparative Approach to the US Supreme Court 
Ruling in the Trinko Case’, (2004) Journal of Network Industries 347, 353.
142 See in greater detail, Part 1 Chapter 3 infra.
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Detailing what has been outlined above, the primary task of sector specifi c 
regulation is to accompany the sector in its transition from monopoly to 
competition, i.e. to introduce, create and promote competition – essentially 
through market growth and the decline of the incumbent. Once this is 
accomplished, i.e. competition has taken hold on the market, it is generally 
accepted that regulation should be rolled back and general competition law 
should become the only body of law governing such market. On the other hand, 
in network-bound industries such as energy supply, which is compelled to rely on 
physical networks with natural monopoly characteristics, general competition 
law on its own is unlikely to suffi  ce to safeguard the competitive structure of the 
energy markets.143 Th is is so because competition law can only work where 
competitive forces can fl ourish on their own with competition law remedying 
individual anti-competitive behaviour, i.e. by resurrecting and maintaining 
competition up- and downstream from the viewpoint of the energy networks. 
Energy networks, however, as the indispensable link between the up- and 
downstream energy supply markets, require permanent supervision, at least as 
long as they remain natural monopolies.144 Th us, in such circumstances sector-
143 See thus the “call” of the Commission for sector-specifi c regulation to step in should 
competition law enforcement tools on their own not suffi  ce to suffi  ciently remedy an allegedly 
anti-competitive situation. Slot/Skudder, n. 118, argue that “whilst the incumbents hold a 
dominant position, either individual or collective, competition law possess the tools to deal 
with behavioural issues such as refusal of access, predatory or excessive pricing (see chapter 2 
infra). However, as the policy of liberalization reaches its ultimate goal and these incumbents 
become merely market players like any other, and fall outside the realm of Article 82 EC, 
traditional competition law is left  with very little power to deal with the problems inherent in 
a network reliant industry as Article 81 requires collusion between two or more undertakings. 
Where, for example, a single operator retains ownership of the network infrastructure but 
access and interconnection regulation has reduced its market position to one of less than 
dominance, […] [this] would suggest that the removal of such regulatory measures would be 
inappropriate as conventional competition would not suffi  ce. Such a problem, however, may 
be dissipated in a situation where duplication of the base infrastructure is economically viable 
(such as in the mobile telecommunications market or the market for the telecommunications 
fi bre optic local loop).” Th is view is, however, diffi  cult to comprehend, at least in the case of 
energy supply. Given that, in contrast to the telecommunications sector, technological 
progress in energy transport infrastructure is slow and investment in parallel infrastructure is 
prohibitively uneconomical, the owner and/or operator of energy networks will always retain 
a dominant position and, thus, Article 82 EC will continue to remain applicable. Th is is, as 
will be seen in section B infra, a situation, in which the criteria established by the ECJ in 
Bronner (C-7/97 – Oscar Bronner v Mediaset, (1998) ECR I-7791) fi nd their natural 
application.
144 N. 128. Or, in other words, because of high and persistent barriers to entry, behind which 
eff ective competition is unlikely to develop and where the application of competition law 
alone does not appear to provide a solution. See P Larouche, ‘Coordination of European and 
Member State Regulatory Policy – Horizontal, Vertical and Transversal Aspects’, presentation 
at conference “Which Regulatory Authorities in Europe?”, Brussels, 18 and 19 March 2004, 
mimeo, p. 11.
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specifi c regulation will have to stay to supervise non-discriminatory and 
transparent access to the sector’s network infrastructures.145
But sector-specifi c regulation might also have to stay in order to safeguard non-
economic objectives. In case of energy supply, this is so because it is not only an 
economic sector but also and increasingly indispensable for the proper 
functioning of the economy as a whole and of society. Functioning well as an 
economic sector lies within the domain of competition law, certainly in the 
longer-term, but safeguarding its societal function and foundation for the proper 
working of the economy as a whole might very well exceed the possibilities 
off ered by a general regulatory framework such as competition law.146 Th is 
becomes apparent when recognizing the non-economic objectives accompanying 
sector-specifi c regulation, such as universal service and public service 
obligations.147
Accordingly, the more energy supply works competitively, the more its regulation 
can be reduced to deal with a few specifi c economic characteristics of network-
bound sectors in order to achieve the economic and non-economic objectives 
outlined before.
Two of these specifi c characteristics stand out, the fi rst being the natural 
monopoly character of energy networks, and the second being network eff ects148 
of energy supply, which can occur at a number of levels. First of all, in the case of 
a new entrant to the energy supply market, network eff ects can prevent a supplier 
from competing on the strength of its off erings. As with the networks, this 
phenomenon requires regulatory supervision because competition law tools only 
apply in individual cases. Secondly, network eff ects can result in certain 
customers being deprived of access to energy supply because of a distortion 
between the creation of value for all users (by, for example, reinforcing the energy 
145 Contra to the Commission’s assumption, comprehensive regulation similar to the one applied 
in the current vertically integrated setting of the energy supply sector is likely to be required 
aft er a possible ownership unbundling of the energy supply networks, see in greater detail 
chapter 2 infra. In economic sectors, which are not network-bound or dependent on natural 
monopolies, i.e. even in areas with legal monopolies such as in the postal services sector, 
regulation is intended to last only as long as market imperfections or technical issues require 
it, and should ideally only be a transitional regime.
146 Cf. Larouche, n. 117, p. 141.
147 Public service obligations sometimes also pursue economic objectives such as energy supply 
security, see already n. 118. Security of energy supply also is a conditio sine qua non for the 
competitiveness of the European economy.
148 Basically meaning that the value to consumers of purchasing a service increases with the 
number of other customers, see M Cave, ‘An Economic Analysis of Remedies in Network 
Industries’, in D Geradin (ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. 
Sector-specifi c Regulation, 2004, pp. 1–19, and Whish, n. 122, p. 9.
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network) and the recovery of costs from the additional customer to be connected. 
Here, the regulation of universal service provision receives its economic 
justifi cation.149 Th irdly, the absence of network eff ects at the transactional level 
due to problems of interconnection can have a negative impact on the performance 
of energy supply as a foundation for society and from a European perspective 
impede energy supply throughout the EU. What can already be indicated here is 
that transactional problems are likely to become more prevalent as the energy 
supply sector becomes more fragmented in the light of increased competition.
In furtherance of the general outline of the objectives of energy sector-specifi c 
regulation in section I above, the main objectives of EC energy sector-specifi c 
regulation, which mainly relates to the regulation of the energy networks150, can 
be described as151:
– To create and develop competition in an imperfect competitive situation 
characterized by natural energy network monopolies in order to facilitate 
market entry, by promoting competition of networks152 or at least competition 
of services up- and downstream in an internal market, which depend on the 
use of such networks.
– To ensure that all energy suppliers have equal access to any network 
infrastructure indispensable to their activities and that customers have equal 
access to any energy supplier, both groups on standardised terms and 
conditions for network access.
– To prevent the exploitation of (natural) monopoly power, in particular by way 
of access price regulation, which ensures effi  ciency gains and the promotion 
149 Similar Larouche, n. 117, p. 143, for the telecommunications sectors. It can generally be said 
that a competitive energy market would fail to supply energy to customers in uneconomical 
locations or with limited incomes. Th us, some form of regulatory intervention will always be 
needed to ensure that at least a minimum set of services, of a specifi ed quality and aff ordable 
price are made available to all users, irrespective of location or profi tability. Th e notions of 
aff ordability (and general availability) and quality are open to wide interpretation, which may 
lead to discrepancies between Member States and a consequent distortion of the playing fi eld 
between operators or energy suppliers, which may be subject to more onerous obligations in 
one country than in another and thereby put some at a competitive disadvantage, see Slot/
Skudder, n. 118.
150 And for the achievement of which unbundling instruments such as accounts, functional, 
operational and legal unbundling, are considered necessary instruments, see in greater detail 
chapter 3 infra.
151 See, for instance, Recitals 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 14, 22, 24 of the proposed Electricity Directive, n. 15.
152 Which because of the natural energy network monopolies is not realistic apart from in 
situations such as gas transmission where alternative networks exist, see Knieps, n. 54, or in 
the case of interconnectors, which compete with generation, see Balmert/Brunekreeft /Gabriel, 
n. 47.
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of network investment (for energy reliability or interconnection purposes)153, 
and to make access conditions transparent and non-discriminatory.154
– To restructure the energy supply sector in order to provide for the commercial 
independence of energy network operations from the up- and downstream 
businesses of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings155 (to safeguard 
or achieve the previously stated objectives and prevent cross-
subsidization).156
– To ensure that any imperfections in the market do not cause harm to 
consumers (to achieve which entails the provision of the universal service 
obligation)157 and requiring market participants in general and network 
operators in particular to meet objective and non-discriminatory quality and 
safety standards, and to require a fair, non-discriminatory and transparent 
licensing regime.158
153 Investment in generation and thus energy supply security (as defi ned here, see section I(1)) 
remains in the remit of national energy sector-specifi c regulation (see, however, also chapter 3 
section II infra), which is mainly concerned with creating the right fi nancial and structural 
incentives; the latter include preferred location and connection to the networks.
154 In terms of applying similar tariff s to similar transactions.
155 To date, the restructuring has reached a status where vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings must have implemented accounts unbundling and be operationally and legally 
unbundled, see Introduction.
156 On cross-subsidization see already n. 136. Accounts and legal unbundling as a result of 
current sector-specifi c regulation, which makes cost-accounting transparent, already makes 
cross-subsidization detectable. Moreover, the Dutch competition authority NMa (Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit) made it clear in May 2007 that even in a setting where energy supply 
undertakings are legally unbundled with the network operators not owning the network they 
operate (so-called lean or slim network operators), regulation is able to eff ectively prevent 
cross-subsidization from taking place, see NMa, ‘Onderzoeksrapport inzake de interne 
verrekenprijzen van energiebedrijven’, no. 102363 / 94 (report rendered in the context of 
Onderzoek Winst Energiebedrijven (no. 102362)), 2 May 2007, in particular p. 6.
157 See nn. 118 and 147 and accompanying text.
158 Given the politically sensitive nature of licensing or authorising operations (not to mention 
planning procedures and dealing with environmental concerns), which are partly due to 
diff erent legal traditions, Member States have retained control over the quality of market 
participants, which leaves them with considerable discretion in this respect; only minimum 
requirements are prescribed, if any, such as, for instance, for natural gas infrastructure in 
Article 4 of Gas Directive 2003. As regards energy network operations, this discretion, 
however, leads to diff erent licensing procedures and requirements in place in the Member 
States, which are potentially hampering the development of an internal market for energy and 
causing competitive disadvantages throughout the Community as well as retarding the 
development of cross-border interconnectors. In the UK, for example, the licence is the 
backbone of the regulatory process throughout the energy supply chain. Th ese licences impose 
extensive and detailed obligations upon the licensee, incorporating everything from public 
service obligations to specifi ed quality standards and price controls. By contrast, the systems 
adopted in the Netherlands and in Germany are much less comprehensive and intrusive, 
which only require permission to operate energy transport (transmission and distribution) 
networks).
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It follows from these objectives that, more generally, sector-specifi c regulation 
deals with market imperfections and controls market power, as is both the case 
in the network-bound energy supply industry where energy supply undertakings 
have to rely on energy networks (provided by others). As a result, it usually 
controls market access and market behaviour, and deals with technical issues. It 
may alter the existing situation in and structure of the market (as do mergers and 
merger remedies).159 Regulation can provide certainty in advance (if only given 
enough time to take eff ect), which facilitates or even abolishes negotiations 
between the parties involved. Regulators may need to strengthen the eff ectiveness 
of both competition law and regulatory rules by imposing detailed obligations 
for both infrastructure and services, such as, for instance cost accounting 
obligations in order to make cross-subsidization visible.
On the other hand, EC competition law has evolved such that it complements 
regulation on major regulatory issues, such as introducing a European style 
“essential facilities doctrine” in order to enable access to so-called essential 
facilities such as network infrastructures160, and broadening the non-
discrimination principle to cover preferential treatment of intra-fi rm dealings 
compared to dealings with competitors also, for instance, in the area of network 
access, and greater attention to pricing issues such as price squeezes and excessive 
pricing.161 An example of the latter has become apparent, for instance, in the 
Deutsche Telekom case discussed in the next section, which discusses competitive 
concerns in the context of the vertically integrated operation of energy networks 
where it seems that the competition law function of sector-specifi c regulation 
failed to work properly.
On the institutional side162, there is a further distinction between sector-specifi c 
regulation and competition law enforcement in that national regulatory 
159 In this respect, see also L Hancher, R de Vlam, ‘Mergers in the Electricity Sector – Relevant 
Markets and Related Issues’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law 
Reports I, 2004, Part 1 Chapter 3, B Eberlein, ‘Regulation by cooperation: the ‘third way’ in 
making rules for the internal energy market’, in P Cameron, (ed.), Legal Aspects of EU Energy 
Regulation – Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas across Europe, OUP, 
2005, ch. 4, and infra at nn. 169, 177 and accompanying text.
160 See in more detail Part 1 Chapter 2 section II infra.
161 See Larouche, n. 49, pp. 230, 231 et seq. Th e majority opinion in the U.S. case in re Trinko, see 
n. 141, also appears to accept the application of competition law in addition to regulation 
when it admits that where regulation exists its degree of completeness could in fact infl uence 
the interpretation of competition law, which could in a diff erent factual setting lead to a 
situation where competition law might apply on top of regulation. See Larouche, n. 139, pp. 8, 
9.
162 Th e fi rst obvious diff erence between European competition law and regulation on the 
institutional side is that only until recently, European competition law has been enforced 
primarily by the Commission, and since the entering-into-force of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
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authorities can normally take action in situations where competition authorities 
usually have no power to act. Th is is so because
– fi rst, regulation creates or involves the power to create and impose new legal 
duties, for the purposes for which the regulation was adopted and for which 
regulators have been given a direct and specifi c mandate by the legislature.163 
Regulation usually has aims, which are wider than those of competition law, 
and has methods which go beyond those of competition law, because 
regulators can (within the constraints of the legislation on which they are 
acting) impose whatever additional or new duties are thought necessary to 
promote the objectives specifi ed. Because regulators can impose new or 
additional obligations, they can impose very precise obligations. A 
competition authority on the other hand usually has no power to impose new 
duties but only applies and executes general competition law.164
– secondly, regulators can act ex ante, i.e. before companies behave in a certain 
way. Competition authorities normally enforce existing rules on market 
participants. Competition law gives power only to stop already identifi able 
illegal actions, while regulation gives power to alter an existing situation 
which is entirely legal, to promote regulatory objectives, which is the case, for 
instance, for unbundling and the prevention of cross-subsidies. When, for 
instance, the question arises whether access should be given to an 
infrastructure facility, which is said to be indispensable to all market 
participants, a regulator, if empowered to do so under legislation, may impose 
a duty to give access, and determine the precise terms of access. A competition 
authority, on the contrary must determine whether all the conditions for 
ordering access under competition law are fulfi lled165, and then determine 
the terms of access, usually on a non-discriminatory basis. Competition 
authorities are also able, however, to determine the precise terms of access in 
a situation where sector-specifi c regulatory experience exists, which can 
generally be said to be the case in energy supply markets, and where both 
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (“Modernization Regulation” or “Regulation 1/20003”), OJ 
2003 L 1/1, 4.1.2003, by national competition authorities. European regulatory policies within 
the framework of European Directives, to the contrary, have always and only been carried out 
by national authorities, which are obliged according to Article 10 EC to facilitate the 
achievement of the Community’s tasks and to abstain from any measure, which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.
163 Regulatory authorities nevertheless have to obey the rules contained in the EC Treaty, in 
particular those on competition law. By contrast, the mandate of competition law is very 
general and its execution thus follows an adjudicative process.
164 In order to impose precise conditions of access (see also Part 1 Chapter 2 infra at the discussion 
of the so-called essential facilities doctrine), the competition authority normally employs 
non-discrimination obligations to make the conditions precise.
165 See Part 1 Chapter 2 infra for a comprehensive discussion of this question.
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institutions, the regulatory authority and the competition authority, 
cooperate.166 In a dispute about alleged anti-competitive behaviour, which 
involves cross-subsidization167, a competition authority must usually decide 
on the basis of the cost accounting information available.168 A regulator can 
impose precise cost accounting requirements, and impose an estimated access 
price on a provisional basis until all relevant data is available.
Besides the diff erences between competition law and regulation, it has already 
been indicated above that their objectives overlap169, and a clear distinction as to 
their application is sometimes hard to draw, in particular when regulators and 
competition authorities are active in the same sector.170 For example, the recently 
established German Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), which is responsible for 
regulating energy networks crossing more than one German state, has partly 
assumed control over network access issues from the German Competition 
166 See infra nn. 170 and 175 and accompanying text.
167 See Part 1 Chapter 2 infra for more details on this question.
168 A competition authority can, however, also employ an external expert as a so-called 
monitoring trustee, which monitors the compliance of the undertaking concerned with the 
remedies imposed, see, for instaonly, CFI, T-201/04 – Microsoft  v Commission, (2007) ECR 
II-3601, nos 1251–1279, where, however, the condition for such an installation and the extent 
of powers conferred upon such a trustee were declared excessive because, amongst other 
reasons, they were deemed to exceed the powers the Commission can legitimately exercise 
itself. To what extent the undertaking on which such a monitoring trustee is imposed also has 
to bear the cost of such an appointment (including the remuneration of the trustee) was also 
subject to controversy, which might thus have to already be considered when determining 
adequate remedies or setting fi nes. Depending on which form of cooperation is customary 
between the competition authority and the sector-specifi c regulator, the Commission or 
national competition authority might also be able to instruct the regulatory authority to 
supervise the proper implementation of commitments entered into by the parties as a 
condition for the approval of their merger (in merger control proceedings) or for closing 
competition cases in competition proceedings based on Article 82 EC. With respect to such 
commitments, see Article 9 Regulation 1/2003. For an example of such a practice in the Italian 
telecommunications services sector, see Larouche, n. 144, pp. 17–8.
169 General competition law and sector-specifi c regulation might blur in merger cases where 
competition authorities might endeavour to restructure a certain market, thereby taking on a 
typical task of a (sector-specifi c) regulatory agency. See in this regard, Motta, n. 54, p. xviii (n. 
2); Hancher/de Vlam, n. 159; Larouche, n. 139, p. 13 with further references.
170 Primary EC law already ensures that regulators whose competencies are based either on 
secondary EC legislation such as Directives and/or on national law work together with the 
national competition authorities (NCAs) since regulators (NRAs) must avoid contradicting or 
undermining the primacy of EC competition law. Compliance with EC law is, however, not 
just about implementing secondary sector-specifi c legislation such as Directives but also 
ensuring the eff ectiveness (eff et utile) of EC (competition) law, a principle, which is not only 
central to ECJ case law (see only ECJ, C-26/62 – Van Gend & Loos, (1963) ECR I-12) but which 
also fl ows directly from primary EC law such as Article 10 EC. Usually, the Member States 
have implemented this through some sort of cooperation agreement between NRAs and 
NCAs, which typically assigns common cases to one of these authorities – usually the NRA, 
with rules to refer cases from one authority to the other accordingly. When dealing with such 
a case, the handling authority must consult with the other. See Larouche, n. 144, p. 14.
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Authority (Bundeskartellamt – BKartA). Accordingly, the provisions of the 
German Energy Industry Act (EnWG)171 relating to network connection and 
access172 take precedence173 over the national competition law provisions against 
abuses of a dominant position.174 Th e BKartA, however, is still responsible for the 
application of Article 82 EC, which might lead to its taking action against an 
energy network owner abusing its dominant position and ordering access 
according to Article 82 EC.175
In any event, what can be concluded is that the cooperation of NRAs and NCAs 
in regulated network-bound sector such as the energy supply sector, which is 
assumed to be comprehensively regulated, results in a division of labour as well 
as an exchange of expertise and information176 when draft ing solutions or 
remedies to a competition and regulatory issue, in particular during the 
preparation of such a decision where the opinion and input of the other authority 
is required.
Competition authorities, on the other hand, sometimes act in a regulatory 
manner when exercising their competition powers. Th e European Commission, 
for instance, acts in such a manner when it goes beyond what seems to be strictly 
171 Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaft sgesetz (Energy Industry 
Act) – EnWG) of 7 July 2005, BGBl. I, p. 1970 (3671).
172 Part III of the EnWG.
173 S. 111 EnWG, s. 130(3) GWB.
174 Ss 19 and 20 GWB.
175 See also Article 3 Regulation 1/2003 as regards the application of Article 82 EC by national 
competition authorities. Confl icts are thought to be avoided through a coordination 
mechanism in s. 58 EnWG. As regards the potential inherent in institutional situations like 
this to forum shopping, see N Petit, ‘Th e Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities 
alongside Competition Authorities: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion’, GCLC Working 
Paper 02/04. For alternative cooperation solutions and their inherent confl ict potentials in the 
Netherlands (DTe as energy regulator is a special subdivision of the competition authority 
NMa) and the UK (OFGEM as sector regulator has concurrent powers to the competition 
authority OFT in the area of competition law), see the corresponding chapters infra. See also 
Larouche, n. 144, p. 16, discussing questions of principle in relation to cooperation within 
such models.
176 Competition authorities, for instance, can use their investigative powers to gather market data 
and conduct the substantive assessment, whereas NRAs are better able to work out and 
implement remedies for market defi ciencies. In the case of the energy sector inquiry, see n. 3, 
the Commission went even further in also taking on the (regulator’s) role of working out the 
remedies, in that the Directorate General of Competition (DG COMP) under the lead of 
Commissioner Kroes conducted the investigation, which lead to the conclusion that there 
were serious competition law issues in the energy supply sector but closing the inquiry without 
any immediate enforcement action. Th e Directorate General responsible for energy issues 
(DG TREN) under the lead of Commissioner Piebalgs then draft ed the proposals of 
19 September 2007, which are described in the Introduction, which contain as one major 
remedy to the perceived malfunction of the energy supply markets the unbundling of 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings. For the telecommunication services sector, 
Larouche, n. 144, p. 17.
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necessary to resolve competition issues by using the merger clearance regime as a 
means to impose quasi-regulation on the energy sector via merger remedies.177
Th is “regulatory” attitude also becomes obvious in cases where the Commission 
enforces competition law even though regulatory authorities did not intervene 
where they could (should) have. In its 1998 Notice on Access Agreements178, the 
Commission clarifi es that “[g]iven the detailed nature of ONP rules [sector-
specifi c regulation of telecommunication services] and the fact that they may go 
beyond the requirements of Article 86 [now Article 82 EC], undertakings 
operating in the telecommunications sector should be aware that compliance 
with the Community competition rules does not absolve them of their duty to 
abide by obligations imposed in the ONP [i.e. regulatory] context and vice 
versa.”179 As Larouche180 puts it, the statement “vice versa”, which the Commission 
applied in its decision in Deutsche Telekom (discussed in the next subsection), 
“typically illustrates how the Commission emphasizes either the convergence or 
the diff erences between competition law and regulation, depending on what 
serves its purpose”, which basically means that the Commission is taking 
advantage of its position as EC competition authority for regulatory purposes, 
which, it is submitted, is problematic181 to say the least because regulation is a 
primarily legislative task (of the EU legislature), which is to be implemented by 
the Member States and enforced by national regulatory agencies.
Based on the observations made in this section, such institutional behaviour 
raises doubts as regards its legitimacy given the rather diff erent legislative 
mandate competition law enforcement agencies and regulators have in the EU, 
and given that the Commission as competition law authority is supposed to act, 
on the one hand, as a guardian of EU wide competition and market integration 
only, and on the other hand as an initiator of sector-specifi c regulation but not as 
177 It seems that the purpose of remedies has generally been to develop competition not just to 
restore it. See Hancher/de Vlam, n. 159, pp. 68–9. See also Eberlein, n. 159, p. 79, speaking of 
merger control as a “regulatory lever to promote domestic market opening and regulatory 
change.” In re Marathon (COMP/36.246), press releases IP/04/573 of 30 April 2006, IP/03/1129 
of 29 July 2003, IP/03/547 of 16 April 2003, IP/01/164 of 23 November 2001, the Commission 
has actually set up an access regime, which appears to be regulatory in character, cf. van der 
Woude, n. 43, p. 12.
178 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector – framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ 1998 C 265/2, 
22.8.1998, no. 22.
179 Emphasis added.
180 Larouche, n. 139, pp. 9, 10.
181 See Hancher/de Vlam, n. 177, and Ehlers, n. 7.
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the actual regulator.182 Whether this attitude of the Commission might now also 
extend to the application of Article 82 EC in cases of individual energy supply 
undertakings abusing their dominant position, and in particular with respect to 
the regulatory endeavours of Competition Commissioner Kroes to restructure 
the energy “marketplace” by way of unbundling the ownership of energy 
networks, will be subject of chapter 2. It has become clear in the ongoing EU 
energy policy debate that the Commission, and in particular Commissioner 
Kroes, holds the fi rm opinion that ownership unbundling of the energy 
transmission networks is the only solution to the systemic confl ict within 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings and the strategic investment 
withholding argument.
III. COMPETITION CONCERNS INVOLVING 
CONTROL OF ENERGY NETWORKS
In order to appreciate the potential necessity of ex post competition law 
enforcement in the market for access to vertically integrated energy networks, it 
is useful to recall what kind of competition concerns can arise from controlling 
such infrastructures.
As has been outline above, fi rms active in the upstream and/or downstream 
energy supply market, which do not own energy networks to feed in to and/or 
out of, need access to energy networks to supply their customers. Unless the 
terms of access are imposed by law, this dependency forces such fi rms into 
contractual relationships with the network operator, in which they are inevitably 
in a weaker bargaining position as they normally do not have the choice of 
alternative networks because of the natural monopoly characteristic of energy 
networks. Th is, by the way, is true no matter whether energy network operators 
are vertically integrated or independent. Because they operate a natural 
monopoly, network operators are, naturally, dominant undertakings so that 
Article 82 EC applies in the case of conduct which constitutes abuse183; they 
control access from upstream and to downstream energy supply markets.
182 Th e Commission, however, already “steers” the NRAs by way of guidelines, which become 
legally binding aft er passing the so-called comitology procedure, see n. 460 and, in greater 
detail, chapter 3 section III, in particular nn. 461 et seq. and accompanying text.
183 Knieps, n. 54, as regards monopolistic bottlenecks; only these are supposed to be dominant.
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Th e following types of abuses, in which fi rms controlling the operation of energy 
networks may become involved, can be broadly categorized:
One category of abuses are those which purport to protect and expand the 
(dominant) position of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings up- and 
downstream in order to exclude competitors from those markets.184 Such abuses 
are called exclusionary practices such as refusal to supply (also called refusal to 
deal), discrimination in the form of price or margin squeezes (as a special variant 
of predatory pricing) and exclusive dealing (here in the form of capacity 
reservation contracts).185 Such abuses are oft en facilitated by or connected to the 
strategic withholding of investment into energy transportation infrastructure.186
Th e other category of abuses is directed at customers up- and downstream in 
order to reap the benefi ts of dominance by exploiting them. Th ey are called 
exploitative practices. Excessive pricing and other unfair trading conditions are 
typical examples.187
184 Th e former incumbent vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, which still control 
energy networks and their operation, are usually still dominant in “their” former oft en legally 
protected service areas.
185 Capacity reservations by vertically integrated undertakings are not caught by Article 81 EC 
because the agreements are not concluded between undertakings, see Kjølbye, ‘Vertical 
Agreements’, in C Jones (ed.), EU Energy Law – Volume II: EU Competition Law & Energy 
Markets, 2nd ed., 2007, Part 3 Chapter 3 no. 3.304, who refers to the application of the “essential 
facilities doctrine” and Article 82 EC in this context. Th is will be discussed in chapter 2.
186 Brunekreeft , n. 9. In its fi nal report of 10 January 2007 on the sector inquiry concluded 
between June and November 2005, n. 3, the Commission identifi ed the following practices, 
some of which might be caught by Article 82 EC (only such practices relevant as potential 
abuses in the context of (vertically integrated) energy network operations are mentioned; 
“RTS” means that these practices are potentially a refusal to supply access to energy networks 
in a wider sense, see infra, “SIW” means strategic investment withholding, which causes 
congestion (scarce capacity) on energy networks and thus might lead to refusal of supply 
situations): discriminatory network access conditions (RTS), postponement of (necessary) 
network investments (SIW), both leading to vertical foreclosure [but see also the danger of 
vertical foreclosure resulting from the integration of generation and retail, see Th omas, n. 331, 
and accompanying text], insuffi  cient interconnecting infrastructure controlled by incumbents 
and investment therein (SIW), which together with insuffi  cient congestion management 
(RTS) hinder market integration, and insuffi  cient data on network capacity and asymmetrical 
access to such data. Also, the procurement of balancing capacity can be discriminatory 
(RTS).
187 It should be emphasized that dominance profi ts are a natural feature of dominance, and since 
dominance in itself is acknowledged but not prohibited under EC law, it is claimed that 
denigrating prices leading to such profi ts as excessive or unfair would be a negation of the 
very concept of dominance, see van der Woude, ‘Article 82 EC – Abuse of a dominant position’, 
in C Jones (ed.), EU Energy Law – Volume II: EU Competition Law & Energy Markets, 2005, 
Part 3 Chapter 4 no. 3.229, a concept, which already requires dominant undertakings to 
maintain the competitive process, an obligation, which curtails substantially their commercial 
freedom. What has to be borne in mind in this context is that as fi rms controlling energy 
network operations are per se dominant, they automatically assume a special responsibility 
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However, this distinction is not clear cut as, for instance, excessive prices charged 
by a vertically integrated energy network operator to competitors of its related 
downstream energy supply business normally have the same eff ect as denying 
access to the network, i.e. an outright refusal to deal, thus excluding competitors 
from competing on the downstream energy supply market.188
As already indicated, the only concerns dealt with here are those which can 
directly involve vertically integrated fi rms controlling the operation of energy 
networks (essential infrastructures without which access from upstream and to 
downstream markets is not possible), and it is only such concerns, which the 
European Commission considers worth targeting with the structural remedy of 
ownership unbundling.189 Th is means that the main focus here will be on 
situations of refusal to supply or, in other words, direct and indirect or disguised 
(meaning conduct which has a similar, vertically foreclosing eff ect as a) refusal to 
grant access to energy networks, which would fall foul of Article 82 EC190; the 
latter kind of refusal also includes unequal access conditions.191 Th e other abuses 
under European law and jurisprudence as regards their behaviour in the markets they are 
active in. Article 82 is a direct refl ection of this special responsibility of dominant fi rms in 
that commercial practices pursued by those fi rms are at times classifi ed as abusive where the 
same practices would not be so in the absence of market power. See also n. 202, and van der 
Woude, ibid., no. 3.206.
188 Van der Woude, ibid., no. 3.201.
189 See fi nal report on sector inquiry, n. 3. See also van der Woude, ‘Article 82 EC – Abuse of a 
dominant position’, in C Jones (ed.), EU Energy Law – Volume II: EU Competition Law & 
Energy Markets, 2nd ed., 2007, Part 3 Chapter 4 no. 3.428.
190 See also van der Woude, n. 187, as regards relationship between Articles 81 and 82 EC.
191 Unequal access conditions are actually more oft en observed than straight forward refusals to 
supply. Th e sector inquiry report observes vertically integrated network operators granting 
priority access to affi  liated undertakings (no. 168 of the report) or delaying network 
connections to the detriment of new entrants (no. 493). Th ey may also charge prices or demand 
payment conditions that diff er from the terms applied to affi  liated undertakings (no. 196), 
which are, however, normally prevented by ex ante tariff  regulation. Services off ered by 
network operators to third party undertakings appear less advantageous than those off ered to 
affi  liates, which includes data for customers willing to switch suppliers and discriminatory 
procurement of balancing (generation) capacity by transmissions system operators (TSOs) 
which off er affi  liated generators a secure outlet (no. 156), which is one example of vertical 
foreclosure [for vertical foreclosure resulting from the integration of generation and retail, see 
Th omas, n. 331, and accompanying text] of upstream competitors wanting to feed generated 
electricity into the electricity networks. Further, a lack of transparent access conditions is 
generally complained about (no. 510), in particular with regard to network capacity; the lack 
of transparency is aggravated by the fact that vertically integrated undertakings possess a 
systemic information advantage. Th e report fi nally observes that integrated network operators 
appear not to have the same incentives to invest in additional transport capacity as non-
integrated operators. With respect to the last aspect, see, however, Brunekreeft , n. 9, with 
respect to the argument of strategic investment withholding and its shortcomings, and Th e 
Brattle Group, ‘Independent System Operator for EU Energy Markets’, Current Topics in 
Energy Markets & Regulations, Issue 01, 2007, p. 3, with respect to the danger of overinvestment 
by non-integrated ISOs.
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mentioned below, i.e. exclusive dealing and discrimination in the form of price 
squeezing, can occur separately but usually arise in the context of refusal of 
supply situations.
Th e following types of abusive behaviour can thus be said to be the usual suspects 
in the context of vertically integrated energy network operation and the most 
relevant to this work:
– refusal to deal, here in terms of supply, which is elaborated in more detail in 
chapter 2. In the context of a network operator granting access to the network 
it operates, a refusal to supply the access required means that this creates a 
barrier for competitors in a related up- or downstream market to entry to or 
exit from that market192, consequently weakening or eliminating competition 
in that market.193 Such a refusal does not necessarily mean outright denial of 
192 In the context of natural monopolies or monopolistic bottlenecks, see n. 54, access to such 
facilities must be indispensable for providing complementary goods and services upstream or 
downstream in the supply chain. See Knieps, n. 54, p. 174, Motta, n. 54, p. 66. In re Sea 
Containers v Stena Sealink, n. 50, the Commission states in no. 66 that “[a]n undertaking in a 
dominant position may not discriminate in favour of its own activities in a related market. 
Th e owner of an essential facility which uses its power in one market in order to protect or 
strengthen its position in another related market, in particular, by refusing to grant access to a 
competitor, or by granting access on less favourable terms than those of its own services, and 
thus imposing a competitive disadvantage on its competitors, infringes Article 86 (now 
Article 82 EC) (emphasis added).”
193 Th e Commission has not yet rendered offi  cial decisions on access refusals in the energy sector. 
When analysing the Commission Decision (2004/33/EC) of 27 August 2003 (Case 
COMP/37.685 – GVG/FS (“Georg”)), OJ 2004 L 11/17, 16.1.2004, which concerns access refusals 
in the Italian railway sector, it appears, however, that the Commission is likely to take a similar 
approach as the Dutch competition authority NMa in the Sep case (decision of 26 August 
1999; case no. 650/Hydro Energy B.V. vs Sep), which fi ned SEP, the then incumbent electricity 
generator and operator of the Dutch transmission networks, in 1998 for refusing network 
access to Norsk Hydro, which wanted to import electricity into the Dutch market. See in 
greater detail, van der Woude, n. 189, nos 3.418 et seq. In another, energy related context, the 
Commission stated (‘Role of interconnectors in the electricity market. A competition 
perspective’, MEMO/01/76, 12 March 2001) that there was “an economic incentive for the 
Network Operator to discriminate in favour of the producer/supplier with which it is vertically 
integrated […]. Th e existence of this incentive creates a risk of discrimination actually taking 
place. Such a situation is addressed by the EC competition rules (emphasis added).” An 
important case with can be said to have value as a precedent for the energy sector is actually 
the Marathon case, n. 177, which will play an important role for the elaborations to follow. 
Marathon, a U.S. energy supply undertaking trying to enter the European gas supply market 
as newcomer, complained about pipeline access conditions. Th e settlement reached between 
the Commission and several energy supply undertakings of France, the Netherlands and 
Germany included arrangements for an increased transparency of access conditions; it was 
inter alia agreed to publish pipeline capacity on the undertakings’ websites, to grant non-
discriminatory access to storage facilities and to impose so-called “use-or-lose-it” obligations 
on affi  liated trading businesses, meaning that unused pipeline capacity is made available in 
the market and not hoarded. Further, gas release programs were implemented, and the 
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access for a certain fi rm but can also take the form of charging excessive 
prices or imposing unreasonable trading conditions194, which render it 
economically impossible to compete in related markets. In more general 
terms, there are mainly two reasons why a dominant fi rm would refuse to 
supply customers: either to protect its activities in the market it dominates195 
or, as is the case for vertically integrated energy network operators, to protect 
the potentially competitive position of affi  liates in a related market.196
– exclusive dealing, which can take various forms, the most obvious of which in 
the current context are so-called (energy network) capacity reservation 
agreements by (usually incumbent) dominant energy supply undertakings 
with (usually vertically integrated) energy network operators.197 Th e rationale 
behind such exclusive dealing agreements is to prevent competitors up- or 
downstream from entering the market, increasing their market shares or 
challenging the dominant fi rm’s position in the relevant market. Such 
likelihood of implicit access refusals signifi cantly reduced by improving the handling of 
access requests and eliminating response times through the introduction of online booking 
procedures. Th e undertakings also agreed to introduce entry and exit capacity reservations, 
which means that capacity need only be reserved at such points, and not, as previously, for 
each pipeline section along the contracted transport route, which can amount to having to 
contract with a large number of pipeline operators, depending on how many sections were 
operated by diff erent operators.
194 Article 82(a) EC provides that imposing unfair purchasing or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions is prohibited. Because dominant undertakings are, according to the ECJ, 
able to behave to a considerable extent independently from external competitive pressure, 
customers and suppliers, such independence implies that the dominant undertaking is able to 
set prices as it sees fi t. As Article 82 does not provide any criteria for determining the existence 
of such exploitation or unfair practices, in United Brands, C-27/76, (1978) ECR I-207, the ECJ 
used the economic value of the products or services in question as a criterion for defi ning 
prices as excessive (i.e. prices which have no reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product supplied). Th e Court suggested that one criterion for the determination of the 
economic value of a product is not only to refer to the prices of competing products but also to 
the diff erence between the costs actually incurred by the dominant undertaking and the price 
actually charged.
195 In United Brands, ibid., the dominant fi rm terminated the supply of its long-standing 
distributor because it began selling bananas of a competitor of the dominant fi rm.
196 In Commercial Solvents (ECJ, C-6/73 – ICI & Commercial Solvents v Commission, (1974) ECR-
223), the dominant fi rm terminated the supply of raw materials to one of its customers in 
order to compete with this customer in the downstream market for goods containing these 
materials. Th is was seen as the refusal to supply an essential input resulting in the leveraging 
of the dominant fi rm’s monopoly in one market to the downstream market.
197 See, for instance, ECJ, C-17/03 – VEMW, APX en Eneco N.V. v DTE, (2005) ECR I-10805, 
discussed by L. Hancher, ‘Case C-17/03, VEMW, APX en Eneco N.v. v. DTE’, case note, (2006) 
Common Market Law Review (CML Rev.) 1125. For a more general outline of exclusive 
dealing obligations, also with respect to exclusive purchasing agreements in the context of 
protecting investments in new generation capacity and LTCs for gas supply, see van der 
Woude, n. 187, nos 3.202–4. See also ECJ, C-393/92 – Almelo, (1994) ECR I-1477, and European 
Commission, ‘Commission closes investigation on Spanish company GAS NATURAL’, 
IP/00/297, press release of 27.03.2000. See also Kühne, n. 137.
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contracts are not only problematic with respect to their oft en long duration 
but even more, which is oft en the case, if reserved capacity is not used.198 A 
wide-spread practice, this is a highly topical issue whose legitimacy is 
currently debated in the context of investments in cross-border 
interconnectors199, either in the form of regulated interconnection when built 
by transmission network operators, or in the form of merchant transmission 
investment.200
– discrimination and exclusionary pricing practices: Article 82(c) EC prescribes 
that dominant fi rms are not allowed to discriminate between their customers 
if a diff erent treatment causes these customers competitive harm in the 
market where they operate.201 From this it follows that unjustifi ed price 
discrimination by dominant fi rms is prohibited because of their special 
responsibility to safeguard a fair competitive process in related markets, 
which is based on the rationale that dominance, which in itself is already 
constraining competition, should not lead to a further constraint of 
competition.202 One of the objectives of Article 82 EC therefore seems to be 
198 Th is type of conduct also reduces output, which is covered by Article 82(b) EC, see van der 
Woude, n. 189, no. 3.399.
199 See also Talus/Wälde, n. 47. In 2001, the Commission forced the British and French 
transmission network operators owning the UK-French interconnector (see also Part 2 
Chapter 5 on Great Britain), to amend its access regime. Th e French incumbent EDF lost its 
exclusive capacity reservation without any reservations made for anyone else, and it was 
ensured that there was fair access to the French transmission grid. Capacity of the 
interconnector is now allocated through auctions. Th e Commission held that reserving 
capacity in favour of certain companies was discriminatory and amounted to an abuse of the 
dominant position held by the two transmission network operators. See European 
Commission, ‘UK-French electricity interconnector opens up, increasing scope for 
competition’, IP/01/341, press release of 12 March 2001. Capacity allocated in so-called open 
season procedures (see nn. 290, 1331), auctions or else nowadays usually become subject to the 
so-called use-it-or-lose-it obligation, which means that unused or un-contracted capacity 
must be sold on the market under transparent and non-discriminatory conditions.
200 See G Brunekreeft , ‘Marked-based investment in electricity transmission networks: 
controllable fl ow’, (2004) Utilities Policy 269, and ‘Regulatory issues in merchant transmission 
investment’, (2005) Utilities Policy 175. See also Talus/Wälde, n. 47. For the issue of growing 
competition between electricity generation and transmission, see Pollitt, (2007) 
Intereconomics, n. 37, and Balmert/Brunekreeft /Gabriel, n. 47.
201 Th ey are thus bound by an obligation of non-discrimination, which means that a dominant 
fi rm must treat third parties equally by way of off ering similar terms and conditions. See ECJ, 
C-333/94 P – Tetra Pak II v Commission, (1996) ECR I-5951; Larouche, n. 49, pp. 218–230; de 
Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, n. 54, p. 6. But note that excessive pricing alone seems to have 
never been suffi  cient to hold an undertaking responsible under Article 82 EC. So far, only in 
United Brands, n. 194, has excessive pricing played a signifi cant role. See also D Geradin, N 
Petit, ‘Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: Th e Need for a case-by-case 
Approach’, GCLC Working Paper 07/05, College of Europe, and ‘Price Discrimination under 
EC Competition Law: Another Antitrust Doctrine in Search of Limiting Principles?’, TILEC 
Discussion Paper DP 2006–023, August 2006.
202 In the EU, market dominance of undertakings does not in itself contravene EC competition 
law; only in exceptional circumstances where public undertakings are involved such as in 
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the protection of competition up- or downstream against potential 
repercussions stemming from a dominant position in a related market.203
Th e prohibition of discriminatory behaviour in order to protect competition in 
related markets becomes of particular importance if a fi rm controlling networks 
and thus being dominant in energy transportation is also present in such a related 
market because then the dominant fi rm has the incentive to grant its business 
there more favourable terms and condition than competing fi rms. In the case of 
price discrimination, should the price be a signifi cant component of the costs of 
products off ered in that related market, such discriminatory conduct could 
ultimately lead to the monopolization of that related market by driving existing 
competitors out of that market of by raising entry barriers prohibitively. Article 
82 EC therefore requires dominant undertakings to deal with their operations 
in related markets at arm’s length, which naturally poses a particular constraint 
on vertically integrated undertakings. Th us, vertically integrated energy network 
operators, which are “naturally” dominant in the market of energy 
transportation204, have a duty to treat their affi  liates in the upstream energy 
production or downstream energy supply markets at arm’s length, i.e. to provide 
them with energy transportation on the same terms and conditions as those 
applied to equivalent non-integrated undertaking requesting access.205
ECJ, C-163/96 – Silvano Raso, (1998) ECR I-533, and C-320/91 – Corbeau, (1993) ECR I-2533, 
because of the structure of an undertaking, does dominance result in the abuse of such 
dominance as soon as such an undertaking acts in the market. Th is must be distinguished 
from vertically integrated undertakings based around a monopolistic core such as energy 
networks whose ownership of the networks creates an inherent or systemic risk of abuse of 
their dominant position in the market for access to these networks for the benefi t of their up- 
and downstream businesses. Dominant undertakings, however, carry a special responsibility 
“not to allow [their] conduct to impair undistorted competition on the common market”, see 
ECJ, C-322/81 – Michelin v Commission, (1983) ECR I-3461. See also van der Woude, n. 187. 
As a consequence, it can be said that Article 82 restricts the conduct of dominant undertakings 
in that a certain unilateral course of action might be permissible when committed by 
competitors but can be prohibited when committed by a dominant undertaking. According to 
the Court of First Instance (CFI), in specifi c circumstances, undertakings in a dominant 
position may be deprived of the right to adopt a course of conduct or to take measures, which 
are not in themselves abuses, see CFI, T-111/96 – ITT Promedia v Commission, (1998) ECR 
II-2937.
203 Van der Woude, n. 187, no. 3.216. See also Geradin/Petit, n. 201. Another issue arising in the 
context of discriminatory conduct of dominant undertakings is the way such fi rms can 
respond to aggressive price competition, i.e. where competitors off er, for instance, specifi c 
customers advantageous terms and conditions in order to poach them from the incumbent. In 
Irish Sugar, T-228/97, (1999) ECR II-2969, no. 189, the Court of First Instance (CFI) emphasized 
that “the protection of the commercial position of an undertaking in a dominant position […] 
must, […] in order to be lawful, be based on criteria of economic effi  ciency and consistent 
with the interests of consumers.”
204 See n. 54 and accompanying text.
205 Van der Woude, n. 187, no. 3.216. Two other potentially discriminatory situations, in which 
dominant fi rms, and more particularly in the current context, independent energy network 
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In energy markets, confl icts regularly occur with regard to non-discriminatory 
access to (vertically integrated) energy network infrastructure. Energy 
infrastructure oft en is constrained in its capacity or congested, i.e. the physical 
energy network can only transport certain volumes or quantities of electricity or 
gas. Th ese confl icts are exacerbated by (already mentioned) exclusive reservations 
of energy network capacity.206
Discriminatory pricing issues have rarely been dealt with in isolation by the 
Commission or the European Courts. It has usually been dealt with in the context 
of other allegedly abusive behaviour of dominant undertakings, oft en in the 
context of predatory pricing207, which is the classic example of exclusionary 
pricing, or, more relevant in the context of network industries, a special variant 
of predatory pricing, the so-called price or margin squeeze, which raises the 
dominant (vertically integrated) undertaking’s rival’s cost.208 In an energy 
network setting, a margin squeeze can occur if the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking is not only present on the energy transportation market 
operators, such as in the UK privately held National Grid plc., in the Netherlands state-owned 
TenneT, the regulated interconnectors between the UK and the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands and Norway, and the Finnish-Baltic interconnector (see in greater detail infra, 
chapter 3 and Part 2 Chapters 5 and 6 on Great Birtain and the Netherlands) can fi nd 
themselves are (i) price discrimination between non-competing customers on the one hand, 
which is in principle not forbidden by Article 82 EC (and which can, if at all, play a role with 
regard to geographical price discrimination where customers in diff erent geographical 
locations have to pay diff erent prices. Since the creation of a single market and market 
integration are the overarching objectives of the EU, conduct which divides existing markets, 
might under certain (but rare) circumstances be caught by Article 82 EC. Th e only price 
discrimination case decided so far by the ECJ is in United Brands, n. 194, where it was ruled 
that a dominant undertaking should not exploit diff erences in geographical markets in that 
they may not unjustifi edly charge diff erent prices depending on what the diff erent geographical 
markets can bear. See, critical in particular with regard to the United Brands case, van der 
Woude, n. 187, no. 3.217) and (ii) in times of scarce resources where a dominant fi rm is forced 
to allocate products between its customers.
206 See, for instance, ECJ, C-17/03, n. 197. See also the Commission Staff  Working Document on 
the decision C-17/03 of 7 June 2005 of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
‘Preferential Access to Transport Networks under the Electricity and Gas Internal Market 
Directives’, SEC(2006) 547, Brussels, 26.4.2006. See also nn. 459, 461, 462 and accompanying 
text with respect to the guidelines annexed to the 2003 Electricity and 2005 Gas Regulations, 
which deal with issues such as congestion management. Remedies for such reservations are 
so-called use-it-or-lose-it obligations (see also n. 199), which are also used in exemptions 
granted for new (merchant or regulated) transmission, (explicit or implicit) auctions and 
open-market coupling. As regards these remedies, see in greater detail chapter 3 infra.
207 See Willems/Ehlers, n. 2: Predatory pricing is the undercutting of the prices of competitors by 
off ering prices, which are below costs. Such pricing policy only makes sense if the losses 
incurred are likely to be recovered at a later stage. Th is is the case if barriers to entry make 
renewed market entry of competitors driven out of the market as a result of predatory pricing 
unlikely, which is normally the case if market entry requires high sunk costs (van der Woude, 
n. 187, no. 3.221), such as building electricity generating plants.
208 See Willems/Ehlers, n. 2.
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through its energy network operation but also on the downstream supply market 
where energy can only be supplied if received from the energy producer through 
the energy network input. Th us, the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertaking’s rivals on the downstream market depend on the vertically 
integrated energy network operator for its input, i.e. the transporting of energy. 
Consequently, vertically integrated energy network operators may be inclined to 
charge competitors of their downstream energy supply business high energy 
transmission or distribution fees whilst the downstream business, which does 
not have to bear the same high level of charges, off ers customers and end 
consumers low prices downstream. Its competitors, however, have to compete 
with such low prices whilst being forced to pay higher energy transportation 
charges. Th is situation obviously aff ects the profi t margins that these competitors 
are able to achieve downstream. Th erefore, this pricing behaviour is called price 
or margin squeeze.209
A good example to illustrate margin squeezing but also the relationship between 
competition law intervention and sector-specifi c regulation is the still contested 
decision of the European Commission in re Deutsche Telekom (DT)210 where it 
seems that the competition law function of sector-specifi c regulation failed to 
work properly.
Th e Commission’s decision concerned the prices charged by DT to its competitors 
and consumers between the end of 1998 and 2002 for access to its local loops in 
Germany. Th e local loop is the physical circuit between the consumer’s premises 
and the telecommunications operator’s local switch; competitors need access on 
adequate and non-discriminatory terms to the local loop in order to off er retail 
services to consumers and compete with the incumbent. In March 1999, several 
competitors claimed that the prices charged for competitors’ access on the 
wholesale local loop market were higher than the prices charged to DT’s own 
subscribers on the retail market. It was thus claimed that DT prevented 
competitors from competing in the retail local loop market and deterred new 
entrance into the market, thus squeezing the profi t margin of DT’s competitors 
because even if they are as effi  cient as the infrastructure owner DT on the retail 
209 See, in greater detail, G Brunekreeft , E van Damme, P Larouche, V Sorana, ‘On the law and 
economics of price squeeze in telecommunications markets’, TILEC Report, February 2005, 
and D Geradin and R O’Donoghue, ‘Th e Concurrent Application of Competition Law and 
Regulation: the Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’, GCLC 
Working Paper 04/05, College of Europe. See also the European Commission’s Notice on the 
application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, n. 
178.
210 Commission Decision (2003/707/EC) of 23 May 2003 (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 
– Deutsche Telekom AG), OJ 2003 L 263/9, 14.10.2003, confi rmed by CFI, T-271/03 – Deutsche 
Telekom v Commission, 10 April 2008, not yet reported (appeal to ECJ, C-280/08, pending).
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or downstream market, they would have to bear higher costs of access than the 
incumbent’s own retail business. DT, however, argued that its wholesale local 
loop access tariff s had been approved by the German regulator, and that, 
therefore, the Commission was not entitled to step in against an undertaking 
whose charges were regulated at national level.211 Instead, if a violation of EC law 
was found, the Commission should only be allowed to initiate infringement 
proceedings against Germany according to Article 226 EC. Th e Commission 
rejected DT’s defence stating that “the competition rules may apply where the 
sector-specifi c legislation does not preclude the undertaking it governs from 
engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition.”212 Moreover, the Commission emphasized that despite regulation, 
DT retained a commercial discretion allowing it to restructure its tariff s in a way 
as to put an end to the price squeeze213, for instance by either increasing its retail 
charges or by raising prices of other non-regulated charges. Th e Commission 
therefore found that DT’s margin squeeze was an imposition of unfair selling 
prices within the meaning of Article 82(a) EC.214 Against the background of what 
has been established in chapter 1 above, the Commission by applying Article 82 
EC in the DT case despite the actions taken by the German regulator on the basis 
of German telecommunications law, which is largely based on EC Directives, and 
211 Th e German regulator seemed not to have resolved an obvious problem. It had approved 
wholesale unbundled local loop tariff s to be paid by DT’s competitors downstream, which 
were higher than the equally regulated retail tariff s for monthly subscription to DT’s network 
by end users.
212 Commission Decision, n. 210, no. 91.
213 Commission Decision, n. 210, no. 57. Th us assuming the special responsibility it holds as a 
dominant undertaking under Article 82 EC, which is not to disturb the competitive process.
214 DT was fi ned aft er taking the prior regulation into account, not as a justifi cation of its 
behaviour but as a mitigating factor for the calculation of the fi ne, see Commission Decision, 
n. 210, no. 212. It has also been argued that the margin squeeze test used by the Commission 
was fl awed, because, for instance, it artifi cially split the monthly subscription from the actual 
call charges, with the result that the German regulator might aft er all not have been mistaken. 
See in greater detail, Larouche, n. 139, p. 7. Larouche, ibid., p. 8, further argues that the 
Commission, instead of convicting DT, should have taken legal action against Germany. 
Given that the wholesale unbundled local loop tariff s were rightly regulated on a cost-
orientated basis, the cause for the margin squeeze was obviously the retail tariff s, which were 
too low. Th e reason for the latter was that Germany had failed to carry out tariff  rebalancing 
ahead of liberalization in 1998 thereby breaching its obligations under Commission Directive 
90/388/EC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, 
OJ 1990 L 192/10, 24.7.1990. Accordingly, the Commission could have opened infringement 
proceedings under Article 226 EC against Germany for not having properly implemented 
secondary EC law. In practice, though, such infringement proceedings would have been rather 
ineff ective as a remedy because in the case of a conviction, Germany would have had to initiate 
regulatory action to remove the margin squeeze, which would have been likely to take much 
longer than bringing a competition law action against DT forcing it to remedy the situation 
swift ly itself in order to avoid further litigation including possible damage claims by 
competitors.
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albeit quasi-regulatory in nature, simply obeyed the superiority of EC competition 
law over sector-specifi c regulation.215
Coming back to predatory pricing, or more specifi cally, price squeezing, vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings, which control energy networks and are 
thus dominant in the market for network access, can use the profi ts made with 
its network business to cross-subsidize the lower prices of their businesses in 
upstream energy wholesale markets or downstream energy supply markets, 
which are not abusive as long as they are not below incremental costs.216 But 
cross-subsidies in themselves are not illegal according to Article 82 EC.217 Th us, 
the eradication of cross-subsidies in the quest for a more “level playing fi eld” for 
competitors not owning energy networks cannot be accomplished by competition 
law, at least not directly. Anticompetitive conduct such as predatory pricing or 
price squeezing, in which context cross-subsidies can also occur, can only be 
remedied in individual cases under competition law.
Cross-subsidies can thus only be controlled and prevented by unbundling 
measures such as accounts and/or legal unbundling and proper supervision by 
sector-specifi c regulatory authorities with a corresponding legislative mandate 
such as the 2003 Energy Directives.218
Th e competition concerns mentioned here are oft en parts of the direct or indirect 
refusal to supply network access to the energy networks, which is indispensable 
for upstream energy producers or wholesalers to fulfi l contracts with energy 
suppliers and for downstream energy suppliers. Together with strategic 
investment withholding, they are particularly relevant in times of energy network 
215 Irrespective of any more adequate course of action such as initiating proceedings against 
Germany according to Article 226 EC.
216 See in greater detail Willems/Ehlers, n. 2, with further references.
217 Cross-subsidies, which do not contravene Article 82 EC, may still be state aid and thus illegal 
according to Article 87 and 88 EC. See also L Hancher and J Buendia Sierra, ‘Cross-
Subsidization and EC Law’, (1998) CML Rev. 901, and G Abbamonte, ‘Cross-Subsidisation 
and Community Competition Rules: Effi  cient Pricing Versus Equity’, (1998) E.L. Rev. 414, the 
fi rst also with respect to the issue of state-aid. More generally on cross-subsidization in EC 
law, L Hancher, ‘Cross Subsidization in EC Law’, in L Hancher (ed.), Competition and Security 
of Supply in the EC Energy Market, 1995, pp. 113–130.
218 Th e Dutch competition authority NMa established in May 2007, n. 156, that it is indeed 
possible in the current regulatory setting of legally unbundled energy supply undertakings 
that cross-subsidies can be prevented from taking place. Th e 2003 Energy Directives explicitly 
seek to induce regulators to prevent cross-subsidization, see Willems/Ehlers, n. 2, with further 
references.
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congestion, i.e. when capacity is scarce, an issue, which has climbed high on the 
political agenda in the context of interconnectors.219
219 Th e reinvestment of profi ts deriving from so-called congestion charges into interconnection, 
for example is one explicit option for using these profi ts, see Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of 
26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, 




EC COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IN VERTICALLY INTEGRATED ENERGY 
NETWORK OPERATIONS
Aft er outlining the rationale behind European energy network regulation, which 
consists of general competition law and energy supply sector regulation, and 
given the applicability in principle of EC competition law parallel to ex ante 
sector-specifi c regulation220, it will now have to be established whether full 
structural unbundling or legal ownership unbundling (or divestiture) of energy 
transportation networks as envisaged by Competition Commissioner Kroes can 
be accomplished in the European Union by way of (general) competition law 
enforcement.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the assumption that as a result of the liberalization eff orts of the European 
Union the behaviour and structure of the European energy supply sector as a 
220 Th e concurrent application of regulation and competition is prone to produce a confl ict 
between the goal of competition law to protect consumer welfare and the aim of regulation to 
create or maintain equal opportunities (“level playing fi eld”) for fi rms when tey are reliant on 
competitors, which occupy a dominant position because they own essential inputs. Geradin/
O’Donoghue, n. 209, p. 64, thus suggest that such a potential confl ict can be resolved by 
applying Article 82 EC as primary EC law to take precedence over regulation. If, however, it is 
believed that consumer welfare can be increased in the long run by promoting entry of fi rms, 
which are less effi  cient than the dominant fi rm, regulation must be used to achieve this, not 
competition law.
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typical network industry221 is comprehensively regulated222, the scope and 
need, if any, for the European Commission to mandate the structural remedy of 
legal ownership unbundling (in the form of forced divestiture) of energy 
networks (gas pipelines and electricity grids) from vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings will be examined in turn. Based on Article 82 EC, such a 
structural remedy would be adopted in individual cases as a corrective 
competition law based measure ex post. Th e aim of such a measure would be to 
prevent vertically integrated energy network operators, which hold a naturally 
dominant position, from (abusively) foreclosing access by up- and downstream 
competitors of their affi  liated up- or downstream businesses to the corresponding 
markets, which the Commission claims is done by unlawful (de facto) refusal to 
supply the energy network input (access to their networks), which is 
indispensable to operate on these markets223, and by not investing into the 
development of the networks (strategic investment withholding).
221 By following the defi nition of Cave, n. 148, p. 1, such networks exhibit one ore more of the 
following characteristics: (1) economies of scale, over a range of outputs substantial in relation 
to the demand as a whole; as demand is location specifi c, this oft en takes the particular form 
of an economy of density, (2) economies of scope, and/or (3) demand-side network eff ects, 
carrying the implication that the value to consumers of purchasing the service increases with 
the number of other customers. See also Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37. Th e traditional 
regulated industries, i.e. telecommunications, energy, rail services and water display these 
characteristics in various ways, see also Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, ibid. To call postal 
services a network industry seems problematic, see P de Bijl, E van Damme, P Larouche, 
‘Towards a liberalised postal market’, TILEC Report, Tilburg University, August 2003. Th ey 
all have, additionally, in common that they consist of a number of separable production 
processes. See also P Joskow, R Noll, ‘Th e Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, 
Electricity, and Other Network Industries’, (1999) Stanford Law Review 1249.
222 Which does not say anything about whether the regulation is defi cient in places. 
Comprehensive regulation in the context given does not only include the approval and 
supervision of (the methodology of) the energy network access (charges) terms and condition 
but also the unbundling of the energy supply industry up to and including legal unbundling, 
which means accounts, operational, functional and legal unbundling, see already supra in the 
Introduction. Accordingly, cross-subsidization as one issue (which is, however, not too 
important anymore, see NMa, n. 156, and Willems/Ehlers, n. 2) to consider in the (regulatory) 
establishment of a level playing fi eld, see supra chapter 1, has become visible. Th e legitimacy of 
the unbundling measures already in place is not subject of this work; the existence of these 
unbundling measures plays a role in order to appreciate whether competition law based 
ownership unbundling is necessary; the existence of such unbundling measures is also of 
relevance infra where the legitimacy of further unbundling legislation is discussed.
223 Refusal of supply and what is perceived as such is discussed in chapter 1 section III. Th ere will 
be no discussion of the ex ante or preventive merger control application of competition law (in 
this respect, see the EC Merger Regulation, n. 19), which would be applicable in the context of 
proposed mergers of energy supply undertakings. In merger control proceedings, the parties 
to a proposed merger can if so “requested” by the European Commission “voluntarily” 
commit to divesting parts of their businesses in order to obtain clearance of their merger 
plans; this is voluntary to the extent that the merging parties have a choice of either off ering 
commitments such as divesting certain parts of their businesses in order to ease competition 
concerns or accepting that they might not be allowed to pursue with the merger envisaged. 
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Particular emphasis will be put on the remedial proportionality test and on the 
importance of economic effi  ciency as a factor to be considered in the application 
of this test (section II(1)). Th e circumstances in which the European Commission 
and the ECJ mandate network access in cases of refusal by energy network 
owners224 to grant TPA on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and in a 
timely manner, will be explored as part of the proportionality test in section II(2). 
Th ereaft er, the need for a detailed analysis of the costs and benefi ts of further 
unbundling will be considered when evaluating effi  ciency as an essential factor 
in determining the proportionality of a remedy (section II(3)). Section III 
concludes.
II. ARTICLE 82 EC AND REGULATION 1/2003: 
COMPETENCE TO ORDER STRUCTURAL 
REMEDIES
As just set out above, the Energy Directives are supposed to promote competition 
in the energy markets in the EU and to create an internal energy market.225 Apart 
from sector-specifi c regulatory authorities enforcing and supervising the 
operation and access to the energy supply networks, the Directives currently seek 
to achieve their aims by prescribing structural separation of vertically integrated 
energy undertakings by way of legal (or corporate) unbundling226 of the operation 
of monopolistic electricity and gas networks227 from the potentially competing 
supply businesses (operating in related markets), which is an (ex post) intervention 
into the structure of established undertakings by way of regulation.228 Th e motive 
behind such sector-wide unbundling is not any established abuse of a dominant 
position or any other violation of competition law but merely to promote 
For a merger, which contained substantial divestiture commitments, see the Commission 
Decision (2006/622/EC) of 21 December 2005 (Case COMP/M.3696 – E.ON/MOL), OJ 2006 L 
253/20, 16.9.2006. On this merger, L Hancher, ‘EU Law and Policy on Vertical and 
Conglomerate Energy Mergers’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law 
Reports III, Intersentia, Antwerpen, Oxford, 2006, chapter 3, 44 et seq. See also Hancher/de 
Vlam, n. 159, p. 69, with respect to the quasi-regulatory conduct of the European Commission 
in merger cases. In this regard, see also Ehlers, n. 7. Th e application of Article 81 EC with 
respect to, for instance, long-term energy (in particular gas) supply contracts will also not be 
part of the discussion which follows; in this regard, see, for instance, Kühne, n. 137.
224 Energy transportation networks as natural monopolies are commonly referred to as “essential” 
or “indispensable” facilities or monopolistic bottlenecks (when network capacity is scarce or 
congested).
225 Cf., e.g., Recital 31 Electricity Directive 2003 and Recital 30 Gas Directive 2003.
226 Which means incorporating a separate legal entity situated within a common shareholding 
structure. See already section C.II.3 of the Introduction.
227 See n. 54.
228 See also text accompanying n. 49.
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competition in an imperfect market setting, which is characterized by its 
monopolistic core.229 As we have seen above, competition law in contrast is 
supposed not to create but to restore the competitive process, i.e. when anti-
competitive behaviour has already occurred. It is against this background that 
Commissioner Kroes threatens to use her general competition law enforcement 
tools to impose full structural unbundling on individual vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings.
Article 7 Modernization Regulation230 empowers the European Commission to 
adopt (behavioural and) structural remedies by Decision in order to bring an 
infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 EC to an end.231 According to the UK 
229 It should again be noted that the legitimacy of the current unbundling measures is not the 
subject of this work.
230 Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003 (n. 162) provides: ‘Where the Commission, acting on a 
complaint or on its own initiative, fi nds that there is an infringement of Article 81 or of 
Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the undertakings and associations of 
undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may 
impose on them any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the 
infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement eff ectively to an end. 
Structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally eff ective behavioural 
remedy or where any equally eff ective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the 
undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. If the Commission has a legitimate 
interest in doing so, it may also fi nd that an infringement has been committed in the past.” 
Th e interpretation of Article 7 can be found in Recital 12 Modernization Regulation, which 
states that the “[…] Regulation should make explicit provision for the Commission’s power to 
impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural, which is necessary to bring the 
infringement eff ectively to an end, having regard to the principle of proportionality. Structural 
remedies should only be imposed either where there is no equally eff ective behavioural remedy 
or where any equally eff ective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the 
undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an undertaking 
as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate where there 
is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of 
the undertaking (emphasis added).”
231 Here, only Article 82 will play a role focusing on abusive practices of dominant undertakings, 
which are prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as they may aff ect 
trade between Member States. For the distinction between Article 81 EC and Article 82 EC, 
see van der Woude, n. 187. With regard to abusive conduct, which “may aff ect trade between 
Member States”, when a national court or competition authority decide on abusive conduct of 
dominant undertakings, they have to apply Article 82 and the Modernization Regulation or 
an equivalent national provision transposing Article 82 into national law. In the event that 
national provisions deviate from the correct interpretation of Article 82, Article 82 must be 
applied directly (direct eff ect of Treaty rules) and be given primacy (principle of primacy of 
Community law), and the deviating national provisions may complement the interpretation 
of Article 82 only if this complementary interpretation is in line with Community law and the 
aim of achieving a competitive internal market. For the interpretation of what “may aff ect 
trade”, the Commission Notice, ‘Guidelines on the eff ect on trade concept contained in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’, OJ 2004 C 101/81, 27.4.2004, can be used. Th ese Guidelines, 
which give national authorities guidance on the interpretation of Community inter-state 
trade, leave only marginal room for the interpretation of abusive conduct not aff ecting inter-
state trade (i.e. if the abuse is of purely local nature or involves only an insignifi cant share of 
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Offi  ce of Fair Trading, bringing such an infringement to an end may require 
directing (or accepting a binding commitment by) an undertaking to make 
structural changes to its business, which might involve withdrawing from a 
particular activity or even divesting itself of a part of its business.232
1. SELECTION OF REMEDY: LEGAL PROPORTIONALITY 
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Th e choice of a – behavioural or structural233 – remedy to end abusive behaviour 
of a dominant undertaking must obey the principle of proportionality.234
Th is principle is applicable under general international law as well as under the 
European Convention of Human Rights235, which has been ratifi ed by all the 
Member States of the European Union, and is thus of great infl uence to European 
law.236 Th e principle of proportionality is also recognized as fundamental 
constitutional principle in most of the EU Member States’ legal systems.237 It is 
sales of the dominant undertaking). It is submitted that the concern voiced, e.g. by Hancher, 
n. 54, that the application of diff erent sets of rules (i.e. Article 82 if inter-state trade is aff ected, 
and national rules which may deviate from Article 82 if not) should not be too great an 
obstacle to substantial harmonization of national competition laws, even though these 
Guidelines are in principle not of binding character.
232 Offi  ce of Fair Trading, ‘Enforcement’, Competition law 2004, December 2004, pp. 4, 12. A 
good example where the Commission accepted a commitment to a structural remedy [for the 
distinction between structural and behavioural or conduct remedies, see also A Klees, S 
Hauser, ‘Eigentumsrechtliche Entfl echtung in der Energiewirtschaft  als strukturelle 
Maßnahme i.S.d. Article 7 Abs. 1 Satz 2 VO 1/2003?’, (2007) WuW 596], albeit under the old 
rules (Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty, [1962] OJ 13/204, 21.2.1962) is the Commission Decision (2001/354/EC) of 
20 March 2001 (Case COMP/35.141 – Deutsche Post AG), OJ 2001 L 125/27, 5.5.2001, where 
Deutsche Post undertook to transfer all its commercial parcel activities, including the 
catalogue delivery, to a legally separate company by December 2001.
233 Structural remedies address the incentives of the vertically integrated incumbent and 
behavioural remedies control or even eliminate its ability to restrict competition, i.e. to deny, 
delay or restrict network access. Further to this distinction, see Klees/Hauser, ibid. See also 
OECD, ‘Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition’, Policy Brief, Paris, February 2002, 
pp. 5, 9.
234 Th e principle of proportionality forms an integral part of each national, supranational or 
international legal system, which aspires to live up to the rule of law not only in form but also 
in substance, see E Pache, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung der 
Gerichte der Europäischen Gemeinschaft en’, (1999) Neue Zeitschrift  für Verwaltungsrecht 
(NVwZ) 1033, with further references. See futher infra n. 239.
235 See R Streinz, Europarecht, 3rd ed., 1996, no. 93. See also Part 2 Chapters 5 and 6 infra for the 
occurrence of this principle in the UK and the Netherlands.
236 See Article 6(2) EU.
237 For a comparative analysis of the application of the principle of proportionality in the EU 
Member States, see J Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht, Band (Volume) 2, 1988, pp. 
663 et seq.
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against this background that this principle is recognized as a fundamental part 
of the legal system of the European Union, and generally accepted as an 
overarching legal principle of all Community measures. It is also seen as an 
overarching rule in the case law of the ECJ.238
Article 5(3) EC only codifi es one part of the principle of proportionality, which 
stipulates that no action by the Community shall go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaty (the necessity leg of the test). Th e other two 
legs of the proportionality test, i.e. the appropriateness of a Community measure 
to achieve a permissible objective and the proportionality in a specifi c sense 
(meaning that the peculiarities or pros and cons of a specifi c case have to be 
adequately weighed and deliberated), are not mentioned explicitly although they 
are recognized by the ECJ as being a substantive part of the test. Th is does, 
however, not mean that the proportionality test under Community law is limited 
to assessing whether the mildest means have been chosen by Community 
institutions, and that the test does not prohibit a disproportionate or inadequate 
restriction of legal entitlements or rights. It is recognised that Article 5(3) EC has 
to be read in such a way as to comprise all three legs of the proportionality test as 
developed by the ECJ, which is thus primary EC law.239
238 Von Bogdandy in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. I, Article 3b, no. 43. 
Th e ECJ, which has, until its explicit codifi cation in Article 3b EC (now Article 5(3) EC), 
recognized in its case law the principle of proportionality as a general principle of Community 
law, see C-265/87 – Schräder, (1989) ECR I-237. As regards the evolution of this principle in 
the case law of the ECJ, see, in great detail, Pache, n. 234, p. 1034. Since Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft  (C-11/70, (1970) ECR 1125, 1135 et seq.), the ECJ has been applying this 
principle when assessing restrictive Community measures, see Pache, ibid., 1034.
239 Confi rmed by the BVerfG, BVerfGE 89, 155, 212 et seq. See also von Bogdandy, ibid., which 
refer to the case law of the European Court for Human Rights as regards “measures 
necéssaires” in Articles 8–11 ECHR and Article 2 of the 4th Protocol, as well as Article 14 
ECHR. In the legal system of the EU, the principle of proportionality is part of the primary 
Treaty law, and therefore has priority over secondary law such as Regulations and Directives. 
Th e various legal systems of the EU Member States obviously have diff erent views on the exact 
scope of this principle. Whereas the English merely assess the necessity of state measures, see 
R v Goldsmith, (1983) 1 Weekly Law Reports (W.L.R.) 151, 155, and further in Part 2 Chapter 5 
infra, the Germans, on the other end, look into the adequateness of state measures by including 
a weighing or balancing of the diff erent interests, i.e. the ones, which are to be permitted, and 
those, which will be restricted, see the hightest German court in public law matters, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG), BVerwGE 45, 51, 59 et seq., and H Maurer, Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht, 11th ed., 1997, p. 234 with further references. Keeping this in mind, the 
substantial requirements, which the ECJ attributes to the principle of proportionality, 
illustrate well the independent development and growing detail of a general principle of law in 
European law. Nevertheless, the ECJ substantially follows the ideas developed under the 
German legal tradition with regard to the scope of the principle of proportionality, see T 
Oppermann, Europarecht, 2nd ed., 1999, nos 514, 521, and E Sullivan, ‘Antitrust remedies in 
the U.S. and EU: advancing a standard of proportionality’, (2003) Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 
2003) 414, with an excellent English language overview over the modalities of this principle. 
See also P Larouche, ‘Legal Issues Concerning Remedies in Network Industries’, in D Geradin 
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Th e ECJ formulates the requirements of the principle of proportionality as 
follows: “By virtue of the principle of proportionality, measures imposing 
fi nancial charges on economic operators are lawful provided that the measures 
are appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by 
the legislation in question. Of course when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be used and the charges 
imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”240
Th e application of the principle of proportionality fi nds diff erent expressions in 
the case law of the EC Courts (European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of 
First Instance (CFI)), depending on whether it is applied to actions of executive 
bodies such as the Commission when enforcing EC competition law or applied in 
the context of reviewing legislation; as regards the latter, the ECJ accepts a wide 
margin of appreciation of the legislature.241
Th e case Alrosa decided by the CFI gives excellent insights into how the EC 
Courts would apply the principle of proportionality to a contested Decision of 
the Commission based on Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 in the context of an 
(ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specifi c Regulation, 2004, 
p. 25. Today, the ECJ and the CFI assess the three legs of the principle of proportionality in the 
style of the assessment under German law, see Pernice in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der 
Europäischen Union, Bd. III, Article 164, no. 101.
240 ECJ, C-265/87 – Schräder, n. 238. Financial charges or fi nes are the usual remedies or responses 
to an undertaking’s anticompetitive behaviour.
241 See only ECJ, C-280/93 – Banana Markets, (1994) ECR I-4973, nos 88–94: “It should be 
pointed out in this respect that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the 
Community legislature has a broad discretion which corresponds to the political 
responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. Th e Court has held that the 
lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be aff ected only if the measure is manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to 
pursue. More specifi cally, where the Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the 
adoption of rules, to assess their future eff ects, which cannot be accurately foreseen, its 
assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the 
information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question […]. Th e Court’s 
review must be limited in that way in particular if, in establishing a common organization of the 
market, the Council has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options within the 
context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility […]. While other means for 
achieving the desired result were indeed conceivable, the Court cannot substitute its assessment 
for that of the Council as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the measures adopted by the 
Community legislature if those measures have not been proved to be manifestly inappropriate 
for achieving the objective pursued (emphasis added).” See in greater detail in chapter 7 on the 
European Union. With respect to the reluctant enforcement of the proportionality principle 
by the ECJ in cases where the proportionality of fundamental rights restricting legislation is 
at issue, see M Schmidt-Preuß, ‘Der Wandel der Energiewirtschaft  vor dem Hintergrund der 
europäischen Eigentumsordnung’, (2006) Europarecht (EuR) 463. See also ECJ, Joined Cases 
C-20/00 & C-64/00 –Booker Aquaculture, (2003) ECR I-7411, where the ECJ seems to show a 
rather mature and balanced understanding of the principle of proportionality.
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alleged abuse of the dominant position of vertically integrated energy network 
operators242:
“In order to attain that objective [i.e. ensuring the eff ective application of the 
competition rules laid down under the EC Treaty], the Commission possesses a 
margin of discretion in the choice off ered to it by Regulation No 1/2003: it may make 
the commitments proposed by the undertakings concerned binding through the 
adoption of a decision under Article 9 of that regulation, or it may follow the procedure 
laid down under Article 7(1), which requires that an infringement be established. […] 
[T]he principle of proportionality requires that the measures adopted by Community 
institutions must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary for attaining the 
objective pursued (Case T-260/94 Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR II-997, 
paragraph 144, and Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, paragraph 201); when there 
is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least 
onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued (Case 265/87 Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 21, and Case C-174/05 
Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] ECR I-2443, paragraph 
28). Th e review of the proportionality of a measure is thus an objective review, since 
the appropriateness of and the need for the contested decision must be assessed in 
relation to the aim pursued by the institution. For decisions adopted under Article 7 
of Regulation No 1/2003, the aim is to put an end to the infringement which has been 
established […]. In cases to which Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 applies, the 
Commission has to establish the existence of an infringement, which implies a clear 
defi nition […] of the abuse for which the undertaking in question is alleged to be 
responsible.”243
Th e CFI clarifi es that “the burdens imposed on undertakings in order to bring an 
infringement of competition law to an end must not exceed what is appropriate 
and necessary to attain the objective sought, namely re-establishment of 
compliance with the rules infringed.”244
Th e CFI further establishes that the Commission can only take a decision lawfully 
under Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003 if it is necessary to re-establish the 
situation which existed prior to the infringement.245
242 CFI, T-170/06 – Alrosa v Commission, (2007) ECR II-2601. Alrosa is concerned with the 
distinction between Article 7 and Article 9 (commitments off ered by the undertakings under 
investigation) Regulation 1/2003 and the application of the proportionality principle in both 
contexts.
243 CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, nos 95–100.
244 CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 102, referring to ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91 – Magill, 
(1995) ECR I-743, no. 93.
245 CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 103, referring to CFI, T-24/90 – Automec v Commission, (1992) 
ECR II-2223, nos 51 and 52.
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Whereas the legislature possess a margin of appreciation when passing legislation, 
which is reviewed by the EC Courts only for manifest or obvious errors, the 
margin of discretion accepted for decisions by the Commission as the executive 
institution of the European Union246 is narrower and subject to full judicial 
review by the EC Courts247, as is also the Commission’s decision whether or not 
to undertake a complex economic assessment prior to acting.248 Only if measures 
of the Commission (have to) involve a complex economic assessment249, is the 
measure taken by the Commission subject to a limited judicial review.250 With 
respect to executive measures, full judicial review is accepted as self-evident by 
the EC Courts because of the eff ect decisions taken under Articles 81 and 82 EC 
have on fundamental economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.251
Th e EC Courts in recognizing that the analysis which the Commission is required 
to carry out in the context of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 (as well as in 
the context of Article 9(1)) concerns existing practices, not only determine on 
their own account whether their review is limited, i.e. whether the Decision of 
246 See CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 108, where the CFI states that “[…] the level of review carried 
out by the Court of the analyses carried out by the Commission on the basis of the competition 
rules of the Treaty must take into account the margin of discretion which underlies each 
decision under consideration and is justifi ed by the complexity of the economic rules to be 
applied.”
247 And not just limited to manifest errors of assessment, see CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 110.
248 In CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 125, the CFI, for instance, established that the Commission did 
not have to carry out a complex economic assessment, which justifi ed a limitation of the 
review to be undertaken by the Court of the Decision. Alrosa was concerned with a 
Commission Decision prohibiting absolutely any future trading relations between certain 
companies active in the world diamond market.
249 Which, according to the CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, (see no. 108, which refers to ECJ, C-12/03 P 
– Tetra Laval v Commission, (2005) ECR I-987, nos 38–40) is per se the case in “[…] fi elds, such 
as concentrations, where the existence of a discretionary power is essential to the exercise of 
the powers of the regulatory institution.” Th e CFI in Alrosa, no. 109, by referring to settled 
case law (CFI, T-158/00 – ARD v Commission, (2003) ECR II-3825, nos 328 and 329) accepts 
that the Commission when reviewing notifi ed concentrations in the area of merger control, 
enjoys a broad discretion in assessing the necessity of obtaining commitments in order to 
dispel the serious doubts raised by such notifi ed concentrations. “Th e review limited to 
manifest error which the Court undertakes in that fi eld is justifi ed by the prospective nature 
of the economic analysis carried out by the Commission in order to be able to fi nd that the 
concentration in question will not create or strengthen a dominant position (Case T-102/96 
Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paragraph 163) (emphasis added).”
250 See CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 108. Such limited judicial review is confi ned to verifying 
whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, 
whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error 
of appraisal or misuse of powers. See CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 122, referring to ECJ, Joined 
Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P & C-219/00 P – Aalborg 
Portland & Others v Commission, (2004) ECR I-123, no. 279.
251 See CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 108. Th is, it is submitted, contrasts starkly the tendency of the 
EC Courts to aff ord a wide margin of appreciation to the European legislature with respect to 
legislative measures enacted.
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the Commission involved a complex economic assessment, but also whether and, 
if so, to what extent there was a more appropriate and less onerous solution 
possible in order to achieve the aim pursued by the Decision.252
In Alrosa, the CFI also reiterates that “since the object of Article 82 EC is not to 
prohibit the holding of dominant positions but solely to put an end to their abuse, 
the Commission cannot require an undertaking in a dominant position to refrain 
from [acting in a manner] which allow it to maintain or to strengthen its position 
in the market, if that undertaking does not, in so doing, resort to methods which 
are incompatible with the competition rules. While special responsibilities are 
incumbent on an undertaking which occupies such a position […], they cannot 
amount to a requirement that the very existence of the dominant position be 
called into question.”253
Alrosa shows how the EC Courts check the proportionality of a remedy selected 
as a result of the application of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, which requires a 
remedy to be proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to 
bring the infringement eff ectively to an end.254
More precisely, the proportionality of an eff ective remedy means that it is 
appropriate (in terms of being capable) and, narrowing it down, is necessary (in 
252 CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, nos 126, 128. Th e Alrosa case is also highly relevant in the context of 
Germany’s energy groups E.ON’s and RWE’s commitments (see Article 9 Regulation 1/2003) 
to divest “voluntarily” (i.e. unbundle ownership) of their German electricity and gas 
transmission networks, respectively, as a consequence of investigations by the Commission 
into allegedly anticompetitive practices, see European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission 
welcomes RWE proposals for structural remedies to increase competition in German gas 
market’, MEMO/08/355, 31 May 2008, and ‘Antitrust: Commission welcomes E.ON proposals 
for structural remedies to increase competition in German electricity market’, MEMO/08/132, 
28 February 2008. No. 156 states that “[…] other solutions existed that were proportionate to 
[the] objective [of the Decision]. In making use of the procedure allowing commitments 
off ered by an undertaking concerned to be made binding, the Commission was not relieved of 
its duty to apply the principle of proportionality, which requires in this case that there be an 
appraisal in concreto of the viability of those intermediate solutions.” It seems that before 
rendering decisions in the E.ON and RWE cases, which make the commitments to divest 
energy networks binding, the Commission has the duty to consider alternative solutions fi rst, 
which are capable of resolving any infringements of Article 81 or 82 EC committed by these 
two vertically integrated energy supply undertakings.
253 CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 146, referring to ECJ in re Michelin, n. 252, no. 57.
254 Article 7 is to be read in conjunction with its interpretation as set out in Recital 12 of 
Regulation 1/2003. Th e proportionality test used in the context of the Modernization 
Regulation and as set out in its recital 12 is a refi nement of previous case law such as the ECJ 
judgement in re Magill, n. 244. A remedy therefore is not of a punitive nature but should 
merely restore the competitive process impaired by the infringement., see I Forrester, 
‘Modernisation, an extension of the powers of the Commission?’, in D Geradin (ed.), 
Modernization and Enlargement: Two Major Challenges for EC Competition Law, 2004, p. 97, 
rightly claims that the remedy “must be approved both from a legal certainty and from a 
human rights point of view.”
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terms of being the least onerous equally eff ective measure), to end an infringement 
and restore the proper functioning competitive process harmed by the 
infringement, which is the main prerequisite for achieving the EU’s overarching 
objective, a common market. It further means that an eff ective remedy must 
observe (actual) proportionality, taking (aft er due weighing and deliberating) 
account of the circumstances and merits of a case.255 Hence, this balancing test 
must also take economic effi  ciency into account.256 Both principles, “legal” 
proportionality and economic effi  ciency, are related and proportionality should 
also be interpreted taking account of economic effi  ciency when considering a 
remedy.257 It is the core of a proportional remedy to avoid excessive intervention, 
or in other words, a remedy is proportional to the triggering abuse and its eff ects 
in the market, if the remedial restrictions placed on the abusive dominant 
undertaking do not exceed the benefi ts achieved. It is the ultimate goal of 
competition law and therefore of the remedies chosen under Article 82 and the 
Modernization Regulation to restore competition, not merely to stop the 
anticompetitive harm and to prevent its recurrence. Proportionality that 
measures anticompetitive harm in relation to the restoration of competition in 
the market by considering how the market would have existed had the abusive 
conduct not occurred, makes ex post competition law remedies more effi  cient.258
Whether a behavioural or structural remedy is to be chosen must be considered 
as part of the necessity or second leg of the proportionality test. Aft er the 
determination of an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 EC, the adoption of 
a behavioural remedy is the rule, whereas a structural remedy is the exception, as 
can be inferred from Article 7 Modernization Regulation and its interpretation 
255 In particular to fi nd the right balance between resolving competition concerns and the 
intervention in fundamental (economic) rights.
256 For the defi nition of econmic effi  ciency and its components, see Motta, n. 54, pp. 40 et seq., 
and Whish, n. 122, pp. 2–4.
257 Cf. Recitals 1, 9, 11, 12 and 25 Modernization Regulation, which assume that (a certain level 
of) competition exists in the internal market and, thus, must not be distorted and be protected. 
Consequently, by bringing an infringement of competition to an end, at least the previous 
level of competition has to be restored. Sullivan, n. 239, pp. 424–5, states: “Proportionality 
[…] should include the competition goal of restoring rivalry to the market. If there is not 
congruence between the harmful eff ects in the market and the remedy, the enforcement will 
create the wrong incentives; it may either overdeter or underdeter competitive conduct. An 
antitrust remedy cannot be effi  cient in an economic sense unless it is proportional to the 
anticompetitive harm and relevant to returning the industry to a competitive pasture.” Referring 
to EU practice, Sullivan continues: “[…] proportionality needs to be defi ned more broadly, 
especially when serious barriers to entry are present. […] By defi ning proportionality in this 
way [the European way] we will come closer to an effi  cient remedy – one that will deter further 
illegal conduct, create appropriate competitive incentives, and restore competition to the 
market. In the end, the remedial goal should embrace a test of effi  ciency” (comment and 
emphasis added).
258 See also Sullivan, n. 239, p. 425.
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in Recital 12: the Commission is only authorized to impose a structural remedy 
either where there is no equally eff ective behavioural remedy or where, for the 
undertaking concerned, a structural remedy would be less burdensome than any 
equally eff ective behavioural remedy, which means the discretion of the 
Commission has been limited by the legislator. Th is limitation is clearly refl ected 
in the CFI’s judgement in re Alrosa.259
From this it follows that the Commission would not be able to prefer structural 
over equally eff ective behavioural remedies even if it argued that the costs related 
to the implementation and monitoring of an equally eff ective behavioural remedy 
are so high as to undermine its eff ectiveness.260 Th e Modernization Regulation 
2003, in recognizing the residual nature of structural remedies in ex post 
intervention gives more weight to the fundamental economic rights of the 
shareholders of the undertaking allegedly guilty of abusive behaviour than to the 
competition enforcement competence of the Commission and possible 
enforcement cost considerations.261
Th is line of argument is also refl ected in the fact that being a dominant 
undertaking, which involves owning the assets on which the dominance is based 
and thus being structured in a certain way, does not contravene European law, 
but only the abusive use of such assets.262 Behavioural remedies target abusive 
conduct, i.e. the abusive use of property, whereas structural remedies, which 
include any form of unbundling, also intervene in the very core of property 
rights, i.e. the possession of property itself and its enjoyment (i.e. its use). Th e 
sheer fact that an undertaking is dominant as a result of its structure, as is the 
case with vertically integrated energy network operators, which just have the 
259 In Automec, n. 245, no. 52, the CFI states “it is not for the Commission to impose upon the 
parties its own choice among all the various potential courses of action which are in 
conformity with the Treaty.”
260 Costs are a matter of the effi  ciency of a remedy; enforcement costs will therefore play a role 
when testing a remedy’s effi  ciency, see below. In any event, what might already be indicated 
here is that the cost argument with regard to the implementation and monitoring of 
behavioural remedies should no longer serve as the main argument against such remedies. 
Th is is because the Commission, in the course of implementing behavioural remedies, is 
increasingly installing external private trustees, not only in merger cases but also in the ex 
post application of competition law, see already n. 168. See also J Killick, ‘IMS and Microsoft  
Judged in the Cold Light of IMS’, (2004) 2 CompLRev 23.
261 It has in any event already been shown that with the current state of the law (and based on 
regulatory costs already incured), eff ective regulation and thus the remedying of abusive 
behaviour of energy network monopolies is indeed possible, in particular that cross-subsidies 
can be detected and suppressed, see NMa, n. 156.
262 See also L Hancher, P-A Trepte, ‘Competition and the Internal Energy Market’, (1992) ECLR 
149, 156.
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“potential” for abusive conduct263, would seem not to suffi  ce to impose structural 
remedies, however, as dominance is not prohibited under EC law.264
Should, nevertheless, the imposition of a structural remedy be seriously 
considered, then the proportionality test is strict in that the Commission can 
only impose such a remedy if it considers that there is a risk of a lasting or 
repeated abuse deriving from the very structure of the undertaking (and then 
only if there is no equally eff ective behavioural remedy available).265 Care must 
however be taken that the distinction between the structure of the undertaking 
and its conduct does not blur, which would undermine the diff erence between 
the dominant position and its abuse.266
Th e substantial risk of a lasting or repeated abuse267 means that the Commission 
has to conduct a prognosis (or prospective analysis) regarding a future continuous 
risk of abuse as the result of an established infringement. For a prognosis of the 
risk of a lasting or repeated abuse to be as accurate as possible, it is submitted that 
the current established abuse does not of itself suffi  ce as an indication of lasting 
or repeated abuse but that in the past there should have been similar abuses 
established. Th is is because the mere capability or incentive for anti-competitive 
behaviour268, which, for instance, vertically integrated energy network operators 
263 CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 146.
264 Unless abuse is the direct and unavoidable result of the undertaking’s dominance, see the 
ECJ’s approach in cases where Article 82 EC is applied in combination with Article 86 EC, 
such as in re Silvano Raso, n. 202, no. 29, where the Court states that “[m]erely exercising its 
monopoly will enable it to distort in its favour the equal conditions of competition between 
the various operators on the market in dock-work services.” It held that Article 82 EC was 
infringed because as a result of the monopoly position in the upstream market, the dominant 
fi rm was not capable of avoiding the abuse of its position when operating downstream. 
Consequently, the structural remedy adopted removed the exclusive right in the upstream 
market. Similar A Tajana, ‘If I had a hammer… Structural remedies and abuse of dominant 
position’, (2006) Competition and Regulation in Network Industries (CRNI) 3, 15.
265 Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003 states: “Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it 
existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate where there is a 
substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of 
the undertaking (emphasis added).” Th e phrase “[…] as it existed before the infringement was 
committed […]” seems to serve only as a link of the structure of the undertaking with the 
infringement committed.
266 Article 82 EC covers only conduct or positive action. It should therefore not deal with the 
mere possibility of such conduct or action. Th e risk of such an approach has been pointed out 
by Advocate General Darmon in ECJ, C-18/88 – RTT v GB-Inno-BM, (1991) ECR I-5941, no. 
44: “[…] the assimilation of the mere possibility of prohibited conduct to such conduct is 
problematic. Such assimilation would signify passing from a repressive scheme of rules, where 
proof of the prohibited conduct must be adduced, to a preventive scheme of rules where the 
presumption that there will be such a conduct suffi  ces.”
267 For such a risk in the context of network industries, see section II (2) of this chapter infra.
268 Capability and incentives are part of the economic effi  ciency analysis of structural remedies, 
which are dealt with in section II (3) of this chapter infra.
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inherently have, does not in itself amount to a risk that such behaviour will in 
fact take place.
A prognosis appears to contradict the concept of ex post intervention of the 
Modernisation Regulation in that the Commission would not only bring an 
infringement to an end but also would have to consider the possible future 
conduct of the undertaking concerned. But in doing so, the Commission, in only 
being authorized to fi nd the least onerous eff ective remedy, merely endeavours to 
bring the current infringement eff ectively to an end by preventing the undertaking 
from committing similar infringements in the future.269 Th erefore, as the Article 
7 power to adopt remedies is competition law enforcement, and not a regulatory 
competence, it must ensure that the adoption of a remedy always focuses on its 
primary purpose, namely the termination of the infringement in question, and 
on the likelihood of the same abuse being committed again in the near future 
only as one aspect in this context.270 Th us, in order for a remedy to eff ectively 
terminate an abuse, the exact features of the current abuse and how it came about 
must be established so that it cannot, not even potentially, continue into the 
future. Th is prognosis therefore serves and refl ects the primary goal of a remedy 
not only to terminate an infringement but also to restore competitive market 
conditions.271 Th e prognosis, it is submitted, must thus also take the remedy, 
which is to be chosen to end an infringement into consideration in order to show 
what might probably change as a result of the implementation of such remedy.272
Further, in order to restrict the regulatory role of the Commission as far as 
possible, the remedy chosen should always be related to the abuse it is supposed 
to cure, and should not infl uence the structure of the undertakings in the market 
nor should it be used as a tool to dictate regulatory policies and the behaviour of 
dominant undertakings.273
269 Here again, the Commission as competition authority seems to assume a quasi-regulatory 
function as well, see already n. 223.
270 Cf. J Temple Lang, ‘Anticompetitive Non-pricing Abuses under European and National 
Antitrust Law’, in B Hawk (ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate 
Law 2003, chapter 14, p. 300.
271 Th is seems to be confi rmed by the CFI in re Alrosa, n. 242, no. 103: “It follows that the 
Commission cannot, without going beyond the powers conferred on it both by the competition 
rules of the EC Treaty and by Regulation No 1/2003, adopt on the basis of Article 7(1) of that 
regulation a decision prohibiting absolutely any future trading relations between two 
undertakings unless such a decision is necessary to re-establish the situation which existed 
prior to the infringement (see, to that eff ect, Case T-24/90 Automec v Commission [1992] ECR 
II-2223, paragraphs 51 and 52).” See in this respect also n. 259.
272 Which is exactly what is determined in the context of evaluating the economic effi  ciency of a 
remedy, see in greater detail section II(3) of this chapter infra.
273 See Tajana, n. 264, (2006) CRNI 3, 16.
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2. REFUSAL OF ENERGY NETWORK ACCESS: 
STRUCTURAL AND/OR BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES?
As indicated towards the end of the previous subsection, a typical setting where a 
structural remedy would be considered is in network industries274, featuring 
vertically integrated monopolistic network businesses, which naturally hold a 
dominant position in their market. Here, a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated 
infringement of Article 82 EC, typically in the form of direct or, more likely, 
disguised refusal to supply access to the vertically integrated energy networks275, 
that derives from the very structure of the dominant undertaking (i.e. a clear and 
direct link between the structure of a dominant undertaking and its abuse) seems 
to be evident.
Th ere are two ways of dealing with exclusionary abuses, and more specifi cally 
with refusal to supply access, of vertically integrated energy network operators, 
which are either by intervening with a structural remedy imposed on the energy 
supply undertaking, which vertically integrates the energy network operator, 
requiring the divestiture of either the potentially competitive or the monopolistic 
network activities276, or through mandating Th ird Party Access (TPA) for up- 
and downstream competitors to the energy networks, which would be a 
behavioural remedy.277
Imposing a structural remedy such as divestiture (legal ownership unbundling) 
would, however, seem to be a draconian form of resolving competitive harm.278 
274 Motta, n. 54, pp. 82–3.
275 See also for other potential abuses, chapter 1 section III supra.
276 Or through, e.g., enforcing a less rigorous structural remedy like legal unbundling as pursued 
in re Deutsche Post, n. 232. In the energy sector, this is, however, not an option any more since 
legal unbundling of the energy networks is already in place.
277 Industry-wide TPA is already mandatory as a result of sector-specifi c regulation (except for 
upstream gas pipeline networks, which link gas production projects with processing plant or 
coastal landing terminals, Articles 2(2), 20 Gas Directive 2003), but see also n. 441 and 
accompanying text. Ordering individual energy network operators in a competition law 
context to allow TPA is usually the consequence of disguised refusal to supply such access. 
Th is remedy was part of the Marathon commitments, see n. 193. Competition law enforcement 
based TPA might require extensive and costly monitoring. On the other hand, as has been 
established before, cost cannot play a role when considering the eff ectiveness of a remedy. 
Moreover, the cost of monitoring may also have to be borne by the perpetrator, see n. 168.
278 See Larouche, n. 239, p. 36; M Motta and A de Streel, ‘Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive 
Prices in EU Law’, presentation at 8th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 
Florence, June 2003, mimeo. Not further elaborated here are collective abuses of dominant 
positions, e.g. in the form of cross shareholdings between competitors (for an example, see 
CFI, T-68/89 – Società Italiana Vetro v Commission, (1992) ECR II-1403) and collective 
dominance cases not based on structural links but rather refl ecting market characteristics 
(such as oligopolistic settings; see, e.g., CFI, T-342/99 – Airtours v Commission, (2002) ECR 
II-2585, CFI, T-193/02 – Piau v Commission, (2005) ECR II-209, and ECJ, C-396/96 – 
Compagnie Maritime v Commission, (2000) ECR I-1365).
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Rather, following the requirements of proportionality, milder (behavioural) 
alternatives, which are less restrictive as regards the legal position of the subject 
of the remedy but equally eff ective in bringing an established infringement to an 
end, have to be explored fi rst.279
Such a milder but equally eff ective alternative might be the ordering of TPA, 
which in the context of monopolistic network infrastructures, would be the result 
of the establishment of a duty of the infrastructure operator to supply access.
Such a duty may be based on the application of the European form of the so-called 
“essential facilities” doctrine280, according to which vertically integrated 
undertakings owning network facilities may under certain (exceptional) 
circumstances be required to supply an input not only to its related up- or 
downstream businesses, but also to competing fi rms on fair and non-
discriminatory terms and conditions281, thereby granting them third parties 
access (TPA). Th e application of the essential facilities doctrine does in fact also 
have structural eff ects because entry into the related market is facilitated.282
279 See Sullivan, n. 239, pp. 414 et seq., for the application of the principle of proportionality in a 
structural remedy setting. Th e search for an equally eff ective but milder or less onerous 
remedy would be part of the necessity leg of the proportionality test.
280 Th e essential facilities doctrine originates from U.S. case law, such as United States v Terminal 
Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) and 236 U.S. 194 (1915), and Otter Tail 
Power Co. v United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), see M Bergman, ‘Th e role of the essential 
facilities doctrine’, (2001) Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 2001) 433. Th is doctrine has, however, 
never been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, see lately in re Trinko, n. 141. Refusal to 
grant competitors access can also constitute an infringement of Article 81 EC Treaty, see D 
Glasl, ‘Essential Facilities Doctrine in EC Anti-trust Law: A Contribution to the Current 
Debate’, (1994) ECLR 306. Th e question of exclusionary refusals to deal (supply) by dominant 
undertakings, albeit in a non-integrated setting, was fi rst analysed in the EU by the ECJ in re 
Commercial Solvents, n. 196.
281 Economically, the compulsory duty to deal under the doctrine includes a form of indirect 
price regulation. Th e eff ect of the doctrine is similar to the eff ect of direct price regulation of 
the essential facility as a stage of production, where prices will be reduced, which is likely to 
also bring prices down in the related market. Its application results in a short-term positive 
eff ect on competition in the related market, from which consumers will benefi t. However, the 
price reduction will decrease a monopolist’s (here the owner of a monopolistic bottleneck) 
profi t and is therefore likely to reduce the monopolist’s incentives to invest. Under which 
circumstances the application of the doctrine is justifi ed depends on whether it is possible to 
suffi  ciently determine that the net eff ect of applying the doctrine is likely to be benefi cial (or 
consumer welfare enhancing). Short-term competitive eff ects and long-term disincentives to 
invest should be adequately weighed. Th e doctrine should only be applied if its long-term 
effi  ciency can be shown; but see infra section II 3 of this chapter as regards the inclusion of an 
effi  ciency criterion in the proportionality test. For an economic analysis of the essential 
facilities doctrine, see Bergman, ibid.
282 In contrast to direct price regulation or challenges of excessive (and therefore abusive) prices 
charged to competitors in a related market, Bergman, n. 280. Th e essential facilities doctrine 
constitutes an intervention in property rights, because dominant fi rms are forced to allow 
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In the EU, the “essential facilities” doctrine, a term, which has actually never 
been used by the ECJ, was introduced in Magill283 as a concept of “exceptional 
circumstances”, forcing the owner of a network facility, which it was unreasonable 
or impracticable to duplicate, to grant access to competitors. Th is concept was 
refi ned in Bronner284 and IMS285 where three conditions for compelling network 
owners to grant access were set out by the ECJ.286 First, for a facility to be 
essential, the refusal of access to a facility must be likely to eliminate any 
competitors the use of their facilities. It, however, restricts the use of property, not its 
structure.
283 N. 239.
284 ECJ, C-7/97, n. 143. In this case, however, the “essential facility” character of a nation-wide 
newspaper distribution scheme was rejected (because the duplicability of such a scheme was 
considered not to be unreasonable) and thus another important issue which was raised but 
was not further discussed, see critically in this regard, Hancher, n. 54. Th is issue was about 
the fact that the owner made the scheme available to everyone only under certain published 
conditions applicable to everyone in a non-discriminatory manner; these conditions could, 
however, not be fulfi lled by the complainant Bronner. In the context given here, the question 
thus arises whether and if so how competition authorities should enforce competition law 
when an energy transmission system operator (TSO), vertically integrated or not, allows one 
energy supplier exclusive access to its network(s) and thus refuses access to any other energy 
supplier. As has already been established, access to energy transmission networks is 
indispensible for competitors in the related up- and downstream energy supply markets; they 
are also limited in capacity. Further, as is explained in chapter 3 infra, energy networks and 
thus also access to them is regulated; new energy networks may be eligible to exemptions from 
the obligation to grant non-discriminatory access under the conditions of Article 7 Regulation 
1228/2003 and Article 22 Gas Directive 2003, see also n. 290 and chapter 3 infra; see also Part 
2 Chapters 5 and 6 on Great Britain and the Netherlands on how such exemptions are dealt 
with in practice; see further the Commission’s website as regards the exemptions granted 
so far, ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/infrastructure/electricity/electricity_exemptions_
en.htm and ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/infrastructure/gas/gas_exemptions_en.htm. 
Competition authorities having to deal with TSOs refusing access to all but one energy 
supplier would thus have to ensure that such behaviour is resolved similar to (independent 
merchant) transmission eligible for such exemptions, which would involve the determination 
of access rules similar to the exemptions in a regulatory setting, such as a certain period of 
time being allowed to grant exclusive access (in order to alleviate the risk of investment by 
inter alia receiving a steady return) accompanied by a so-called use-it-or-lose-it obligation, n. 
199, and upon expiry of that period to comply with regulation. On regulated and unregulated 
investment in electricity transmission networks from an economic point of view, see 
Brunekreeft , n. 200.
285 EC, C-418/01, IMS Health v NDC Health, (2004) ECR I-5039. A fourth condition applied in 
Magill, n. 244, i.e. the refusal of access must prevent the emergence of a new product for which 
there is consumer demand, appears to be an intellectual property specifi c condition. Th e 
concept also played a central role in the recent Microsoft  case, see n. 168.
286 For criticism voiced, see e.g. Hancher, n. 54; Petit, n. 141. On the “essential facility” doctrine 
more generally, J Temple Lang, ‘Th e principle of essential facilities in European Community 
competition law – the position since Bronner’, (2000) Journal of Network Industries 375; D 
Geradin, ‘Limiting the scope of Article 82 EC: What can the EU learn from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft , IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?’, (2004) 
CML Rev. 1519. From a law and economics perspective, G Werden, ‘Th e Law and Economics 
of the Essential Facilities Doctrine’, (1987) Saint Louis University Law Journal 433. On the 
economics behind the “essentail facilities” doctrine, see also Motta, n. 54, pp. 66–9, 339 (note 
33), 490.
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competition on a related market (in other words, access is necessary to compete 
in a related market). Secondly, the access to the facility must be indispensable for 
a competitor in the related market, and the facility must be technically, legally or 
economically not reasonably possible to duplicate. And fi nally, access must be 
denied without any objective justifi cation.287
In particular with respect to the rather vague second condition288 – the facility 
must be not reasonably possible to duplicate (which is normally the case in natural 
monopolies such as energy network infrastructures) – it is submitted that the 
doctrine should only be applied if access for competing fi rms is expected to 
increase competition substantially, and not applied if such access would reduce 
the incentives to invest (as competition would then unlikely to be increased).289 
Th e reason for this submission is that the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine (or exceptional circumstances concept) has been criticized as creating 
disincentives for both network owners and potential competitors to innovate and 
invest.290 Disincentives for network owners may be the result of too broad an 
application of this concept (exceeding its original application in pure non-
287 It is rightly claimed that once a network facility is identifi ed as essential, the burden of proof 
lies on the operator to show that a valid commercial justifi cation for a refusal to supply access 
exists, Hancher, n. 54, p. 1303. It is submitted, that this shift  in burden of proof can indeed 
happen rather quickly as a result of the fairly vague second condition, which would leave the 
impression that the owner of the network facility is under a duty to protect its competitors 
rather than competition itself, cf. Hancher, ibid. Th e German notion of the “essential facilities” 
doctrine as put down in s. 19(4) no. 4 GWB seems to be more responsive and fl exible in that 
denial of access can be justifi ed if impossible or unreasonable (“nicht zumutbar”). Further, the 
doctrine explicitly applies to infrastructure facilities only. See also A Heinen, ‘Access to 
Electricity Networks: the Application of the ‘Essential Facilities Doctrine’ by the German 
Federal Cartel Offi  ce’, (2001) Journal of Network Industries 385, 393. On the other hand, such 
deviation could confl ict with the “essential facilities” doctrine as applied by the ECJ, which 
might result in the non-applicability of German law, see nn. 170, 231.
288 See also the criticism voiced by Hancher, n. 54, p. 1305.
289 Cf. P Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’, (1989) Antitrust 
L.J. 841. See also Knieps, n. 54, with respect to the requirement of network facilities to be 
monopolistic bottlenecks.
290 See n. 281. Exceptions to TPA for new investment are, however, available according to Article 7 
EC Regulation 1228/2003 and Article 22 Gas Directive 2003; such exception have already 
been applied to interconnection infrastructures in several EC Member States, see n. 284 and, 
in greater detail, infra in Part 2 Chapters 5 and 6 on the UK and the Netherlands. Investment 
incentives for so-called merchant (unregulated) transmission usually include the exclusive 
right for investors, aft er a so-called open season procedure has been applied where investors 
can bid to take part in such infrastructure investments, to have, for a certain period (nearly 
equating to the amortisation period of the investment), the exclusive right to the capacity of 
the interconnector investment; however, such rights are also normally subject to so-called 
use-it-or-lose-it obligations, see n. 199. On investment incentives for electricity transmission 
from an economic point of view, G Brunekreeft , K Neuhoff , D Newbery, ‘Electricity 
transmission: An overview of the current debate’, (2005) Utilities Policy 73.
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duplicatable infrastructure cases such as energy networks)291 or the result of the 
negligence of its effi  ciency as remedy.292 For potential competitors, such 
disincentives might result from the opportunity to free-ride on others’ 
commercial advantages.293
With respect to non-discriminatory (pricing and non-pricing) access terms and 
conditions, the network operator forced to grant network access by way of 
application of the “essential facilities doctrine” is only allowed to treat access 
requests diff erently if objectively justifi able; otherwise, access must be provided 
in such a manner that the goods and services off ered to competitors in related 
markets are available on terms no less favourable than those given to other 
parties, including their own corresponding operations.294
It has been claimed that applying the principle of non-discrimination295 in such 
a way may prove diffi  cult, as it would involve costly accounting adjustments by 
291 Areeda, n. 289. A good example may be the Commission Decision in re Georg, n. 193, where 
the Commission stretches the essential facilities doctrine beyond purely non-duplicable 
infrastructure facilities. See for a brief discussion of this Decision, Petit, n. 141, pp. 351–2. It is 
submitted that strict adherence in terms of narrow interpretation of the criteria for the 
application of the essential facility doctrine would increase legal certainty, which is likely to 
give fi rms stronger incentives to invest. Here, it might be appropriate to draw conclusions 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in re Trinko, n. 141, where the Court accepted that the 
possibility of exercising monpoloy power can be important to promote effi  cient competition 
in order to achieve investment and economic growth: policies based on sharing monopolistic 
infrastructure facilities are in confl ict with “the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it 
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically 
benefi cial facilities” (p. 8 of Trinko). See for an extensive discussion of this case, Petit, ibid., 
concluding (in n. 56) that the ruling of the ECJ in IMS, which confi rmed Bronner, n. 143, 
seems to imply that the concept of exceptional circumstances should not be construed too 
extensively.
292 See n. 302. See also ibid.
293 Which is, however, not usually the case with respect to energy networks. AG Jacobs in Bronner, 
n. 143, states in no. 57 “[t]he justifi cation in terms of competition policy for interfering with a 
dominant undertaking’s freedom to contract oft en requires a careful balancing of confl icting 
considerations. In the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of 
consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has developed for 
the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a production, purchasing or distribution 
facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop 
competing facilities. Th us while competition was increased in the short term it would be 
reduced in the long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in 
effi  cient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the 
benefi ts. Th us the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking 
retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify requiring access to it.”
294 CFI, Joined Cases T-374–375/94, T-384/94 & T-388/94, European Night Services v Commission, 
(1998) ECR II-3141, de Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, n. 54, p. 6. See also Petit, n. 141, pp. 354–5.
295 See nn. 205 et seq. and accompanying text.
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the network operator and extensive control eff orts by the competition 
authorities.296
Such arguments are, however, negligible with regard to energy network operators 
because, as has already been emphasized above, energy network operators are 
comprehensively regulated in terms of the principal sector-wide duty to grant 
non-discriminatory access, and in terms of tariffi  cation and non-pricing 
(technical) access conditions such as network connection. Th us, enforcing TPA 
via competition law would “merely” be complementary to sector-specifi cally 
regulated TPA. Further, sector-specifi c regulation has also already imposed 
accounting unbundling and legal unbundling (both of which are of a structural 
nature) upon the sector so that extensive accounting adjustments are not 
necessary nor are extensive control eff orts by the competition authorities, as such 
supervision is to a large extent already in place; also, competition authorities are 
either supposed to cooperate with regulators or regulators also have the 
competition law enforcement powers to apply the “essential facilities” doctrine to 
the energy networks.297
Consequently, determining exact access conditions should not pose too great a 
challenge to competition authorities, as has, by the way, already been shown in 
the Marathon case and the implementation of the remedies agreed there.298 Also, 
the issue of economic effi  ciency of the remedy of competition law enforced TPA 
does not seem to be as critical as in the context of structural remedies because 
the energy supply industry is already subject to extensive TPA obligations.299
In conclusion, it can be said that in particular because competition law enforced 
TPA by way of the so-called “essential facilities” doctrine as a behavioural remedy 
with structural eff ects would be applied in an already regulated setting, it is 
indeed a milder, and, it is claimed here, equally eff ective alternative to the 
structural remedy of divestiture. Th e claim of equal eff ectiveness derives from 
the conclusions drawn from the economic considerations discussed in the next 
296 De Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, n. 54, p. 6, Hancher, n. 54. Further, such an obligation should 
only be applied to network operators, which have already been forced to grant access on the 
basis of the “essential facilities” doctrine, as otherwise it would involve the danger of imposing 
access obligations through the backdoor. In this respect, see de Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, 
ibid.
297 Th e exchange of data and regulatory support is not problematic from a legal point of view as 
competition authorities follow adjudicative procedures and thus possess ex offi  cio investigation 
powers, which should normally allow them to fi nd out and rely on any data relevant to the 
case at hand.
298 See n. 186 and van der Woude, n. 43, p. 12, explaining that in re Marathon, n. 177, there was 
actually a regulatory access regime laid down.
299 See nn. 277, 441, 444 and accompanying text.
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subsection. Strictly speaking, those considerations are rendered in the context of 
the third leg of the proportionality test, i.e. the genuine proportionality of the 
structural remedy of divestiture. But the serious doubts raised in terms of 
effi  ciency of such a remedy also seriously question its eff ectiveness.300
Th e application of the essential facilities concept, on the other hand, can be 
eff ective immediately, in particular when considering that the competitions 
authorities can step (and already have stepped) into action at any time in a sector, 
which is already heavily regulated, and that they are equipped with the adequate 
tools and expertise (at least when cooperating with the sector-specifi c regulatory 
authority).
3. NECESSARY STRUCTURAL REMEDY: ALSO EFFICIENT?
Should, against what has just been established here, the structural remedy of 
divestiture of the energy networks of an individual vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking be considered necessary in order to restore competition in 
the European energy markets, then, as has been shown above, the economic 
effi  ciency of such a remedy requires consideration as part of the proportionality 
of the remedy. Economic effi  ciency does not stop at fi nding an eff ective remedy. 
In the case of structural remedies, in particular divestiture, their eff ectiveness 
might confl ict with their (economic) effi  ciency.
Th e question therefore is how to determine an effi  cient remedy. Th e characteristics 
of the industry to which the dominant undertaking belongs is the context within 
which the impact of a proposed remedy needs to be assessed.301 Th is impact is 
300 Another argument in favour of the equal eff ectiveness of TPA enforced by way of the “essential 
facilities” concept compared to the structural remedy of divestiture can be inferred from the 
fact that energy supply security, which is one of the predominant objectives for the European 
Commission to be achieved throughout the EU, see chapters 1 and 3 section II, appears to 
confl ict with the eff ectiveness of such a remedy. See in this regard the conclusions of the 
economic cost benefi t analysis outlined in the next subsection, which seem to question the 
eff ectiveness of this structural remedy (at least as regards electricity transmission networks) if 
suffi  cient generation capacity is available, and the elaborations at the end of chapter 3 section 
II infra, which also outline the security of supply measures already taken by the European 
Union. See also the elaborations in chapter 3 on Article 175 EC and Article 194 TFEU (Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), OJ 2008 C 115/47, 9.5.2008, 
as it would exist aft er the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Treaty of Lisbon amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
13 December 2007, OJ 2007 C 306/1, 17.12.2007). On the trade-off  between the ex ante 
(dynamic) and ex post (allocative) effi  ciency of mandating TPA to an essential facility, in 
particular as regards its impact on the incentives to invest, Geradin, n. 286, pp. 1539, 1540.
301 For an account of the economic characteristics and an evaluation of remedies in network 
industries, see Cave, n. 148.
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normally assessed by a so-called cost and benefi t analysis, which also requires a 
close examination of the prospective performance of a proposed remedy.
An analytical framework for the evaluation of the costs and benefi ts of structural 
remedies in network industries must explore the competitive gains achieved by 
the remedy, which should exceed the anticompetitive costs associated with the 
conduct that caused the violation and any costs incurred by the remedy, while 
restoring competition to the market.302
A more detailed framework to analyse the costs and benefi ts of competition law 
enforced remedies has been proposed by Larouche where the following costs and 
benefi ts are relevant303:
1. for the competitors benefi ting from the remedy, the cost if no remedy (or an 
insuffi  cient one) is adopted (including the costs of withdrawal from the 
market or even bankruptcy), and the benefi ts they would have obtained had 
the remedy been imposed;
302 Sullivan, n. 239, pp. 424–5. H Shelanski, J Sidak, ‘Antitrust Divesture in Network Industries’, 
(2000) University of Chicago Law Review 95, focus on a divestiture scenario in the context of 
the network bound telecommunication services industry and suggest a three-stage welfare 
test in which, fi rst, the proposed remedy should produce a net gain in static economic 
effi  ciency, which aims at foreseeing how the market will react to the creation of an additional 
competitor (aft er the network has been divested), or how the market will react in the absence 
of the abusive conduct of the dominant fi rm aft er a behavioural remedy has been imposed; as 
to the necessity of assessing the economic effi  ciency of competition law enforced TPA, see 
supra. Secondly, the gains in static economic effi  ciency should outweigh the potential losses in 
dynamic effi  ciency: here, it is necessary to assess how a remedy might aff ect investment and 
innovation incentives, as dynamic effi  ciencies cannot be assumed by just relying on the eff ects 
of static effi  ciencies. Finally, enforcement cost would also have to be considered: an effi  cient 
remedy should minimize administrative, enforcement and transaction costs. According to 
such a cost and benefi t analysis, a remedy is consumer-welfare enhancing only if the gains 
(losses) in static effi  ciency deriving from it are greater (lower) than potential losses (gains) in 
dynamic effi  ciency and costs related to its implementation, which can also be labelled as 
remedial effi  ciency. Th is test is designed to deal with network industries and the detrimental 
impact of an erroneous choice of remedies on investment and innovation incentives. In the 
electricity sector, investment and innovation incentives would, for instance, mean more 
advanced and effi  cient technology being developed at generation and grid level, thereby 
changing the structure of the generation market (e.g. towards effi  cient smaller-scale and 
decentralized generation) and the grid structure, which has to provide for the feeding-in of 
more decentralized generation, and consequently providing a higher degree of security of 
supply. See also Brunekreeft /Ehlers, nn. 8, 38; G Brunekreeft , ‘DNO unbundling: the road to 
smart grids?’, presentation at UNECOM workshop at TU Delft , 24 October 2008; R Künneke, 
‘Institutional reform and technological practice: Th e case of electricity’, (2008) Industrial and 
Corporate Change 233.
303 Larouche, n. 239, pp. 28–30.
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2. for the dominant undertaking, the cost of implementing a remedy including 
possible transaction costs and longer-term disincentives for innovation and 
investment;
3. for the administration imposing the remedy, the cost of imposing the remedy 
(gathering information, its analysis, monitoring and enforcement); and
4. for customers and the general public, the costs and benefi ts from the 
imposition of a remedy, (short-term) in the form of increased competition 
(with better choice and lower prices), but also longer-term disincentives for 
the dominant undertaking to innovate and invest.
According to this approach, for a remedy to be effi  cient, the following three 
conditions must be fulfi lled cumulatively:
– no. 4 must be positive, i.e. there must be a net benefi t to customers and the 
general public in the form of increased competition (outweighing longer-term 
disincentives);
– nos 2 and 3 together must be smaller than no. 4, i.e. the costs incurred by the 
dominant undertaking in connection with the implementation of the remedy 
and by the public authorities must be smaller than the benefi ts to customers 
and the general public; and
– nos 2 and 3 together have to be smaller than no. 1, i.e. the costs incurred by 
the dominant undertaking in connection to the implementation of the 
remedy and by the public authorities must be smaller than the advantage 
given to the competitor(s).
Not only must an eff ective remedy restore the desirable level of competition, 
which benefi ts both, the consumers and the general public as well as competitors. 
It is also important that any costs related to the implementation of an eff ective 
remedy and incurred by the dominant undertaking and the public authorities, 
especially in the long-term must be carefully taken into consideration in the 
course of establishing the effi  ciency of an eff ective remedy.304
304 Similar Larouche, ibid.
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EC competition policy strives for increased consumer welfare305; thus, an effi  cient 
remedy has to be (at the least) consumer welfare enhancing.306 In case of a 
proposed vertical separation, such a desired result can only be achieved if the 
negative eff ects on the dominant fi rm and the market in which such a fi rm is 
active are duly considered: loss of economies of scale and scope, increased 
transaction costs307, risks of double marginalization308, to name but a few. Since 
these negative eff ects are extremely diffi  cult to determine, structural solutions to 
competition problems have so far been avoided in favour of behavioural 
remedies.309
Th e evaluation as to whether an eff ective remedy is also effi  cient also requires 
assessing the future performance of the proposed remedy.310 In the case of 
divestiture, which would create a new competitor in the up- and/or downstream 
market (aft er the structural separation of the network infrastructure), its 
performance and the performance of the restructured market have to be taken 
305 See n. 114. While not disputing the consumer welfare approach in this work, it might however 
be indicated that this approach in focussing on the welfare of consumers in particular in 
terms of a decrease in prices necessarily neglects the produces side where, for instance, 
transaction and investment costs go up, which in the long term have to be paid for by society. 
If society pays more for consumer welfare enhancing measures in the long term that it gains 
form such measures in the short term, the overall balance is negative for society; the consumer 
welfare approach is then not economically effi  cient. Th us, a social cost and benefi t analysis 
(SCBA) by analysing the eff ects of a measure on society as a whole also takes its cost element 
into account, see Brunekreeft ’s SCBA outlined in the text accompanying nn. 350 et seq. and, in 
greater detail in the text accompanying nn. 1233 et seq.
306 See also Motta, n. 54, p. 18.
307 For the defi nitions of economices of scale and scope, see Motta, n. 54, p. 2 (n. 3), and Whish, n. 
122, pp. 8–9. See also P Joskow, ‘Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules and Remedies’, 
(2002) JLEO 95.
308 But see Pollitt, n. 321 and accompanying text, who plays this particular risk down against the 
background of regulation of energy network access charges.
309 Geradin/O’Donoghue, n. 209, p. 17.
310 Competition Commissioner Kroes emphasizes that “when it comes to fundamentally 
restructuring the market, both competition law and regulation have to step into action” (see 
Introduction). Further the Director General of the European Commission’s Directorate 
General Competition Policy, Lowe, jointly with other Commission offi  cials has tried in Lowe/
Pucinskaite/Webster/Lindberg, n. 12, to make the general case for ownership unbundling. As 
a consequence, although the discussion whether an eff ective remedy is also effi  cient takes 
place in the competition law enforcement context here, which is primarily concerned with 
individual undertakings, such evaluation appears to follow the same patterns of reasoning as 
the evaluation of the proportionality of sector-wide ownership unbundling introduced by 
sector-specifi c regulation in the context of its fundamental rights compliance. It also refl ects 
the attitude of the Commission to also have quasi-regulatory functions as the guardian of the 
EC Treaty, see already n. 223. Th e preference towards ownership unbundling as competition 
law enforcement tool also blurs the distinction of principle between competition law 
enforcement (through the executive) and sector-specifi c regulation (through the legislature), 
according to which competition law can only alter the structure of the individual undertakings 
concerned and not a whole industry.
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into consideration when deciding whether an eff ective remedy is also effi  cient. It 
is also likely that the dominant fi rm whose abusive conduct has been remedied 
will try to circumvent the remedy (whether structural or behavioural).311
Such an evaluation has yet to be undertaken by the Commission; in particular 
the economic evidence, which “shows that ownership unbundling is the most 
eff ective means to ensure choice for energy users and encourage investment,”312 
has yet to be tabled.313 In this respect, the regulatory impact assessment delivered 
in support of its proposals seems not only to be highly superfi cial for this purpose 
but also inaccurate and based on misinformed case studies314; in particular the 
alleged success of the liberalization of the British gas sector is misleading.315
311 Joskow, n. 307, makes the criticism that so far there have been no studies on the eff ects of 
divesture remedies, looking into the costs divested entities face, the competitive viability of a 
divested asset and the fi nal eff ect such intervention has on the performance of competition. 
Joskow emphasizes the diff erence between voluntary divestitures proposed by fi rms during a 
merger control scenario, and divestitures as a remedy for anticompetitive behaviour of 
dominant fi rms. Voluntary divestitures can already have suff ered from strategic behaviour of 
the fi rm obliged to divest, as a result of which bahviour there might be an early exit from the 
market of the newly created competitor, or collusive behaviour of the established competitors 
in the market. But this scenario might, according to Joskow, ibid., p. 115, be even more diffi  cult 
to handle in structural remedy cases in the context of ex-post intervention because competition 
authorities are usually not in a position to adopt eff ective divestiture remedies as they usually 
lack a sophisticated “understanding of the consequences of alternative governance 
arrangements for divested assets.” A study by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission on 
divestiture in merger remedies seems to draw similar conclusions, see Staff  of the Bureau of 
Competition of the (U.S.) Federal Trade Commission, ‘A Study of the Commission’s 
Divestiture Process’, 1999. See also M Motta, M Polo, H Vasconcelos, ‘Merger Remedies in the 
European Union’, in F Lévêque, H Shelanski (eds), Merger Remedies in American and European 
Union Competition Law, 2002, p. 106, who also seem sceptical as regards the adoption of 
structural remedies ex post. Th ey suggest that the decision to impose structural remedies 
should be measured against the risk of creating single or joint fi rm dominance aft er the 
implementation of the divesture remedy.
312 European Commission, n. 10, p. 12, and n. 3, p. 12.
313 See, for instance, the chairman of the German Monopolies Commission, Haucap, n. 37, pp. 
301 et seq.
314 See, for instance, the letter to A Piebalgs, Commissioner for Energy, by A Niebler, the 
chairwoman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, 
Ref.: D(2007)72912, 22 November 2007, requesting further analysis on the 3rd energy package 
impact assessment, and the response by A Piebalgs of 11 December 2007, Ref.: D/(2007) 1462. 
See also the critique of S Th omas, ‘A critique of the European Commission’s evidence of the 
need for ownership unbundling of energy networks’, PSIRU, University of Greenwich, 
London, July 2007, in particular with respect to Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and 
the UK; G Brunekreeft , ‘Ownership Unbundling auf Energiemärkten – eine Soziale-Kosten-
Nutzen-Analyse der ÜNB-Entfl echtung in Deutschland’, presentation at Seminar FinPum, 
Universität Wien, 16 April 2008; SERIS, n. 38 (see, in greater detail, Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great 
Britain); see also Pielow, n. 11.
315 See Wright, n. 314, and Th omas, ibid. and n. 25. Lowe/Pucinskaite/Webster/Lindberg, n. 12, 
refer to gas network unbundling in Britain as evidence. Th ey, for instance, identify a price 
reduction of 50 per cent in network charges since 1990 and high levels of investment aft er 
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What is more, contrary to the claim of the Commission in its Impact Assessment 
(RIA)316, ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks seems not to 
be conducive to the reduction of the concentration in the European electricity 
generation and gas wholesale markets.317 On the contrary, what can be observed, 
for instance, in the UK is that ownership unbundling will not in itself prevent 
concentration in wholesale and retail activities and vertical integration of energy 
retail with gas wholesale and electricity generation.318 Even worse, there is no 
apparent mechanism of the European Commission to remedy the increasing 
vertical foreclosure in European energy markets.319 Th e Commission even seems 
to accept this when stating in its RIA that “in an integrated market, external 
suppliers would be more likely to be faced with a smaller number of large and 
powerful EU-wide energy companies rather than 27 small national ones. Th ese 
companies would have the fi nancial strength to negotiate with external suppliers 
without needing to own the network, represent a very large portfolio of customers, 
have access to a wider range of alternative resources (LNG, North Sea gas etc.) 
[and] be more effi  cient and commercially focused than […] national 
incumbents.”320
unbundling. As Wright and Th omas (July 2007), ibid., show, however, this evidence is seriously 
fl awed. What is more, they do not seem to be clear about the criterion for judging the reforms, 
i.e. whether this is price reductions or increases in the level of investment. Th ese two criteria 
tend to be mutually exclusive. Price reductions are likely to be possible only if investment 
levels are low, while large investment programmes must be paid for by consumers, tending to 
increase prices. See in greater detail, Th omas (July 2007), ibid.
316 N. 15.
317 Th is is shown by Th omas (November 2007), n. 315, para. 4.3.2. at the examples of Italy and 
Great Britain.
318 See NERA Economic Consultants and Th omas, nn. 1228, 1229 and accompanying text. See 
also Th e Brattle Group, n. 1212, as regards Scottish generation.
319 Th e use of the merger clearance regime according to the Merger Regulation, n. 19, by the 
Commission has not lead to bringing this process to a halt. For an in-depth analysis of energy 
mergers in the EU in recent years, see Hancher/deVlam, n. 159, and Hancher, n. 223. Vertical 
foreclosure, by the way, also occurred in the much smaller energy market of New Zealand 
aft er ownership unbundling was imposed on the industry, see P Nillesen, M Pollitt, ‘An 
economic analysis of the ownership unbundling of electricity distribution in New Zealand’, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge, 
2006; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, ‘An economic analysis of the ownership unbundling of 
electricity distribution in New Zealand’, commissioned by Essent N.V., 16 March 2006; P 
Nillesen, M Pollitt, R Sitompoel, ‘Eigendomssplitsing in Nieuw Zealand’, (2006) Economisch 
Statistische Berichten (ESB) 533. In New Zealand, the fi rst and only country so far, which has 
forced unbundling of the distribution networks onto its energy sector, the development of 
competition has failed. Aft er the separation of the retail businesses from the distribution 
networks, most of these businesses became vertically integrated in the fi ve large generators 
and retail competition stopped. Th is process quickly foreclosed any subsequent retail entry. 
See also E Ehlers, ‘Book Review: M. Roggenkamp, U. Hammer (eds.), European Energy Law 
Report III, Energy & Law, Volume 4, Intersentia, Antwerp, Oxford, 2006’, (2007) JENRL 190; 
Brunekreeft /Ehlers, nn. 8, 38.
320 Impact Assessment, n. 15, p. 40.
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In addition to the failure by the Commission to actually table economic evidence, 
the pros and cons of ownership unbundling of vertically integrated energy 
networks in the energy supply industry are highly controversial amongst 
economists. Th eoretically or qualitatively321, ownership unbundling aff ects 
competition in that the scope for discrimination against non-integrated rivals 
should be reduced. On the other hand, ownership unbundling might facilitate 
further mergers in the electricity generation market as sales of vertically 
unbundled transmission assets provide fi nancial resources for horizontal 
integration. It is further said that in terms of ease and eff ectiveness of regulation, 
ownership unbundling would improve cost (and other types of) transparency in 
network and competitive businesses. However, it may also increase the 
requirement for regulatory oversight of transactions between unbundled stages 
of production. Ownership unbundling may facilitate privatization of the 
competitive and network businesses due to a greater sustainability of the 
unbundled market structure (and hence reduced regulatory risk). On the other 
hand, privatization of the networks might be delayed if they are kept in public 
ownership while generation and retail assets are privatized.322 Ownership 
unbundling may further improve the focus of the transmission business on 
supply security and incentivize improved information fl ows. On the other hand, 
information problems between electricity generators or gas producers and 
shippers and transmitters may be created in the absence of investment into 
enhanced information systems. Ownership unbundling may also reduce 
transaction costs by facilitating the creation of more effi  cient price signals. Th is, 
however, may be countered by an increase in costs if new IT systems are needed 
321 Th e following paragraph summarizes the concise elaborations of Pollitt, EPRG 0714, n. 37, pp. 
7–10, which are themselves based on Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37 (balancing the 
economic arguments without relying on empirical evidence), M Mulder, V Shestalova, ‘Costs 
and benefi ts of vertical separation of the energy distribution industry: the Dutch case’, (2006) 
CRNI 197, Centraal Planbureau, ‘Kwantitatieve verkenning welfvaartseff ecten splitsing 
nenergiebedrijven’, CPB Notitie, Den Haag, 20 March 2006, and Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38 
(balancing the economic arguments in reply to CPB and also rendering a social cost and 
benefi t analysis based on several counterfactual scenarios and empirical evidence) who, 
contrary to Pollitt, however, come to ambiguous (Mulder et al. (CPB)) and negative results 
(Baarsma et al. (SEO)) in terms of welfare eff ects, albeit with respect to the Dutch market 
where, on the one hand, unbundling of distribution networks is at stake, and, on the other, 
most of the energy networks are owned by the State or its subdivisions, see further Part 2 
Chapter 6 on the Netherlands.
322 In such a case ownership unbundling and privatization occur where competition is already in 
place, which might be diff erent from ownership unbundling at the time of liberalization. Th is 
is because there are fi xed cost elements (not least in political time) to restructuring of assets, 
the establishment of regulatory structures and the introduction of competition. Th erefore 
ownership unbundling is likely to be cheaper when other restructurings are taking place and/
or when initial ownership structures are cheaper to change with fewer implications for 
fundamental rights protection (i.e. a scenario involving initial state ownership of an integrated 
company, rather than private ownership). See Pollitt, EPRG 0714, p. 6.
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to coordinate transmission and other separated (competitive) segments. Th ere 
may also be signifi cant power contract renegotiation costs, which if with foreign 
parties may involve substantial wealth transfers and lower national social welfare. 
As regards the cost of capital and investment, the overall cost may decline if 
transmission businesses can get access to cheaper capital and if there is increased 
ease of integration of generation and retail. In an effi  cient capital market 
separation should lead to effi  cient cost of capital for each business. Th e cost of 
capital may, on the other hand increase and investment be reduced if the size of 
fi rms falls, or if regulatory risk is increased due to increased (and ineffi  cient) 
regulatory oversight of investment decisions. Ownership unbundling may also 
enable a clearer focus on the part of the separated energy supply businesses. Th e 
management of both, the networks and the competitive businesses of the former 
vertically integrated energy supply undertaking, may be subject to clearer 
incentives to improve their respective businesses. However, there might also be a 
loss of synergies or so-called vertical economies, due to a lack of knowledge of 
how the separated energy supply businesses operate. Double-marginalization 
should not become a problem when multipart-tariff s are applied. If, however, 
such tariff s are not applied in a fully effi  cient manner, the occurrence of double 
marginalization might be the consequence.323 And because the sale of assets (one 
way or the other) as a result of ownership unbundling makes takeovers more 
effi  cient, foreign (and domestic) merger activity within the European Union is 
likely to rise. Undesirable takeovers of strategic assets may, however, only be 
prevented on the basis of a competition policy tailored to such market activity.324 
Ownership unbundling could also reduce the risk of arbitrary government 
intervention in terms of further major reforms for some time. However, 
ownership unbundling may also increase the likelihood of government 
interference in the operation of the network companies if these are retained in 
state ownership.
323 See Haucap, n. 38, p. 303: Since transmission charges are not usually based in incremental 
cost, but include a mark-up to cover fi xed and common costs, a second mark-up will be added 
at the retail and/or generation stage if these markets are not perfectly competitive. In the end, 
vertical separation may lead to higher prices than vertical integration, a tendency, which has 
been shown to be real in the European Union by a recent study of AT Kearney, ‘Ownership 
Unbundling – Der richtige Weg für mehr Wettbewerb? – Zusammenfassung der 
Studienergebnisse’, Berlin, January 2008, which compares, amongst other parameters, the 
development of electricity prices and electricity network charges of several Member States 
with diff erent degrees of unbundling implemented in their respective electricity supply 
sector.
324 In this regard, see the third country (“Gazprom”) clause in the Commission proposals for 
Energy Directives (n. 15) and the draft  Energy Directives (n. 33), which requires for such a 
strategic sale to proceed that the purchaser’s home market is liberalized to an extent similar to 
the EU market.
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According to Pollitt, one of the academic proponents of ownership unbundling 
in the energy supply industry, in theory the benefi ts of this form of unbundling 
seem to outweigh its cost325: Ownership unbundling was likely to improve 
competition, ease regulation, facilitate privatization, lead to synergies, make 
foreign takeovers more likely and reduces the risk of arbitrary government 
intervention. He considers the counter-arguments outlined before as weak, 
referring to economic “school book” reasoning as followed by the European 
Commission for example that the ownership of physical transmission rights 
(under vertical integration) increased the ability of generators to exercise market 
power through withholding transmission capacity. Th e potential risk of higher 
cost of capital and stagnating investment levels is rebutted by contending that 
there seemed to be little technical reason why focus would not lead to 
improvements.
On the other hand, Pollitt also accepts that the transaction costs of ownership 
unbundling can be considerable.326 He further concedes that ownership 
unbundling may indeed require stronger regulation (causing the regulatory 
burden to increase signifi cantly) than under vertical integration (including legal 
unbundling) because more information asymmetries would occur than before 
325 Or, with respect to the cost of capital and investment volumes, at least not clearly 
disadvantageous. In his overview of the economic benefi ts and costs of ownership unbundling, 
however, Pollitt’s weighing of the benefi ts and costs appears to be rather superfi cial. With 
regard to the case studies he refers to and explains, some do not seems to fi t the European case 
because they involve continuing public ownership in the sector, and in others he comes to 
wrong conclusions (for instance when qualifying the New Zealand experience as successful) 
or contradicts himself when qualifying the regulation requirements of legal unbundling in 
France; Pollitt also seems to be mistaken about the state of unbundling of the German market, 
which he qualifi es as vertically integrated as opposed to the French market where he sees his 
model of legal unbundling realized. With respect to energy transmission, however, which is in 
the focus of his work, the German market is indeed fully legally unbundled, see further Part 2 
Chapter 4 on Germany, which includes the holding of the network assets by the legally 
unbundled transmission network operators. Th is serious fl aw in analysis, in particular with 
respect to the fact that Germany belongs to the biggest energy supply markets in the EU, 
appears to bias the conclusions in places. Pollitt’s conviction about the success of regulation 
and unbundling of the GB market is to some extent relative when considering the serious 
criticism of energy supply liberalization in the UK as raised by Th omas and SERIS, n. 314. Th e 
special situation of the GB market with respect to the success of liberalization is also stressed 
by D Newbery, ‘Th e relationship between regulation and competition policy for network 
utilities’, presentation at conference “Advances in the Economics of Competition Law”, Rome, 
24 June 2005, p. 7. Reviewing econometric empirical evidence on the eff ects of ownership 
unbundling, Pollitt argues very tentatively and contradictory, which can, for instance, be seen 
at p. 17 where on the one hand he claims that unbundling leads to lower prices but, on the 
other hand, admits that this eff ect is diffi  cult to model given the diff erences in underlying cost 
structures.
326 See, however, Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38, showing empirically that such cost can indeed be 
substantial and even outweigh the claimed benefi ts of ownership unbundling. See also in the 
particular context of divestiture remedies, Joskow, n. 311.
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between the undertakings involved in energy supply, and there would be more 
market based transactions between such undertakings. Th is may negatively aff ect 
the incentives to invest or operate the transmission system eff ectively, in the 
absence of skilful regulation. He further admits that separation would lead to 
diff erent market interest rates for raising capital, which albeit important for 
fi nancial effi  ciency would be likely to raise the cost of capital for new generation 
investments and hence reduce the volume of investment in generation. On the 
other hand, fully vertically integrated fi rms may require signifi cant amounts of 
anti-trust monitoring and enforcement action if privately owned.327 Pollitt328 
also observes that the main problem of forced separation is its unintended 
consequences, which are brought about by any structural reform of an industry.329 
Moreover, there seems to be no clear evidence that structural remedies generally 
bring about social welfare improvements.330 Any major policy induced change to 
market structure may require signifi cant vigilance on the part of anti-trust 
327 Pollitt, EPRG 0714, n. 37, p. 26.
328 Pollitt, EPRG 0714, n. 37, pp. 26–7.
329 Th is is particularly true with respect to whether restructuring by way of ownership unbundling 
is consistent with future technological developments, i.e. robust to the likely future evolution 
of the electricity and gas industries, see more generally in this respect, Künneke, n. 302, 
Pollitt, EPRG 0714, n. 37, pp. 27–8, and M Mulder, V Shestalova, G Zwart, ‘Vertical Separation 
of the Dutch Energy Distribution Industry: an Economic Assessment of the Political Debate’, 
Forum: Vertical Unbundling in the EU Electricity Sector, (2007) Intereconomics 305, argue 
that network expansions may become increasingly important because with increased cross 
border fl ows, increased demand for electricity from renewable energy sources on the system 
and increased future expansion requirements transmission increasingly competed with 
generation (in this regard, see Balmert/Brunekreeft /Gabriel, n. 47). Th ey consider creating 
ownership unbundled transmission companies conducive to such development Mulder/
Shestalova/Zwart, ibid., however, qualify this conclusion in that the overall welfare eff ect of 
ownership unbundling is ambiguous as long as small-scale generation does not play a major 
role, see also n. 321. If small-scale generation, however, gained importance, the largest 
potential positive eff ect of ownership unbundling could be achieved if applied to distribution 
networks, which would lead to increased competition in the wholesale energy market. See, 
however, Brunekreeft /Ehlers, nn. 8, 38, who show for distributed generation and distribution 
network ownership unbundling that such conclusions might not necessarily hold. As 
distributed generation becomes increasingly important and with it the smart confi guration of 
distribution networks, the distinction between transmission and distribution will, however, 
become increasingly blurred, cf. Pollitt, (2007) Intereconomics, n. 37, p. 296. Pollitt also 
expresses the expectation that competition between generation and transmission may have 
the added benefi t of improved information fl ow compared to the situation under vertical 
integration, in that one party (generation or transmission) will have an incentive to reveal 
accurate information that will benefi t it, even if it is at the expense of the other. Th is eff ect, 
however, can already occur under legal and operational unbundling conditions, as has been 
confi rmed by the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) in its Monitoring Bericht 
(Monitoring Report) 2008, pp. 214–5.
330 R Crandall, C Whinston, ‘Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the 
Evidence’, (2003) 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, for instance, struggle to fi nd consumer 
benefi ts arising from structural remedies in the most celebrated anti-trust cases in the US 
(including Standard Oil, Alcoa and AT&T).
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authorities as market forces (via mergers) seek to reconfi gure the industry in the 
light of legal restrictions on ownership. Care should be taken that the additional 
cash generated by the sale of transmission assets is not used to fi nance 
reintegration by way of mergers between generation and retail leading to 
foreclosure at this side of the energy supply market.331 Wholesale markets were 
of little use if retailers were buying their supplies from their wholesale divisions, 
which would, moreover, compromise the main justifi cation for liberalization, 
which was to turn the wholesale activity from a monopoly to a competitive 
market.332 Price signals would not be reliable enough for electricity and gas to be 
bought in signifi cant quantities on the (visible) wholesale market and would 
certainly not be reliable enough to provide signals that would be the basis for 
investments.333 Ensuring non-discriminatory access to the energy networks was 
simply an enabling measure to allow the wholesale and retail markets to function 
effi  ciently. If, for other reasons, the markets could not function effi  ciently, 
unbundling had little if any value.334 However, the European Commission in its 
market analyses concentrated heavily on the integration of networks and 
wholesale/retail with little mention of integration of wholesale and retail.335
Haucap, the chairman of the German Monopolies Commission, however, fi nds 
considerable arguments against ownership unbundling336: even an unbundled 
network operator may have an incentive to discriminate between diff erent 
331 Th omas, nn. 314 and 25.
332 Th omas, n. 314.
333 If the market is dominated by such companies, the liquidity of the visible wholesale markets 
will be negligible, as seems to the case in the UK where six integrated companies dominate the 
energy markets, see in greater detail Th omas (November 2007), n. 315, contradicting S Dow, 
‘Energy Law in the United Kingdom’, in M Roggenkamp, C Redgwell et al. (eds), Energy Law 
in Europe, OUP, 2nd ed., 2007, chapter 15, nos 15.217, 15.315. Th e UK energy markets seem to 
get more concentrated and dominated by integrated generation and retail undertakings, see 
already nn. 317 and 319 and accompanying text.
334 Th omas (July 2007), n. 314. Th e barriers to entry for new retail and gas wholesale/electricity 
generation companies would become insurmountable. If there is no liquid wholesale market, 
a new generator or gas importer would have nowhere to sell its product and a new retailer 
would have no market in which to buy supplies, see Th omas (November 2007), n. 315. Exactly 
this seemed to have happened in New Zealand aft er the imposition of ownership unbundling 
on its energy supply sector. On New Zealand, see n. 319.
335 Th is is in spite of the Commission acknowledging the failure of the wholesale markets when it 
fi nds in its Sector Inquiry, n. 3, p. 6, that there is a chronic lack of liquidity, both in electricity 
and gas wholesale markets. However, it proposes no remedies for dealing with what it had 
acknowledged in its Preliminary Report of February 2006, n. 41, as one of the main causes of 
this lack of liquidity, corporate integration of wholesale and retail activities. It might be 
recalled that one of the major fi ndings of the Commission in the Preliminary Report was the 
problems created by vertical foreclosure (see also n. 186) in both, the electricity and gas 
markets. Th e Commission representatives Lowe/Pucinskaite/Webster/Lindberg, n. 12, also 
ignore the issue of integration of wholesale and retail. See further Th omas, nn. 314 and 25.
336 N. 38, p. 303.
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customers, just as any monopolist or oligopolist has an incentive to engage in 
price discrimination. Th ere was no reason to believe that a vertically separated 
network monopolist would not engage in price or non-price discrimination if 
this was possible. Whether such discrimination was possible depended on the 
degree of regulatory supervision and the contractual arrangements between the 
various energy supply undertakings, which may engage in, as he calls them, “side 
payments” to re-establish the vertical integration through the “back door”. 
Consequently, even vertically separate networks would need regulatory 
supervision as the potential to abuse market power would remain. While it was 
clear that the price levels needed regulation, the incentives to discriminate would 
not be eliminated either, which contrasts with the repeated claims by the 
Commission. Even a single-product monopolist usually has an incentive to 
engage in price or non-price discrimination.337
As regards the incentive of the network operator to invest, in particular in 
network reliability, such incentive would likely be negatively aff ected as a result 
of vertical separation. Th is is because an integrated network operator has a much 
greater incentive to ensure that the network is reliable. In the case of a blackout, 
the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking would not only forego 
transmission revenues, but also the revenues from electricity, which cannot be 
sold during the blackout. Additionally, the specifi city of network investments 
further reduced investment incentives if companies were vertically separated. In 
fact, investment specifi city had been the key argument of transaction cost 
economics in favour of vertical integration.338 Should double marginalization 
occur339, this also reduces the investment incentives for a separated network 
operator because it would reduce its profi ts from additional investment.340 
Further, it had been shown that it is in fact legal unbundling, which may yield the 
best investment incentives when compared to full integration and full ownership 
unbundling.341
337 Similar C Müller, ‘Eine preistheoretische Betrachtung des Ownership Unbundling’, (2006) 
1/2 et 34, 36.
338 See Haucap, n. 37, p. 304. See also O Williamson, Th e Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 
1985; S Grossmann, O Hart, ‘Vertical and Lateral Integration’, (1986) Journal of Political 
Economy 619.
339 See n. 323 and accompanying text.
340 Under certain circumstances, the separate network operator can, however, also engage in 
over-investment, see Th e Brattle Group, n. 191, and Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great Britain.
341 See Haucap, n. 37, p. 304. F Höffl  er, S Kranz, ‘Legal Unbundling: A Golden Mean between 
Vertical Integration and Vertical Separation?’, Working Paper, WHU Otto Beisheim School of 
Management, 2007; in this regard also H Cremer, J Cremer, P de Donder, ‘Legal Vs Ownership 
Unbundling in Network Industries’, CEPR Working Paper Series, No. 5767, 2006.
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Lastly, Haucap rightly refers to the likely long legal battles, which ownership 
unbundling or divestiture with the requirement of a forced sale of either networks 
or the non-network assets and activities would entail. In the meantime, there 
would be considerable legal uncertainty resulting in negative impacts on 
investment incentives for both, generation and network operators.342
According to Haucap, the case for ownership unbundling in gas was actually 
much weaker as gas can be more easily substituted for than electricity by a 
substantial number of (potential) customers, which decreases market power. As 
gas to a large extent comes from non-EU countries such as Russia, Norway and 
North-African countries, if their fi rms (such as Gazprom) had to unbundle from 
their networks within the EU, they would simply raise prices at the borders.343
Th e double marginalization problem would also be more likely to occur as these 
countries do not fall under EC jurisdiction (at least as far as gas production 
concerned). Th us, the vertical separation of gas production, transport and retail 
entails substantial problems in this regard, also because much larger parts of 
long-distance pipeline systems are outside EC jurisdiction, dedicated to particular 
gas fi elds, which makes them specifi c investments. What also needs to be 
considered is that ownership unbundling would substantially reduce the gas 
undertakings’ incentive to invest in electricity generation within the EU.
Instead of ownership separation or introducing “deep” ISOs, Haucap considers a 
whole package of remedies necessary to remedy what have rightly been shown by 
the Commission to be competition defi ciencies hampering the development of 
an internal market for energy supply: the need for a signifi cant reduction of 
planning regulations for electricity generation and network expansions (including 
an acceleration of permission procedures, even against local resistance), a solid 
regulation of network connection, access and charges344 and a stringent 
requirement for transmission network operators to use the revenues from the 
342 Haucap, n. 37, p. 304, also notes with regard to “deep” Independent System Operators as for 
instance, proposed by the Commission, see further infra, similar issues would arise as outlined 
here in the context of ownership unbundling. Further, collusion might be facilitated. As a 
result, it can be said that both, ownership unbundling and “deep” ISOs are not effi  cient.
343 N. 37, p. 304. C Growitsch, G Müller, M Stronzik, ‘Ownership Unbundling in der Gaswirtschaft  
– Th eoretische Grundlagen und emprirische Evidenz’, WIK-Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 308, Mai 
2008, also cannot see an economic justifi cation for ownership unbundling in the gas sector.
344 See, for instance, the German regulation Kraft NAV (Verordnung zur Regelung des 
Netzanschlusses von Anlagen zur Erzeugung von elektrischer Energie (Regulation concerning 
network connection of generation plant), 26 June 2007, BGBl. I, p. 1187), which alleviates the 
connection and access of new generation, and the introduction of incentive regulation there 
from 2009.
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allocation of scarce interconnector capacities to increase such cross-border 
transmission capacities.345
When it comes to quantifying the costs and benefi ts based on empirical data, the 
economic justifi cation of ownership unbundling appears to be even more 
doubtful as has recently been argued by SEO346 and Brunekreeft .347
Brunekreeft  has produced a social cost and benefi t analysis of ownership 
unbundling of the electricity transmission networks in Germany, which, however, 
allows for more general conclusions to be drawn. He analyzes two intended 
eff ects of ownership unbundling in the form envisaged by the European 
Commission, namely the facilitation of investment into the expansion of the 
European energy transmission networks and the construction and expansion of 
interconnectors at the internal borders348, and more favourable conditions for 
network access and stronger competition in up- (generation wholesale) and 
345 Which would, however, not require ownership divestiture or unbundling but simply an 
amendment of Regulation 1228/2003, n. 219, deleting all other options for using such 
congestion charges. According to the President of the German regulatory agency 
Bundesnetzagentur BNetzA, Kurth, interconnector capacity seems actually to catch up, see M 
Kurth, ‘Hearing on the third legislative energy package proposals of the European 
Commission’, European Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, Brussels, 
31 January 2008. On interconnection projects in the UK and the Netherlands, see in the Part 2 
Chapters 5 and 6 infra. Another central element of such a package is ever closer regional 
cooperation of regulatory agencies and transmission system operators, see in greater detail 
chapter 3 infra.
346 See Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38, and Baarsma/de Nooij/Koster/van der Weijden, n. 115.
347 Brunekreeft , n. 9. Brunekreeft  applies the so-called Residual Supply Index (RSI) model used 
by London Economics in its study for the European Commission, n. 12, in which it analyzes 
the market structure in six EU Member States.
348 It may be recalled that the “strategic investment withholding” argument (see Brunekreeft , 
EPRG, n. 9) claims that vertically integrated utilities have insuffi  cient incentives to invest in 
interconnector capacity in order to hold off  competition from abroad. Reversing the argument, 
it is said that unbundling would improve incentives to build interconnector capacity. One 
major issue, which this assumption neglects, however, is that even if all the incentives to invest 
are good actual investment may still be impeded by legal obstacles with respect to obtaining a 
building permission in good time, and factual obstacles in terms of local resistance; with 
respect to resolving legal obstacles, this is in the sole remit of the Member States, as are, in the 
same context, the legal condition of network connection of generation capacity. See in this 
regard the recent German regulation Kraft NAV, n. 344.
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downstream (retail) markets349, which is supposed to contribute to decreased 
prices for energy consumers.350
Brunekreeft  argues that the positive eff ect of ownership unbundling on investment 
into electricity generation351 and interconnector capacity may be rather small; 
available generation capacity and the eff ects of ownership unbundling on such 
capacity actually determines the size of such capacity investment.352 Under the 
favourable but debatable assumption that ownership unbundling can in principle 
have a generation and interconnector capacity acceleration eff ect (and thus a 
positive eff ect on competition), i.e. investment would become available faster 
than without unbundling, in practice such an acceleration eff ect is only likely to 
take place in times of low or even scarce generation capacity. If there is, however, 
adequate generation capacity, which falls into the remit of the Member States, 
unbundling does not seem to have such a capacity acceleration eff ect because 
investment will not be needed in the face of adequate generation capacity353; as a 
349 For some more detail on these eff ects, see Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great Britain. It may be recalled 
that theory claims that unbundling increases competition. Unbundling is argued to have pro-
competitive eff ects, which is one of the drivers of the debate. Th is eff ect may be direct by 
intensifying the competition among existing players, or indirect, by facilitating more or faster 
entry of third parties. More competition can result in lower prices and thereby benefi t 
consumers, and can also increase cost pressure and thereby increase the sector productivity. 
But see, however, n. 311 and n. 326 and accompanying text as regards the long-term costs for 
society. See also n. 305.
350 See nn. 114 and 305. One of the most important determinants of competition and prices (in 
electricity wholesale markets) is the availability of generation capacity relative to peak load, 
i.e. when demand for electricity peaks. More and/or faster investment in generation and 
interconnector capacity would increase total available generation capacity and thereby 
intensify competition; interconnector capacity makes generation capacity in other Member 
States available. More available generation leads to more competition, which is refl ected in the 
Residual Supply Index.
351 Based on the assumption that ownership unbundling might be more conducive because 
independent network operators have less of an interest to withhold generation capacity.
352 Th e size of interconnector capacity depends on the volume of electricity imports and exports, 
which can lead to more or less generation capacity and therefore to more or less competition.
353 Th is is also something, which the Commission should in principle know, see, for instance, the 
study by CESI et al., ‘TEN-ENERGY-Invest – Energy Infrastructure Costs and Investments 
between 1996 and 2013 (medium-term) and further to 2023 (long-term) on the Trans-
European Energy Network and its Connection to Neighbouring Regions with emphasis on 
investments in renewable energy sources and their integration into the Trans-European 
energy networks, including an Inventory of the Technical Status of the European Energy-
Network for the Year 2003’, TREN/04/ADM/S07.38533/ETU/B2-CESI, October 2005, no. 
4.6.2.5., pp. 89 et seq., 92, which was commissioned by the Commission and is available on the 
Commission’s website. See further on this issue, J Hers, Ö Özdemir, ‘A Nodal Pricing Analysis 
of the Future German Electricity Market’, study of Bremer Energie Institut and ECN 
Amsterdam, 2009, and Ö Özdemir, J Hers, E Bartholomew Fischer, G Brunekreeft , B Hobbs, 
‘A Nodal Pricing Analysis of the Future German Electricity Market’, proceedings of the 6th 
International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 09), Leuven, 27–29 May 
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consequence, the positive eff ect of ownership unbundling on interconnector 
capacity would be very small.354
To summarize, the size of the eff ects of ownership unbundling on interconnector 
capacity and competition critically depend on available generation capacity, 
which apart from the fact that interconnection makes more generation (from 
abroad) available355, is a matter for the Member States to provide in a suffi  cient 
manner.356 Only if Member States do not manage to provide adequate generation 
capacity357, can the EU and thus the Commission as guardian of competition in 
the internal market consider measures to promote interconnection and generation 
adequacy. Th is, however, is a regulatory issue and not one of competition law 
enforcement because individually enforced ownership unbundling would not 
change the structure of the internal energy supply market or signifi cantly 
enhance interconnection capacity.
III. CONCLUSIONS
As the European Commission in its capacity as competition authority would act 
as an organ of the executive, it only possesses a limited margin of appreciation 
(compared to the margin of appreciation of the legislature with respect to passing 
legislation) as regards the question whether and how to react to anticompetitive 
behaviour of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings. Because of the 
systemic (potential) confl ict of vertical integration, ownership separation would 
likely be considered an appropriate means to restore the competitive process; 
however, such a step would not be necessary or proportionate because milder, 
and as has been explained here, equally eff ective means are available, in particular 
2009. On the effi  cient location of generation investment, Brunekreeft /Neuhoff /Newbery, n. 
290.
354 Th e same is true for the eff ect of ownership unbundling on competition, which results from 
the size of its eff ect on interconnector capacity. Brunekreeft  estimates the eff ects of ownership 
unbundling as small.
355 Article 176 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), n. 300, explicitly 
provides for network interconnection to fall into the competence of the EU, see chapter 3.
356 According to the Article 175(2) EC, the energy mix and thus electricity generation falls into 
the sole remit of the Member States; but see also infra, chapter 3, with respect to the issue of 
security of energy supply in the context of unbundling measures in the European energy 
sector, more particularly Directive 2005/89/EC of 18 January 2006 concerning measures to 
safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investments, OJ 2006 L 33/22, 
4.2.2006, and Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard 
security of natural gas supply, OJ 2004 L 127/92, 29.4.2004.
357 Which, at least for Germany, albeit that generation scarcity is projected, seems unlikely to 
happen. See BNetzA, n. 125, p. 61. See also, with respect to the fact that the adequate provision 
of generation capacity falls into the remit of the Member States, the elaborations in the context 
of the principle of subsidiarity in chapter 3 section VI infra.
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if worked out and supervised in cooperation with the corresponding sector-
specifi c (national) regulatory agencies.
Th e application of the principle of proportionality in the context of ex post 
competition law enforcement, in particular with regard to imposing structural 
remedies, places great emphasis on the protection of the fundamental economic 
rights of the dominant undertaking, in particular the structure or organization 
of its property. At the same time, the proportionality principle can be seen as 
preserving competitive market conditions by including an effi  ciency test for 
prospective remedies, which should include a social cost benefi t analysis.358
According to the analysis of the costs and benefi ts of the structural remedy of 
ownership unbundling, a possible trade-off  exists between its eff ectiveness and 
its effi  ciency. While the choice is obvious when two prospective remedies are 
equally eff ective but not equally effi  cient, it becomes complicated when a 
behavioural remedy does not appear to be as eff ective as a structural remedy, but 
where such a structural intervention would only remedy an abuse of a dominant 
position in the short-term and be expected to produce effi  ciency losses in the 
long-term.
It is claimed here that the Commission when facing such a dilemma is not allowed 
to impose such a structural remedy, as it would not be proportionate to do so. 
Rather, the adoption of an eff ective remedy, which also observes economic 
effi  ciency, even if it was more costly and took longer to restore competition, 
would be the way forward.359
It has been suggested here that in a setting of network infrastructure monopolies, 
the application of the “essential facilities” doctrine, i.e. an obligation to grant 
TPA to network facilities, as a behavioural remedy with structural implications 
358 According to Sullivan, n. 239, pp. 377 et seq., an antitrust remedy is in line with the principle 
of proportionality if it ends the off ending conduct, prevents its recurrence and restores the 
competitive conditions in the market.
359 W Comanor, ‘Th e problem of remedy in monopolization cases: the Microsoft  case as an 
example’, (2001) Antitrust Bulletin (Spring 2001) 115, 132, distinguishes two coexisting and 
co-applied approaches to the determination of a remedy, namely a “legal” approach focussing 
on the violation of competition rules by a dominant fi rm and its consequences, and a so-called 
“regulatory” approach taking market and consumer welfare enhancing eff ects into account 
when adopting a remedy. He claims that an excessive focus on effi  ciency considerations could 
lead to an ineff ective remedy. It is contested though that imposing a less eff ective remedy, 
which is suffi  ciently effi  cient, is not only proportionate in the short run. It does also not give 
rise to changes in market conditions in the long run which are already known to be harmful 
to competition (as a result of knowing the remedy’s effi  ciency). Th is contrasts with choosing a 
more eff ective but less effi  cient remedy, which alters market condition to the positive in the 
short run but for which it is already clear at the outset that it will cause competition problems 
in the long-term.
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on related markets might prove to be equally as eff ective as an imposed divestiture 
but less problematic in terms of the effi  ciency of the remedy (and the impact on 
the fundamental economic rights of the dominant undertaking).360 Given the 
fact that competition authorities are well capable of tackling TPA to energy 
supply networks under competition law ex post in individual cases (possibly in 
close cooperation with national regulators, which can impose more detailed 
access rules), imposed divestiture seems not to be proportionate according to the 
(remedial) proportionality test as required under Regulation 1/2003.
When weighing the economic arguments pro and contra ownership separation 
of the energy (transmission) networks from vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings (here by way of competition law enforcement), its benefi ts are 
qualitatively diff use or ambiguous. Quantitatively or empirically, however, the 
benefi ts of forced divestiture in a liberalized market setting appear highly 
questionable.
As has been shown in the context of economic reasoning pro and contra 
ownership separation, suffi  cient generation is actually the problem in the energy 
supply industry; moreover, more interconnection investment or expansions of 
the energy transmission networks only happen if they are economically 
justifi ed.361 Th e current exemptions for energy supply network investment362, 
which competes with generation, seems to be the way forward as regards 
attracting more network investment as is the obligation to reinvest all revenues 
received from interconnector congestion charges into the expansion of such 
interconnectors. Further, the sector-specifi c regulators and competition 
authorities’ sanctioning of (network) capacity hoarding also appears conducive 
to reduce anti-competitive behaviour of vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings with respect to their network operations.
Further, it should be noted that assuming for the sake of argument that the 
Commission would legitimately exercise its power under competition law to 
impose structural remedies on individual vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings, the use of this ex post power might lead to competitive 
malformations in the sector (as might actually the ex ante use of merger remedies 
to restructure the sector). Th is is because competition law is only enforced in 
individual cases of anti-competitive behaviour (or, in merger cases, to prevent 
such occurrences in the future). In an industry characterized by incumbent fi rms 
360 See also Bergman, n. 280, p. 434.
361 Which is obviously diff erent from cases where existing networks have to be maintained or 
reinforced in order to fulfi l the network operators obligations to ensure network reliability 
and security under the current regulatory framework.
362 See in greater detail in chapter 3 infra.
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in the various Member States, and taking into account the incentives to exercise 
their market power in an anti-competitive way as outlined in the previous 
chapter, it can easily be appreciated that incumbents tend to behave anti-
competitively across the board. On the other hand, not every instance of anti-
competitive behaviour is (easily) detected. Given that National Competition 
Authorities are likely to pursue diff erent competition law enforcement practices 
and further to the decentralization of competition law enforcement in the 
European Union away from the Commission to the National Competition 
Authorities, applying structural remedies in individual cases is likely to lead to 
competitive disadvantages for the energy supply undertakings concerned 
compared to their peers, which were lucky enough or more cautious not be 
detected and subsequently subjected to such structural remedies.
In this context, it should also be noted that the creation of a level playing fi eld, 
which is one of the goals of European competition policy, would be seriously 
undermined if the European Commission exercised its power to order structural 
ex post measures. Th e prevention of cross-subsidization by sector-specifi c 
regulation, which is not applied coherently to the energy sector because it is only 
targeting sector-internal cross-subsidization and only with respect to vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings but not those companies, which cross-
subsidise from sources other than those situated in the energy supply sector, is 
also contributing to “unlevelling” (i.e. reducing the levelness of) the playing fi eld, 
as do, by the way, the divergent licensing and authorization requirements (which 
also vary in terms of the time delay before they are granted), which impose 
diff erent burdens upon competing operators in diff erent Member States.
Finally, competition laws enforced TPA as referred to above as well as legal and 
operational unbundling and the 2003 Energy Directives as implemented by the 
Member States (possibly in combination with tightening the regulatory 
requirements of these Directives) appear to be suffi  cient means to remedy 
competition concerns.363 Moreover, as has been demonstrated in the E.ON and 
RWE cases364, the threat of high fi nes imposed on returns from energy network 
operations, which are moreover already regulated, not only contributes to the 
resolution of competitive concerns but also has precential value, which increases 
the pressure on the industry to comply with competition law.365
363 As to the latter, see chapter 3 infra.
364 Which have undertaken to sell, respectively, their electricity and gas transmission networks. 
See n. 252.
365 Sector-specifi c regulation and corresponding enforcement powers of regulatory agencies are 
obviously also conducive to convince the industry not to behave anti-competitively as is 




UNBUNDLING AS PART OF 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION
Th e rationale behind economic regulation of EC energy supply networks, which 
consists of competition law enforcement on the one hand and sector-specifi c 
regulation on the other, has been shown in chapter 1 of this Part 1. Now, aft er 
discussing certain aspects of competition law enforcement with respect to the 
European Commission’s competence to restructure European energy supply, the 
legislative competence of the EU to introduce further unbundling measures, in 
particular in the form envisaged by the Commission in September 2007 (as 
outlined in the Introduction) is the subject of the discussion to follow in this 
chapter 3.366
I. INTRODUCTION
Before analysing whether the EU possesses a competence to impose further 
unbundling measures on the European energy supply industry, section II briefl y 
explores why it is just this industry, which is subjected to such strict unbundling 
requirements. Section III then outlines the evolution and latest status of EC 
energy supply policy and (proposed) legislation to the extent relevant here, with 
an emphasis on the institutional side of sector-specifi c energy supply network 
regulation.
Section IV deals briefl y with the question of the competence of the European 
Union to become active in energy sector-specifi c regulation.367 Reference will 
also be made to the fi rst time introduction of an energy chapter in the Lisbon 
366 Fundamental rights aspects of exercising any such competence are discussed infra in Part 2 
Chapter 7.
367 For rather extensive discussions about whether Article 95 EC and/or other provisions of the 
EC Treaty can or cannot serve as a basis for energy sector-specifi c regulation, see U Hüff er, K 
Ipsen, P Tettinger, Die Transitrichtlinien für Gas und Elektrizität, Bochumer Beiträge zum 
Berg- und Energierecht, Band 14, 1991, R Scholz, S Langer, Europäischer Binnenmarkt und 
Energiepolitik, Schrift en zum europäischen Recht, Band 13, 1992, H Jarass, Europäisches 
Energierecht, Schrift en zum europäischen Recht, Band 23, 1996, Baur/Lückenbach, n. 96, and 
Baur/Pritschke/Klauer, n. 86.
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Treaty (which is not yet in force).368 More important in this context and on the 
assumption that such a competence exists, is, however, whether the European 
Union actually is allowed to exercise this competence with respect to introducing 
further unbundling measures. Section V thus elaborates on Article 295 EC369 
and the question of whether this can be seen as an absolute bar on the European 
Union engaging in further unbundling of energy supply networks. Some brief 
elaborations will follow with respect to Article 175 EC370 and Article 194(2) 
Lisbon Treaty to see whether these provisions can be regarded as another absolute 
bar on the European Union introducing further energy supply network 
unbundling.
Th e competence conferred by Article 95 EC serves to assist in the achievement of 
the goals set out in Article 14 EC, and thus the fundamental freedoms of the 
internal market.371 It thus is to be asked whether compulsory ownership 
unbundling or the introduction of ISOs would override these freedoms. Th is is 
because if these two alternative unbundling measures entered into force unaltered 
and without further less rigid alternative unbundling measures372, the 
368 N. 300. Th e entering-into-force of the Lisbon Traty is pending a second referendum inthe 
Republic of Ireland in autumn 2009 and the approval by the respective heads of State of the 
ratifi cations in Germany (pending a ruling of the BVerfG, the Czech Republic and Poland 
(pending the outcome of the said Irish referendum). It is likely that the Lisbon Treaty enters 
into force at the beginning of 2010. See Financial Times, ‘Czech clear way for Lisbon treaty’, 
6 May 2009, and Spiegel, ‘Tschechien stimmt für EU-Reform’, 6 May 2009.
369 Th e English version says that “[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member 
States governing the system of property ownership.”.
370 As part of Title XIX “Environment” of the EC Treaty, Article 175(2)(c) says that “[…] without 
prejudice to Article 95, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
[…] shall adopt: […] measures signifi cantly aff ecting a Member State’s choice between 
diff erent energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.”
371 See ECJ, C-376/98 – Germany v European Parliament & Council (Tobacco Advertising 
Directive), (2000) ECR I-8419, nos 83 et seq.
372 On 9 and 10 October 2008, the EU Energy Council agreed the coexistence on the internal 
energy market of three diff erent unbundling models for production and supply activities, on 
the one hand, and energy transmission activities on the other. Th e Council (and the European 
Parliament on 22 April 2009 with amendments in detail) approved a third solution (ITO) 
(additional to what has been proposed by the Commission in September 2007) whereby 
independent transmission network operators would be set up with a view to eff ective 
unbundling. Th is option would enable companies to retain ownership of transmission 
networks provided that the networks were operated by an independent transmission network 
operator and that additional assurances were given. As regards this third option, see already 
nn. 31, 33 and 95 of the Introduction and accompanying text. Undertakings engaging in the 
production or supply of gas or electricity will, however, be prohibited from exercising control 
over or operating transmission networks in Member States that have opted for full unbundling. 
See Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions C/08/276 of 2895th Council meeting 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy’, Press Release 13649/08, Luxembourg, 9 and 
10 October 2008, p. 18, and Recital 16, Article 9(12) of both the Electricity and Gas Directive 
proposals as approved on those dates, according to which, in an unbundled ownership 
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Commission in its 2007 proposals further intends to ensure that vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings in the EU would have to either give up all 
of their (shareholdings in) energy supply networks373 or supply/production 
activities all throughout the EU (if ownership unbundling was enforced EU-wide). 
Or, in the event that a Member State chose to introduce ISOs, vertically integrated 
transmission network owners situated in such a Member State374 would not only 
not be allowed to operate transmission networks anywhere else in the EU; as 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings pursue production or supply 
activities, they would equally not be allowed to own and pursue such activities in 
Member States where ownership unbundling has been enforced instead of 
ISOs.375 Similarly to ownership unbundling, this would mean that existing 
network activities or the other energy supply activities would have to be sold.376
Th us, section V(4) deals with the question of whether the Commission proposals 
infringe the free movement of capital according to Article 56(1) EC377, which can 
be regarded as a relative bar to exercising the competence of Article 95 EC because 
it allows for exceptions if legislative measures are proportionate.378
Before chapter 3 concludes, section VI will discuss the question of whether 
further unbundling measures as envisaged with the Commission proposals of 
scenario, vertically integrated gas supply undertakings are also not allowed to control 
electricity transmission networks and their operations and vice versa.
373 And, obviously, any network operations.
374 With transmission network ownership being legally unbundled, see Article 10a of the 2007 
Commission proposals for Energy Directives, n. 15, and the operation of the network pursued 
by an Independent System Operator.
375 Although Recitals 10 and 11 of the proposals refer to system operators only, Article 8(1) and 
(2) and Article 10(2)(a) and Article 10a of the 2007 Commission proposal for an Electricity 
Directive in conjunction with p. 7 (1st para.) of the proposals’ Explanatory Memorandum, n. 
15, for instance, might be read in this way. Th is conclusion seems also be supported by the 
proposals’ referral to the EU wide applied term of control, see n. 19. It is not clear from these 
proposals whether vertically integrated electricity supply undertakings would be allowed to 
control gas supply activities or vice versa. As regards the position under the draft  Electricity 
and Gas Directives as approved by the European Parliament on 22 April 2009, see n. 569.
376 For instance, if the ISO model was introduced in Germany and ownership unbundling 
according to the proposals in the UK, German vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings such as E.ON would have to give up either their supply and generation activities 
in England and Wales or their networks in Germany. To a less extreme extent, this is now the 
explicit position of the Council of Energy Ministers, see n. 372 and in greater detail infra 
where issues of Article 56 EC are discussed. See also n. 24.
377 Th e fundamental freedoms do not only bind the Member States but also, as can be inferred 
from, inter alia, Articles 3(1), 7(1) and 249(1) EC, the community legislature, see Schroeder in 
Streinz, EUV/EGV, 2003, Article 28 EGV, no. 29, and thus any new legislation on the basis of 
the agreement reached by the Council of Energy Ministers on 9 and 10 October 2008 or the 
approval of the European Parliament on 22 April 2009, see n. 372.
378 See ECJ, C-51/93 – Meyhui v Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke, (1994) ECR I-3879, nos 20 et seq.; ECJ, 
C-114/96 – Kieff er & Th ill, (1997) ECR I-3629, nos 31 et seq.
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September 2007 obey the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in Articles 
5(2) and 5(3) EC.
II. LEGAL (OWNERSHIP) UNBUNDLING ONLY IN 
ENERGY SUPPLY NETWORK INDUSTRY
Structural separation in the form of legal or corporate unbundling379 of non-
competitive infrastructure network activities from competitive up- or down-
stream activities as required of the European energy (electricity and gas) industry 
has not (yet) been applied in the European postal services, telecommunications 
and rail industries380, at least not as rigidly.381
One of the reasons why more rigid forms of structural separation like legal or 
ownership unbundling have not been tried in the European rail, postal or 
telecommunications industries appears to be political resistance. Other reasons 
comprise the technical structure of the industry in question, potential 
restructuring costs, the observance of the proportionality principle in the 
restructuring measures deemed to be necessary to promote competition as well 
as public policy issues such as securing public and universal service 
obligations.382
In the railway sector the EU has chosen to approach liberalization in three stages. 
Th e fi rst step was undertaken with Directive 91/440 providing for accounting 
separation between infrastructure and operations.383 A second step, the so called 
First Railway Package entered into force on 15 March 2003, opening up the trans-
379 See Introduction.
380 It may be recalled that the European Council under the Portuguese presidency in its Lisbon 
Strategy in March 2000 encouraged the European Commission and the Member States “to 
speed up liberalization in areas such as gas, electricity, postal services and transport.” Th e 
Lisbon Strategy consequently aims at achieving a fully operational internal market in these 
areas, see n. 1, no. 17.
381 It may be recalled that the Commission claims, in accordance with economic theory, that only 
ownership separation eliminates the incentives or the ability of the regulated fi rm to act in an 
anti-competitive manner. Less rigid forms of structural separation such as accounting, 
management or legal separation are assumed not to eliminate such incentives. In a regulatory 
setting, the latter kinds of structural separation are oft en chosen as a supplement to other 
(behavioural) approaches such as access regulation in order to limit the incentives and to 
additionally control the incumbent’s ability to restrict competition. See also n. 233.
382 See already n. 118.
383 Complemented by two further Directives in 1995, Directive 95/18/EC of 19 June 1995 on the 
licensing of railway undertakings, OJ L 143/70, 27.6.1995, and Directive 95/19/EC of 19 June 
1995 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the charging of infrastructure 
fees, OJ L 143/75, 27.6.1995.
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European rail freight network to international goods services, with the entire 
network following in 2008.384 A third step was the adoption of the Second 
Railway Package at the end of April 2004, inter alia creating a European Railway 
Agency for Safety and Interoperability and allowing for the full opening of 
international freight by January 2006 and of domestic freight by January 2007.385 
Th e completion of EU liberalization eff orts is envisaged by a third railway 
package whose approval is currently pending and which would inter alia include 
passenger service liberalization by 2010.386 With Directive 2001/14/EC the EU 
actually endeavours to achieve vertical separation. Th e Directive requires that 
the allocation of infrastructure capacity and the setting of track usage charges is 
managed and performed by an entity legally independent from any railway 
undertaking. Th is can be achieved by an infrastructure manager if legal 
separation between infrastructure and operations has been opted for by a Member 
State, or by an independently accountable entity of the incumbent railway 
undertaking if such legal separation has not been chosen. Th is rather cautious 
approach has been taken because railways are regarded as a technically highly 
complex industry in a rather poor fi nancial state. Furthermore, rail transport 
already faces stiff  competition by alternative transport means such as road and 
air transport (the latter also showing characteristics of a natural monopoly).387 
More rigid forms of structural separation in this sector are widely considered to 
be too costly and economically harmful, at least for the time being.388 For 
technical reasons, competition of track infrastructure, which displays very strong 
monopolistic characteristics (parallel track networks are obviously uneconomical 
to build), is impossible to achieve. And last but not least, political resistance 
contributes to the rather slow and cautious liberalization and integration into an 
internal market of the oft en state-owned national railway industries.389
Th e telecommunications industry on the contrary has been formally liberalized 
since 1998, albeit without providing for legal separation of the infrastructure 
384 Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 2001/14/EC of 26 February 2001 (OJ L 75/1–46, 
15/3/01), providing for rules on the development of the Community’s railways, on licensing of 
railway undertakings, and on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity, the levying of 
charges for its use and safety certifi cation.
385 Directive 2004/49/EC of 29 April 2004 (Rail Safety Directive), OJ L 164/44, 30.4.2004, and 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of 29 April 2004 on establishing a European Railway Agency, 
OJ L 164/1, 30.4.2004.
386 L Di Pietrantonio, J Pelkmans, ‘Th e Economics of EU Railway Reform’, (2004) Journal of 
Network Industries 295, 304; Commission Staff  Working Paper, ‘Horizontal Evaluation of the 
Performance of Network Industries Providing Services of General Economic Interest’, 
SEC(2004) 866, Brussels, 23.6.2004, pp. 19 et seq.
387 Di Pietrantonio/Pelkmans, n. 386, pp. 297 et seq.
388 In the UK, for example, ownership separation of the track infrastructure from train service 
operations has been pursued and ended in vain, see OECD, n. 52, p. 43.
389 Di Pietrantonio/Pelkmans, n. 386, pp. 339 et seq.
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from telecommunication services.390 It was only in the second half of the 1990s 
that local loop unbundling (LLU) became an issue. Th e local loop, also called the 
local or customer access networks or the last meter to the fi nal customer, displays 
monopolistic characteristics as the high costs of the duplication of the local 
access infrastructure prohibit new market entry. Unbundling of the incumbent’s 
local access network allows entrants to lease the incumbent’s local lines in order 
to get access to end users. Access to the local loop was therefore considered as a 
substitute to facility-based entry, i.e. building a parallel local loop, and important 
for operators of a network backbone connecting diff erent local switches on which 
local loops hinge.391 Whereas until 2000 it was for the EU Member States to 
decide about regulating access to the local loop392, LLU was made compulsory 
EU-wide in 2000.393 LLU only applied to operators, which had been designated 
by their national regulatory authorities as having signifi cant market power (SMP) 
in the fi xed telephone network supply market with the determination of SMP 
now being at the core of the New Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications of 2002.394 LLU as regulated for on European level is not 
390 For an in-depth analysis of the EU legislation up to full liberalization, see Larouche, n. 118, pp. 
15 et seq. In June 1999, the so-called Cable Directive (Commission Directive 99/64/EC of 
23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC in order to ensure that telecommunications 
networks and cable TV networks owned by a single operator are separate legal entities, OJ L 
175/39, 10.7.1999) was adopted imposing legal separation between telecommunications services 
and cable television network. See also OECD, n. 52, p. 49. But see also the recent discussions in 
the European Commission with a view to introduce “functional unbundling” (the vertically 
integrated telecommunication undertakings would still own their networks, but have to create 
a separate management structure under the supervision of the national regulator) of the 
vertically integrated telecommunications networks in general and the local loop in particular 
(with British Telecom (BT) serving as an example), Financial Times, ‘EU Commissioner 
favours telecoms break-up’, 29 March 2007, and ‘Brussels split over telecoms’, 24 September 
2007. Th ese plans are, interestingly, opposed by Competition Commissioner Kroes because she 
fears investment disincentives for the undertakings concerned, a concern, which does not seem 
to come to trouble her in the case of energy supply, which is at issue here.
391 P de Bijl, M Peitz, ‘Local loop unbundling in Europe: experience, prospects and policy 
challenges’, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2005–008, Tilburg University, March 2005, pp. 4 et 
seq. Critics contest whether short-term competition through the compulsory granting of 
access comes at the cost of more long-term competition through enhanced investment. 
Directive 2002/19/EC, n. 131, also states that “the imposition by national regulatory authorities 
of mandated access that increases competition in the short term should not reduce incentives 
for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will secure more competition in the long 
term.”
392 See, however, the Europen Commission’s Notice on the application of the competition rules to 
access agreements in the telecommunications sector, n. 178.
393 Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, 
OJ 2000 L336/4, 30.12.2000.
394 See M Bak, ‘European Electronic Communications on the Road to Full Competition: the 
Concept of Signifi cant Market Power under the New Regulatory Framework’, (2003) Journal 
of Network Industries 293, 299. Th e New Regulatory Framework for services and network 
alone consists of fi ve Directives and one Regulation, i.e. Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
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structural separation though, but rather a form of access regulation – the 
incumbent retains ownership and the responsibility for the maintenance of the 
lines which are then leased to rival operators.395 Th e reasons for not pursuing 
structural separation of the local loop are mainly two-fold. First, the boundaries 
between network infrastructure components and telecommunication services 
provision are blurred and hard to defi ne, for technical as well as for legal reasons 
(e.g. the question whether voice over IP is to be qualifi ed as data or the legal 
question whether the subsequent lease (following the initial lease) of a fi xed 
telephone line is to be qualifi ed as downstream service provision). As the 
telecommunications market is characterized by rapid technological change396, 
these boundaries tend to shift  over time so that certain parts of the network 
defi ned today might not display the same characteristics tomorrow. Secondly, 
although the local loop displays monopolistic characteristics, these seem to 
become weaker over time as technically and commercially viable alternatives are 
built or developed, such as mobile phone services and broadband and cable 
infrastructures for which legal separation has already been introduced.397 
Th erefore, regulating (third party) access and network interconnection appears 
to be suffi  cient in this industry.398
In most European Member States399, the postal services sector is still characterised 
by a legal monopoly400 for reserved letter delivery services conferred upon one 
services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108/33, 24.4.2002, Directive 2002/20/EC of 7 March 
2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation 
Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/21, 24.4.2002, Directive 2002/19/EC, n. 131, Directive 2002/22/EC 
of 7 March 2002 on universal service and user’s rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/51, 24.4.2002, Directive 
2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic 
communications networks and services, OJ 2002 L 249/21, 17.9.2002, and Regulation 
2887/2000, ibid.
395 OECD, n. 52, p. 50.
396 De Bijl, n. 128, p. 12.
397 OECD, n. 52, pp. 46–7. See also de Bijl/Peitz, n. 391, p. 33, about the declining role of local 
access networks.
398 LLU has, however, long been under consideration on a national level. In the UK, for example, 
the sector was assessed in 2004 and 2005 with a view to proceeding with structural separation 
of the local loop should access regulation prove to be insuffi  cient to sustain eff ective 
competition, see UK telecommunication regulator Ofcom’s ‘Strategic Review 
Telecommunications Phase 2’, www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/telecoms_p2, which 
culminated in undertakings off ered by incumbent British Telecommunications plc (‘BT’) on 
30 June 2005 and accepted by Ofcom on 22 September 2005, see www.ofcom.org.uk/media/
news/2005/09/nr_20050922. See also www.ofcom.org.uk/static/telecoms_review/index.htm.
399 With the exception of Sweden and Finland, see Council of the European Union, ‘Annual 
Report on Structural Reforms – 2002’, Report 6912/02, Brussels, 6 March 2002, p. 22.
400 As opposed to a natural monopoly whose characteristics cannot be found in the labour-
intensive postal services industry. Th e setting-up of a postal infrastructure parallel to the one 
owned by the incumbent is neither capital-intensive nor extensively time-consuming, two 
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service provider by the State.401 Although considerable competition has been 
introduced by European legislation to the sector of the postal services industry 
serving business customers, this legal monopoly, which in essence covers the 
regular local delivery of letter mail to households402, is maintained mainly for 
universal service (including economies of scope) considerations. Additionally, 
the danger of job losses and with it political resistance have so far hindered the 
liberalization of this industry. Th e complete abolition of the legal monopoly and 
as a consequence full liberalization and completion of the internal market in 
postal services is envisaged for 1 January 2009.403
In contrast to the industries discussed before, the relative technical simplicity 
(i.e. the clarity of the interface boundaries) and healthy economic state of the 
energy sector (compared to rail) made it easier to introduce legal unbundling of 
vertically integrated electricity and natural gas undertakings404 (structural 
approach) combined with network access regulation (behavioural approach).405
important factors whose existence make the facility-based entry of new entrants into a 
network industry which displays monopolistic characteristics economically impractical, see 
also de Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, n. 221, who consider the network industry character of 
postal services problematic. See also de Bijl, n. 128, pp. 11 et seq.
401 Directive 2002/39/EC of 10 June 2002 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the further 
opening to competition of Community postal services, OJ 2002 L 176/21, 5.7.2002, which 
further limits the service sectors that can be protected from competition, allows Member 
States to exempt items of correspondence weighing less than 100 grams from competition 
until the end of 2002, and items weighing less than 50 grams until the end of 2005. It sets 
1 January 2009 as the date for the full accomplishment of the Internal Market for postal 
services, to be confi rmed by the European Parliament and the Council. As to the network 
industry characteristics of postal services, see de Bijl/van Damme/Larouche, n. 221, p. iv. See 
also OECD, n. 52, p. 51.
402 See OECD, n. 52, p. 51.
403 See Article 7 of Directive 97/67/EC of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development 
of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of 
service, OJ 1998 L 15/14, 21.1.1998.
404 See the 2003 Energy Directives and the Introduction supra. Th e way the unbundling measures 
currently in place aff ect the fundamental rights of the privately owned energy supply 
undertakings are not the subject of this work.
405 As a result of the Commission’s determination that aft er the introduction of the fi rst 
liberalization package (containing milder forms of structural separation such as accounts 
unbundling) competition in the energy sector had not developed as desired. Legal unbundling 
increases transparency, makes cross-subsidies within integrated undertakings more visible 
and, therefore, regulation especially of the transportation part of the industry easier to 
regulate. For a recent account of the state of internal energy market liberalization, see the 
Communication of the Commission, n. 10. For an early account of the revision of the fi rst 
liberalization package, see Hancher, n. 118. Hancher also analyses the PSO and USO in the 
new Directives, in particular in the context of the concessions made by the European 
Commission in this respect in order to win the Member States acceptance of further 
liberalization of the internal energy market.
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In addition, energy networks display the strongest characteristics of a natural 
monopoly in the sense that alternative means of transporting services are not 
available compared, for instance, with the telecommunications industry where 
alternative transmission modes exist and the rail transport sector where 
competing modes of transport exist. It is this lack of infrastructure alternatives406, 
which makes investment infrastructure in traditional network-bound energy 
transportation so important. Above all, however, energy supply is the backbone 
of economic activity in the European Union (which includes being the basis for 
any other network industry activity). It is the most indispensable industry for the 
internal market in the European Union to function and for competition in the 
internal market to fl ourish.
Energy supply security and the reliability of the energy networks are thus 
predominant components of European energy policy, as already indicated in 
chapter 1 above when outlining the rationale behind economic regulation of the 
energy networks. Th ey are made subject to Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 
which are imposed on energy supply undertakings, in particular energy network 
operators407, and, more importantly, are the subject of separate security of supply 
Directives.408 Th e imperative for security of supply distinguishes the energy 
supply sector from other liberalized network industries such as the 
telecommunication and rail transport sectors. Energy supply security and 
reliability provides the Commission with a further argument in favour of 
ownership unbundling of the energy (transmission) networks.
Whereas security of gas supply predominantly aims at securing suffi  cient volumes 
of gas throughout the EU (in the “spirit” of solidarity amongst the EC Member 
States and in particular in the event of sudden crisis), and at ensuring suffi  cient 
gas storage and interconnection of the national gas systems409, security of 
electricity supply instead aims at suffi  cient reliability (quality) of electricity 
406 Apart from may be LNG, which, however, also requires traditional gas pipelines to deliver the 
converted gas.
407 In this regard, see the Directives referred to in n. 404.
408 Directives 2004/67/EC (security of gas supply) and 2005/89/EC (security of electricity supply), 
n. 356. Both Directives are supposed to complement the 2003 Energy Directives with their 
market opening rules by imposing additional obligations of the Member States to maintain 
secure networks and to promote a stable market framework for investments. Neither Directive, 
however, is supposed to aff ect the sovereign rights of Member States over their own natural 
resources, which also include providing (suffi  cient) electricity generation capacity. See in this 
regard the discussion in the context of Article 175 EC and the new Article 194 TFEU (aft er the 
coming-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty) infra; both Articles deal with the sovereignty as 
regards the system of energy supply albeit with diff erent emphases. New Article 122 TFEU (ex 
Article 100 EC aft er the coming-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty) clarifi es that Community 
action can also be taken if energy supply diffi  culties arise.
409 Consequently, the Directive on the security of gas supply is based on Article 100 EC.
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supply networks, which is mainly concerned with maintenance and renewal 
investment into the electricity networks.
With regard to electricity supply, in the EU the generation of electricity as 
“secondary” energy resource depends increasingly on gas as “primary” energy 
input. Th e aims of the Directive on the security of electricity supply appear in the 
wider context of safeguarding competition in a functioning internal energy 
market410, which include ensuring appropriate levels of generation reserve 
capacity, facilitating new generation capacity and taking appropriate measures to 
ensure a regulatory framework that encourages investment in new interconnection 
between Member States.
It is against the background of the objectives of these two energy supply security 
Directives, which clearly show that (only) suffi  ciency of supply of gas and 
electricity really matters as a safeguard of competition in a functioning internal 
(energy supply) market, that divestiture or legal ownership unbundling of energy 
transmission networks is not the next tool to support the achievement of energy 
supply security as the Commission wants to make everybody believe. As has been 
shown in chapter 2 section II(3) above, in particular in the context of economic 
reasoning, if suffi  cient generation capacity is available (which the Directives aim 
at promoting) the divestiture or legal ownership of energy transmission networks 
loses its eff ectiveness or, in other words, does not off er much additional benefi t if 
any.411
Four network industries in four diff erent states of liberalization displaying very 
diff erent grades of competition have been briefl y discussed here. It seems that the 
clearest case, if any, for legal (ownership) separation would be the European 
energy supply industry, which is one of the most indispensable economic sectors 
in the EU and thus plays a highly important role in the development of the 
internal market and in the eff ective functioning of competition in the internal 
market. Against this background, security and reliability of energy supply is of 
410 Consequently, the Directive on the security of electricity supply is based on Article 95 EC.
411 Haucap, chapter 2 section II 3, actually argues that ownership unbundling (and “deep” 
independent system operation) of gas transmission is detrimental to gas supply security. In 
addition to his argument, it is also oft en argued that if vertically integrated gas supply 
undertakings were broken apart, gas producers would lose the secure outlet for their 
production in terms of steady demand (in favour of more gas supply undertakings entering 
gas wholesale and retail), which they have counted on when making specifi c gas production 
and infrastructure investment. Th e risky nature of such investment has also been recognized 
when allowing for exemption from TPA in Article 22 Gas Directive 2003 and Article 7 
Electricity Regulation 1228/2003. It is therefore feared that gas prices would rise instead of 
falling as a result of seemingly greater competition in gas supply.
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eminent importance and thus suffi  cient investment in particular in generation 
capacity and the energy networks is considered indispensable.
III. EVOLUTION AND LATEST STATUS OF 
EUROPEAN ENERGY SUPPLY POLICY AND 
LEGISLATION
As a basis for the answer to the question whether the European Union is allowed 
to introduce further unbundling measures by way of energy sector-specifi c 
legislation, it needs to be appreciated how European energy policy evolved and 
what is already in place in terms of energy sector-specifi c regulation. It has 
already been claimed that the process of market integration and promotion of 
competition in the European energy markets are already comprehensively 
regulated, which will become apparent during the discussions to follow. What 
also becomes clear in the course of these discussions, however, is that the rather 
comprehensive sector-specifi c regulation already in place still leaves leeway to 
the Member States on important issues, which leads to regulatory gaps and 
incoherence. Particular emphasis will be put on so-called “regulation by 
cooperation” to show how many of these shortcomings have been or are on their 
way to be remedied. It will certainly be the task of further regulatory measures to 
close these gaps in order to create greater coherence. However, greater coherence 
only appears achievable if each regulatory measure is fi ne-tuned to the whole 
body of measures to be applied to the sector. Too radical an individual regulatory 
measure puts the framework of energy regulation out of balance and renders it 
even more incoherent.412 Th us closing the regulatory gaps and deepening the 
coordination process at European level appears to be the way forward for the 
time being in order to test whether more radical measures are required to force 
greater competitiveness onto the sector.
In the 1950s, the European energy sector was considered an area of economic 
policy, which required rather urgent development of common policies and 
coordinated actions.413 Th e lack of a special chapter on energy in the 1957 Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), a state which has lasted 
until today414, and which would change once the Lisbon Treaty, which contains 
412 In this respect, see Ehlers, n. 7, and Pielow/Ehlers, n. 35.
413 See E Cross, B Delvaux, L Hancher et al., ‘EU Energy Law’, in M Roggenkamp, C Redgwell et 
al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe, OUP, 2nd ed., 2007, chapter 5, nos 5.06 et seq.
414 It was not until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992, OJ 
1992 C 191/1, 29 July 1992) that the ‘spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism’ were listed 
in Article 3 EC amongst the various Community activities, and Article 129b (now 154) EC on 
the promotion of trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, 
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such a chapter415, comes into force416, hindered the development of Community 
law and policy well into the late 1980s.417 It was not until the end of 1995 that the 
European Commission in its White Paper on ‘An Energy Policy for the European 
Union’ laid the foundation for an EU policy reconciling competitiveness, security 
of supply and environmental protection.418
In 2000, the Lisbon Agenda among other things set out the commitment to 
complete the market opening process for network industries including electricity 
and gas. Th is objective led to the second generation of Electricity and Gas 
Directives in summer 2003419, which revised and repealed the fi rst generation of 
internal energy market legislation, the 1996 Electricity and the 1998 Gas 
Directives.420 Th e two 2003 Energy Directives were accompanied by a 2003 
Regulation on cross-border trade of electricity and complemented in 2005 by a 
Regulation on gas transmission networks.421 Th e fi rst three measures became 
operative on 1 July 2004, the last on 1 July 2006. On 10 January 2007, the 
European Commission published the fi nal report on its energy sector inquiry 
and the latest internal energy market progress report422, which both led to the 
Commission’s fi rst strategic review of EU energy policy as set out in the 
telecommunications and energy infrastructures was added. See in greater detail, infra 
subsection IV.
415 See nn. 300, 368, and in greater detail, infra.
416 See nn. 368.
417 Th e fi rst signifi cant and detailed document on the internal energy market, more specifi cally 
in the area of electricity was published by the Commission in 1988, see Commission of the 
European Communities, ‘Th e Internal Market for Electricity’, COM(1988), 238 fi nal, Brussels, 
2.5.1988, which initiated the Internal Energy Market Programme (IEM), see in more detail, 
Eberlein, n. 159, pp. 59, 63 et seq. For an extensive account on the early stages of the internal 
market for energy, see Hüff er/Ipsen/Tettinger, n. 367. See also L Hancher, ‘A Single European 
Energy Market – Rhetoric or Reality?’, (1990) Energy Law Journal 217.
418 European Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’, COM(95) 682 fi nal, 
December 1995. See also Council Resolution of 8 July 1996 on the Commission’s White Paper, 
OJ 1996 C 224/1.
419 See n. 16 and accompanying text.
420 Th e fi rst generation of Energy Directives of 1996 and 1998, n. 49, did not require full 
liberalization of the national energy industries but merely set minimum standards allowing 
for diff erent degrees of liberalization to co-exist. Th ey established, for the fi rst time, some 
common rules for the organization of the energy sector. For an excellent analysis of the latter 
Directives and the draft  2003 Directives, see Hancher, n. 118.
421 Regulation 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity, n. 219, and Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of 28 September 2005 on conditions for 
access to the natural gas transmission networks, OJ L 289/1, 3.11.2005. Th e Gas Regulation is 
not confi ned to interconnections as is the Electricity Regulation. For more details, see L 
Hancher, I del Guayo, ‘Th e European Electricity and Gas Regulatory Forums’, in B Barton, L 
Barrera-Hernández, A Lucas, A Rønne (eds), Regulating Energy and Natural Resources, OUP, 
2006, chapter 13, pp. 243 et seq., 245 et seq., 249 (note 15).
422 NN. 3, 10.
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Communication “An Energy Policy for Europe”423, and to the tabling of proposals 
for a third generation of internal energy market legislation consisting of fi ve 
legislative instruments on 19 September 2007424: two Directives amending the 
above mentioned 2003 Energy Directives, two Regulations amending the two 
above mentioned Regulations and a Regulation establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).425 On 9 and 10 October 2008, the 
Council of Energy Ministers of the Member States reached a common position 
on these fi ve pieces of legislation, which was followed by a second strategic EU 
energy policy review of the Commission.426
Although the two 2003 Energy Directives have brought about a common set of 
rules which are much more detailed than the fi rst set of Energy Directives (of 
1996 and 1998), they have still left  considerable scope for implementation at 
Member State level. Th e subsidiarity inherent in this legislative approach has not 
fully eradicated the divergence among Member States as regards national energy 
specifi c regulation and its application to the sector, which the European 
Commission considers confl icts with the declared aims of the European Union 
to create an internal and competitively structured European market for energy.427 
Th e two predominant features of the 2003 Energy Directives are the introduction 
423 Striving to achieve a truly competitive EU-wide internal energy market within three years in 
order to comply with the time limit set by the Lisbon agenda, see nn. 1, 6. In greater detail on 
this fi rst strategic review, see Ehlers, n. 7.
424 Only the legislative instruments and related documentation, which address internal energy 
market issues directly, are listed here. Other legislative measures are, for instance, in the area 
of energy supply security, the already mentioned Directives 2005/89/EC and 2004/67/EC, n. 
356, and in the area of sustainable energy supply, Directive 2001/77/EC of 27 September 2001 
on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal 
electricity market, OJ 2001 L 283/33, 27.10.2001, Directive 2004/8/EC of 11 February 2004 on 
the promotion of cogeneration based on a useful heat demand in the internal energy market 
and amending Directive 92/42/EC, OJ 2004 L 52/50, 21.2.2004, and Directive 2003/30/EC of 
8 May 2003 on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport, OJ 
2003 L 123/42, 17.5.2003. With respect to energy effi  ciency, Directive 2002/91/EC of 
16 December 2002 on the energy performance of buildings, OJ 2003 L1/65, 4.1.2003, might 
serve as an example. All these measures are interrelated as regards their objective of achieving 
an internal energy market, which is sustainable, secure in terms of supply and competitive. 
For a fairly recent account of other energy related issues on the Agenda of EU energy policy, 
see Ehlers, n. 7. Th e most recent developments in EU energy policy can be found at on the 
European Commission’s website “Energy policy for a competitive Europe” at http://ec.europa.
eu/energy/index_en.htm.
425 N. 15.
426 In the meantime, the fi ve pieces of legislation have passed the European Parliament, see nn. 
31, 33 (and accompanying text), 95, 372. For the 2nd strategic review, see European 
Commission, ‘Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and Solidarity 
Action Plan’, Communication, SEC(2008) 2794–5, Brussels, November 2008.
427 See P Cameron, ‘Completing the Internal Market in Energy: an Introduction to the New 
Legislation’, in P Cameron, (ed.), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation – Implementing the 
New Directives on Electricity and Gas across Europe, OUP, 2005, chapter 2, p. 8, no. 2.02.
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of regulated TPA, and legal and management unbundling of all energy network 
operators until July 2007428 as a safeguarding measure because TPA to the energy 
networks, as has been shown above, is one of the most important prerequisites 
for the creation of a competitive internal energy market.
It should be recalled that regulated TPA is intended to safeguard non-
discriminatory network access to all market participants more eff ectively, while 
the more stringent unbundling measures have been put in place to address the 
perceived barriers to competition created by corporate structure. Th ese two 
measures require stringent institutional enforcement by National Regulatory 
Agencies (NRA), whose independence and policing powers have been 
considerably strengthened by the 2003 Energy Directives and are further 
strengthened by the proposals for Energy Directives of September 2007.429 Th ese 
Directives have brought about a minimum set of competences for NRAs with an 
emphasis on tariff  and network access regulation. What is more, NRAs have 
obtained an advisory role on implementation and further shaping of European-
wide regulatory measures through the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity 
and Gas (ERGEG).430
Taking the main two aims of the 2003 Directives, it seems that bringing about 
full liberalization in terms of quantitative (or formal) market opening by July 
2007 has largely been achieved, whereas enhancing qualitative (or substantive) 
regulation and bringing about more uniformity and coordination of national 
regulation has made major progress.431 However, major shortcomings remain, 
428 Including the tightening the requirements of functional unbundling. As regards the diff erent 
kinds of unbundling measures, see already the extensive discussions in the Introduction.
429 See n. 425, and here in particular Articles 22c and 24c of the proposed Electricity and Gas 
Directives, respectively. For a critical review, see U Ehricke, ‘Die von der Kommission 
geplanten Kompetenzerweiterungen der Regulierungsbehörde auf dem Energiesektor nach 
den Entwürfen zur Änderung der Richtlinien 2003/54/EG und 2003/55/EG und deren 
Vereinbarkeit mit Article 3 Abs. 1 lit. G) EG-Vertrag’, (2008) RdE 159; W Höfl ing, S Augsberg, 
‘Grundrechtsfragen im Zusammenhang mit der geplanten Erweiterung der Befugnisse der 
nationalen Regulierungsbehörden auf den Strom- und Gasmärkten’, (2008) RdE 353.
430 In order to facilitate the mandatory contribution of NRAs to the development of the internal 
market and a level playing fi eld by cooperating with each other and the Commission in a 
transparent manner, see Article 23(12) of the 2003 Electricity Directive, Article 25(12) of the 
2003 Gas Directive, Article 9 of the 2003 Electricity Regulation, the Commission established 
the independent advisory group ERGEG at the end of 2003, see Commission Decision 
2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003 on establishing the European Regulators Group for 
Electricity and Gas, OJ 2003 L 296/34, 14.11.2003. Its purpose is it to ‘contribute to the eff ective 
market opening in practice by promoting consistent approaches to market regulation 
throughout the Union’, press release of the European Commission of 12 November 2003, 
‘Commission creates European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas’, IP/03/1536.
431 See for the distinction between quantitative market opening and qualitative regulation, 
Cameron, n. 427, p. 16, no. 2.20.
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which become obvious from the letters of formal notice sent by the Commission 
to 17 Member States on 4 April 2006 informing them about matters of non-
compliance with the 2003 Energy Directives432, and a series of Commission 
Reports on the progress of the internal energy market and the sector inquiry.433
Looking at the 2003 Energy Directives more closely and starting with electricity 
transmission and distribution, Member States are required to ensure that the 
system of TPA they implement is based on published tariff s, applicable to all 
eligible customers and applied objectively and without discrimination between 
system users.434 Th e rationale behind regulated TPA is to promote competition 
in the wholesale market, rather than in the retail supply market. Refusal of access 
is, however, still possible where suffi  cient capacity is not available.435 Th e reasons 
for such refusal must be substantiated, taking public service obligations into 
account.436 Where appropriate, the Member States have to ensure that the TSO 
or DSO refusing access provides relevant information on measures that would be 
necessary to reinforce the network.
As regards gas transmission and distribution networks, TPA also has to be 
granted on the basis of published and regulated tariff s437 albeit with a number of 
exceptions. As regards access to storage facilities and line pack438, Member States 
can opt for negotiated or regulated TPA, whereas access to upstream pipelines 
continues to be at the discretion of the Member States.439
Although regulated TPA in gas and its refusal closely resemble the provisions in 
the 2003 Electricity Directive, the following diff erences concerning long-term 
transportation contracts and cross-border transmission are worth mentioning: 
fi rst, TPA should not prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts as long as 
they comply with EC competition law440, and secondly, TPA may be refused on 
the ground that it would cause serious economic and fi nancial diffi  culties with 
432 See for the list of issues causing these complains, Hancher, n. 49, p. 97. See also NERA 
Economic Consulting, ‘EC Challenges Member States Over Regulation of Electricity and Gas 
Markets’, Energy Regulation Insights, Issue 29, April 2006.
433 For details on the latest progress report and the fi nal report of the sector inquiry, see nn. 3, 
10.
434 Article 20(1) Electricity Directive 2003.
435 Article 20(2) Electricity Directive 2003.
436 As regards the provisions relating to public and universal service obligations in the 2003 
Energy Directives and their consequences for the development of a competitive and internal 
market for energy, see n. 118 and accompanying text.
437 Article 18 Gas Directive 2003.
438 A means of storing gas by compressing it within the transmission and distribution systems.
439 Articles 19(1), 20 Gas Directive 2003.
440 Article 18(3) Gas Directive 2003.
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take-or-pay contracts.441 Finally, TSOs, which have to transmit gas across 
borders, must be granted access by the TSOs of the gas networks required for 
such transmission.442
As regards access to gas storage, line pack and ancillary services, Member States 
can chose negotiated and/or regulated TPA. In any event, the regime chosen has 
to be operated in an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 
Market actors require access to these parts of the gas networks as it is an 
important and fl exible tool assisting them in reducing the prices for electricity 
and gas they have to pay for by, for example, buying on spot markets. Gas storage 
is also a tool for electricity generators to ensure continuity of supply.
Th e 2003 Gas Directive’s provisions for access to gas storage come with an 
Interpretation Note of the Commission443 containing guidelines, which are not 
legally binding, which endeavour to limit the exemptions from the Directive’s 
access provisions to such storage facilities, which are required by gas transmission 
operators (TSOs) to fulfi l their function, and those facilities, which are needed in 
the context of production. Further, these guidelines specify the information 
which storage system operators should provide to system users to enable them to 
access the system effi  ciently.444
Access to upstream pipelines eff ectively remains negotiable.445 Although the 
Member States have to take measures to make these networks accessible to 
natural gas undertakings and eligible customers, the form of such access can be 
determined by the individual Member State, which has to observe objectives such 
as fair and open access, establish a dispute settlement mechanism operated by an 
authority which is independent of the parties involved and must have access to 
441 Article 21(1) Gas Directive 2003. Take-or-pay gas contracts basically oblige the buyer to pay 
for a percentage of the contracted quantity even if the buyer fails to take the gas supplied. Th e 
seller usually imposes such an obligation to guarantee a predictable minimum cash fl ow, and 
fi nancial institutions involved in the gas fi eld or pipeline development may require these 
obligations as a condition for fi nancing. According to Article 21(2) Gas Directive 2003, the 
Member State has to ensure in the case of refusal of TPA that the refusing natural gas 
undertaking makes the necessary enhancements to the pipeline network if it is economic to 
do so or when potential customers are prepared to pay for them. Article 21(1) Gas Directive 
2003 has to be read in conjunction with Article 27 Gas Directive 2003 (derogations in relation 
to take-or-pay obligations). On these issues, see also Talus/Wälde, n. 47.
442 Article 18(2) Gas Directive 2003.
443 European Commission, ‘Th ird Party Access to Storage Facilities’, Note of DG Energy & 
Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity 
and Gas, 16.1.2004.
444 Th e 2003 Gas Directive requires the establishment of storage system operators, which have to 
obey the Directive’s provisions for system operators including the requirement to provide 
information to system users.
445 Cameron, n. 427, p. 16, no. 2.26.
Chapter 3. Unbundling as Part of Sector-Specifi c Regulation 
Intersentia 133
all information relevant to the dispute. On the other hand, Article 20 of the 2003 
Gas Directive also aff ords a certain extent of protection to the owners and 
operators of upstream pipelines.
TPA to electricity and gas infrastructure may be waived in specifi c cases involving 
major new infrastructure projects (including Liquefi ed Natural Gas (LNG) and 
gas storage facilities) and signifi cant increases in capacity in existing 
interconnectors.446 An exemption can only be granted if such projects fulfi l the 
following criteria: the investment proposed for an exemption must contribute to 
competition in supply (and in the case of gas infrastructure, enhance security of 
supply), must not be detrimental to the functioning of the internal market, and, 
most importantly, the level of risk attached to the investment must be such that it 
would not be undertaken if the exemption is not granted. In both cases, the 
infrastructure must also be owned by a natural or legal person, which is separate 
at least in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems that 
infrastructure will be built, so that possible cross-subsidies can be laid open to 
scrutiny more easily. Exemptions will not be granted for infrastructure, whose 
construction has been fi nancially committed to before 15 July 2003, and they are 
only allowed to be granted on their merits on a case-by-case basis. Th e 
requirement not to grant exemptions where such new infrastructure would create 
or reinforce a dominant position or where it would reduce the scope for diluting 
existing dominant positions, might appear odd in the context of energy 
infrastructures, in particular infrastructures relating to electricity (which we 
should recall is not storable and whose fl ow cannot be steered along certain paths 
as it follows the path of least resistance), which are characterized by monopolistic 
properties (naturally putting its owner or operator in a dominant position) unless 
built in parallel and by diff erent owners.
Th e decisions of the NRA, to which the application for an exemption has to be 
made, have to be communicated to the Commission with all the relevant 
information, which can request decisions to grant an exemption to be amended 
or even withdrawn.447
446 Article 22 of 2003 Gas Directive, Article 7 of 2003 Electricity Regulation, both of which are 
similar in structure and content.
447 Th e absence of precise criteria for a possible rejection by the Commission has been criticized 
as a source of uncertainty where infrastructure investment is much needed, see Cameron, n. 
427, p. 16, no. 2.29. On the other hand, many exemptions have in the meantime already been 
granted in both electricity and gas, see, for instance, the Commission’s website at http://ec.
europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/ electricity/electricity_exemptions and gas/gas_exemptions.
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Th e 2003 Energy Directives also introduce three kinds of unbundling of the 
network businesses from the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings448, 
which complement the Directives’ endeavours to ensure non-discriminatory 
TPA to the energy networks with a view to addressing the structural constraints 
on the creation of an internal market.
It may be recalled that legal unbundling requires the formal separation of the 
energy network business (which also includes (cross-border) electricity 
interconnectors) into a separate legal entity from other vertically integrated 
activities not related to transmission and distribution, which may continue to 
operate within one company or group of companies.449 Functional or 
management unbundling requires a managerial separation of the network 
business from the remaining businesses of the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertaking to guarantee its independence from the remaining businesses in 
terms of management, organization and decision-making with respect to the 
assets necessary to maintain, operate and develop networks.450 Accounts 
unbundling is the minimum unbundling requirement to be observed by all 
energy network (operation) businesses and concerns the maintenance of accounts 
separate from the other activities/businesses of the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking. Th is form of unbundling will only become relevant for those 
energy distribution network (DSO) businesses that will not (have to) be legally 
unbundled.451 Th e duties of NRAs include ensuring the accurate application of 
national accounting principles, and monitoring the businesses to ensure that no 
cross-subsidies fl ow from the network (operation) business to the potentially 
competitive businesses of the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking, 
448 See the Introduction for a defi nition of these types of unbundling. Th e Commission’s 
understanding of ‘vertically integrated undertakings’ and ‘control’ are published in its 2004 
Unbundling Note (‘Th e Unbundling Regime’, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 
2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Gas, Brussels, 
16.1.2004). Th is note, which is part of a series of notes of the same nature on various subject-
matters of the 2003 Energy Directives, sets out matters such as ensuring the network operation 
company’s independence from its parent company, minimum criteria for functional 
unbundling and the organization of combined network operators, but is however not binding, 
neither on the Member States nor the Commission, and thus hardly remedies the rather vague 
provisions of the 2003 Energy Directives.
449 Articles 10, 15 of the 2003 Electricity Directive, Articles 9, 13 of the 2003 Gas Directive.
450 Articles 10(2), 15(2) of the 2003 Electricity Directive, Articles 9(2), 13(2) of the 2003 Gas 
Directive.
451 DSOs not serving more than 100,000 customers can be exempted from the legal unbundling 
requirement beyond 1 July 2007 by national implementing legislation, Articles 15, 30(2) of the 
2003 Electricity Directive, Articles 13, 33(2) of the 2003 Gas Directive.
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such as electricity generation/gas production and energy supply to customers (on 
wholesale and retail level).452
In order to promote non-discriminatory conduct from within the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings, the 2003 Energy Directives demand the 
implementation of a compliance programme in TSOs, DSOs and/or combined 
system operators453, which is also supposed to ensure that unbundling is properly 
enforced. An annual report is to be published and submitted to the NRA to assist 
in its monitoring tasks.
Th e 2003 Energy Directives have enhanced the legal status of the NRAs 
signifi cantly by obliging Member States to charge one or more competent bodies 
with the function of regulatory authorities and by setting a minimum level of 
functions and competences for the sake of harmonization.454 Th is can lead, 
however, to regulatory functions being spread over several authorities, such as 
local or regional regulatory bodies like in Germany where there are national and 
state regulatory agencies. It can also lead to combinations of NRAs and 
competition authorities (and even ministries) exercising the regulatory function, 
which is, for instance, the case in the Netherlands where the energy sector 
regulator DTe is a directorate within the competition authority NMa. Such forms 
of organization might impair the obligatory independence of the regulatory 
authority (or authorities), although it should be noted that this independence is 
only defi ned in relation to the interests of the energy industries rather than in 
relation to the existing government structures (which may be the reason for the 
failure to ensure such independence).455
Th e general responsibilities of NRAs according to the 2003 Energy Directives are 
to ensure non-discrimination, eff ective competition and the effi  cient functioning 
of the market.456 Following from these general tasks, the following activities are 
specifi ed as tasks for the NRAs:
452 Articles 19(3) and (4), 23(1)(e) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 17(3) and (4), 25(1)(e) Gas 
Directive 2003. Cross-subsidization has successfully been prevented, for instance, in the 
Netherlands, see NMa, n. 156 and accompanying text.
453 Articles 10(2)(d), 15(2)(d), 17(2)(d) of Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 9(2)(d), 13(2)(d), 
15(d) of Gas Directive 2003.
454 Article 23 and Recital 15 of Electricity Directive 2003, Article 25 and Recital 13 of Gas 
Directive 2003. Th e NRAs’ supervisory role over network access and their power to set or 
approve network tariff s or at least the methodologies underlying their calculation are now 
anchored in European law.
455 See in this respect, Cameron, n. 427, p. 19, no. 2.36.
456 Additionally, the NRA acts as dispute settlement authority in complaints against TSOs or 
DSOs in the context of their obligations under the 2003 Energy Directives, and against 
decisions of the NRA on tariff s or their methodology, Article 23(5) of the 2003 Electricity 
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– setting the rules on the management and allocation of interconnection 
capacity (jointly by the NRAs concerned), ensuring the publication of 
appropriate information by TSOs and DSOs concerning interconnectors, grid 
usage, and capacity allocation to interested parties, and creating mechanisms 
to deal with congestion on the national electricity or gas networks;
– monitoring the time taken by TSOs and DSOs to make connections and to 
carry out repairs. In this context, NRAs also have to ensure the application of 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory terms and condition (including 
tariff s) for connecting new electricity generation capacity, thereby particularly 
accounting for the costs and benefi ts of distributed generation, renewable 
energy sources (RES) and combined heat and power (CHP). In the case of gas, 
this responsibility is confi ned to ensuring such transparent and non-
discriminatory conditions for access to storage, line pack and other ancillary 
services;
– monitoring the eff ective unbundling of accounts to ensure that there are no 
cross-subsidies between generation, transmission, distribution, and supply 
activities, and, in the case of gas, additionally storage and LNG; and more 
generally
– monitoring the compliance of TSOs and DSOs with the tasks accorded to 
them by the Directives, and the level of transparency and competition.
Further to the monitoring duties of the NRAs, they are responsible for fi xing or 
approving ex ante, i.e. prior to their entry into force, as a minimum the 
methodologies used to calculate or establish the terms and conditions (including 
tariff s) for the connection, the access to the national energy transmission and 
distribution networks and the provision of balancing services.457
Further, NRAs play an important role in the application of the Regulations on 
cross-border electricity exchanges and on gas transmission, which entered into 
force in July 2004 and 2006, respectively458, and which enable the adoption of 
detailed technical rules on network access in order to address restrictions on 
cross-border trade in electricity and gas. Th e Regulations provide for 
arrangements for the exchange of electricity and gas transmission throughout 
Directive, Article 25(5) of the 2003 Gas Directive. Th e NRA also has jurisdiction in cross-
border disputes in respect of a system operator that refuses the use of or access to its system.
457 Th is competence of NRAs might, however, be limited, since they can be required by national 
legislation to submit their (draft ) decisions on tariff s or at least methodologies for formal 
approval or rejection to the relevant body according to this legislation. And although the 
formal approval or rejection of the NRA’s decision, including their reasons, has to be 
published, such a procedure slows down the regulatory process, impairs the NRA’s reputation 
and, what is more, signifi cantly hampers the independence of the NRA.
458 N. 421.
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the EU and deal with issues such as congestion management, the allocation of 
available transmission capacity of interconnections between national systems in 
the EU and the auctioning of such capacity. Th e application of these rules fall 
largely into the remit of the Member States’ energy regulators.459 Both Regulations 
allow the Commission under the Comitology procedure460 to amend or adopt 
detailed and legally binding guidelines on these issues461, such guidelines being 
largely based on consultations in the course of the so-called forum process, which 
is explained below; these guidelines are then incorporated into the Annexes of 
the Regulations and become directly applicable in the Member States’ legal 
systems.462 According to the proposed Electricity and Gas Regulations463, new 
structures of cooperation between the Electricity and Gas TSOs are to be 
introduced by establishing European networks of transmission system operators 
under the supervision of the Commission and the Agency for the Cooperation of 
459 With regard to cross-border electricity interconnectors, although the NRAs decide on 
exemptions to TPA for new investment, they still require the approval of the Commission, see 
Article 4 of the 2003 Electricity Regulation. NRA approve the TSOs operational and planning 
standards including schemes for the calculation of the total transfer capacity, see the 
Guidelines annexed to the 2003 Electricity Regulation. Th ey supervise the compliance with 
all guidelines adopted under the 2003 Electricity Regulation, see Article 9, and keep the 
Commission informed so that it can carry out its duties under the 2003 Electricity Regulation, 
such as adopting or amending the Guidelines annexed to the Regulation, see Article 10(1), (2), 
(5).
460 Comitology is the offi  cial term used to refer to delegation of decision-making under 
participation of committees. Th ere are three distinct comitology procedures, using an 
Advisory, Management or Regulatory Committee, with varying degrees of control over the 
Commission’s power to adopt new rules, see Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission, OJ 1999 L 184/23, 17.7.1999. For details and a critique on this procedure in the 
context of amendments to the Annexes to the Energy Regulations, see Hancher/del Guayo, n. 
421.
461 Th e Electricity Regulation 2003 provides for the adoption of further guidelines by the 
Commission (Recital 8 and Article 8) and contains in its Annexes two sets of specifi c 
guidelines, which have thus become legally binding. Whereas the Commission may or may 
not decide to adopt the fi rst type of guidelines in its own right in the future, it can only amend 
the second set. In the Gas Regulation, the Commission is only empowered to amend the 
annexed guidelines. See also n. 478 as regards the problematic expansion of the Commission 
powers to adopt legally binding guidelines under the comitology procedure contained in the 
proposed Energy Regulations and proposed in the context of establishing the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).
462 For a critical view as to the democratic justifi cation of this ‘fora process’, Hancher/del Guayo, 
n. 421. Th e use of Regulations in the energy market establishes the principle that the common 
rules introduced by internal market Directives, which are based on Article 95 EC, may be 
narrowed down by means of such Regulations that set out in detail the basic principles and 
implementation measures for certain key issues related to internal market goals, in particular 
through annexed guidelines, see P Cameron, ‘Th e Internal Market in Energy: Harnessing the 
New Regulatory Regime’, (2005) European Law Review 631, 636. Whereas Regulations are 
directly applicable in the Member States, Directives require implementation by the Member 
States, thereby conferring upon them a certain margin of interpretation.
463 N. 15.
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Energy Regulators (ACER), which is to be established under the revised 
Regulations.464 Th ese European Networks are supposed to establish regional 
cooperation465 and to lead to the publication of regional network investment 
plans.466
Coming back to the legislation in place at present, the 2003 Energy Directives 
have fi rmly established the role of NRAs in the sector, which makes cooperation 
and coordination between these agencies highly relevant.467 Th e development of 
“regulation by cooperation”468 has played an important role in the Commission’s 
endeavours to achieve an internal energy market.469 To address the regulatory 
needs arising from the national implementation of the revised Energy Directives 
(of 2003), in particular technical and commercial barriers to the creation of fully 
integrated and operational electricity and gas markets470, the fi rst step in this 
development was the establishment the so-called forum process by the 
Commission with two voluntary fora to provide a platform for informal 
464 N. 478.
465 See, however, the already existing cooperations such as the so-called Pentalateral Forum, infra 
nn 479 et seq. and accompanying text.
466 Th e Electricity and Gas Regulations as agreed on 9 and 10 October 2008 (and approved by the 
European Parliament on 22 April 2009, see n. 33, and fi nally adopted unamended by the 
Council of the European Union on 25 June 2009, see also n. 33) also provide for the 
Commission under the comitology procedure to adopt detailed and legally binding guidelines, 
albeit to a considerably lesser extent than according to the original proposals; with respect to 
the latter, see the critical review of H Lecheler, ‘Die Verschärfung des Regulierungsregimes 
durch die drei neuen Verordnungs-Entwürfe im Paket vom 19.9.2007’, (2008) RdE 167. See 
also n. 476.
467 Recital 16 of the 2003 Electricity Directive, Recital 14 of the 2003 Gas Directive. Th e 2003 
Energy Directives (Article 23(12) Electricity Directive 2003, Article 25(12) Gas Directive 
2003) require the NRAs to ‘contribute to the development of the internal market and of a level 
playing fi eld by cooperating with each other and with the Commission in a transparent 
manner’.
468 Ever since the fi rst Internal Energy Market Directives entered into force in 1996 and 1998, 
regulation by cooperation based on transnational networks has had an important infl uence on 
the evolving regulation of European energy markets and the creation of a single energy market 
in the EU. See Eberlein, n. 159, pp. 60, 62, 82.
469 Th e Commission’s strong formal power in competition policy, which is fully applicable to the 
energy sector, was in itself not able to address the regulatory needs of this sector, namely to 
advance the Single Market agenda, and to ensure that decentralized implementation in the 
Member States without some level of European coordination does not undermine the 
establishment of a truly integrated European energy market. Because Member States pursued 
diff erent liberalization and regulatory strategies, the Commission sought to introduce a 
mechanism to interconnect national regulatory systems in an integrated market by promoting 
regulation by coordination in order to address the regulatory needs arsing from the national 
implementation of the two 2003 Energy Directives. See in more detail, Eberlein, n. 159, p. 65.
470 Competition law cannot produce similar solutions to the regulatory solutions developed by 
the fora. On the other hand, competition law can be used as a check and driver for the 
development of the regulatory foundation, playing a complementary role in the supranational 
regulation of the European energy markets.
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discussion and transnational cooperation. Th e two biannual fora, the Electricity 
Regulatory Forum, also called ‘Florence Forum’ or ‘Florence Process’, and the 
Gas Regulatory Forum, also called ‘Madrid Forum’ or ‘Madrid Process’ were set 
up in early 1998 and autumn 1999 respectively.471
Th ese two processes have allowed for voluntary agreements to improve the 
competitive conditions of the market and produce informal guidelines, which 
complement the legislative measures in place.472 Th e fora have oft en been used by 
transmission system operators to develop solutions, which could be more 
expeditiously implemented than through legislative measures. Th e good practice 
guidelines for gas storage operators and the congestion management guidelines 
adopted by the Commission are two examples of voluntary agreements of this 
471 Given the weak Treaty basis and thin legislative context of energy policy as well as the slow 
market opening and network integration resulting from the 1996 and 1998 Energy Directives, 
the Commission had to draw on some level of European coordination in order to promote the 
establishment of a truly integrated European energy market, i.e. to convert the European 
patchwork of national energy markets, which on top of national divergences did not provide 
for any mechanisms to interconnect national systems to an integrated market, into a level 
playing fi eld throughout the European Union. See in more detail, Eberlein, n. 159, pp. 59 et 
seq. See also Hancher/del Guayo, n. 421, pp. 243 et seq. With respect to the Amsterdam Forum 
on sustainable energy supply and the Berlin Forum on fossil fuel supply, see Ehlers, n. 7.
472 Th ese two fora focus on TPA issues such as on tariff s for cross-border gas and electricity 
exchanges, the allocation and management of scarce interconnection capacity as well as access 
to storage facilities, all issues related to the development of an internal energy market. 
Participants in the fora include the Commission, Member States’ offi  cials, representatives of 
the NRAs, transmission system operators (TSOs), representatives of gas and electricity 
suppliers and traders, consumers, network users, gas and power exchanges and the Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER), which was constituted in March 2000 comprising 
energy regulators from 24 Member States except Luxembourg, and Norway and Iceland from 
the European Economic Area, and which is the link between regulators and the European 
Commission’s Directorate for Energy and Transport (DG TREN). In short, all stakeholders 
with an interest in the respective subject matter of the respective fora are present. Th ey also 
contributed to informal settlements in competition cases. See in more detail, Hancher/del 
Guayo, n. 421. Th e Florence and Madrid fora had an important impact on the regulatory 
content of the second generation of energy regulation. Th ey have also produced informal 
guidelines, which initially complemented these legislative measures and served as a point of 
reference for informal settlements in competition cases. Th ese guidelines detail principles and 
rules, particularly on TPA to networks and storage facilities as well as tariff  issues, matters, 
which the 1996 and 1998 Energy Directives failed to address. Th e fora have signifi cantly 
contributed to energy legislation moving from the regulatory principle of the fi rst generation 
of Energy Directives to the greater regulatory detail of the second generation of energy 
legislation. See in more detail, Hancher/del Guayo, n. 421, pp. 253, 255.
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type473, which have become legally binding by becoming part of the Annexes of 
the Energy Regulations.474
In order to formalize and improve the cooperation and coordination between the 
national regulators, and to round up this summary of the regulatory framework, 
the Commission established, as indicated above, the European Regulators’ Group 
for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) in November 2003475, which adopts and 
monitors guidelines resulting from the consultations at forum level, and holds 
regular meetings with the Commission on all issues related to market 
liberalization.476 In its fi rst strategic review “An Energy Policy for Europe”, the 
Commission moved further by proposing a European network of independent 
473 See W Webster, ‘Recent Developments in EU Energy Markets’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer 
(eds), European Energy Law Report III, Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford, 2006, chapter 1, pp. 3 et 
seq. Th e fora have successfully attracted expertise, mobilized stakeholders, and clarifi ed the 
regulatory issues at stake, across established national boundaries. As Eberlein, n. 159, p. 77, 
has put it, “[t]he crucial resource for informal coordination through networks is […] 
information or expertise. In policy domains, in which decision-making depends on technically 
complex knowledge, control over credible information, underpinned by professional 
standards, becomes an important tool of ‘soft  steering’. Professionalization, the fact that the 
participants share a common professional […] background and meet regularly in similar 
policy circles, creates a strong, shared frame of reference that facilitates convergence and 
harmonization.”
474 Regulation 1228/2003, n. 219, and Regulation 1775/2005, n. 421. Th e proposed Electricity and 
Gas Regulations, n. 15, which would establish European networks of TSOs also confer the 
responsibility for the draft ing and enforcing of technical and market codices, rules on network 
security and reliability, on the publication and exchange of data, on billing and on 
interoperability on the European Networks. See Lecheler, n. 466. Th is conferral would further 
diminish the role of the fora, see n. 476.
475 See n. 430. Th e establishment of ERGEG formalizes the informal regulatory role of the 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) in the forum process, which remains a 
distinct body; the creation of CEER in March 2000 brought together the energy regulators 
from the European Economic Area (EEA) Member States.
476 As a result of the creation of ERGEG, the regulators have entered into direct consultations 
with market participants on the details of advice they are giving to the Commission for later 
adoption. ERGEG takes a greater role in this process as it is consulted on new guidelines both 
during the draft ing and when the formal proposal is submitted to the comitology committee 
for approval, see Hancher/del Guayo, n. 421, pp. 246, 253–4, also with respect to the 
increasingly diminishing role of the two fora. Recital 5 of Decision 2003/796/EC, n. 430, to set 
up ERGEG as the formal basis for the cooperation of the NRAs explains the relationship 
between the fora and ERGEG as follows: “Whilst the two forums will remain important as 
comprehensive discussion platforms involving all players from government, regulators and 
industry, it is now necessary to give regulatory cooperation and coordination a more formal 
status, in order to facilitate the completion of the internal energy market […].” ERGEG is now 
also monitoring the implementation of non-binding guidelines. National regulators are thus 
subjected to a form of ‘peer group’ evaluation or pressure forcing national regulators either to 
conform to European best practice or, when not applying the guidelines, to account for their 
decisions. Consequently, even though guidelines not incorporated in the Regulations lack 
formal legal status, they have come to have a signifi cant regulatory impact, see Hancher/del 
Guayo, n. 421, p. 258.
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regulators (so called “ERGEG+” approach). Under this mechanism, the role of 
ERGEG was to be formalized and given the task of delivering binding decisions 
for regulators and relevant market players, such as network operators, power 
exchanges or generators, on certain precisely defi ned technical issues and 
mechanisms relating to cross-border issues. As an alternative model, the 
Commission proposed at the time the setting up of a new, single body at 
Community level, which would be responsible for regulatory and technical issues 
relevant to making cross-border trade work in practice. Th is latter alternative 
approach eventually led the Commission to propose a Regulation establishing 
ACER in September 2007477, the details of which were eventually settled by the 
Council of Energy Ministers on 9 and 10 October 2008.478
One major contribution of ERGEG to the establishment of an internal energy 
market was the launching of Gas and Electricity Regional Initiatives. Picking the 
Electricity Regional Initiatives (also called mini fora), they address congestion 
management, transparency and balancing in the European electricity 
transmission network on a regional basis.479 Such regional market initiatives try 
477 See n. 425. Th e establishment of ACER and the proposed Electricity and Gas Regulations, see 
n. 463 and accompanying text are designed to complement each other as the Electricity and 
Gas Regulations draw heavily on ACER and make its tasks operational.
478 See n. 372. For a critical review of ACER and of the two proposals for Energy Regulations, see 
Lecheler, n. 466, who expresses great concern about the excessive endowment of the 
Commission with law-making powers with respect to enacting binding guidelines, which 
only have to pass the comitology procedure, see n. 460, in accordance with which the 
Commission can also confer additional powers on ACER. In the same vein, denouncing the 
establishment of such powers as a serious violation of the rule of law and a severe defi cit in 
terms of democratic legitimacy and accountability, see J-C Pielow in his statement at the 
public hearing of the committee for economic aff airs and technology of the German Federal 
Parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, on 9 April 2008 (‘Stellungnahme von Prof. Dr. jur. Johann-
Christian Pielow’, Öff entliche Anhörung zum Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission für 
ein drittes Richtlinien-Paket zum EU-Binnenmarkt vor dem Ausschuss für Wirtschaft  und 
Technologie des Deutschen Bundestages). Th e current forum process has already raised 
concerns with respect to its potential democratic defi cit and accountability problems, see 
Hancher/del Guayo, n. 421, pp. 260–1: “Th e informal consultation with a wide range of 
stakeholders can be regarded as an eff ective fi rst step on the way to circumventing national 
opposition to further loss of sovereignty on energy market issues, […]. It seems that key 
decisions are taken outside the competent democratic institutions. Th is seems particularly the 
case for the guidelines setting out principles and rules, which are albeit legally not binding 
agreed upon in the fora. Th ey cannot easily be altered during the formalized procedures for 
the adoption of EU legislation, which in turn raises questions of accountability. On the other 
hand, the oft  en highly technical debates leading to the formulation of guidelines cannot 
always be properly addressed in a parliamentary setting.”
479 Electricity Regional Initiatives were installed for France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, for 
the Baltic States, for Central Eastern Europe (Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Austria, Slovenia), for Central Southern Europe (Germany, Italy, Switzerland, 
France, Austria, Slovenia, Greece), for South Western Europe, for Northern Europe (Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland, Sweden), and for North Western Europe (Germany, 
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to resolve problems, in situation where political backing is required to put in 
place measures needed to promote market integration and to ensure that 
regulators take coherent measures on both sides of national borders.480 For the 
regional Northwest European electricity market, for instance, the eff ectiveness of 
this cooperation has already become visible: since November 2006, “tri-lateral 
market coupling”481 between France, Belgium and the Netherlands is in place, 
which is an effi  cient capacity allocation mechanism for day-ahead trading 
guaranteeing energy fl ows in the right direction in relation to spot prices. 
Maximal use of existing capacity is achieved through load-fl ow based capacity 
calculation.482 Market coupling is extended to the entire Central West region of 
the Electricity Regional Initiative by January 2009, thereby (linking France, 
Germany and the Benelux countries together into one region, the so-called 
Pentalateral Forum).483 Further, there is a growing integration between the 
France, Benelux). For further details, see ERGEG, ‘Assessment of the Development of the 
European Energy Market 2007’, Ref: C07-URB-05–03, Brussels, 11 December 2007, and 
Hancher/del Guayo, n. 421, pp. 245 et seq. As regards the establishment of gas regional energy 
markets, i.e. for the areas North-West, South and South-East, improved transparency and 
interoperability have been identifi ed as key factors to facilitate market integration. Coherence 
of the gas initiatives is less important as the gas system is less integrated. Th erefore 
harmonisation of rules within the regions is the most urgent need. Th e existing voluntary 
guidelines (as a result of the Madrid Forum) for gas balancing, gas storage, access to LNG 
facilities and open season procedures have not yet delivered a harmonised approach to these 
issues as they are not uniformly applied by market participants in all countries, see in greater 
detail, ERGEG, ibid.
480 See Webster, n. 473, p. 12.
481 See APX Group, Belpex, Elia, Powernext, RTE, TenneT, ‘Trilateral Coupling of the Belgian, 
Dutch and French Electricity Markets’, Technical Press Briefi ng, Brussels, 14 February 2007. 
Market coupling combines the so far separate processes of electricity trading, cross-border 
interconnector capacity allocation, congestion management and network operation, which 
enhances the effi  cient cross-border network capacity utilization, cross-border supply 
competition and network reliability. For an analysis of the compatibility of market coupling 
with legal unbundling, see J Kühling, G Hermeier, ‘Innovationsoff enheit des Unbundling-
Regimes? – Die Einführung neuer Strukturen im grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandel als 
Bewährungsprobe’, (2006) ZNER 27. For an analysis of methods of regional congestion 
management, see consentec, ‘Towards a common co-ordinated regional congestion 
management method in Europe’, study commissioned by the European Commission, Final 
Report, 12 October 2007.
482 In the France-UK-Ireland region, intraday trading and reciprocal access to balancing markets 
between France and England have been introduced in 2008. Th e other major continental 
initiative “Central-East” is also going for a load fl ow based capacity calculation Both regions 
will thus have the same mechanism of capacity calculation and its allocation, which resembles 
the market coupling mechanisms of the examples of regional electricity markets dealt with in 
the main text.
483 Th e Pentalateral Energy Forum comprise of the governments, regulators, electricity TSOs, 
power exchanges and other market parties, which establishes a uniform platform for electricity 
trade and network operation in Germany, France and the three Benelux countries from 2009. 
Th e Members of this forum also intend to cooperate in the area of gas supply. Th e Pentalateral 
initiative strives for improving the cooperation in the fi eld of cross-border exchange, aims at 
regional integration of electricity markets towards a European energy market in compliance 
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Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway484, the Baltic countries 
and the other Northern European market countries Germany and Poland: 
EstLink485 and NorNed486 are two DC cables, which provide additional 
infrastructure, and the day-ahead market coupling between Denmark and 
Germany has established an effi  cient market link between Germany and the 
Nordic region from September 2008 (including a platform for secondary trading 
of transmission rights)487, which involves the Danish and German electricity 
TSOs concerned and the power exchanges Nord Pool and EEX.488
Th e structure of the ERGEG Regional Initiatives is effi  cient so far as it allows 
diff erent levels of market development to be taken into account while moving 
toward the common ultimate goal of a single electricity market in Europe.
Th e current legislative framework promotes regulation by cooperation between 
national and Community institutions to achieve EU-level policy coordination 
under conditions of shared governance489 and, at the same time, puts cooperation 
with Directives 2005/89/EC (security of electricity supply, see n. 356) and 2003/54/EC 
(internal electricity market, see n. 16) and EC Regulation 1228/2003 (see n. 219). Th e market 
coupling method applied in the Pentalateral Forum is based on available transfer capacity at 
interconnector (ATC), which allows for coherence with the same market coupling methods 
applied between Norway and the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark (Nordic region) and 
the central eastern market (see n. 482). In greater detail, (fl ow-based) market coupling within 
the Pentalateral Forum will involve implicit day-ahead capacity auctions, which are 
simultaneously coupled with electricity trading contracts to one tradable product, explicit 
long-term (interconnector) capacity auctions, the coordination of cross-border intraday and 
balancing energy trading and regional investment plans. See in greater detail, 
Bundesnetzagentur et al. (the other four energy sector regulatory authorities involved), 
‘Central Western Electricity Regional Energy Market – Action Plan’, (end of) 2006.
484 Th ese countries are already market coupled for some time.
485 Between Estonia and Finland connecting the Nordic with the Baltic electricity market since 
the end of 2006.
486 Coupling the electricity markets between the Netherlands and Norway since May 2008, see in 
greater detail, van der LIppe/Meijer, n. 44.
487 See European Commission, ‘Mergers: Commission approves proposed joint venture between 
Energinet, E.ON Netz, Vattenfall Transmission, Nord Pool and EEX on management of cross-
border power transmission’, IP/08/1272, press release of 22 August 2008. See also Energinet.
dk, E.ON Netz, European Energy Exchange, Nord Pool Spot, Vattenfall Europe Transmission, 
‘Market coupling between Denmark and Germany’, press release, 02.11.2006.
488 Two regions exhibit signifi cant price correlation. Th e fi rst is Th e Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Austria and the second Finland, Sweden and Norway, see ERGEG, n. 479. Th e 
improvement of price correlation occurred while prices in general rose, inter alia due to 
increasing CO2 prices and fuel prices since late 2005.
489 Th e governance of the European Union is characterized by shared competencies and joint 
policy-making on several layers, see Eberlein, n. 159, p. 59. Only very few policy areas are 
exclusively assigned to the supranational level, with exclusive powers of rule setting. 
Consequently, policy-making in the European Union is usually pursued at national and 
supranational levels, and energy policy-making is not an exception, see further section IV 
infra. Th is framework for policy making is a product of the principle of subsidiarity, see 
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on a new institutional footing by formalizing transnational cooperation of 
independent national regulators under Commission leadership, while 
maintaining informal channels of participation and stakeholder involvement. As 
a result, a complex, hybrid form of governance has developed, linking national 
and supranational levels of regulation.
Similarly, it can be said that the forum process and the regional initiatives have 
established that regulation by cooperation and formal regulation can play 
complementary roles in supranational regulation. Combinations of informal and 
formal mechanisms can enhance the eff ectiveness of EU policy coordination and 
help sidestep the subsidiarity ‘trap’.490 Th e forum process, and more specifi cally 
its recommendations and guidelines, which have been draft ed and adopted by all 
the diff erent stakeholders, lays the groundwork for the formal regulatory process 
and serves as an instrument to fi ll regulatory gaps. European legislation, however 
detailed, will still need to be interpreted and implemented at national level, and 
naturally cannot address all current and future regulatory issues arising in a 
technically complex and evolving policy area. Th us, the need for detailed 
coordination and interpretation on a transnational basis persists. It can thus be 
claimed that the proposed legislation491 creates an institutional framework for 
regulatory cooperation in the process of integrating the national energy markets 
towards an internal energy market.492 Th is institutionalization, however, 
diminishes the importance of the Madrid and Florence fora; on the other hand, 
regional cooperation is becoming increasingly important. In this regard, the 
mini fora or regional cooperations in place or in the process of evolving 
signifi cantly contributed to the development of the EU’s energy policy, inter alia, 
to build voluntary consensus and to deliver agreements, which can be regarded 
as the most diffi  cult part for the Commission to realize given the oft en rather 
opposing interests of the parties involved in the forum process. Specifi cally from 
the viewpoint of the Commission, the tension between national regulatory 
competences and supranational regulatory activities or, in other words, between 
subsidiarity and supranational EU-wide coordination have been to a substantial 
extent reconciled. It seems that so far, the development of regulatory and 
stakeholder coordination in particular on regional level, and the current status of 
the industry have moved the evolving internal energy market rapidly towards 
completion of the integration process – rapidly taking into account the short 
time frame of approximately one decade for accomplishing this progress in an 
further section VIII infra. One of the reasons why the Commission uses the forum process is 
to escape this subsidiarity ‘trap’.
490 See Eberlein, ibid.
491 See nn. 425 and 463 and accompanying text.
492 See Eberlein, n. 159, p. 81.
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industry, which has operated within a completely opposite market environment 
and structure for some four decades since the establishment of the European 
Economic Community in 1957.
IV. EU COMPETENCE FOR ENERGY NETWORK 
REGULATION
Having dealt with the evolution, current status and some likely future 
developments of energy network regulation, it is now worthwhile to explore, 
more generally, the competence of the supranational level for such regulation. 
Apart from dealing briefl y with the current competence issues in subsection 1, 
subsection 2 will explain the new title on energy introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.493
1. ENERGY ISSUES AS EC OBJECTIVE BUT WITHOUT 
SPECIFIC EC COMPETENCE
Energy policy has yet never attained the status of a Community task. Although 
“measures in the sphere of energy” were included as a general goal in Article 3(t) 
EC (now Article 3(1)(u) EC) of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty494, a corresponding 
competence or explicit title in the Treaty, which is normally attached to general 
goals listed in Article 3 EC, to take measures in the area of energy policy has not 
been conferred upon the European Union. According to the Member States’ 
“Declaration on civil protection, energy and tourism” attached to the Final Act of 
the Maastricht Treaty, “the question of introducing into the Treaty establishing 
the European Community Titles relating to the spheres referred to in Article 3(t) 
of that Treaty will be examined, in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
Article N(2) of the Treaty on European Union […].”495 Th e Commission, however, 
declared in the same Declaration “that Community action in those areas will be 
pursued on the basis of the present provision of the treaties establishing the 
European Communities.”
493 See n. 368 and accompanying text.
494 N. 414.
495 Th is has eventually happened in the Treaty of Lisbon, see n. 368 and accompanying text. In 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), n. 300, Titles 
XXIII, XXI and XXII deal with civil protection, energy and toruism, repsectively. Title XXI 
on energy contains one Article, which is Article 194. Th is new Title and Article will be dealt 
with further below.
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In particular against the background of the principle of conferred powers in 
Article 5(1) EC496, and ever since the fi rst steps towards liberalization of the 
energy markets in the EU, it has been controversial whether and, if so, to what 
extent European institutions can rely on general competences of the EC Treaty to 
take measures in the area of energy policy.497 Apart form the fact that Member 
States insist on retaining control over the sector by claiming its strategic economic 
importance, very diff erent types of organization of the national electricity sectors, 
in particular with respect to the mix of energy inputs, the degree of import 
dependence, and even more, the ownership structure, makes European energy 
market harmonization so diffi  cult to achieve. Only Article 154(6) EC gives the 
EC the power to establish and develop, through guidelines, Trans-European 
Networks in the area of transport, telecommunications, and energy 
infrastructures.498 Although this competence to promote the interconnection 
and interoperability of national networks can be regarded as an important tool to 
create an internal energy market, it does, however, not confer any regulatory 
powers to remove any obstacles to cross-border trade, which do not result from a 
lack of infrastructure.499
Th e competence debate, however, will not be repeated here again. What should 
be appreciated, however, is that from the Declaration mentioned above, it cannot 
be inferred that there are no competences at all. On the contrary, with the 
Commission’s stated intention in the said Declaration to pursue Community 
action in the area of energy on the basis of the present Treaty provisions, it seems 
that the Member States tacitly agreed that energy sector regulation would be 
based on competencies such as Articles 94, 95 and 308 EC.500
496 See also ECJ, C-376/98, n. 371, nos 83 et seq.
497 See early Hüff er/Ipsen/Tettinger, n. 367. Contra, Scholz, n. 367, Baur/Lückenbach, n. 96, and 
Baur/Pritschke/Klauer, n. 86. Pro, Jarass, n. 367. See also Lecheler, n. 466, with further 
references in note 7.
498 In the TFEU, see n. 495, competences with respect to Trans-European Networks are to be 
found in Title XVI, Articles 170 et seq.
499 See Eberlein, n. 159, p. 63.
500 For similar conclusions, see von Bogdandy in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 
Bd. I, Article 3, no. 18. It seems that the Constitutional Convention working on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe of 29 October 2004 (OJ 2004 C 310/1) but never ratifi ed 
(and now succeeded by the Lisbon Treaty), when draft ing a new Title on Energy with its 
Article III-256 assumed that most of the measures in the area of energy policy had been based 
on Article 308 EC, see G Rashbrooke, ‘Clarifi cation or Complication? Th e New Energy Title in 
the Draft  Constitution for Europe’, (2004) JENRL 373, 380, by referring to offi  cial 
documentation. Th is also sheds a meaningful light on the widespread insecurity that exists 
with respect to the powers of the EU in the area of energy policy. Article 352 TFEU, which is 
the successor to Article 308 EC, requires the involvement of the Member States Parliaments 
should it become necessary to apply this “fall back” competence. For a critical view as regards 
the application of this competence and the “insuffi  cient” involvement of the national 
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Th e fi rst and second generation internal energy market Directives are based on 
the “harmonization” competence of Article 95 EC and, as far as services are 
concerned, on Articles 47(2), 55 EC501, which are the same provisions, on which 
the Commission is now basing its proposals. Article 95 EC confers upon the 
Community the competence to take any measures for the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States, which are necessary for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.502 For this general competence to apply, it is, 
however, necessary that the measures envisaged abolish obstacles or distortions 
of competition.503 Because it is precisely this which is the predominant objective 
of the Commission’s proposals, Article 95 and Articles 47(2), 55 EC can be 
considered as a competence basis for further energy network regulation.504
Parliaments, see S Weatherill, ‘Better Competence Monitoring’, (2005) European Law Review 
23.
501 Mainly due to the persistence of the Commission and the (unanimous) approval of the 
European Council and the European Parliament; the unanimous approval seems to be a clear 
sign that today it is politically recognized that EU energy policy measures can be based on 
Article 95 EC. Accounting for repeated demands of the Commission, cf. E Cross, L Hancher, P 
Slot, ‘EC Energy Law’, in M Roggenkamp, A Rønne et al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe, OUP, 
2001, ch. 5, pp. 220 et seq. See also Rashbrooke, n. 500, p. 377. Note, however, the elaborations 
infra in the context of the new Article 194(2) TFEU.
502 As Article 95 EC is applied to the European energy sector in order to achieve the objectives set 
out in Article 14 EC, European energy sector regulation is not exempt from observing the four 
fundamental freedoms of the EC; this will become relevant further below in this chapter 3.
503 See in this respect, ECJ, C-376/98, n. 371, nos 95 et seq. See also, revising the case law in this 
area, ECJ, C-301/06 – Ireland v Commission, 10 February 2009, not yet reported.
504 Article 3(1)(h) EC, which sets out the Community activity of “the approximation of the laws 
of Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common market” (emphasis 
added), is the basis for the competences in Articles 94 et seq. EC as regards the approximation 
of the (Member States’) laws. “To the extent required” is to be distinguished from the necessity 
leg of the proportionality test of Article 5(3) EC, see Advocate General Fennelly in ECJ, 
C-376/98, n. 371, nos 95 et seq.; Tietje in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. 
II, Vor Article 94–97 EGV, no. 54. With respect to the Commission’s proposals for the further 
unbundling of energy supply networks, it might be claimed that such proposals exceed what is 
required for the proper functioning of the common market with the consequence that the 
Community would not have any principal competence at all to introduce the further 
unbundling measures proposed. Th is issue is, however, not further elaborated here because it 
is accepted that the internal market for energy supply is not accomplished yet, that the 
competitive process is still to some extent distorted, and that the laws of the Member States 
and their respective energy supply sectors still display very diverging states of development, 
which still require harmonization measures at a supranational level in order for the internal 
energy market to function eff ectively and effi  ciently. Th e question, which is the focus of this 
work is whether the further unbundling measures proposed comply with the subsidiarity 
principle of Article 5(2) EC and are proportionate to the aims pursued according to Article 5(3) 
EC as construed by the ECJ. But this is a question to be answered by the diff erent 
proportionality tests applied in the context of the enforcement of competition law, of the 
exercise of the competence as accepted here and of the fundamental rights issues evaluated in 
Part 2. Tietje, ibid., nos 58 et seq., argues that the subsidiarity principle is not applicable in the 
context of approximation measures according to Articles 94 et seq. EC, which apparently 
refl ects the earlier approach of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, 
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2. ENERGY CHAPTER IN LISBON TREATY
It has just been established that currently, there is no specifi c competence of the 
EU to pursue energy policy and regulation. Consequently, the Community has to 
rely on the general competences for the approximation of the Member States’ 
laws in order to achieve progress in the area of establishing an internal energy 
market.
Th e failed 2004 Constitutional Treaty made an attempt to change and clarify this 
rather unsatisfying situation. For the very fi rst time, it contained its own title on 
energy, with far reaching competences for the European legislator.505 Th ese 
energy policy specifi c competences have been extended in the Lisbon Treaty.506 
In the Lisbon Treaty, Article 100(1) EC has been revised by emphasizing the area 
of energy in the context of diffi  culties arising in the supply of certain products, 
and Article 194 of the new energy title takes the following form507:
“1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and 
with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on 
energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
(c) promote energy effi  ciency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; and
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives 
for references see ibid. Th e ECJ, C-491/01 – British American Tobacco v Council, (2002) ECR 
II-2997, nos 177 et seq., seems, however, to accept the applicability of the subsidiarity principle, 
even if it uses considerations, which are to be made in the context of Article 95 EC in any 
event. Again, this controversy will not be decided here. As it is accepted here without further 
discussion that Article 95 EC is the basis of the competence for further energy network 
regulation, arguments with respect to the question whether and to what extent Community 
action is required will thus be made infra in the context of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
tests.
505 Cf. Article III-256 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 29 October 2004, OJ 
2004 C 310/1, 16.12.2004. See also n. 500. Further, L Hancher, ‘Th e New EC Constitution and 
the European Energy Market’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law 
Reports II, 2005, chapter 1.
506 See further in nn. 368 (and accompanying text), 495. Addition at the end of the 2nd paragraph 
of Article 194(2) by the author. Article 194(3) is concerned with measures of a fi scal nature.
507 Numbering of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), 
see n. 495.
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in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted aft er consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Such measures shall not aff ect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between diff erent energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c) [currently 
Article 175(2)(c) EC].
3. […].”
Article 194 TFEU covers all measures, for which the Community has already 
legislated; the explicit competence to promote the interconnection of energy 
networks complements the extended competences of the Community in the area 
of the Trans-European Network as set out in new Article 170(2) TFEU and thus 
strengthens the overall competence of the EU to deal with cross-border energy 
network issues.508
V. BARS ON EXERCISE OF COMPETENCE
Th is section deals with possible bars or barriers to the exercise of current 
competences and the new competences of the TFEU in order to answer the 
question to what extent the Community is prevented from legislating for further 
energy network unbundling.
1. ARTICLE 295 EC
Article 295 EC (Article 345 TFEU) contains a bar on the exercise of competences 
conferred upon the EC509, according to which the “Treaty shall in no way 
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership.” Although this provision belongs to the original provisions of the EC 
Treaty, its exact scope is far from clear yet.510
508 Th e competences to issue guidelines and take other measures in the area of Trans-European 
networks are set out in Articles 170–172 of Title XVI in the TFEU.
509 See, e.g., C Calliess, ‘Ownership Unbundling für alle? – Kritische Überlegungen zu den 
aktuellen Entfl echtungsvorgaben der Europäischen Kommission’, (2007) 11 and 92, 93; 
Kingreen in Calliess/Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, Article 295, no. 5, with further 
references.
510 Th ere exists a variety of legal opinions on this subject. For an overview, see Storr, n. 35; 
Calliess, ibid.
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Th e wording of this provision seems to support a broad applicability. Th e “system 
of property ownership”, it is claimed, comprises of all constitutional provisions 
concerning private ownership and in particular expropriation, socialization and 
the regulation of the use of property.511
Such a wide interpretation does, however, neglect the fact that the EC cannot 
establish a common market as the predominant aim of the EC (Articles 2, 3 lit. c, 
4(1) and 14 EC) without a competence to regulate the use of property. 
Consequently, the ECJ rejects such wide interpretation. Although the Court has 
not yet clarifi ed the function and meaning of Article 295 EC, in the so-called 
“Golden Share” cases it has stated that the Member States’ systems of property 
ownership are not excluded from the application of the fundamental principles 
of the Treaty.512
511 Schweitzer in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. III, Article 295, no. 3; B 
Bär-Bouyssière in H von der Groeben, J Schwarze (eds), Vertrag über die Europäische Union 
und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäische Gemeinschaft , Band 4, 6th ed., 2004, Article 295, 
no. 7; R Geiger, EUV/EGV, 4th ed., 2004, Article 295, no. 1.
512 See, for instance, ECJ, C-463/00 – Commission v Spain, (2003) ECR I-4581, no. 67; C-367/98, 
Commission v Portugal, (2002) ECR I-4731, no. 48; C-182/83 – Fearon v Irish Land Commission, 
(1984) ECR I-3677, no. 7; ECJ, C-302/97, Klaus Konle v Austria, (1999) ECR I-3099, no. 38; 
Advocate General Mischo in C-363/01, Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen I v Deutsche 
Luft hansa, (2003) ECR I-11893, no. 38. See last ECJ, C-503/04 – Commission v Germany, 
(2007) ECR I-6153, no. 37. In the very recent judgement of the ECJ, C-326/07– Commission v 
Italy, 26 March 2009, not yet reported, Article 295 EC does not play any role because the 
subject-matter of this case deals with (substantively) part-privatized companies (as regards 
the distinction between formal and substantive privatization, see infra chapter 6 on the 
Netherlands); any possible exercise of Article 295 EC is thus subject to the EC Treaty 
provisions, in particular the fundamental freedoms, whose examination is the focus of this 
case. Th e rare jurisprudence of the ECJ on Article 295 prohibits the EU from taking isolated 
decisions about the allocation of property (see for a brief defi nition n. 517) and thus any formal 
deprivation of property rights, cf. ECJ, C-309/96 – Annibaldi v Major of Guidonia, (1997) 
ECR, I-7505, no. 22. Th is acknowledges the importance of the system of property ownership 
as a signifi cant part of the Member States’ economic constitution and social structure and the 
exclusive organizational power the Member States have, at least with respect to any substantial 
shift ing of frontiers in this area. Th e EU competence to legislate thus extends to measures, 
which have a bearing on property rights, as long as they serve the Treaty’s goals, in particular 
the completion of the internal market, and to the extend that they are not specifi cally targeted 
at reconstructing the national systems of property ownership. Th is case law, however, does not 
at all draw a clear line, see in this respect, for instance, M Ruff ert, ‘Zur Bedeutung des 
Article 295 EGV’, in Henneke (ed.), Kommunale Perspektiven im zusammenwachsenden 
Europa, Boorberg, Stuttgart, 2002, p. 22, and is therefore challenged by some Advocate 
Generals, see, for instance, the recent opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in 
C-112/05 – Commission v Germany, (2007) ECR I-8995, nos 47 et seq., with respect to the 
participation of public shareholders in the private limited company Volkswagen GmbH. For 
further references, see also Ruff ert, ibid., p. 20. See also further nn. 522 et seq. and 
accompanying text. Th is jurisprudence in particular leaves open the central question of what 
exactly is meant by the Member States’ “rules governing the system of property ownership”.
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Th e “Golden Share” cases are referred to as support for a narrow interpretation of 
Article 295 EC.513 According to such an interpretation, this provision is only 
meant as a prohibition on the Community ordering the privatization or the 
nationalization (socialisation) of companies. In other words, only the allocation 
of property in public or private ownership (for national economic policy reasons) 
falls outside the competences of the Community.514
Th is also seems to be the interpretation the CFI is following, which assumes a 
restriction of the scope of protection from Community interference under Article 
295 EC, at least in cases where the Member State would not have any practical 
chance to run public undertakings, to participate in public undertakings or to 
pursue any other than mere profi t-orientated considerations.515
It was indeed an essential motive for the Member States of the EEC at the time 
the Community was founded to retain the competence to decide about 
privatizations and nationalizations of the undertakings under their jurisdiction.516 
Midway through the 20th century, there were extensive socializations in some 
Member States, which it was intended the Community should not be competent 
to reverse.
513 See the references in Calliess, n. 509.
514 Th is, it is claimed, is so because the German, French and Spanish versions of Article 295 EC, 
for instance, only generally refer to the system of property ownership (“Eigentumsordnung”, 
“régime de la propriété”, and “régimen de la propiedad”, respectively) and not to specifi c 
property rights (rules) such as the English version, which refers to “rules […] governing […] 
property ownership”. It is further believed that only such a narrow interpretation lives up to 
the ECJ’s emphasis on the internal market objective and its demand to give eff ect to the eff et 
utile of Treaty provisions. See further, Kingreen in Calliess/Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, 
Article 295, no. 11; Calliess, n. 509, p. 94; K Hailbronner, ‘Öff entliche Unternehmen im 
Binnenmarkt – Dienstleistungsmonopole und Gemeinschaft srecht’, (1991) NJW 593, 598; C 
Kahle, ‘Die eigentumsrechtliche Entfl echtung (Ownership Unbundling) der 
Energieversorgungsnetze aus europarechtlicher und verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht’, (2007) RdE 
293.
515 CFI, T-228/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission, (2003) ECR II-435, no. 
195; S Storr, ‘”Eigentumsentfl echtung”, “ISO” und “Aktiensplitt” im Gefüge des europäischen 
Verfassungsverbundes”’, proceedings of Annual Conference 2008 of Institut of Energy and 
Mining Law, 21 February 2008, pp. 55 et seq.
516 See the offi  cial explanation (motives) of the German government to Article 295, BT-Drs. 
2/3440, Appendix C, p. 154. It was introduced to meet the wide-spread fear (especially in 
Germany) that the exercise of Treaty competences could deeply interfere with the economic 
order by way of adopting socialization measures whose practical implications have always 
been highly controversial, in particular because of the diff erent organization of national 
systems of property ownership. For a concise account of the range of opinions on this issue, 
see Storr, n. 35, pp. 234 et seq., with further references, and in greater detail, Ruff ert, n. 512. 
See also H Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaft srecht, 1972, ch. 41, nos 11, 18, also with reference 
to the extensive debates conducted in the area of the Treaties on the European Coal and Steel 
Community and EURATOM. Ipsen at the time already emphasized that Article 295 (ex 222) 
EC is a barrier for exercising competences rather than the basis for individual rights.
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In all other cases, Article 295 EC would not have any barring eff ect according to 
this narrow interpretation. Even EC measures with expropriating eff ect would 
thus be valid without, however, questioning the principal competence of the 
Member States to decide about property ownership allocation according to their 
respective legal systems.517 Th is view also refers to Article 17 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which explicitly allows for 
expropriations.518 Th is would mean that ownership unbundling and the ISO 
model as proposed by the Commission would not be prohibited by Article 295 
EC even if they led to expropriation, as long as private property is transferred to 
another private party or property in public ownership is transferred to a public 
institution diff erent from the one which is forced to transfer its property.519
It must be borne in mind, however, that the wording of Article 295 EC is clear in 
that it does not refer to a transfer or property from private to public ownership 
and vice versa. Rather, “the system of property ownership” in the Member States is 
to remain untouched, i.e. including the decision of the State to allocate property 
ownership; expropriation is one such decision. As a result, this provision must 
have a primary meaning going beyond the mere prohibition of privatizations and 
socializations by the Community.520 Also, the position of this provision as part 
of the general and fi nal provisions of the Treaty suggests a fundamental function, 
which aff ects all other provisions of the Treaty.521
Another interpretation of Article 295 EC is suggested by GA D. Colomer in his 
fi nal pleadings in the Golden Share cases.522 He argues in favour of a functional 
517 In brief, allocation of property ownership can be described as the establishment of rules 
governing the categories of persons who can own property subject to general constitutional 
principles (within a constitutional framework).
518 Kingreen in Calliess/Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, Article 295, no. 11.
519 Callies, n. 509, p. 94.
520 Storr, n. 35, p. 235.
521 Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in the Golden Share cases C-367/98, n. 512, C-483/99 
– Commission v France, (2002) ECR I-4781, C-503/99 – Commission v Belgium (2002) ECR 
I-4809, no. 44.
522 Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in C-367/98, n. 512, C-483/99, ibid., C-503/99, ibid., 
nos 49 et seq., in particular 54 and 65. In C-112/05, n. 512, Colomer insists in no. 48: “I 
continue to hold the view that the expression ‘system of property ownership’ contained in 
Article 295 EC refers not to the civil rules concerning property relationships but to the ideal 
body of rules of every kind, including public law rules, which are capable of granting economic 
rights in respect of an undertaking: in other words, rules which allow the person vested with 
such ownership to exercise decisive infl uence on the defi nition and implementation of all or 
some of its economic objectives. At the same time, the necessary purposive interpretation of 
the provision precludes a distinction between public and private undertakings, for the 
purposes of the Treaty, which is based merely on the identity of its various shareholders, and 
that distinction must depend instead on the opportunity available to the State to impose 
specifi c economic policies other than the pursuit of the greatest fi nancial gain which 
characterises private business.”
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interpretation. According to his interpretation, Article 295 EC is supposed to 
secure the Member States’ “economic rights” in respect of an undertaking. In 
this context, he refers to the historical interpretation. Th e wording of Article 295 
EC goes back to a draft  of the French Minster of Foreign Aff airs, Robert 
Schumann, of 9 May 1950: “Th e establishment of the High Authority in no ways 
prejudices the system of ownership of the undertakings.” Apparently, it was not 
the legal organization of ownership in each of the Member States that was to be 
shielded from the interference of the Community but the ownership of companies 
engaged in trading activities.523
Th e draft smen of the Treaty proposed in December 1956 that “[t]his Treaty shall 
in no way prejudice the system of ownership of means of production which exists 
within the Community.”524 Similarly the second proposed version of January 
1957: “Th e establishment of the Community shall in no way prejudice the system 
of ownership of the undertakings to which this Treaty applies.”525 Th is latter 
version was then translated into Article 83 ECSC526, which was in force until 
2002. In the EEC Treaty527, the addition “of the undertakings” was deleted in 
March 1957, and the current version of Article 295 EC incorporated. It is not 
possible to conclude from this that the substantial function of this Article to 
reserve decisions of economic policy to the Member States was to be dropped. 
Colomer also refers to the position of this Article within the Treaty in Part VI 
“General and Final provisions” as well as the fi nality and imprecision of the 
expression “system of property ownership”, which aft er all seems to indicate that 
it is not a legal concept but is meant as an economic concept.528
Th e ECJ has not accepted Colomer’s perception of Article 295 EC. Without clearly 
stating how Article 295 EC is to be interpreted, the Court at least seems to 
consider the historical interpretation of only subordinate relevance. Colomer can 
indeed be countered in particular when looking at the wording of Article 295 EC, 
which does not refer to the competence of the Member States to dispose 
economically of property ownership (wirtschaft liche Verfügungsmacht) but 
simply to the system of property ownership in the various Member States. Th is is 
the central defi nitional element of Article 295 EC.
523 Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in C-367/98, n. 512, C-483/99, n. 521, C-503/99, n. 
521, no. 50.
524 Colomer, ibid., no. 51.
525 Colomer, ibid., no. 50.
526 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 18 April 1951 (“ECSC”), 
(entry into force on) 24 July 1952, expired on 23 July 2002.
527 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 25 March 1957 (“EEC”), (entry 
into force on) 1 January 1958.
528 Colomer, n. 523, no. 47.
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An interpretation of Article 295 EC, compromising between the narrow and the 
wide interpretation, leads to the conclusion that the eff ect of this provision can 
only be the exemption of the core of the system of property ownership in the 
Member States. Such an interpretation must respect the competence of the 
Community to establish a common market, on the one hand, while on the other 
respecting that the scope of applicability of Article 295 EC should not be reduced 
contrary to its express wording. Legal scholarship therefore distinguishes 
between rights to allocate (the existence of) property ownership and rights to 
exercise property ownership. It construes Article 295 EC in such a way that the 
Community is prohibited from taking any decision with respect to the allocation 
of property ownership.529 Accordingly, the Community should be prohibited 
from taking decisions which immediately aff ect the system (or existence) of 
property ownership530 but not from taking decisions which aff ect the exercise of 
property ownership and which are equivalent to a restriction of the allocation of 
property ownership.
Following the legal opinion of Storr, which he has only voiced recently531, there 
are two important aspects to Article 295 EC, which are of fundamental 
signifi cance for any further interpretation of this provision:
First, Article 295 has a functional purpose according to which it does not protect 
the private law system of property ownership in the Member States as such but 
reinforces the economic policy competence of the Member States in the area of 
the law of property ownership. Advocate General Colomer is to be agreed to the 
extent that this provision is to ensure the neutrality of the Treaty with respect to 
the ownership of undertakings in an economic sense. Article 295 EC is thus to be 
seen as complementary to Articles 98 and 99 EC, which accord the competence 
for economic policy to the Member States, and to Articles 86(2) and 16 EC, which 
leave it to the Member States to pursue certain economic policies related to other 
public objectives through the operation of undertakings.532 Article 295 EC, 
however, is not concerned with the competence to dispose economically of the 
ownership of undertakings (wirtschaft liche Verfügungsmacht) but simply with 
the “system of property ownership in the various Member States”.
Secondly, Article 295 EC is not concerned with the system of property ownership 
as guaranteed by EC law but with the rights of property ownership as granted by 
529 Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 475. For a brief defi nition of “allocation of property ownership”, see 
n. 517.
530 Koenig/Kühling in Streinz, EUV/EGV, 2003, Article 295 EGV, no. 13.
531 Storr, n. 515.
532 S Storr, Der Staat als Unternehmer, 2001, p. 301, and Storr, n. 35, p. 235.
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national law. Th is can be inferred from the wording of Article 295 EC, which is 
not aimed at the European right to property but which leaves the system of 
property ownership “in the Member States” untouched. In the context of this 
work, the Dutch and the German version of this provision read similarly: “Dit 
Verdrag laat de regeling van het eigendomsrecht in de lidstaten onverlet” and 
“Dieser Vertrag lässt die Eigentumsordnung in den verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten 
unberührt”.533 Th is wording also deviates signifi cantly from the wording of 
Article 6(2) EU, which refers to the “constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States”.534 Article 295 EC thus turns out to be one of the core provisions 
of the European “multilevel constitutionalism” (or “union of national 
constitutions” or Verfassungsverbund)535 in that it refers to the Member States’ 
legal systems.536
Consequently, having established that Article 295 EC is supposed to ensure that 
fundamental decisions of economic policy stay in the remit of the Masters of the 
Treaty, i.e. the Member States, and that the national systems of property 
ownership are to be left  untouched, the fundamental decisions to nationalize or 
socialize private sector market activity or, e contrario, to privatize public sector 
market activity fall within the competences of the Member States and not the 
EU. As measure of principal property ownership allocation, such decisions 
consequently are not subject to the Treaty rules and thus the fundamental 
freedoms such as Article 56 EC.537 Article 295 EC therefore prohibits any 
533 Emphasis added.
534 Emphasis added.
535 Understood as interactive reciprocal infl uence and complementary to the Member States’ and 
EU constitutional law, see Huber in VVDStRL, Europäisches und natinales Verfassungsrecht, 
Vol. 60, 2001, pp. 194, 226 et seq., or as normative entanglement and functional fusing, see 
Pernice in VVDStRL, Europäisches und natinales Verfassungsrecht, Vol. 60, 2001, pp. 148, 
164.
536 Storr, n. 515. Th is might appear rather impracticable and overly complex given that there are 
27 Member States and thus as many legal systems but in the early years aft er the Treaty entered 
into force this was consistent because the theoretical basis of property rights in the Member 
States is the fundamental right to property as guaranteed in these Member States. Further, an 
EC fundamental right to property was not in place at the time, and was not established until 
its recognition by the ECJ in 1974 and 1979 in re Nold (C-4/73, (1974) ECR 491) and in re 
Hauer (C-44/79, (1979) ECR 3727), respectively.
537 To exclude the Member States’ right to alocate property ownership from the application of the 
Treaty rules does not contradict the ECJ’s case law according to which the Member States’ 
systems of property ownership are not excluded from the application of the fundamental 
principles of the Treaty. First, this case only seems to be directed against the exercise (and not 
the allocation or existence) of property ownership, which is refl ected in the subject-matters of 
the Golden Share cases. Any measures protected by Article 295 EC as understood here can 
thus never be in breach of the Treaty rules, a fact, which the ECJ has so far not dealt with. Th e 
ECJ case law so far concerned the exercise of property ownership, which is in an established 
confl ict with the Treaty rules. Th e guaranteed core of the right to property (Wesensgehalt), see 
further infra, as a fundamental right can never be in confl ict with the Treaty. What is more, it 
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decisions of the Community to nationalize, socialize or privatize. Th is argument 
is supported by the fact that the EC does not distinguish between public and 
private undertakings as market actors, which is an indication that the EC is not 
interested in shift ing undertakings into the private or public sphere. As soon, 
however, as such a fundamental decision has been taken such as would be the 
case in situations of part or minority privatization, i.e. in the sphere of property 
ownership allocation, or as soon as the fundamental decision as to privatization 
of any kind has taken place and been enforced, property ownership has been 
allocated and the exercise of property ownership comes into the focus and falls 
under the Treaty provisions, in particular under Article 56 EC.
Th is interpretation also fi nds support in the Treaty of Lisbon. Although, for the 
fi rst time, the EU will explicitly obtain a competence for energy in the new Article 
194 TFEU (see below), the Article’s 2nd subsection provides for the exclusive 
competence of the Member States to determine “the general structure” of their 
energy supply.538
Th ese conclusions do not, however, mean that the entire national system of 
property ownership can be relevant. In an increasingly integrated European 
“union of national constitutions” (Verfassungsverbund)539, the constitutional 
traditions of the other Member States and the development of the law in the 
European Union have to be taken into account when interpreting Treaty 
provisions. As it is one of the main tasks of the Community to establish a 
functioning internal market, the area of application of Article 295 EC must 
therefore be adjusted accordingly. It is therefore only logical to reduce the scope 
of Article 295 EC to an “integration resistant” core consisting of the national 
guarantee of property ownership.540
is alleged that vertically integrated energy network ownership is in confl ict with the Treaty 
rules, but this has, however, never been established to date. Lastly, the ECJ ruled in the context 
of existing national legislation which is in a completely diff erent context to the measures 
discussed here. Th e measures discussed here are the subject of legislation currently about to 
be passed on European level (i.e. not yet in existence) which has as its objective to detach 
allocated energy network ownership from its vertical integration so as to remedy its alleged 
breach of Treaty rules.
538 See further in section V(3) infra.
539 See, e.g., U Di Fabio, ‘Grundfragen der europäischen Eigentumsordnung’, in W Löwer, Bonner 
Gespräch zum Energierecht, Band (Volume) 1, 2006, pp. 9 et seq.; further, Storr, n. 35, 235; 
Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 475, and ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen des 
Unbundling’, in J Baur, K Pritzsche, S Simon (eds), Unbundling in der Energiewirtschaft , 2006, 
ch. 2, no. 68.
540 Storr, n. 35, 235; J-C Pielow, E Ehlers, ‘Rechtsfragen zum “Ownership Unbundling”’, (2007) IR 
259, 262.
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Th is interpretation of Article 295 EC is refl ected in a concept of cooperation541, 
which runs through the entire Treaty, exemplifi ed by the duty of loyalty in Article 
10 EC, the obligation of the EU in Article 6 EC to respect the national identities 
of the Member States, the subsidiarity (and the proportionality) principle of 
Article 5(2) and (3) EC and fi nally, constitutional safeguards in the Member 
States; for Germany, for instance, a constitutional safeguard exists in Article 
79(3) of the German Constitution Grundgesetz (GG)542 for the core principles of 
the Grundgesetz, to which the “integration clause” in Article 23 GG refers.543
Given, however, the ever growing fundamental rights protection on the EU level, 
exemplifi ed by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its incorporation 
into the Lisbon Treaty, this argument can be taken further to the extent that 
Article 295 EC also disallows community legislation, which encroaches upon the 
essential content (Wesensgehalt) of the fundamental right to property, which all 
Member States’ constitutions throughout the European Union have in 
common.544 Th e untouchable core of the right to property in the Member States’ 
constitutions and under EC law is similar in structure545 and, apart from 
diff erences in detail, the constitutions of all Member States allow for, explicitly or 
implicitly, the expropriation and the regulation of property.546 As sources of the 
European order of fundamental rights (see Article 6 EU) they, together with the 
ECHR, characterize the EC law fundamental right to property. Explicitly, Article 
17 ECFR547, which is to be included in the Lisbon Treaty, provides for the right to 
541 To this extent also prominently the BVerfG in its seminal Maastricht decision, see n. 99 
(BVerfGE 89, 155).
542 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland of 3 May 1949 as amended.
543 See Storr, n. 515. See the corresponding reference in Article 23(1) 3rd sentence GG to 
Article 79(3) GG, which is also called eternity clause meaning that no parliamentary majority 
can change certain constitutional principles. To some extent similar to Germany albeit 
enforced by completely diff erent means of law, the UK, which, being a dualistic constitutional 
system like Germany, safeguards its (non-codifi ed) constitution by way of the overarching 
principle of “Sovereignty of Parliament”, which basically means that the current Parliament 
cannot bind future Parliaments; e contrario, this means that unless judge-made common law 
changes, parliamentary democracy cannot be abolished in the UK. For an excellent account 
of this predominant principle of state organization in the UK, see A Tomkins, Public Law, 
OUP, 2003, pp. 102 et seq. Th e Netherlands, as monistic constitutional system, does not 
possess such a mechanism, which can be inferred from an e contrario conclusion drawn from 
Article 91 Dutch Constitution Grondwet.
544 Storr, n. 35, 235; ‘Der Wandel der Energiewirtschaft  vor dem Hintergrund der europäischen 
Eigentumsordnung’, in W Löwer (ed.), Bonner Gespräch zum Energierecht, Band (Volume) 1, 
2006, pp. 51 et seq.
545 Storr, n. 515.
546 For references to the corresponding Member States’ constitutional laws, see Storr, n. 515; S 
Heselhaus, ‘Eigentumsgrundrecht’, in S Heselhaus, C Nowak, Handbuch der Europäischen 
Grundrechte, 2006, § 32 nos 22 et seq.; Depenheuer in Tettinger/Stern, Article 17, pp. 432 et 
seq.
547 Debenheuer, ibid.
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possess, use and dispose of lawfully acquired property, and it distinguishes 
between expropriation as deprivation of property in the public interest, in return 
for compensation548, and the regulation of the use of property to the extent 
necessary for the benefi t of the general public, which, however, may not violate 
the essential content (Wesensgehalt) of the right to property. Consequently, the 
Wesensgehalt as core of the right to property is protected.549
Accordingly, Article 295 EC prevents the Community from substituting 
ownership with something, which does not deserve to be called “ownership” any 
longer550, or in other words, the “untouchable” core of the guarantee to own 
property may not be undermined.551 Hence, in order to defi ne the scope of Article 
295 EC, the Wesensgehalt of the right to property within the European “union of 
national constitutions” needs to be explored.
In brief, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court552, the 
Wesensgehalt of the right to property consists of the allocation of a particular 
property to a particular owner (so-called Privatnützigkeit) in order for it to be 
available for his economic use and benefi t on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, to give him the principal power to dispose of such property 
(Verfügungsbefugnis).553 Th e power to dispose of his property does not only 
include the positive power for the owner to do with his property whatever he 
pleases but also the (negative) power, not to have to dispose of it; the power to 
dispose thus refl ects the control, or better, the sovereignty over the property.554
As can be inferred from the outline of the unbundling measures envisaged by the 
Commission in the Introduction, the measures would considerably impact the 
548 Expropriation is the most intrusive interference with ownership and thus principally carries 
the obligation to pay compensation, no matter whether vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings receive the market value (aft er a forced sale) or compensation for the 
expropriation because this is only a fi nancial compensation, which does not alter the complete 
deprivation or de facto expropriation of the power to dispose of the property on its own 
volition.
549 See C Calliess, ‘Eigentumsgrundrecht’, in D Ehlers (ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten, 2nd ed., 2005, § 17, p. 475.
550 For Germany, this was, for instance, decided by the BVerfG in BVerfGE 24, 367, 389, in the 
context of the guarantee of the Wesensgehalt of the right to property.
551 Th e substance of ownership must be preserved, see BVerfG in BVerfGE 79, 174, 198, and 
BVerfGE 100, 226, 241 – Denkmalschutz.
552 Reference is made to the case law of the BVerfG, the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
because the right to property, apart from its basic features and the recognition of its essential 
substance, is not developed in equal breadth and depth throughout the European Union. Th e 
BVerfG, however, can be considered to be at the forefront of the development of fundamental 
rights theory.
553 BVerfG in re Denkmalschutz, n. 551, and in BVerfGE 87, 114, 138.
554 BVerfG in BVerfGE 53, 257, 291.
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Privatnützigkeit and power of disposal of the energy network assets. Ownership 
unbundling as envisaged by the Commission could only be enforced by way of 
imposing an obligation in law to sell and/or (in case of failing to do so) the 
expropriation in favour of the State or private third parties. In whatever way the 
transfer of the network assets (or the remainder of the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking) is mandated, at the end of the day, the intended result will 
be the deprivation of property leading to a complete loss of the right to and the 
possession of the property.
As will be shown in greater detail in Part 2 of this work in the context of analysing 
the fundamental rights protection in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and the 
EU, ownership unbundling by way of a forced sale and/or (complete) deprivation 
of property can either be viewed as an outright expropriation and/or a deprivation 
of property, which amounts to a de facto expropriation.555
Th e proposed special variant of ownership unbundling, the so-called share split, 
which was outlined in the Introduction, does not alter the fact that owners are 
deprived of their property by way of expropriation or at least of de facto 
expropriation.556 Th e share split not only splits the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking into two parts thereby expropriating the legal person of the 
undertaking but by also demanding the sale of one of the two shareholdings 
(resulting from the share split), should one of the two shareholdings be a 
controlling stake, this amounts to an expropriation or at least de facto 
expropriation of the shareholders.
Consequently, the proposed measures of ownership unbundling and share split 
would both, if enacted, be in breach of Article 295 EC. Th e Community may thus 
not exercise its competence to regulate energy supply networks in the EU in order 
to introduce those two further unbundling measures.557 Th is is so even if lawful 
alternative unbundling measures are introduced at the same time because it 
would breach the rule of law, according to which institutions with sovereign 
powers have to act in accordance with the law; a Directive to this extent would 
thus be partially invalid.
555 Under German law, the latter would be classifi ed as a regulation of property (Inhalts- und 
Schrankenbestimmung) amounting to expropriation, see BVerfG in re Denkmalschutz, n. 551. 
For an exact distinction between deprivation, expropriation and regulation of property, see 
Introduction and Part 2 infra.
556 See also in greater detail Part 2 infra.
557 But see, in this regard, n. 504 and n. 596 and accompanying text at section VI infra.
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As regards the ISO model proposed as an alternative unbundling measure by the 
Commission558, the power to dispose of the network assets to some extent 
remains with the network owner, although on an alternative view (i.e. in 
particular as regards the control of the networks, which is inherent in the power 
to dispose) the power to dispose is lost to the ISO. Further, by having to transfer 
the operation of the networks to the ISO, the Privatnützigkeit of the network 
assets to the network owner is considerably inhibited. Here also, with respect to 
the question of whether Article 295 EC is to be seen as a bar to introducing the 
ISO model as part of energy supply network regulation, the question arises 
whether the extent to which the Privatnützigkeit of the network owner (to make a 
profi t from its property, the energy networks and their operation) is restricted, 
amounts to an expropriation of network property. Th is mainly depends on 
whether the network owner receives an adequate allowance (to include some 
profi t margin) as a compensation for the loss of control over (operation of) its 
networks, for putting capital (consequent on its obligation to ensure suffi  cient 
quality of the networks) and network assets at the disposal of third parties. 
Although it will be argued in Part 2 infra that the ISO model as proposed by the 
Commission indeed amounts to a (de facto) expropriation of network property559, 
this is not per se the case, in contrast to ownership unbundling and share split. 
Th us, it can be said that in principle, the Community is allowed to introduce 
independent system operation, i.e. pursued by third parties independent from 
the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking and the integrated network 
owner, as long as the Privatnützigkeit of the energy network owner is not 
abolished altogether. If the Privatnützigkeit is safeguarded by the ISO model, it is 
simply a permissible regulation of (network) property.560
558 See in the Introduction.
559 Th e network owner loses control of and the power to dispose of and use its existing networks 
(incl. the power to decide over the necessity of investments) and any investment he pursues; if 
third parties invest he would have to concede the decision to carry out the investment to third 
parties). Further, an adequate return is questionable as this is likely to be regulated (or at least 
controlled by a sector regulator). Network owners are downgraded to mere service providers 
on their own grids, which does not give them any economic benefi t from the use of their 
property but only from their economic activity as service provider. Th e ECtHR has articulated 
in Katte Klitsche de la Grange v Italy, 27 October 1994, Ser. A 293-B, that “[w]here […] the 
owner retains the ownership subject to restrictions which reduce to virtually nothing the 
economic value of the use or exchange of the property, this is known as “value expropriation” 
and it gives rise to an entitlement to compensation. Th is situation arises where the restriction 
is very severe – absolute prohibition – and where it is imposed for an indefi nite period of time 
or remains in force for longer than is reasonable.” See also n. 1161 .
560 See in greater detail Part 2.
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2. ARTICLE 175(2)(C) EC
Another bar for the Community to the exercise of its competence to regulate 
energy supply networks in the EU or, better, a restriction could possibly be seen 
in Article 175(2)(c) EC, according to which measures, which “signifi cantly” aff ect 
the “general structure” of national energy supply, require as an exception to the 
rule of qualifi ed majority the unanimous decision of the Council.
Article 175(2)(c) EC, however, is part of Title XIX on “Environment”.561 It thus 
can only be applied to measures with respect to the structure of energy supply, 
which are motivated by environmental policy objectives. Th e Commission 
proposals of September 2007, however, have as their main objective to enhance 
competition in the internal energy market.562
As part of an explicit Treaty Title, which confers specifi c competences onto the 
Community, its applicability in the context of harmonization measures based on 
Article 95 EC is also questionable. Nevertheless, the existence of this provision 
indicates that measures, which touch upon the Member States’ general structure 
of energy supply, have to be met with reservations. With respect to the question 
whether “the general structure of energy supply” also includes the vertical 
structure of the energy supply sector has not been answered yet. So far, this issue 
has only become relevant in the area of environmental policy, in particular with 
regard to the composition of primary energy resources to be used for electricity 
generation in the Member States.563
Th e inclusion of the vertical structure of the energy supply sector into the 
meaning of the term “general structure of energy supply” seems to have played a 
role in the context of the draft ing of the new Title on energy policy to be 
introduced when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, more particularly in the 
new Article 194 TFEU564, which is discussed below.
561 Th e Lisbon Treaty, n. 300, would move the Title on ‘Environment’ to Title XX, and 
Article 175(2)(c) EC would become Article 192(2)(c) TFEU, keeping its wording.
562 See in this respect also Lecheler, n. 466, who rightly notes that the factual basis, on which the 
Commission bases its assertion that competition in the internal energy market works 
inadequately, is of a rather doubtful nature. Th e factual basis Lecheler is referring to can only 
mean the Impact Assessment of the September 2007 proposals, n. 15, and the results of the 
energy sector inquiry, n. 3, which are based on 2005 fi gures. Lecheler also reviews the other 
components of Article 175(2)(c) EC such as the unanimity requirement.
563 As regards background and content of Article 175(2)(c) EC, see Kahl in Streinz, EUV/EGV, 
2003, Article 175 EGV, nos 28 et seq. with further references, and Pielow/Ehlers, n. 35.
564 See nn. 495, 506.
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3. ARTICLE 194(2) LISBON TREATY
Unlike Article 175(2)(c) EC, Article 194(2), 2nd sentence TFEU is straightforward 
in stating that measures taken in the area of energy policy “shall not aff ect a 
Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between diff erent energy sources and the general structure 
of its energy supply, […].”
Th e fi rst observation to make when analysing this new provision is that the 
Member States’ right is exclusive and cannot be overturned even if the Council 
decided unanimously. Secondly, vertical integrated energy supply, it is submitted, 
is indeed part of the “general structure of energy supply”, which is not subject to 
the harmonization powers of the Community (but obviously still subject to the 
competition law provisions of the Treaty), and which leaves its determination 
entirely and exclusively to the Member States.565 Vertical integration is assumed 
here to be included because in leaving to the Member States the decision on the 
way energy is supplied, it must also be left  to their legal, economic and political 
judgement, to determine under which corporate structure this supply is supposed 
to be organized.566
4. ARTICLE 56 EC
Another issue to consider in the context of introducing further unbundling 
measures on the basis of Article 95 EC is that its application must serve the 
attainment of the goals set out in Article 14 EC, and thus the fundamental 
freedoms of the internal market.567 Th e fundamental freedoms do not only bind 
the Member States but also, as can be inferred from Articles 3(1), 7(1) and 249(1) 
565 Any measures taken under Article 194 EC may thus not interfere with vertically integrated 
energy supply on the national level; only the Member States themselves are allowed to take 
such measures (of their own volition). Not even the procedure of the new Article 352 TFEU 
(ex Article 308 EC) can be applied here because this is not about a lack of competences but 
about the explicit exclusion of such competence. Article 194 TFEU appears to be a sort of ex 
tunc approval of all the measures taken so far by the Community in the area of energy policy, 
see already n. 506 and accompanying text. However, the explicit mention of the exclusive 
competence of the Member States to determine the general structure of their energy supply 
seems to indicate that the prescription of ownership unbundling of the energy networks as the 
only possible measure which would fi nally and defi nitely dissolve the vertical structure of 
energy supply, is a competence which the Member States did not want to entrust the 
Community with. Th is position would also confi rm the stance taken supra with respect to the 
interpretation of Article 295 EC.
566 Th is does, however, not mean that the current state of unbundling can be rolled back because 
it belongs to the acquis communitaire, which has been approved by the Member States.
567 See again ECJ, C-376/98, no. 371, nos 83 et seq.
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EC, the EC legislature, even with respect to legislation based on the approximation 
and harmonization competences of Article 94 et seq. EC.568
To a lesser extent than the Commission’s proposals of September 2007, the 
Council of Energy Minister of the Member States in its common position of 9 
and 10 October 2008 suggests that “companies engaged in the production or 
supply of gas or electricity [should be prohibited] from exercising control over a 
transmission network operator of a Member State that has opted for full 
unbundling.”569 Th is would mean that energy generation or production and 
supply undertakings (i.e. not including TSOs) whether vertically integrated or 
not, would either have to give up their (shareholdings in) energy transmission 
network owning TSOs in Member States, which have opted for ownership 
unbundling or not be allowed to acquire such interests or control. Similar to 
ownership unbundling, this would mean that existing transmission network 
operation activities would have to be sold or that such generation/production and 
supply undertakings would be prevented from establishing and carrying on an 
economic activity in the area of transmission networks in Member States, which 
have opted for ownership unbundling.570
568 See Schroeder in Streinz, EUV/EGV, 2003, Article 28, no. 29; Tietje in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht 
der Europäischen Union, Bd. II, Vor Article 94–97 EGV, no. 53.
569 See Council of the European Union, nn. 372 et seq. and accompanying text, also with regard 
to the Commission’s proposals of September 2007. Article 9(12) of the draft  Electricity and 
Gas Directives as approved by the European Parliament on 22 April 2009, nn. 31, 33, 95, 372, 
426, contain a similar wording. Such undertakings are also not allowed to own transmission 
networks in such Member States. Th e draft  Energy Directives do not refer to vertically 
integrated companies in this context any more which contrasts with the more far reaching 
intentions expressed by the Commission in its original proposals, see n. 375 and accompanying 
text. Th us, vertically integrated TSOs (not vertically integrated generation/production and 
supply undertakings!) in Member States which opt for the ISO or the ITO alternatives seem to 
be able to control TSOs or own transmission networks in Member States which have opted for 
ownership unbundling.
570 Further unbundling measures initiated by EC legislation might infringe the EU’s obligations 
arising from its ratifi cation of the Energy Charter Treaty, more particularly from its Article 13. 
Th e investment regime of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), n. 96, covers both pre-investment 
and post-investment phases with the latter providing enforceable obligations of the signatory 
states. EU Member States’ investors in the energy (supply) sector enjoy protection under the 
ECT as regards their shareholdings in other EU Member States, see C Bamberger, T Wälde, 
‘Th e Energy Charter Treaty’, in M Roggenkamp, C Redgwell et al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe, 
OUP, 2nd ed., 2007, chapter 3, no. 3.16, and more generally, T Wälde, ‘International Investment 
under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty’, (1995) JWT 5, and can directly sue the for breach of 
the Treaty’s post-investment obligations under its Part Th ree by way of arbitration under 
Article 26 ECT, or before the courts of the contracting party where the investment is situated. 
State-state arbitration is also possible according to Article 27 ECT. Th e obligation to pay 
compensation for expropriation is also set out in Article 13. As regards the diff erent forms an 
expropriation may take and the inconsistent terminology used and the varying defi nitions for 
expropriation, see C Redgwell, ‘International Regulation of Energy Activities’, in M 
Roggenkamp, C Redgwell et al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe, OUP, 2nd ed., 2007, chapter 2, no. 
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Th e Council’s common position (and even more the Commission’s position of 
September 2007) might run into confl ict with two EC fundamental freedoms, 
the free movement of capital according to Article 56 EC and the freedom of 
establishment according to Article 43 et seq. EC.571
Th e ECJ made it clear that the free movement of capital, as a fundamental 
principle of the Treaty, may be restricted only by rules which are justifi ed by 
reasons referred to in Article 58(1) EC or by overriding requirements of the 
general interest. Furthermore, in order to be so justifi ed, national legislation must 
be suitable for securing the objective which it pursues and must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the principle of 
proportionality.572 Th e Court further stressed that the requirements of public 
policy and security, as with every derogation from the fundamental principle of 
free movement of capital allowed in Article 58(1)(b) EC, must be interpreted 
narrowly.573 Th us, public policy and public security may be relied on only if there 
is a genuine and suffi  ciently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society, 
2.222. As regards the need for an expropriation to be in the public interest, it also appears that 
this is the only test which applies as the proportionality of expropriation hardly seems to be 
an issue. See in greater detail, Redgwell, ibid., no. 2.224, with further references. Compensation 
is supposed to amount to the payment of the market value of the investment immediately 
before the expropriation (or before it became public knowledge), see Redgwell, ibid., nos 
2.224–5. See T Wälde, A Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’, (2001) ICLQ 811, with respect to de facto 
expropriation under the ECT.
571 With respect to the concurrence of the two fundamental freedoms at issue here, i.e. Articles 
56 (for instance, with respect to controlling shareholdings as direct investment) and 43 EC 
(for instance the establishment of a subsidiary in another Member State), both are in principle 
applicable. However, what can be inferred from Articles 43(2) and 58(2) EC is that activities 
relevant under both freedoms are covered by the level of protection as laid out in Article 56 
EC, only the scope of the restrictions of the fundamental freedoms are extended in that lawful 
restrictions of both freedoms are applicable. In the context given, only the restrictions in the 
context of the free movement of capital are relevant; thus, the freedom of establishment will 
not be further assessed here. As to the priority or independency of the examination of Articles 
43 and 56, see also ECJ, C-326/07, n. 512, nos 34–36.
572 See, e.g., ECJ, C-503/99, no. 521, no. 45, and C-174/04 – Commission v Italy, (2005) ECR I-4933. 
On the application of the proportionality test in the current context, see ECJ, Joined Joined 
Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Sanz de Lera and Others, (1995) ECR I-4821, no. 23, 
and C-54/99 – Église de scientology v Th e Prime Minister, (2000) ECR I-1335, no. 18.
573 According to the ECJ, public policy means sovereignly established fundamental rules, which 
aff ect the fundamental interests of the State, see ECJ, C-30/77 – Régina v Bouchereau, (1977) 
ECR I-1997, 2013. Any derogation on grounds of public policy and/or public security is only 
permissible if there is a genuine and suffi  ciently serious threat to public policy, see ECJ, C-36/75 
– Rutili v Ministre de l’Interieur, (1975) ECR 1219, whereby such a threat must aff ect the 
fundamental interests of the State. Public security, which is a particular part of public policy, is 
concerned with fundamental interests of the State such as the safeguard of the continuance of 
fundamental public services or the safe and eff ective functioning of the operation of the State, 
i.e. the safeguard of the existence of a Member State against internal and external interferences, 
see ECJ, C-72/83 – Campus Oil v Minister for Industry and Energy, 1984) ECR I-2727, 2751.
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such as supply security in the event of crisis.574 In this context, the ECJ has 
recognized that the State can interfere with the economic activity of undertakings, 
which render services of general interest or which are of strategic importance, 
such as energy supply undertakings.575
Only if no reasons referred to in Article 58(1) EC are applicable, do the overriding 
requirements of the general interest as a restriction immanent to Article 56 EC 
come into play.
Th e ECJ has so far only recognized such overriding interests on a case-by-case 
basis, in matters such as consumer or environmental protection.576 It is widely 
claimed that only general interests of non-economic character can be overriding 
restrictions.577 Th is seems to be confi rmed by the case law of the ECJ, which has 
so far only recognized non-economic interests.578 What is true in this respect at 
the least is that protectionist measures (or any other economic measures 
disallowed under the Treaty or contrary to the aims of the Treaty) are not 
justifi ed.579 Further, the ECJ has explicitly not recognized the strengthening of 
574 See ECJ, C-54/99, n. 572; C-483/99 – Commission v France, (2002) ECR I-4781, no. 48; 
C-503/99, n. 521, no. 48; C-463/00, n. 512, no. 72; C-274/06 – Commission v Spain, 14 February 
2008, no. 39 (summary reported in (2008) ECR I-26); ECJ, C-207/07 – Commission v Spain, 
17 July 2008, no. 47 (not yet reported). A civil court in the Hague in the Netherlands has 
recently ruled that energy supply reliability (i.e. reliability of energy transport) generally is to 
be regarded as a public policy reason (which the court also relates to consumer protection, see 
further n. 576 and accompanying text), not only in times of crisis, see Rechtbank ‘s Gravenhage, 
Delta N.V. tegen De Staat der Nederlanden, no. 293142 / HA ZA 07–2538, 11 March 2009. Th is, 
however, is in clear contradiction to the just mentioned ECJ case law, which accepts energy 
supply security (i.e. suffi  cient availability of energy) and then only in times of crisis as public 
security reason.
575 See, e.g., ECJ, C-503/99, n. 521, no. 45, and C-367/98, n. 512, no. 47.
576 For the latter, see, for instance, the recent judgement by the EFTA Court, E-2/06 – EFTA 
Surveillance Authority v Norway, (2007) EFTA Court Reports 167, nos 79, 81. Contra to the 
Dutch court ruling, see n. 574, it is questionable whether reliability of energy transportation 
serves the protection of consumers; only the safety of appliances at the consumer premises 
where such transport ends would seem to related to consumer protection. As to the defi nition 
of consumer protection, see n. 591 and accompanying text.
577 See, for instance, Ress/Ukrow in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Kommentar, 
Bd. II, Article 56 EGV, no. 77, and Article 58, no. 3; R Streinz, Europarecht, 8rd ed., 2008, no. 
833.
578 Although it can be said that oft en economic general interests have a non-economic aspect, 
such that, for example, the functioning of the (internal) market and undistorted competition 
as economic general interests and original goals of EC integration also serve the functioning 
of the economy and thus society as a whole, which is a non-economic general interest, 
economic general interests have never been recognized by the ECJ as overriding restrictions 
of fundamental freedoms.
579 ECJ does not allow Member States to avoid the eff ects of Treaty measures by invoking 
economic diffi  culties, which arise as a consequence of the elimination of obstacles to the 
internal market, see, for instance, ECJ, C-72/83, n. 573, no. 35; see also P Wilmowsky, ‘Freiheit 
Part 1. Economic Regulation
166 Intersentia
the competitive structure of the market as a valid basis for an overriding 
restriction.580 Moreover, it is submitted that non-economic overriding general 
interests should not be taken into account merely because they may be ancillary 
to primarily economic general interests, or consequential thereon because 
otherwise the principle established by the ECJ that restrictions of fundamental 
freedoms are to be narrowly construed would be infringed and non-economic 
general interests would be artifi cially deemed to be associated with economic 
general interests simply to validate an economic general interest as a basis for 
applying it as a restriction.581
Th e EU invokes the improvement of competition in the internal energy markets 
in order to achieve energy supply security in the long-term as public security 
reason (in accordance with Article 58(1)(b) EC) for introducing further 
unbundling.582 Further, the achievement of greater market transparency in order 
to enhance consumer protection through greater market transparency has, for 
instance, been relied upon by the UK, as well as the improvement of competition 
in the markets in order to achieve greater environmental protection, such as a 
more eff ective emission trading scheme, and easier and non-discriminatory 
market access of renewable energy sources (RES) and combined heat and power 
(CHP) in order to fi ght climate change.583 All these aims may possibly be 
des Kapital- und Zahlungsverkehrs’, in D. Ehlers (ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten, 2nd ed., 2005, § 12, pp. 343–350.
580 See ECJ, C-174/04, n. 572, where the Court upheld its earlier fi ndings in C-367/98, n. 512, no. 
52, that “an interest in generally strengthening the competitive structure of the market in 
question cannot constitute valid justifi cation for restrictions on the free movement of capital.
581 Particularly prohibited is the abusive reliance on reasons of public security and policy if such 
reasons are detached from their actual function and in fact invoked for economic purposes, 
see ECJ, C-54/99, n. 572, no. 17, and C-503/99, n. 521, no. 47.
582 See Recital 14 of the Commission’s proposals for Electricity and Gas Directives of 19 September 
2007: “Th e safeguarding of energy supply is an essential element of public security and is 
therefore inherently connected to the effi  cient functioning of the EU electricity market. 
Functioning electricity and gas markets and in particular the networks and other assets 
associated with electricity supply are essential for public security, for the competitiveness of 
the economy and for the well-being of the citizens of the Community. Without prejudice to 
the international obligations of the Community [such as the European Energy Charter 
Treaty], the Community considers that the electricity transmission system sector is of high 
[i.e. strategic] importance to the Community and therefore additional safeguards are 
necessary regarding the infl uence of third countries in order to avoid any threats to 
Community public order and public security and the welfare of the citizens of the Community 
(comments added).” Considerations relating to non-EU countries are not further analysed 
here.
583 See Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great Britain. Th e UK, however, has failed so far to live up to such 
aims. C Mitchell, D Bauknecht, P Connor, ‘Eff ectiveness through risk reduction: a comparison 
of the renewables obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany’, (2006) 
Energy Policy 297, have established that the German support mechanism albeit less effi  cient 
in the short-term and thus promoting less the competitive incentive to keep prices down, is 
more eff ective at increasing the share of electricity generation from renewable energy sources 
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classifi ed as overriding restrictions in the general interest of Article 56 EC.584 
Reciprocity and the protection of the national energy supply industries, both 
irrelevant objectives under Article 56 EC, are also reasons, which are likely to 
have played a role in helping the Council to settle a common position on 9 and 
10 October 2008.585
(RES) and thus more conducive to provide long-term security of electricity supply leading to 
effi  ciency improvements in the long-term. Th e support scheme for electricity generation from 
RES in England and Wales (which is similar to the system applied in Scotland) is based on 
so-called renewable obligation certifi cates proving compliance with the obligation to supply a 
certain volume of electricity produced from RES. In Germany, to the contrary, a so-called 
feed-in tariff  support scheme is applied according to which electricity network operators are 
obliged to connect electricity generation from RES and pay such generators a certain surcharge 
for the electricity they feed into the system. See in greater detail also Brunekreeft /Ehlers, nn. 
8, 38.
584 Th e European Commission describes the general interest its proposals of 19 September 2007 
are supposed to serve in its Explanatory Memorandum as follows: “a competitive and effi  cient 
electricity and gas market is a pre-condition to tackle climate change [and is] crucial to ensure 
the security of Europe’s energy supply, as only a Europe-wide and competitive market 
generates the right investment signals and off ers fair network access for all potential investors, 
and provides real and eff ective incentives to both network operators and generators to invest 
the billions of Euros that will be needed in the EU over the next two decades. […] Well-
functioning retail markets will also play a very important role in increasing people’s awareness 
of domestic energy consumption and the cost of energy. Competition over supply to 
households will enhance people’s energy-awareness. Suppliers therefore need to give more 
information to ensure that customers get more frequent information on their energy 
consumption and costs.” It should be noted, however, that competitive markets are economic 
general interests, and that they serve as one, and not the only, precondition to tackle climate 
change as can be inferred from the EC legislation already in place such as support mechanisms 
for RES and CHP, see in this regard already Ehlers, n. 7. Functioning Europe-wide and 
competitive markets are the direct and economic goals of the legislation proposed here, 
whereas supply security is “only” the indirect goal to be achieved aft er functioning markets 
have been achieved. Competition and market integration as the Treaty’s original goals are in 
principle legitimate general interests and the fundamental freedoms are there to achieve them. 
On the other hand, it has been established that in the context of restricting fundamental 
freedoms, these general interests do not seem to be admissible as they would restrict what the 
fundamental freedoms are supposed to promote. Th e question whether only EU-wide and 
competitive markets generate the “right” investment signals is questionable given that 
renewable energy sources whose promotion is a major goal of the EU’s energy policy are still 
not competitive and still require support mechanisms, which are already in place. Further, it 
has so far not been suffi  ciently proven that network access is not fair. What is more, it has 
turned out that tackling suffi  cient network investment is of much lesser urgency than tackling 
investment in generation. Empirically, however, it is not clear that further unbundling is 
tackling this issue, see Brunekreeft , EPRG and UNECOM, n. 9. With respect to functioning 
retail markets, as has already been established, this is not a goal accepted by the ECJ in the 
context of restricting Article 56 EC. Further unbundling is, however, not necessary to enhance 
the information customers get about their energy consumption and costs.
585 See n. 31. As regards the issue of creating a so-called level playing fi eld, see already chapter 1 
section III in the context of the alleged problem of cross-subsidization.
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Invoking supply security as valid public security restriction according to Article 
58(1) EC to justify further unbundling legislation might, however, confl ict with 
what has been established by the ECJ. In Commission vs Belgium586 the ECJ 
accepted supply security as a valid public security restriction (Article 58(1)(b) EC) 
of Article 56 EC only because the legislation was specifi cally targeted at events of 
energy crisis587, i.e. where supply security was under immediate threat, occurring 
in narrowly prescribed circumstances and not across-the-board and restricting 
fundamental freedoms permanently588, and subject to judicial review. Th e mere 
acquisition of shareholdings in undertakings, which pursue certain activities in 
the energy sector, which are subject to regulation, and the acquisition of assets 
necessary for such activities, are not as such to be regarded as genuine or 
suffi  ciently severe threat to the security of energy supply.589
Further unbundling legislation is primarily aimed at enhancing the competitive 
structure and thus the functioning of the energy markets in order to attract 
investment, which is supposed to safeguard supply security in the long-term, but 
it is not merely targeted at ensuring that supply security does not fail in the event 
of an immediate threat. Th e legislation is thus based on an economic general 
interest, which in addition has already been refused by the ECJ in Commission vs 
Italy.590 Th e public security general interest of supply security (and economic 
goals such as greater transparency in the markets) are not to be achieved directly 
586 See, e.g., ECJ, C-503/99, n. 521. Th ere, the ECJ states that “[t]he objective pursued by the 
legislation at issue is the safeguarding of energy supplies in the event of a crisis. It has 
previously been recognised that the public-security considerations which may justify an 
obstacle to the free movement of goods include the objective of ensuring a minimum supply of 
petroleum products at all times (Campus Oil, paras 34 and 35). Th us, these are legitimate 
grounds of justifi cation referred to in Article 58(1)(b) EC. […] It is necessary, therefore, to 
ascertain whether the legislation in issue enables the Member State concerned to ensure a 
minimum level of energy supplies in the event of a genuine and serious threat, and whether or 
not it goes beyond what is necessary for that purpose.” (emphasis added).
587 See also the recent judgement by the EFTA Court, E-2/06, n. 576, nos 79, 81, 85. Th e legislation 
was solely aimed at ensuring a minimum level of energy supply as a public service obligation 
of the vertically integrated incumbent and securing infl uence on strategic assets such as 
supply networks without requiring the need for ownership unbundling. In general, the ECJ 
has established that the aim to safeguard the supply of products from the areas of oil, 
telecommunication and electricity, or the rendering of such services in a Member State in 
times of crisis can be a reason of public security, see ECJ, C-463/00, n. 512, no. 71; C-174/04, n. 
572, no. 40.
588 But see the Dutch Raad van State in its advice of 17 June 2005 (‘Advies inzake het voorstel van 
wet tot Wijziging van de Elektriciteitswet 1998 en van de Gaswet in verband met nadere regels 
omtrent een onafh ankelijk netbeheer met memorie van toelichting’, nr. W10.05.0095/II, 
’s-Gravenhage, 17 juni 2005) who accepts the supply security exception in this case as suffi  cient 
ground for the more general distribution network unbundling legislation in the Netherlands.
589 See ECJ, C-207/07, n. 574, nos 51 et seq. See also Ress/Ukrow in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der 
Europäischen Union, Kommentar, Bd. II, Article 58 EGV, no. 37 (n. 7).
590 See n. 580.
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or immediately at any given point in time but through the economic goals of 
promoting competition and establishing an internal market. Th us, if this was 
permitted as a restriction of Article 56 EC, the ECJ’s narrow interpretation of 
restrictions of fundamental freedoms such as Article 56 EC would be avoided.
For the same reasons, environmental protection through further unbundling 
legislation can also not be accepted as an overriding restriction of Article 56 EC. 
Th e possible claim that greater market transparency would benefi t consumer 
protection can also not be regarded as an overriding restriction of Article 56 EC 
because greater transparency serves amongst other things also the benefi t of 
consumers but not per se or directly consumer protection. Consumer protection591 
is typically concerned with enhancing product security and the fair treatment of 
consumers in business relationships such as protection from fraud, unexpected 
terms and conditions and abuse of consumers’ inexperience.
To conclude, it can thus be said that prohibiting vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings owning and operating energy transmission networks in one 
Member State from owning and operating energy supply networks in another 
Member State where ownership unbundling has been introduced, cannot be 
considered to be a measure that if proportionate would legitimately restrict the 
free movement of capital according to Article 56 EC. If one does not follow what 
has just been established, then further unbundling measures must be 
proportionate, i.e. in order to be justifi ed, they must be suitable for securing the 
claimed overriding objectives in the general interest and must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain them. With respect to the proportionality of 
further unbundling measures, see the elaborations on the proportionality of 
further unbundling measures in the context of assessing their fundamental 
rights impact in Part II of this work.592
What might already be questioned here is the necessity of further unbundling 
measures with respect to supply security, and environmental and consumer 
protection. On the one hand, as investment cannot be imposed as an obligation it 
is hard to say whether there are any other equally eff ective measures. On the 
other hand, there is already extensive legislation in place promoting energy 
effi  ciency, favourable treatment of RES and CHP; there is also a Europe-wide 
Emission Trading Scheme in place.593 Via the exemption mechanisms in Article 
591 For the defi nition of consumer protection and the measures initiated in this regard by EC 
legislation, see Wolf in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Kommentar, Bd. III, 
‘A 1. Grundzüge’, nos 1–34.
592 See also Part 1 Chapter 2 section II supra.
593 See in all these respects already Ehlers, n. 7.
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7 of Regulation 1228/2003 and Article 22 of Gas Directive 2003, there are 
incentives for merchant interconnection, which the market obviously only uses if 
it is economical to do so, and measures are already in place to secure investment 
in interconnection such as the obligation to reinvest revenues from congestion 
charges into electricity interconnectors, see Article 6(6) of Regulation 1228/2003. 
Further, the Commission itself acknowledges that EU legislation already includes 
instruments dealing with security of energy supply594, and more particularly 
monitoring and reporting tools with respect to energy supply security are in 
place595: Accordingly, Directive 2005/89/EC requires the national regulators, 
with the help of the transmission system operators, to report yearly to the 
Commission on security of electricity supply. Directive 2004/67/EC requires 
Member States to report on the security of the gas supply situation and on the 
regulatory framework to enhance investment in infrastructure; the same 
Directive establishes the Gas Coordination Group and defi nes a “Community 
mechanism” in the event of supply disruption, which includes measures in 
relation to gas stocks. In addition, Gas Directive 2003 introduced general 
monitoring obligations for the Member States. Th e proposed amendments to 
Regulations 1228/2003 (electricity) and 1775/2005 (gas) give the task of making 
system adequacy forecasts for every summer and winter as well as for the long 
term to the Network of European Transmission System Operators. All in all, 
although it is clear that investment into infrastructure is necessary and that the 
construction of energy supply infrastructure requires time, the European 
Commission does not succeed in showing that there is an imminent threat to 
supply security.
VI. ARTICLES 5(2) AND (3) EC: (COMPETENCE) 
SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
Under the assumption that article 95 EC confers on the European Union the 
competence to regulate the European energy networks and, more particular, to 
introduce further unbundling measures, and leaving aside the substantial 
concerns raised with respect to the legitimacy of exercising this competence, the 
exercise of this competence on the basis of Article 95 EC is subject to the 
observance of the principle of subsidiarity and must be proportionate according 
to Articles 5(2) and 5(3) EC, respectively.596
594 See already n. 408 and accompanying text.
595 See the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Commission’s proposals of 
19 September 2007.
596 Tietje in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. II, Vor Article 94–97 EGV, no. 
59, argues with considerable persuasiveness that the principle of subsidiarity according to 
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With regard to whether harmonization is required at all or the question whether 
the Community may actually take action (further unbundling measures) because 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi  ciently achieved by the 
Member States597 and can therefore, by reason of the scale or eff ects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community (principle of 
subsidiarity)598, further unbundling as a harmonization measure fi rst requires 
that national provisions are or are suffi  ciently likely to become an obstacle to the 
functioning of the common market.599
Further, the exercise of the competence to introduce further unbundling must be 
proportionate, i.e. current legislation must be defi cient to such an extent that new 
legislation requiring more intrusive unbundling measures is appropriate, 
necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives outlined in chapter 1 above, 
or in other words, it must actually be necessary to enforce further unbundling 
measures in the Member States because current legislation cannot be tightened 
so as to remedy the shortcomings in individual Member States (by, for instance 
reducing the leeway for the Member States for interpretation).
Th e following paragraphs deal with the issue of the subsidiarity and the 
proportionality of the EU exercising its competence to introduce further 
unbundling as a single question as these two principles cannot always be clearly 
distinguished. Germany may serve as an example in many places600 as it is the 
Article 5(2) EC is not applicable in the context of Articles 94 et seq. EC because a measure of 
approximation of laws can only be enforced by the Community. In this regard, the question of 
whether such a measure is required (see already n. 504) should actually be answered in the 
affi  rmative in order for a competence (here Article 95 EC) to be applicable, see already n. 504. 
On the other hand, as the ECJ has, for instance in British American Tobacco (C-491/01, n. 
504), applied the subsidiarity principle (according to Tietje without any added advantage 
compared to the assessment whether a measure is actually required), this position is followed 
here. As there are strong reasons to believe that the subsidiarity principle is in fact be 
contravened, following the reasonable view of Tietje would thus indeed lead to the conclusion 
that a competence according to Article 95 EC does not exist.
597 It is debatable whether it is necessary that all Member States cannot fulfi ll this requirement or 
whether it must be more than one Member State, see for the fi rst opinion, Streinz in Streinz, 
EUV/EGV, 2003, Article 5 EGV, nos 38, and for the latter opninion, Calliess in Calliess/
Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, Article 5 EGV, no. 45.
598 See ibid.
599 See ECJ, C-376/98, n. 371. Although the Protocol (No 30) on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of the European Community (as 
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam), OJ 1997 C 340/105, 10.11.1997, last amended by 
Article 1(9)(g) of Protocol No. 1 to the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007, OJ 2007 C 306/1, 
17.12.2007, provides for guidelines for how to assess this issue, the ECJ does not assess the 
subsidiarity principle in detail but simply establishes whether the Member States cannot 
achieve the objectives sought on an EC level with their own national measures. See also ECJ, 
C-491/01, n. 504, nos 180 et seq.
600 For a detailed analysis, see Part 2 Chapter 4 infra.
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least “developed” EC Member State in terms of energy network unbundling 
compared to the other two countries at issue here, i.e. energy transmission (and 
distribution) networks have “only” been legally unbundled (inclusive of the 
transmission network property transferred to the corresponding transmission 
system operator).
Th e Commission claims that not only have the current Directives not been 
suffi  ciently implemented into national law but also that further unbundling 
measures would be necessary to achieve the objectives outlined in chapter 1 
above. In April 2006, the Commission sent 28 letters of formal notice commencing 
infringement proceedings for 17 Member States, followed by the adoption of 26 
reasoned opinions addressed to 16 Member States in December 2006.601 Th e 
main thrust of these infringement allegations related to insuffi  cient unbundling 
not guaranteeing the independence of energy network operators (mostly at 
distribution network level), the re-introduction of regulated energy prices 
(preventing entry of new market players)602 and the failure to grant suffi  cient 
powers to the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) as well as the continuance of 
discriminatory access through existing contractual arrangements (long-term 
energy supply contracts).603
Th e Commission in particular identifi ed issues relating to lack of clarifi cation on 
key concepts used in the Gas and Electricity Directives – including for instance 
the classifi cation of TSOs as opposed to DSOs – of key importance with respect 
to unbundling requirements. Similar interpretation gaps were identifi ed with 
respect to the role of the NRAs, in particular the relationship between government 
and the NRAs, as well as the lack of clarifi cation of how regulators should 
reconcile national and European regulatory objectives.604 In addition, there are 
601 In July 2007, the European Commission published its annual report on the application of 
European Union law in the Member States, which included the application of the 2003 
Electricity and Gas Directives, see European Commission, ‘24th annual report from the 
Commission on monitoring the application of Community law’, COM(2007) 398 fi nal, 
Brussels, 17.7.2007. Th is showed that in the majority of Member States, the Directives had not 
been implemented to the satisfaction of the Commission, see Th omas, n. 25.
602 Th e Commission had not received any information on public service obligations, especially as 
regards regulated supply tariff s, see Th omas, n. 25.
603 See Hancher, n. 49, pp. 87 et seq., 97.
604 Th e Commission claims that in order to improve the eff ectiveness of energy regulation, 
regulators must be given the task of promoting the development of the internal market, and 
not just national markets. Th is claim, however, does not necessarily entail more regulation in 
this area in terms of explicitly obliging NRAs to focus more on internal (energy) market 
related issues because this is already enforceable as a primary EC law obligation deriving from 
Article 10 EC, which reads “(1) Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether 
general or particular, to ensure fulfi llment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. Th ey shall facilitate the 
Chapter 3. Unbundling as Part of Sector-Specifi c Regulation 
Intersentia 173
major gaps in terms of issues which are simply not addressed in the current 
legislative framework itself, in particular as regards provision dealing with the 
coordination of regulatory responses to cross-border issues.605
On the other hand, it should be recalled that only three years aft er the 
implementation deadline for the 2003 Energy Directives on 1 July 2004 and just 
aft er the deadline of 1 July 2007 for introducing legal unbundling of the operation 
of distribution networks, the Commission in September 2007 had already come 
up with its proposals for the revision of the 2003 Energy Directives, at a time 
when the current Directives’ eff ectiveness had hardly had the chance to prove its 
value.
It, however, fl ows from the rule of law and the general principle of proportionality, 
more particularly the principles of legal certainty, legal expectations and 
continuity of legislation606, that legislation should be given suffi  cient time to take 
eff ect.607 In this context, it also fl ows from these principles that a regulatory 
regime should only be rectifi ed if new objectives are pursued or new facts occur 
altering the basis for the legislation in place; the objectives underlying the current 
regulatory framework and the proposed legislation have not changed but new 
developments have indeed been occurring608 ever since the sector inquiry was 
closed and the progress report published609, both of which are based on fi gures 
and facts from 2005, and on which the proposals have been based. Th is means 
that the inquiry was mainly concerned with the initial implementation phase of 
the 2003 Energy Directives, whose full implementation was not due before 1 July 
2007. Th us, what matters here and plays a role in the fundamental rights 
assessment, which follows in Part 2, is the necessity of further unbundling or the 
question whether there are milder means to achieve the objectives sought, which 
can only be evaluated aft er the current regulation has been given suffi  cient time 
to take eff ect.
Germany may serve as a typical example for the claim that insuffi  cient time has 
passed and that new developments have occurred, which give fi rst indications as 
to the eff ectiveness of the 2003 Energy Directives. Since the implementation of 
achievement of the Community’s tasks. (2) Th ey shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.”
605 See n. 603, and n. 492 and accompanying text as regards the growing institutionalization of 
regulatory cooperation.
606 According to which the legislature should abstain from taking contradictory measures.
607 See only Büdenbender/Rosin, n. 35, and Pielow/Ehlers, n. 35.
608 Which, however, as will be shown infra do not justify the revision of the current legislation 
towards further unbundling.
609 See NN. 3, 10.
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these Directives in German law610 and the establishing of the German regulatory 
agency Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) in the summer 2005, considerable progress 
and noticeable reductions in network tariff s have been achieved.611 Further, 
incentive regulation of network charges has been introduced from January 
2009612, which is enforced and supervised by the BNetzA.613 Th ese are facts, 
which, it is claimed here, have not been duly taken into account by the 
Commission.
Th e Commission further claims that only ownership unbundling prevents the 
discrimination against third parties requiring network access, and ownership 
unbundling would be particularly advantageous for the connection of new 
generation because further unbundling would create special investment 
incentives for the extension of the electricity networks so that such generation 
plants could be connected.614 Referring again to Germany615, the legislative 
context has however changed signifi cantly since. On 30 June 2007, the so-called 
Kraft NAV entered into force616, a regulation, which strengthens considerably the 
position of new generation. It not only enhances network connection of new 
generation plants (which cannot be refused for reasons of actual or future 
capacity restraints) but also gives them priority network access over existing 
generators. Consequently, this measure promotes investment in new generation.617 
610 With the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaft sgesetz – EnWG) of 7 July 2005, n. 171. See 
in greater Part 2 Chapter 4.
611 See, for instance, the BNetzA’s Monitoring Reports (Monitoringberichte) 2006, 2007 and 2008, 
available at www.bundesnetzagentur, and the evaluation report of the German government 
on the experiences with energy network regulation of 26 September 2007 (“Evaluierungsbericht 
der Bundesregierung an den Deutschen Bundestag und den Bundesrat nach § 112 EnWG über 
die Erfahrungen und Ergebnisse mit der Regulierung durch das Energiewirtschaft sgesetz”), 
BT-Drs. 16/6532.
612 Th e legislative process of which was already underway when the Commission delivered its 
September 2007 proposals.
613 Based on ARegV (Verordnung über die Anreizregulierung der Energieversorgungsnetze 
(Regulation on the incentive regulation of energy supply networks), 26 October 2007, BGBl. I, 
p. 2529), a regulation based on s. 21a EnWG, see in greater detail Part 2 Chapter 4, and which 
exceeds the requirements of the 2003 Energy Directives.
614 Contra with respect to the latter issue, Haucap, n. 38, and accompanying text.
615 Further, not only are the network operators obliged to grant non-discriminatory access in 
Germany, which can be enforced by the regulator, but private network access seekers also have 
a civil law claim enforceable in the courts, independently from actions of the regulator.
616 Regulation concerning network connection of generation plant (Kraft werks-
Netzanschlussverordnung), n. 344, which is based on s. 17 EnWG.
617 See BNetzA, ‘Monitoringbericht 2007’, n. 125, p. 61, which confi rms that the Kraft NAV leads 
to greater planning reliability for generation investment. According to this regulation, the 
connection of new generation can only be refused if the point of connection is technically not 
capable of taking the generated electricity and such capability cannot be achieved by 
reasonably possible measures undertaken by the network operator such as the upgrading of 
the point of connection or the reinforcement of the network up to the next network hub. Th e 
Kraft NAV explicitly stipulates that the network connection cannot be refused by reasoning 
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Legislative measures of Member States such as this also contribute to ensure 
reliable and suffi  ciently sized networks, which network operators are obliged to 
maintain.618 Such privileged treatment of new generation as granted by the 
German Kraft NAV is also conducive to ensuring that the network operators fulfi l 
their legal obligation to maintain reliable and suffi  ciently sized networks and to 
make the investment necessary.619
Th e Commission claims further that only ownership unbundling would 
guarantee the necessary incentives for investment into the energy networks, in 
particular as regards interconnection.620 In terms of interconnection capacity, it 
is the aim of the Commission to have 10% of the installed generation capacity 
available permanently.621 Germany, for instance, exceeds this requirement by 
60%.622
With respect to the reasons why the elimination of the capacity restraints on the 
interconnectors is not progressing as expected, the main reason, again for 
Germany, is the extensive and time consuming planning and permission 
requirements. In other Member States obtaining the plant-specifi c and 
environmental permissions necessary for the reinforcement of interconnectors 
on its own takes considerable time under their various diff erent jurisdictions, a 
that the capacity restraints of the network, which is directly or indirectly connected to the 
point of connection, would or will occur. Th e Kraft NAV thus distinguished between network 
connection and network access. With respect to network access in case of capacity restraints, 
the Kraft NAV gives privileged network access for a period of a maximum of 10 years to new 
generation plants. Generators connected to the network between 1 January 2007 and 
31 December 2012 will be granted such privileged network access. See in greater detail, T 
Höppner, ‘Die Kraft werks-Anschlussverordnung – Eine kritische Würdigung’, (2008) ZNER 
25. See also K-P Schulz, ‘Die Liberalisierung der Märkte für die leitungsgebundene 
Energieversorgung – Bestandsaufnahme und Ausblick’, (2008) et 32, 36.
618 See Articles 9, 14 Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 8, 12 Gas Directive 2003. For Germany, 
for instance, see ss. 12, 14 (for electricity), 15, 16a (for gas) EnWG. See further infra, Part 2 
Chapter 4 on Germany. Th is obligation is enforceable by the German energy regulator BNetzA 
according to Article 65 EnWG.
619 As is the prosecution of discriminatory refusals to connect or grant access by the regulator as 
well as by private action before the courts.
620 See, for instance, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission proposal for an Electricity 
Directive, n. 15, p. 5.
621 See p. 175 of the Commission’s ‘DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry’, 
SEC(2006)1724, Brussels, 10 January 2007, which contains the full technical report and 
includes the Final Report, n. 3, as executive summary.
622 For interconnection investment in Great Britain and the Netherlands, see the corresponding 
chapters in Part 2 infra. Th e importance of investment in interconnector capacity appears 
questionable when considering the statement of the German regulatory agency BNetzA, n. 
125, that the impact of foreign generation capacity on competition is, at least for Germany 
which belongs to one of the largest energy supply markets in the European Union, rather 
small because electricity transport over long distances also entails losses in quantities 
transported.
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fact which is recognized by the Commission.623 Th ese causes cannot, however, be 
remedied by further unbundling measures.
Further, it is another claim of the Commission that ownership unbundling would 
remedy problems of price formation on the electricity wholesale markets. Long-
term supply contracts are seen in this context as one of the main reasons for 
disturbed market mechanisms in price formation and foreclosure of the 
market.624 It is not clear, however, how this would change under ownership 
unbundling, at least for existing contracts. What is more remedying these 
problems seems to be rather a matter for competition law to resolve.625
With respect to the non-discriminatory access to interconnection, it has been 
shown that ever growing regulatory cooperation and coordination via ERGEG 
and Regional Initiatives626, such as the Pentalateral Forum, show tangible results 
such as the growing implementation of the market based congestion method of 
market coupling at the national borders.627 Th is development aims at the 
expansion of coordination involving an ever growing number of transmission 
623 Th e Commission itself has established that network and more particularly interconnector 
investment is oft en subject to time and resource consuming planning and permission 
procedures or meets the resistance of the local population, see Communication of the 
Commission, ‘Priority Interconnection Plan’, COM(2006) 846 fi nal, Brussels, 10.1.2007, pp. 8 
et seq. Th e German regulator BNetzA, however, also acknowledges that energy network and 
interconnector investment is increasing substantially, see Kurth, n. 345, who further confi rms 
that interconnection investment at the German borders is catching up.
624 See Final Report of sector inquiry, n. 3, pp. 6, 8, 11.
625 In this regard, see already chapters 1 and 2 supra.
626 In this context, it is worthwhile to remember that the ERGEG+ model outlined supra (and 
even more ACER, which is now in the process of being established, see also supra) will lead to 
the adoption of binding decisions on individual NRAs and will also develop binding measures 
for the implementation of new technical rules instead of mere guidelines, which is conducive 
to the ever growing regulatory coordination directed at the technical aspects of grid 
coordination as well as harmonization of measures relating to the provision of ancillary 
services, such as balancing and fl exibility services, storage and the like. See further Hancher, 
n. 49, p. 106.
627 See nn. 474 et seq. and accompanying text. Regional cooperation and coordination is also a 
means supportive of greater independence of regulatory agencies. As regards capacity 
hoarding, the current Directives require mechanisms to remedy capacity restraints, see 
Article 23(1)(b) Electricity Directive 2003 and Article 25(1)(b) Gas Directive 2003. In 
Germany, s. 13 NZV Gas (Verordnung über den Zugang zu Gasversorgungsnetzen (Regulation 
concerning the access to gas supply networks), 25 July 2005, BGBl. I, p. 2210), see further infra, 
Part 2 Chapter 4 on Germany, provides for the duty to release unused capacity (so-called use-
it-or-lose-it obligation, see n. 199) and powers to revoke booked but unused capacity. Th us, 
non-discriminatory access can be achieved by regulation. Th e regulatory agency BNetzA 
possesses strong competences in this regard, see Article 65 EnWG.
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system operators (within certain market regions) and is a further signifi cant step 
towards greater transparency in the market.628
Further, as has already been indicated in chapter 2 above, ownership unbundling 
would still require additional regulation to ensure transparency, ease of switching 
energy suppliers and investment. Only if the market structures were balanced, 
would further unbundling possibly make sense and guarantee eff ective 
competition in energy supply. In non-balanced market structures, market 
asymmetries would not be reduced by ownership unbundling, at least not 
initially, nor even signifi cantly remedied.629
Th e preceding elaborations have put the Commission’s reasoning, in particular 
on the basis of its sector inquiry, into perspective.630 Many objectives of the 
current regulatory framework can be achieved at Member States’ level if only 
regulation was given suffi  cient time to show its eff ectiveness.631 As has already 
been said above, suffi  cient time before reviewing current legislation and rendering 
very extensive amendments to current legislation only aft er such legislation has 
had the chance to prove itself belongs to the fundamental principles of the rule of 
law.
For such areas, which might not be considered adequately covered by current 
regulation, tightening legislation would seem to be a proportionate way forward 
to achieve the objectives outlined in Part 1 Chapter 1, no matter which unbundling 
regime is in place. Likely candidates are, for instance, the areas of network 
investment and wholesale market transparency632, as would be the passing of 
supportive legislation for intensifying regional cooperation and coordination of 
NRAs and TSOs633, a mode of governance which has proved its eff ectiveness.
628 As regards the possible introduction of further measures to enhance market transparency and 
non-discriminatory access to information, see Büdenbender/Rosin, n. 35, pp. 28–9.
629 Th is also seems to be the view of the German regulator BNetzA, see Schulz, n. 617, p. 38.
630 See in particular nos 51 et seq. of the Final Report, n. 3.
631 Experiences such as in the Netherlands suggest, for instance, that with adequate regulation, it 
is possible within the current European regulatory framework to eff ectively uncover and even 
stop cross-subsidization of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings and in particular 
between the network operations and the supply businesses, see n. 156, which is one of the 
declared goals of EC energy sector regulation, see chapter 1 supra and Article 19(3), (4) and 
Article 23(1)(e) Electricity Directive 2003, Article 17(3), (4) and Article 25(1)(e) Gas Directive 
2003.
632 As regards the fi rst, for instance the amendment of Regulation 1228/2003, n. 219, might be 
considered to be prescribing the reinvestment of profi ts from interconnector congestion 
charges into interconnectors only. As regards the latter, see n. 628.
633 In this regard see the draft  Energy Directives, n. 33, 372. Whereas further unbundling 
measures would require implementation fi rst followed by a lengthy process of restructuring of 
the European energy industry, the establishment of regional markets and institutions is 
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Against the background of rapid progress of regulation by cooperation and 
coordination and its institutionalization and the proliferation of regional market 
coupling in the framework of existing comprehensive sector-specifi c regulation634, 
the exercise of the competence to introduce further unbundling measures such 
as ownership unbundling or “deep” ISOs appears to be in breach of the principles 
of subsidiarity and (competence) proportionality.
Th ese conclusions also receive some support from economists. Th e social cost 
and benefi t analysis of Brunekreeft  discussed in chapter 2 above indicates that 
further unbundling measures would not be proportionate to the rather marginal 
gain achieved. Rather, suffi  cient generation capacity matters635, which is 
something falling into the sole remit of the Member States.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Th is chapter analyses further unbundling measures in the context of sector-
specifi c regulation, more specifi cally with respect to the question whether further 
unbundling can actually be enforced on the basis of Article 95 EC.
As a result of what has been established in chapter 2, in particular in the context 
of the proportionality of a potential competition law based structural remedy of 
divestiture of energy supply networks, the provision of suffi  cient generation 
capacity in the course of safeguarding electricity supply security appears to 
render the legislative separation of energy transmission networks less eff ective 
compared to TPA imposed by sector-specifi c regulation combined with 
competition law enforcement in individual cases. Gas transmission network 
ownership unbundling even seems to confl ict with the objective to safeguard gas 
supply security.
It has further been established that the European energy supply industry is 
already comprehensively regulated albeit with defi ciencies in the area of cross-
border competencies of NRAs. In this context, it is a fact that the comprehensive 
regulation in place on a European level lacks coherent implementation in the 
already underway and can be regarded as a signifi cant intermediate step towards a truly 
internal market for energy supply, which it is one of the predominant objectives of the 
European Commission to achieve.
634 Although with gaps in the area of cross-border competencies of NRAs, which regulation by 
cooperation and coordination is supposed overcome.
635 Th is can also be inferred from the 2007 sector monitoring report of the German regulatory 
agency BNetzA, n. 125, p. 61.
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Member States due to too great a leeway for interpretation granted by such 
regulation.
An in-depth analysis of Article 295 EC shows that for reasons of constitutional 
law the European Union must not exercise its competence to introduce further 
unbundling measures, at least not when it comes to complete ownership 
unbundling. With respect to the imposition of independent system operators, it 
has also been substantiated that only such models should be allowed to be 
introduced, which do not confer investment decision powers on the independent 
system operator alone thereby stripping the network owners off  any means to 
exercise infl uence.
Unlike Article 175 EC, which is concerned with environmental policy, the future 
Article 194 TFEU to be introduced once the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force 
specifi es vertical integration as being in the sole remit of the Member States when 
measures in the area of energy policy are undertaken.
Th e introduction of further unbundling would also be in breach of Article 56 EC, 
the fundamental freedom of the free movement of capital. It would not fall within 
the rules which may allow a restriction (if proportionate) of this freedom by 
reasons referred to in Article 58(1) EC or to fulfi l an overriding requirement of 
the general interest.
Further, as has just been explained in the previous section, the principle of 
subsidiarity would not be suffi  ciently observed if further unbundling was 
introduced at this point in time; the proportionality of exercising the competence 
for further unbundling measures is also questionable.
What is required though is a more stringent implementation of the current 
regulatory framework and amendments to it so as to, for instance, cut down on 
the interpretation leeway left  to the Member States636 and safeguard suffi  cient 
investment in energy network interconnection. It has been shown that albeit only 
in force for a short while, legal and operational unbundling has proved in many 
respects that it can live up to the expectations placed upon it by current legislation 
if only properly implemented.637 Th e developments in regulatory coordination 
636 With respect to unbundling, ERGEG notes that mainly functional unbundling (involvement 
of the management of the network business in vertically integrated competitive activities and 
vice versa) was not suffi  ciently eff ective because the relevant unbundling provisions of 
Article 15 Electricity Directive 2003 and Article 13 Gas Directive 2003 were not suffi  ciently 
clear. See ERGEG, n. 479.
637 As has been confi rmed by the German regulator BNetzA in its 2008 Monitoringbericht, n. 
329, p. 224, which reports a complaint received about an abuse, which a vertically integrated 
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and TSO and NRA cooperation have further shown that non-discriminatory and 
transparent interconnection (congestion) management can be achieved and 
supported by the unbundling regime in place without further unbundling being 
necessary.
generation undertaking raised against its transportation network sister undertaking. Th is 
shows that the independence of vertically integrated network undertakings can indeed be 




In Part 1, the rationale behind the economic regulation of EC energy supply 
networks has been outlined in chapter 1, followed by an analysis of the fi rst leg of 
economic regulation in chapter 2, namely the EC competition law enforcement 
in the area of the operation of vertically integrated energy network operation 
with particular focus on the possibility of ordering divestiture of energy supply 
networks in individual cases; the core issue here was the assessment of the 
economic proportionality of such a measure, which is similarly applicable in Part 
2 below. Part 1 Chapter 3 has dealt with the question of the competence for the 
second leg of economic regulation of EC energy supply networks, i.e. sector-
specifi c regulation with an emphasis placed on unbundling of such infrastructures. 
Part 2 of this work now focuses on the fundamental rights issues, which need to 
be considered when introducing further unbundling measures in the way the 
Commission planned to do it in September 2007. Chapters 4–6 concentrate on 
the Member States chosen for this analysis, i.e. Germany, the United Kingdom 
(more particularly Great Britain) and the Netherlands, followed by fundamental 






Th is chapter deals with the constitutional issues arising in Germany should more 
intrusive forms of unbundling be introduced. More specifi cally, the proposals of 
the European Commission as outlined in the Introduction will be scrutinized as 
regards their compatibility with German constitutional law.
Section II outlines the evolution and current structure of network-bound energy 
supply in Germany and the role German municipalities have been playing all 
throughout this development. Here, the current regulatory and competition law 
environment which the German energy supply industry is facing, is outlined. 
Further, following on from the explanations of diff erent forms of unbundling in 
the Introduction, these are discussed in more detail in this section because 
compared to the other two EC Member States at issue here, energy transmission 
in Germany is “only” legally unbundled whereas the networks in Great Britain 
and the Netherlands are further unbundled. Th ese additional details are also 
important in order to better understand the brief discussion of Eff ective and 
Effi  cient Unbundling (the so-called “Th ird Way”, see Introduction) towards the 
end of this chapter.
Section III illustrates the constitutional setting relevant to this work, in particular 
the residual state responsibility for energy supply, the constitutional background 
of German municipalities and the role of the BVerfG.
Also included here is a brief discussion of the relationship between EC and 
national law according to German constitutional law and its interpretation by the 
BVerfG with a focus on the Solange638 doctrine and its ruling in re Maastricht.639 
In particular, the circumstances, under which German constitutional law is 
638 BVerfGE 37, 271 et seq. and BVerfGE 73, 339 et seq., concerning the level of human rights 
protection in the EU.
639 BVerfGE 89, 155 et seq., concerning matters of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (competence to defi ne 
competences), and, more generally, the Kooperationsvorbehalt (reservation of cooperation) of 
the BVerfG.
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applicable to German legislation implementing EC Directives will be set out 
here.
Other issues include the position of the ECHR in German law and the judicial 
review of the German legislature’s margin of appreciation and the proportionality 
test in Germany.
Section IV deals with the fundamental rights issues arising in the context of 
further unbundling legislation. Although in the context given, the right to 
property as set out in Article 14 GG is by far the most important fundamental 
right, other fundamental rights of the German Grundgesetz relevant here will 
also be discussed briefl y. Of particular importance here will be the question of 
whether public and public-private energy supply undertakings (wholly of partly 
owned by public law bodies such as municipalities)640 should be eligible for 
fundamental rights protection, in particular when subjected to legislation 
imposing further energy supply network unbundling.
Section V will then apply the framework set in section IV to further unbundling 
measures. Slightly deviating from the analysis in other parts of this work, in 
particular as regards the proportionality of further unbundling legislation, 
section V will explore under which circumstances the introduction of an 
Independent System Operator (ISO) model would be in compliance with German 
constitutional law.
Section VI will briefl y refer to Article 56 EC, which would become applicable in 
the unlikely case that Germany introduced stricter unbundling rules 
unilaterally.
Section VII summarizes the fi ndings of this chapter and concludes.
II. NETWORK-BOUND ENERGY SUPPLY
1. EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE
Network-bound energy (electricity and gas) supply was initially provided by 
private rather than state undertakings.641 With the development of street lighting 
640 For a defi nition in the context of the European Union, see Part 2 Chapter 7 on the European 
Union.
641 For a detailed treatise on the history of the German energy industry, see G Hermes, Staatliche 
Infrastrukturverantwortung, 1998, § 13, and J-C Pielow, Grundstrukturen öff entlicher 
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and tram systems, larger cities in particular became increasingly involved in the 
energy sector through their own city works (kommunale Versorgungsunternehmen, 
oft en also called “Stadtwerke”). In rural areas, however, municipalities continued 
to depend on co-operation with private undertakings because of the considerable 
fi nancial resources required to establish a suitable supply system. Th us, not only 
municipalities but also private and private-public partnerships performed the 
task of supplying energy.642 Whilst large supra-regional energy supply 
undertakings evolved, the former Deutsches Reich and the German Länder also 
began to enter the energy market. As a consequence of the increasingly commercial 
operation of large power plants, a concentration and monopolization process 
took place, which led to the enactment of sector-specifi c legislation in 1935643, 
leaving, however, the existing industry structure intact.
Th e German electricity supply sector traditionally consists of three levels.644 Th e 
fi rst level accommodates so-called Verbundunternehmen, which develop, 
maintain, and (inter-) connect the supra-regional high-tension grids and operate 
the central power plants.645 Th ere are four such compound utilities, which are 
vertically integrated.646 Th e second level comprises local utilities and end 
consumers (in terms of gas supplied for electricity generation purposes) 
predominantly in rural areas (Regionalversorger). Th e third level consists of more 
Versorgung, 2001, pp. 573 et seq. As regards a detailed account of energy supply in Germany 
and its regulation, see J-C Pielow, H-M Koopmann, E Ehlers, ‘Energy Law in Germany’, in M 
Roggenkamp, C Redgwell et al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe, OUP, 2nd ed., 2007, chapter 9.
642 An early example for private-public partnerships in the energy sector is the incorporation of 
Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke AG (RWE) by the city of Essen and several private 
undertakings such as the industrialist Hugo Stinnes in 1898.
643 Gesetz zur Förderung der Energiewirtschaft  (Act for the Promotion of the Energy Industry – 
EnWG 1935) of 13 December 1935, RGBl I, p. 1451.
644 See also s. 3 no. 18 EnWG.
645 Such companies operate so-called Verbundnetze, which are a number of electricity transmission 
and distribution networks connected with each other by one or several connection cables, or a 
number of interconnected gas supply networks.
646 As a result of the ongoing energy market liberalization, the German energy sector has become 
increasingly concentrated throughout the whole energy supply chain resulting in four energy 
utility groups: E.ON AG, EnBW AG, RWE AG and Vattenfall Europe AG, each with separate 
subsidiaries for electricity generation (e.g. RWE Power AG), network operation (e.g. RWE 
Energy AG) and trade (e.g. RWE Trading GmbH), in accordance with the unbundling 
requirements of the EnWG. For a detailed account of the shareholder structure of these 
undertakings and their wide-spread (cross-)shareholdings throughout the German energy 
sector, see Monopolkommission, ‘Strom und Gas 2007: Wettbewerbsdefi zite und zögerliche 
Regulierung’, Sondergutachten 49, 2007, Anhang (Annex). See also, from an economist’s point 
of view, G Brunekreeft , D Bauknecht, ‘Distributed Generation and the Regulation of Electricity 
Networks’, in F Sioshansi (ed.), Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, 
Performance, 2008, chapter 13.
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than 850 local utilities647, which are primarily concerned with supplying 
electricity within their respective municipalities. Additionally, independent 
electricity generation is growing, in particular distributed generation (DG) from 
renewable energy resources (RES).648
Th e organization of network-bound gas supply basically follows the same 
tripartite patterns as the electricity sector with Verbundunternehmen (some of 
which also import gas)649, regional utilities and local suppliers (more than 
720).650
At present, at transmission network (Verbundunternehmen) level, only the 
shareholdings in the listed public limited company E.On AG (approx. equivalent 
of an English plc) are predominantly private with a wide shareholder basis 
whereas the State and municipalities own signifi cant shareholdings in the other 
transmission network companies:
Vattenfall Europea AG is entirely owned by Vattenfall AB, which itself is 
completely owned by the Swedish State.651 Municipal shareholders of RWE, on 
the other hand, hold approx. 27% of its shares, which confers upon them a 
blocking minority. Th e communal/municipal grouping of “Oberschwäbische 
Elektrizitätswerke” and EDF, the French state owned vertically integrated 
electricity company, both hold an equal proportion of shares (45,01%) in 
EnBW.652
2. REGULATION
Th e above mentioned sector-specifi c legislation remained substantially 
unchanged until the liberalization of the German energy sector in 1998.653 In 
647 For exact fi gures, consult the lists of electricity and gas network operators, which are 
periodically updated by the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) and available on its website www.
bundesnetzagentur.de.
648 For a defi tion of distributed generation, see n. 8. See also Brunekreeft /Ehlers, n. 38.
649 In particular E.ON Ruhrgas AG; other gas importers are Th yssengas GmbH, Verbundnetz Gas 
AG and Wintershall Gas GmbH (WINGAS).
650 See n. 647. See also Monopolkommission, n. 646. Many of the network operators operate both 
electricity and gas networks.
651 As they (i.e. EDF also, see infra) are controlled by foreign public entities, which naturally do 
not have any sovereign powers in Germany, they are not regarded as German public 
shareholders, which are bound to obey fundamental rights as German public entities are, see 
infra.
652 For more details, see Monopolkommission, n. 646, no. 611 and Anhang (Annex).
653 With the Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaft sgesetz (Energy 
Industry Act) – EnWG 1998) of 24 April 1998, BGBl I, p. 730. For details of the 1998 amendments 
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this context, however, the enactment of the Law against competition restraints 
in 1957 deserves mention.654 In order to preserve the traditional ‘area monopolies’ 
(Gebietsmonopole), monopoly contracts between the energy supply companies 
(Demarkationsverträge), as well as contracts between such companies and the 
municipalities stipulating access rights to the public (municipal) highways 
(Konzessionsverträge), were exempted from the application of competition law 
until 1998.655
On 13 July 2005, the new Energy Industry Act (EnWG) entered into force656, 
implementing the 2003 Electricity and Gas Directives and completely revising 
the energy industry legislation existing at the time in Germany.657 Th e main 
challenges for the German legislator were the transformation from negotiated to 
regulated network access658 as well as the implementation of the stricter 
unbundling requirements, in particular legal and operational unbundling. As 
regards the degree of energy market opening, the German energy market already 
formally complied with the requirements of the 1996 and 1998 Electricity and 
Gas Directives, since 1998 and 2003, respectively.
and the old law more generally, see J-C Pielow, H-M Koopmann, ‘Energy Law in Germany’, in 
M Roggenkamp, A Rønne et al. (eds), Energy Law in Europe, OUP, 2001, chapter 8, nos 8.101 et 
seq.
654 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Law against competition restraints) of 27 July 
1957, BGBl I, p. 1081.
655 See n. 139.
656 N. 171. For an introduction to the new legal environment in Germany, see E Ehlers, ‘Th e New 
German Energy Industry Act: Do Good Th ings Come to Th ose Who Wait?’, (2004/2005) 6 
Utilities Law Review 263; G Kühne, C Brodowski, ‘Das neue Energiewirtschaft srecht nach der 
Reform 2005’, (2005) NVwZ 849; C Koenig, J Kühling, W Rasbach, Energierecht, 2006, pp. 35 
et seq. See also S Klauer, ‘Th e new German energy regulator – context and structure’, in M 
Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Report II, 2005, chapter 6, p. 83; K 
Pritzsche, S Klauer, ‘Germany’, in P Cameron, (ed.), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation, 
OUP, 2005, chapter 8, p. 145. G Brunekreeft , D Bauknecht, ‘Energy Policy and Investment in 
the German Power Market’, in F Sioshansi, W Pfaff enberger (eds), International experience in 
restructured electricity markets: What works, what does not and why?, 2006, chapter 8, provide 
an in-depth analysis of the new EnWG from an economist’s point of view and a very instructive 
overview of the structure of the German energy sector.
657 On the old law, see Pielow/Koopmann, n. 653.
658 In 2003, the Federal Ministry for Economic Aff airs and Employment already recognized 
that this transformation was necessary, see ‘Bericht über die energiewirtschaft lichen 
und wettbewerblichen Wirkungen der Verbändevereinbarungen (Monitoring Bericht)’ of 
31 August 2003. For the same point, see also the German Monopolkommission in its 14th 
Hauptgutachten (main report) 2000/2001 on ‘Netzwettbewerb durch Regulierung’. For a very 
instructive comment on the so-called self-regulatory industry association agreements 
(Verbändevereinbarungen), which played an important role under the old regulatory 
environment in Germany, see Klauer, n. 656, p. 85. See also Brunekreeft  and Bauknecht, n. 656, 
who point out that refraining from regulating network access ex ante was unsatisfactory, and 
that from an economist’s point of view, network regulation should be ‘expected to promote 
competition and thereby stimulate new investment by newcomers’.
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Th e new EnWG did not pass parliament until more than a year aft er the original 
implementation date of 1 July 2004. Th e delay was mainly due to intensive 
political discussions. Until the very end, the following issues were subject of 
vigorous discussion: the content and degree of ex ante access regulation, the 
peculiarities of access to the gas networks and the allocation of regulatory 
competences between the federal government and the Länder.
Th e new law contains a broad range of authorizations for the federal government 
to enact statutory instruments (Rechtsverordnungen or Regulations), which are, 
inter alia, concerned with network access and access charges659, general rules for 
distribution network connection and rules for universal supply and supply of last 
resort660, and lately also the Regulation providing for the introduction of 
incentive regulation from the beginning of 2009 (ARegV)661, and a Regulation 
promoting network connection and access of generation capacity (Kraft NAV)662, 
which has already been dealt with in Part 1 Chapter 2.
Th e German legislator has enacted a system of ex ante regulation of network 
charges, followed by incentive-based regulation as of 1 January 2009. 
Furthermore, issues of network access and charges are dealt with by regulatory 
authorities which have been operational since July 2005. Th ese are the Federal 
Networks Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications and Railways 
(Bundesnetzagentur – BNetzA)663 and the regulatory agencies of the German 
Länder. Only networks crossing the territory of more than one German state, 
659 Verordnung über den Zugang zu Elektrizitätsversorgungsnetzen (Regulation concerning the 
access to electricity supply networks – NZV Strom), 25 July 2005, BGBl. I, p. 2243; NZV Gas, 
n. 627; Verordnung über die Entgelte für den Zugang zu Elektrizitätsversorgungsnetzen 
(Regulation concerning the charges for access to electricity supply networks – NEV Strom), 
25 July 2005, BGBl. I, p. 2225; Verordnung über die Entgelte für den Zugang zu 
Gasversorgungsnetzen (Regulation concerning the charges for access to gas supply networks 
– NEV Gas), 25 July 2005, BGBl. I, p. 2197.
660 Verordnungen zum Erlaß von Regelungen des Netzanschlusses von Letztverbrauchern in 
Niederspannung und Niederdruck (Regulations regarding the enactment of rules for the 
connection of end consumers to low voltage electricity and low pressure gas networks), 
1 November 2006, BGBl. I, p. 2477; Verordnung zum Erlaß von Regelungen für die 
Grundversorgung von Haushaltskunden und die Ersatzversorgung im Energiebereich 
(Regulation regarding the enactment of rules concerning universal supply of household 
customers and concerning supply of last resort in the energy sector), 1 November 2006, BGBl. 
I, p. 2391.
661 N. 613.
662 NN. 344, 615 (and accompanying text).
663 Previously Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP). As regards the 
controversy from a constitutional point of view over the institutional setting in particular 
whether the BNetzA should become a part of the Federal Competition Authority 
(Bundeskartellamt), a self standing federal authority or a private law regulatory body, see P 
Tettinger, J-C Pielow, ‘Zum neuen Regulator für den Netzzugang in der Energiewirtschaft  aus 
Sicht des öff entlichen Rechts’, (2003) Recht der Energiewirtschaft  (RdE) 289, and F Säcker, 
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and which belong to vertically integrated energy undertakings with more than 
100,000 connected customers, are regulated by the BNetzA.664
Th e Act emphasizes that network-bound energy supply must be secure, 
inexpensive, environmentally and consumer friendly, and effi  cient.665 In addition, 
energy industry regulation aims to promote genuine competition and to 
safeguard the long-term reliable operation of energy supply networks. Th is puts 
the regulatory agencies under considerable pressure, as they have to prioritize 
potentially confl icting goals: regulation and effi  ciency gains are not absolute but 
have to be put in perspective by quality considerations when it comes to network 
stability.
As regards control of market entry, only fi rst time energy supply network 
operations require authorization. A new energy supply to household customers 
must merely be notifi ed in order to give the competent regulatory authority the 
opportunity to prohibit or restrict such activity.666 Th e supply of additional 
customers and end consumers does not require any permissions or notifi cations.
For electricity networks of 110 kV or higher and gas supply pipelines of 300 
millimetre diameter or more, the EnWG requires the offi  cial approval of the 
corresponding project plan resulting from a public law planning procedure 
(Planfeststellung).667 Such a Planfeststellungsverfahren is only necessary if an 
environmental impact assessment has to take place; otherwise, a simplifi ed public 
law procedure leading to the approval of a plan (Plangenehmigungverfahren) 
suffi  ces.668 Under certain conditions, property can be expropriated for network 
construction purposes.669
‘Ex-Ante-Methodenregulierung und Ex-Post-Beschwerderecht’, (2003) Recht der 
Energiewirtschaft  (RdE) 300.
664 S. 54(2) EnWG.
665 S. 1 EnWG.
666 SS. 4 and 5 EnWG. Th e authorization of electricity generation and gas storage facilities as well 
as LNG terminals is not covered by the EnWG. Such authorizations are dealt with by the 
Bundes-Immissionschutzgesetz (Federal Immission Protection Act – BImSchG) of 15 March 
1974, revised version (Neufassung) published on 15 July 1985, BGBl. I, p. 3830, as amended, or 
by the Atomgesetz (Atomic Energy Act – AtG) of 23 December 1959, revised version 
(Neufassung) published on 26 September 2002, BGBl. I, p. 1565, as amended.
667 A plan approval is the conclusion of a formal administrative procedure. It is binding on public 
institutions and, at the same time, replaces various other administrative decisions and acts, 
such as permissions and licences. Without such a procedure, many larger projects, such as 
railway, electricity, gas and other networks, would have to undergo a number of administrative 
procedures, such that effi  cient and consistent planning would become extremely time-
consuming and almost impossible.
668 See for further details, ss. 43 et seq. EnWG.
669 SS. 45 and 45a EnWG.
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Unbundling
Unbundling of the energy sector is certainly among the most predominant and 
progressive features of recent German energy supply legislation.670
All unbundling measures apply to vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings671, which transmit gas through high-pressure pipeline networks or 
electricity through high-voltage or extra-high-voltage grids, and at the same time 
either supply energy in terms of retail to (end) customers and/or generate/produce 
electricity/gas.672
Distribution network operators, which are part of vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings, were given until 1 July 2007 to implement legal 
unbundling.673 A de minimis clause has been applied to smaller distribution 
network operators, which means that operators with less than 100,000 connected 
customers are permanently exempted from legal and operational unbundling.674 
Generally, the operators of gas storage facilities and liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) 
facilities do not have to comply with the legal and operational unbundling 
requirements.675 However, no matter whether operators are transmission, 
distribution, storage or LNG operators and whether they are vertically integrated 
670 See in greater detail B Malmendier, J Schendel, ‘Unbundling Germany’s Energy Networks’, 
(2006) JENRL 362; N Tödtmann, U Setz, ‘Umsetzung der Entfl echtung im deutschen 
Energiewirtschaft srecht (Überblick)’, in J Baur, K Pritzsche, S Simon (eds), Unbundling in der 
Energiewirtschaft , 2006, chapter 3. As regards company law related problems occurring as 
result of the current implementation of unbundling in Germany, see T Volz, Das Unbundling 
in der britischen und deutschen Energiewirtschaft , 2006, pp. 166 et seq.
671 SS. 3(38) EnWG implementing Articles 2(21) and 2(20) Electricity and Gas Directives 2003 
respectively, in conjunction with Article 3(1) and (2) Merger Regulation. See also the 
Commission’s Unbundling Note, n. 448 and accompanying text.
672 SS. 3(19) and (32), 6–10 EnWG implementing Articles 2(3), 10, 17 Electricity Directive 2003, 
Articles 2(3), 9 and 15 Gas Directive 2003. Upstream gas pipelines, i.e. pipelines from gas 
production sites to terminals connecting these sites to the gas transmission network do not fall 
under these rules, see ss. 3(16), (19), (20) and (39) EnWG based on Article 2(2), (3) Gas Directive 
2003.
673 S. 7(3) EnWG based on Articles 15 and 30(2) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 13 and 33(2) 
Gas Directive 2003.
674 SS. 7(2), 8(6) EnWG implementing Articles 15(2) and 13(2) Electricity and Gas Directives 2003, 
respectively. Th e 2003 Energy Directives use the term ‘functional’ unbundling. For further 
details on the term ‘connected customers’ and the repercussions the group structure, in which 
the distribution network operator is embedded, has in this respect, see Tödtmann/Setz, n. 670, 
p. 68.
675 S. 6(1) last sentence EnWG clarifying Articles 7(1) and 9 Gas Directives 2003.
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or not, they all have to comply with the prescribed accounts and informational 
unbundling provisions.676
Th e network owner is responsible for appointing the network operator(s) carrying 
out the transmission or distribution of energy and maintaining and developing/
extending the network(s) they operate.677 As the network operator manages the 
network, it must have unlimited control of all aspects of network operation. More 
specifi cally, since the network operator is entitled to use the network on its own 
account, it must also bear the operational costs and responsibilities.678
Th e German legislator largely reproduced the relevant and rather broadly draft ed 
sections of the 2003 Energy Directives679 when formulating the German 
unbundling requirements. Th ere are, thus, hardly any clear operational directions 
to be found on unbundling in the EnWG, which leaves it to the courts, the 
BNetzA and state regulators to provide a precise interpretation.680
As has already been explained, legal unbundling is the separation into legally 
separate companies of energy production and supply on the one hand, and the 
operation of electricity and/or gas transmission and/or distribution on the 
other.681 Th e network operating company and the network as such, in one 
company or separate, may both be owned by an energy supply company but not 
vice versa: a network operator is not allowed to pursue energy production and 
supply within the same company nor to have an interest such as shares in an 
676 SS. 9 and 10 EnWG implementing Articles 12, 16 and 19 Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 10, 
14 and 17 Gas Directive 2003.
677 SS. 3(5)-(7) and (10), 11–16a EnWG implementing Articles 8, 9, 13, 14 Electricity Directives 
2003, Articles 7, 8, 11, 12 Gas Directive 2003.
678 See in this respect also C Koenig, A Haratsch, W Rasbach, ‘Neues aus Brüssel zum Unbundling: 
“Interpreting Note” zu den Beschleunigungsrichtlinien für Strom und Gas’, (2004) ZNER 10, 13; 
Säcker and Boesche in Säcker, Berliner Kommentar zum Energierecht, 2004, § 6 EnWG, p. 829, 
no. 44.
679 Th e (non-binding) Commission’s Unbundling Note referred to in n. 448 can assist in the 
interpretation of the Directives’ unbundling provisions. With regard to the scope of the 
Directives’ unbundling provisions from a German law point of view, see Koenig/Haratsch/
Rasbach, n. 678, p. 11.
680 Th e Gemeinsame Auslegungsgrundsätze der Regulierungsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder 
zu den Entfl echtungsbestimmungen in §§ 6–10 EnWG of 01.03.2006 (Joint interpretative 
guidelines of the federal and state regulatory agencies on the unbundling provisions in ss 6–10 
EnWG) of 01.03.2006 (“Joint Guidelines”) serve as interpretative guidelines, which are not 
legally binding.
681 SS. 6(1) and 7(1) EnWG based on Articles 10(1), 15(1), 17 Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 
9(1), 13(1), 15 Gas Directive 2003. As regards the tax privileges aff orded to transactions in the 
context of legal and operational unbundling, see ss. 6(2), (3) and (4) EnWG. See also Tödtmann/
Setz, n. 670, p. 72, no. 73; Pritzsche/Klauer, n. 656, p. 149, no. 8.16.
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energy production or supply company.682 Under German law, ownership of the 
network assets can be but does not have to be transferred.683
Th at legal unbundling only concerns the separation of energy network operation 
from energy production and supply is particularly relevant to the German energy 
supply industry. Th is is because commercial interests in other areas do not 
constitute a vertically but a horizontally integrated undertaking.684 Th us, network 
operators are allowed to supply commodities or operate networks, which are not 
related to energy, such as water. Th is is of particular importance to municipalities, 
which oft en operate several supply services, such as energy distribution and 
supply, water distribution and other supply, waste disposal and (local) public 
transport, and activities requiring continuous fi nancial support, such as 
municipal swimming pools, museums and theatres, in combination (so-called 
Querverbund).685 As long as the operation of the energy networks remains 
independent, a confl ict with the unbundling provisions does not arise. What is 
682 See Unbundling Note, n. 448, pp. 4, 8, 9. Th e reason is that the management of the network 
operator would retain an incentive for discriminating in favour of its subsidiary. Th e 
operational unbundling provisions (see in more detail infra), however, hinder the management 
of the network operator from directly or indirectly participating in the day-to-day operations 
of energy production or supply, s. 8(2) 1st sentence EnWG based on Articles 10(2)(a), 15(2)(a), 
17(a) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 9(2)(a), 13(2)(a), 15(a) Gas Directive 2003. Further, the 
management of the network operator has to be in a position to act independently of other 
business interests, s. 8(3) EnWG based on Articles 10(2)(b), 15(2)(b), 17(b) Electricity Directive 
2003, Articles 9(2)(b), 13(2)(b), 15(b) Gas Directive 2003. See also F Säcker, n. 30, and ‘Das neue 
“institutionelle Design” des Independent System Operator’, (2007) 11 et 86, and Der 
Independent System Operator – Ein neues institutionelles Design für Netzbetreiber?, 2007, 
setting out the (mainly company law related) amendments, which would have to be made to 
German law, exceeding the requirements of the 2003 Energy Directives, in order to optimize 
the independence of system operation in Germany within the current legislative framework.
683 Th is is refl ected in the legislative motives (see ‘Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf 
eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaft srechts’ of 14 October 2004, 
BT-Drs. 15/3917, p. 51, right column), which serve as an important interpretative tool for the 
EnWG and state that ‘the unbundling of ownership, i.e. the sale of the network operations 
division, and also the transfer of ownership of network assets is not mandated.’ Th us, shares in 
a network operator do not also have to be disposed of. Recitals 8 and 10 Electricity and Gas 
Directives 2003, respectively, confi rm that legal separation does not imply a change of 
ownership of assets. According to Articles 10(1) last sentence, 15(1) last sentence, 17(1) last 
sentence Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 9(1) last sentence, 13(1) last sentence, 15(1) last 
sentence Gas Directive 2003, nothing in the 2003 Energy Directives shall create an obligation 
to separate the ownership of assets of the network operator from the vertically integrated 
undertaking which, for the four electricity transmission system operators vertically integrated 
into E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall has, however, happened.
684 See Article 2(23) Electricity Directive 2003, Article 2(21) Gas Directive 2003.
685 For the German concept of Daseinsvorsorge and its EC law equivalent of services of general 




not allowed, however, is the combination within one legal entity of, say, electricity 
networks operation and gas supply.686
As has already been explained, legal unbundling is merely the formal requirement 
to operate the network separately from the remaining vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking. Operational (or management or functional) unbundling, 
supplements legal unbundling. As the main intention of operational unbundling 
is to safeguard the independence of the network operator from other units of the 
vertically integrated undertaking687, the network operator must be equipped 
with suffi  cient human, physical and fi nancial resources and means to operate the 
network independently.688 Management decisions with regard to the operation 
of the energy networks must not be infl uenced by the holding company.689 
Operational unbundling, however, is not supposed to interfere with the network 
operator shareholders’ reasonable economic interest690, i.e. the network operator’s 
competences should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination 
mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of 
the parent company in respect of return on assets in a subsidiary are protected.691 
Consequently, shareholders are left  with a number of strategic and business 
related decisions as long as these do not deprive the network operator of its assets, 
its control over the networks or the necessary fi nancial means.692 Typical 
ownership related decisions such as the disposal of shares, the payment of 
dividends and other profi t related decisions are thus still the shareholders’ remit. 
Shareholders may also set global limits on the level of indebtedness or approve an 
annual fi nancial plan as well as individual construction projects exceeding the 
686 See BT-Drs. 15/3917, n. 683, p. 51; Unbundling Note, n. 448, pp. 6, 10. However, the joint 
operation of gas and electricity networks is possible.
687 S. 8(4) EnWG implementing Articles 10(2)(c), 15(2)(c), 17(c) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 
9(2)(c), 13(2)(c), 15(c) Gas Directive 2003. See also Articles 10(2) (transmission) and 15(2) 
(distribution) Electricity Directive, Articles 9(2) (transmission) and 13(2) (distribution) Gas 
Directive.
688 Unbundling Note, n. 448, p. 11.
689 Services such as accounting, fi nances, human resources and legal may be shared amongst the 
divisions of the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking if the sharing does not impair 
the network operator’s independence, ibid., 9; BT-Drs. 15/3917, n. 683, pp. 53–4. Prices for such 
services have to be reasonable and at arm’s length, and be detailed in service agreements in 
order to avoid potential cross-subsidization, see F Säcker, ‘Entfl echtung von Netzgeschäft  und 
Vertrieb bei den Energieversorgungsunternehmen: Gesellschaft srechtliche Möglichkeiten zur 
Umsetzung des sog. Legal Unbundling’, (2004) DB 691, 695, and ‘Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des 
Unbundling in der Energiewirtschaft ’, (2005) RdE 85, 92.
690 BT-Drs. 15/3917, n. 683, p. 51.
691 Obviously a scenario of combined legal and operational unbundling. See in this respect Säcker, 
n. 682, who explains that further reaching restrictions of the parent company’s rights would 
violate current German company law (and its fundamental rights protected under the German 
Constitution).
692 SS. 8(4) 3rd sentence, 11–16a EnWG.
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terms of the fi nancial plan. Such general strategic competences allow the 
shareholders to ensure that the network operation subsidiary delivers a suffi  cient 
return on investment.693 Th erefore, there is considerable scope for control of the 
network operator by its parent. On the other hand, instructions with respect to 
day-to-day operations, maintenance or individual network construction or 
upgrading projects, which do not exceed the terms of the approved fi nancial plan, 
are prohibited (fi nancial independence).694 It will thus be necessary to demarcate 
strategic from operational directions in each individual case. Th e objective will 
always be to prevent discriminatory access to energy networks and restrictions 
on competition. In practice, operational unbundling will require the legally 
independent network operator and its shareholder(s) to adapt their legal 
relationship, which will aff ect the details of control and management agreements 
as well as the powers of the shareholders’ meeting and the supervisory board.695
Operational unbundling is not only concerned with the relationship of the 
unbundled legal entities but generally includes all measures serving the internal 
separation of integrated activities.696 In order to safeguard the network operator’s 
operational independence, special conditions for the employment of managers 
and other personnel at the network operating company have been introduced. 
Managers of the network operator must not participate in company structures 
that are directly or indirectly responsible for day-to-day operations in energy 
production or supply and they have to be treated in such a way as to ensure that 
they can act independently.697 In order to protect managerial independence and 
693 Malmendier/Schendel, n. 670, p. 373.
694 BT-Drs 15/3917, n. 683, p. 54.
695 As regards ways of optimizing the current German legal framework in order to achieve a 
higher degree of independence of system operators, Säcker, n. 682.
696 Meaning measures, which serve the strict separation and independent accountability of the 
activities concerned. Personnel of the activity concerned only thus report to the management 
of the respective internal activity.
697 See s. 8(2) 1st sentence and (3) EnWG implementing Articles 10(2)(a) and (b), 15(2)(a) and (b), 
17(a) and (b) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 9(2)(a) and (b), 13(2)(a) and (b), 15(a) and (b) 
Gas Directive 2003. With regard to management bonuses, the Commission rejects their 
admissibility by stating that ‘[t]he salary of the network management must not be based on the 
holding/supply company’s performance and be established on the basis of pre-fi xed elements 
related to the performance of the network company’ (Unbundling Note, n. 448, 8). Accordingly, 
the holding of shares in an affi  liated energy supply company are also supposed to be 
unacceptable. Germany, on the contrary, only sees a confl ict of interest in terms of impaired 
independence if ‘substantial parts’ of the salary depend on the performance of non-network 
operation related divisions of the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking, see BT-Drs. 
15/3917, n. 683, p. 54. Municipalities entering into (public or private) partnerships or 
incorporating a limited company (private: GmbH (Gesellschaft  mit beschränkter Haft ung) or 
public: AG (Aktiengesellschaft ), see text aft er n. 780, must ensure according to the constitutional 
principle of (local) democracy that their governing councils have adequate infl uence resp. 
participation rights within the new undertaking. Th is may prove problematic as regards 
private law undertakings, which are required to be managed independently. In particular with 
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to ensure that the network operator has a suffi  cient number of staff , the German 
legislator has introduced three provisions, which have made the 2003 Energy 
Directives operational unbundling rules more precise. Managers698 must be part 
of the organizational structure of the network operator699; the same applies to 
others with the power to make fi nal decisions that are crucial for operating the 
networks in a non-discriminatory manner. As for managers, they must not 
participate in organizational structures that are directly or indirectly responsible 
for the day-to-day operations of energy production or supply.700 Employees of 
other parts of the vertically integrated energy undertaking who perform tasks 
related to the operation of networks have to comply with the directions of the 
network operators’ management.701 Consequently, every person who has to be 
part of the organizational structure of the network operator702 will have to be 
employed by the network operator, and is banned from being part of the company 
structures of energy production or supply. Th us, in general, managers and 
decision-makers of a network operator must not work for an energy production 
or supply company at the same time. Th e managing director of an energy supply 
company may, however, join the network operator’s supervisory board because it 
remains the exclusive right of the shareholders to control their subsidiary.703
Th e unbundling measures also require the implementation of compliance 
programmes for employees of network operators704, which each network operator 
regard to municipal network operations, which are not only required to be independent legally 
but also operationally, this seems to run counter to the intentions of current legislation. More 
generally discussing this confl ict, D Ehlers, ‘Empfi ehlt es sich, das Recht der öff entlichen 
Unternehmen im Spannungsfeld von öff entlichem Auft rag und Wettbewerb national und 
gemeinschaft srechtlich neu zu regeln?’, in Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages (ed.), 
Verhandlungen des vierundsechzigsten Deutschen Juristentages in Berlin, Gutachten, Band 1, 
Teil E, 2002, p. 110.
698 Anyone who exerts infl uence on the network operator’s business policy in terms of 
responsibilities, planning and operative decision-making. Th is includes high-ranking 
employees with decision-making powers in areas sensitive to discrimination, BT-Drs 15/3917, 
n. 683, p. 53, and Joint Guidelines, n. 680, p. 17. Th e Joint Guidelines include every person 
rendering decisions that can be relevant to transparent and non-discriminatory network 
operations, Joint Guidelines, n. 680, pp. 17–8. Th e distinction between ‘managers’ and 
‘decision-makers’ is important because only the formers’ professional independence is 
explicitly protected (s. 8(3) EnWG).
699 S. 8(2) 1st sentence EnWG.
700 Ibid.
701 S. 8(2) 2nd sentence EnWG.
702 S. 8(2) 1st sentence EnWG.
703 Unbundling Note, n. 448, 8. In its 2007 monitoring report, n. 125, the BNetzA establishes that 
in Germany there is not so much a problem with the implementation of legal unbundling by 
the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings but rather some contentious issues as 
regards operational and informational unbundling, which still require tackling.
704 S. 8(5) EnWG implementing Articles 10(2)(d), 15(2)(d) and 17(d) Electricity Directive 2003, 
Articles 9(2)(d), 13 (2) (d) and 15(d) Gas Directive 2003. See also Joint Guidelines, n. 680, pp. 
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has to adopt according to its individual discriminatory potential.705 German 
legislation also prescribes informational unbundling in order to prevent 
commercially sensitive data, in particular customer data from being disclosed to 
the affi  liated energy supply company.706 With regard to IT systems, confi dentiality 
may be safeguarded by introducing so-called Chinese walls regulating personal 
access, which can oft en be implemented without purchasing new IT systems.707 
Accounts unbundling tops the unbundling measures off  by mandating the 
installation of separate accounts for the diff erent activities of the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertaking. Every activity has to be accounted for as if 
it were pursued in separate companies.708 Substantial transactions between 
associated undertakings have to be disclosed separately.709
Under German law, the public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft ) appears to 
be the most suitable legal form to ensure the effi  ciacy of the unbundling 
requirements of the current legislative framework for the energy sector. Section 
76(1) Aktiengesetz710 confers upon the executive board a great degree of 
independence from the supervisory board where the shareholders are 
represented.711 Th e managing directors of a private limited company (Gesellschaft  
mit beschränkter Haft ung – GmbH), by contrast, are bound to follow the 
20–2.
705 H Lecheler, J Herrmann, ‘Energierechtliches Unbundling und EG-Wettbewerbsrecht’, (2005) 
WuW 482, 485. German network operators can rely on a model compliance programme 
draft ed by the three German associations of energy network operators, see Malmendier/
Schendel, n. 670, p. 379.
706 See s. 9 EnWG implementing Articles 12 and 16 Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 10(1) and 
14(1) Gas Directive 2003. As regards the problems the BNetzA faces with the appropriate 
implementation of operational and informational unbundling in Germany, see n. 703.
707 Unbundling Note, n. 448, p. 15; BT-Drs. 15/3917, n. 683, p. 55. Th e BNetzA has proposed a 
method of data processing, which would clearly bar access to network data by the vertically 
integrated energy supply division, see S Gras, ‘Die Entfl echtung nach §§ 6–10 EnWG’, 
presentation, Bonn, 27 October 2005, pp. 14–6; see also Malmendier/Schendel, n. 670, p. 378.
708 S. 10 EnWG implementing Article 19 Electricity Directive 2003, Article 17 Gas Directive 2003. 
Accounts unbundling was fi rst prescribed in 1998 for electricity in s. 9 EnWG 1998 and in 2003 
for gas in s. 9a EnWG 1998.
709 S. 10(2) EnWG.
710 Public Limited Company Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG) of 6 September 1965, BGBl. I, p. 1089, as 
amended.
711 See also Säcker, n. 30, suggesting that in order to enhance the independence of vertically 
integrated network operations, certain provisions of the Aktiengesetz (AktG) dealing with 
supervisory boards should be applied to private limited companies (GmbH) as well. Th e latter 
is the legal form of the electricity transmission network companies of E.On, Vattenfall and 
RWE with some gas network companies of EnBW, E.On and RWE also incorporated as 
GmbHs. Säcker claims that in doing so the proposals of the Commission with respect to the 
introduction of ISOs would become superfl uous (at least for Germany), also invoking 
fundamental rights concerns. Th e explanations given in the main text are also meant as a basis 




directions of its shareholders, in general as well as in individual cases.712 However, 
restrictions of shareholders’ rights are widely considered possible with regard to 
the above issues, which potentially confl ict with the requirements of operational 
unbundling and confi dentiality.713 Th e most straightforward reason in support 
of this view is that the EnWG is legislation special to, and entered into force later 
than, the GmbHG.714
Network operators: obligations and access regulation
Th e terms and conditions of connection and access to the networks (but not gas 
storage) have to be adequate, non-discriminatory, transparent and no less 
favourable than what is required by the network operator in comparable cases 
either within the (vertically integrated) energy undertaking to which it belongs or 
from affi  liated or associated undertakings. Energy network operators are 
responsible for providing secure and reliable energy networks.715 Sections 22 and 
23 EnWG set out transparent and non-discriminatory rules for network operators 
balancing the electricity and gas fl ows in their networks; transmission system 
operators have to tender for the energy required for balancing.
712 See ss. 37 and 47 GmbHG (Gesetz betreff end die Gesellschaft en mit beschränkter Haft ung – 
Limited Liability Companies Act of 20 April 1892, RGBl., p. 477, as amended). Th ese two legal 
forms can be considered as the most suitable under German law, in the context given. For 
further suitable forms, see Volz, n. 670, pp. 179, 180. Consequent to what has just been said in 
the main text, if a shareholder holds a majority stake in the network operator GmbH, as will 
usually be the case with the holding company of vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings, such a shareholder is able to instruct the managing director(s) of the network 
operator. In this context, GmbH shareholders also have the right to have access to the company’s 
fi les, i.e. obtain any information they require, see s. 51a(1) GmbHG. See in more detail, Volz, n. 
670, pp. 173 et seq. Th ese two issues seem to confl ict with the managerial independence 
mandated by operational unbundling and the confi dentiality requirement.
713 See Malmendier/Schendel, n. 670 , p. 380, with further references, and Volz, ibid.
714 For a concise overview of further reasons pro and contra, see Malmendier/Schendel, ibid. It is 
argued that the GmbH’s articles of association do not need to be adapted to comply with the 
operational unbundling requirements because these requirements would automatically 
invalidate any confl icting directions, information requests and dismissals by shareholders of 
the network operator, see Säcker, n. 689, (2005) RdE 85, 87–90; U Ehricke, ‘Unbundling und 
Vereinbarkeit der Gesellschaft sform einer GmbH’, (2004) IR 170–172. See also Malmendier/
Schendel, n. 670, p. 382. However, this seems to contradict the fact that the unbundling 
provisions are not self-executing but require implementation by the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertaking. Following the latter argument would call for the supervision of the 
BNetzA and the state regulatory agencies, which are competent to review the compliance with 
the unbundling provisions of the EnWG and, thus, the articles of association of every network 
operator incorporated as a GmbH, see s. 54(2) no. 4, (3) EnWG.
715 SS. 13 and 14 EnWG for electricity transmission and distribution, respectively, and ss. 16 and 
16a EnWG for gas transmission and distribution, respectively.
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Network operators are obliged to connect end consumers as well as electricity 
and gas supply networks of the same or a lower voltage/pressure level, and to 
connect generation and storage facilities to their network.716 Th e connection can 
be refused if it is impossible or unreasonable for operational or other commercial 
or technical reasons taking into consideration the aims laid down in section 1 
EnWG.717
Two of the central objectives of German energy law are to achieve secure and 
reliable as well as sustainable energy supply, both to the greatest extent possible.718 
As regards sustainability, Germany has chosen to impose on network operators 
the obligation to grant priority network access to their networks for electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources (RES)719 and combined heat and 
power (CHP).720 Th is obligation must also be taken into account in the event 
716 S. 17 EnWG. In contrast, s. 18 EnWG establishes a general duty to connect for operators of 
networks for the general supply of end consumers. Such operators have to publish general 
terms and conditions for the connection of end consumers to the low voltage/pressure networks 
and for their use of the connection. For further details, see also the Regulations listed in n. 660. 
In summer 2007, the Kraft NAV entered into force, which makes easier and accelerates the 
connection of new power plants of new market entrants in particular to the electricity 
networks, see in greater detail nn. 344, 615 (and accompanying text). Th is is safeguarded by the 
introduction of the new competition law provision of s. 29 GWB, see n. 749 and accompanying 
text. See also the monitoring report 2007 of the BNetzA, n. 125.
717 S. 21b EnWG has also in principle liberalized the metering trade. Upon request of the user, the 
installation, operation and maintenance of metering appliances and the measuring of the 
energy supplied can be carried out by a third party other than the network operator.
718 See s. 1(1) and (2) EnWG.
719 See s. 4(1) EEG (Gesetz zur Neuregelungen des Rechts der Erneuerbaren Energien im 
Strombereich (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz – Renewable Energy Sources Act) of 21 July 
2004, BGBl. I, p. 1918, as amended). Th is obligation comprises of priority purchase of electricity 
exclusively generated from RES and the prescription of minimum prices (feed-in tariff s) in 
order to aff ord RES generators preferential treatment (also called ‘take and pay’ obligation), 
and of RES plants to be connected to the next grid available, even if the grid has to be extended 
(if reasonable). Ultimately, the TSO is obliged to take and pay for the electricity from RES (aft er 
deducting avoided network charges), usually from the DSOs who initially took and paid for it. 
Th e cost of connecting to the grid is borne by the plant operator (but see s. 17(2) EnWG: the 
connection between the transformer stations of off shore wind generation farms and the next 
suitable connecting points to the grid on land has to be provided and paid for by the network 
operator concerned), the cost for reinforcing the grid by the network operator. Th e network 
operator’s cost is passed through on to the end consumer as part of the network access charges. 
See in greater detail, Brunekreeft /Ehlers, n. 8. See also Mitchell/Bauknecht/Connor, n. 583.
720 See s. 4(1) KWKG (Gesetz für die Erhaltung, Modernisierung und den Ausbau der Kraft -
Wärme-Kopplung (Cogeneration Modernisation Act) of 19 March 2002, BGBl I, 1092 as 
amended). CHP generation is also entitled to connect to the nearest network (even if a 
(reasonable) extension or reinforcement of the grid is necessary) and to be remunerated 
according to a feed-in tariff . Th e KWKG also provides for a settlement mechanism similar to 




that the security and reliability of the electricity supply system is disturbed or at 
risk.721
Th e core issue of the new EnWG is the introduction of regulated network access. 
Th e new regime includes the requirement to obtain prior approval of network 
charges722, which is set out in more detail in the accompanying Regulations.723 
Th e network users enjoy a right to network access.724
In the gas sector, the EnWG provides for an entry-exit system, meaning that gas 
network operators have to off er feed-in and feed-out capacities, which enable 
network access without the need to enter into a contract for a particular transport 
path, and which can be individually used and traded.725 In contrast, access to gas 
pipelines coming from gas production sites (vorgelagerte Rohrleitungsnetze) and 
to gas storage facilities is subject to negotiations. Th us the resulting access charges 
are not subject to prior approval by BNetzA.
Th e terms and conditions, and the charges for network access must be reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory and transparent, and no less favourable than those that, in 
comparable cases, a network operator charges its own company or affi  liated or 
associated undertakings, both in the way they are calculated (kalkulatorisch) and 
in real terms (tatsächlich).726 For the fi rst time, charges have to be drawn up on 
the basis of the cost of operating the network business and have to refl ect the 
costs of an effi  cient and structurally comparable network operator. In principle, 
incentives to provide an effi  cient output have to be taken into account as well as 
the need for a reasonable, competitive and risk-adequate rate of return on capital, 
subject to the stipulations of the NEVs727, which may depart from this cost-based 
determination of network charges.
721 See ss. 13(1) (for transmission) and 14(1) (for distribution) EnWG.
722 SS. 20 to 23 EnWG. Th e BNetzA has already used its new power to lower network charges 
considerably. It has, for instance, cut the network charges of the four German electricity 
transmission operators E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall by between 8 and 18%. As regards 
gas network charges, two E.ON subsidiaries have had to accept reductions between 9.5 and 
11%. See further www.bundesnetzagentur.de (for electricity and gas network charges). Th ere 
are now, however, changes in the way in which network charges are calculated and the NZV 
Strom and NZV Gas, n. 659, introduce standardization and give the regulator powers to 
intervene, see ss. 27 and 28 NZV Strom and ss. 42 and 43 NZV Gas. See also s. 30 NEV Strom 
resp. Gas, n. 659, detailing the regulator’s power to determine the exact content of certain 
balance sheet and accounts items.
723 See n. 659.
724 S. 20(2) EnWG.
725 S. 20(1)(b) EnWG. Previously, network access charges were calculated on the basis of individual 
transport routes.
726 S. 21 EnWG.
727 Regulations concerning the charges for access to the electricity and gas supply networks, see n. 
659.
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Because the EnWG deals with the calculation of network charges in abstract 
terms, the very detailed NEVs play an important role. Section 21a EnWG already 
provides for the possibility of deviating from a cost-based calculation of network 
charges, allowing for the introduction of incentive-based regulation.728 Incentive 
regulation729 basically means that once network access charges are approved, 
they remain unchanged for a prescribed regulatory period (two to fi ve years) 
setting upper limits for network charges or for total revenue from these charges, 
based on criteria of effi  ciency. As a result, network operators increasing their 
effi  ciency will have the incentive of higher profi ts. Incentive regulation will enter 
into force in Germany at the beginning of 2009.730
Finally, energy supply companies, which are the universal suppliers of household 
customers in a given network area (Grundversorgung), have to publish general 
terms and conditions and generally applicable prices within low voltage/pressure 
networks, and must supply all household customers accordingly.731 Th e duty to 
provide universal service does not require the supply company to operate the 
corresponding network for general supply.732 Universal service providers are 
companies that supply the majority of the household customers on a certain date 
(on 1 July of every third year, starting with 1 July 2006). Th is is not necessarily 
the traditional municipal energy supplier.733
Regulatory procedure and judicial review
German regulatory authorities have acquired extensive powers to supervise the 
energy sector.734 All decisions of these authorities are the result of a special 
administrative procedure as set out in sections 65 et seq. EnWG. Th is procedure 
resembles court proceedings and takes place before one of nine ruling chambers 
(Beschlusskammern). Th e decisions of the regulatory authorities can be appealed 
728 Brunekreeft /Bauknecht, n. 656, ch. 8.3.1., point out that it is not clear what incentive-based 
regulation means, and how incentive-based regulation diff ers from cost-based regulation. As 
to the criticism of the application of these types of regulation from a legal perspective, see J-C 
Pielow, ‘Auslegungsfragen zur Einführung der Anreizregulierung nach § 21a EnWG’, 
Bochumer Forschungsberichte, Band 29, 2007.
729 As refl ected in s. 21a(2) and (3) EnWG.
730 SS. 21a(6), 118(5) EnWG. See also n. 662.
731 S. 36 EnWG. Th is duty refl ects the universal service obligation of the energy supply sector and 
is complemented by the Regulation named second in n. 662. For supply of last resort and 
exemptions from universal supply, see ss. 37 and 38 EnWG and the Regulation, ibid., which is 
based on s. 39 EnWG.
732 As regards the obligation to connect household customers, which is a separate obligation of 
network operators, see supra.
733 See in this respect supra and n. 768.
734 For the power of the regulatory authorities to give directions to energy supply undertakings, 
see also the general legal basis in s. 65 EnWG.
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(Beschwerde)735, but this does not lead to the suspension of the execution of the 
decision unless so ordered by the appeal court. Th e competent appeal courts are 
the competition law divisions of the Higher Regional Courts (Kartellsenate der 
Oberlandesgerichte) where the respective regulatory authority is situated.736 Th e 
extent of judicial control of the decisions of the regulatory authority is heavily 
disputed: on the one hand, there is an argument for a wide margin of appreciation 
(Beurteilungsspielraum) of the regulatory authorities, on the other hand, Article 
19(4) GG requires as a matter of principle that decisions by the administration are 
subject to a comprehensive judicial review.737
Following the establishment of the BNetzA in July 2005, the demarcation of 
powers and the relationship between the BNetzA (and possible regulatory 
authorities of German states) and the BKartA (and corresponding state 
authorities) with respect to the supervision of non-discriminatory TPA has 
gained importance.738 Sections 20 et seq. EnWG and sections 33 and 19(4) no. 4 
GWB grant the right to access energy networks but do so on very diff erent legal 
bases739: the former operates as an ex ante regulatory tool, the latter as an ex post 
competition law measure.740
Before the BNetzA became operational in July 2005, the BKartA and the 
competent state authorities were generally responsible for preventing abusive 
practices by dominant fi rms, including the setting of energy prices (which 
included network connection and access charges). Th is has changed with the new 
EnWG. Sections 19 and 20 GWB741 are now no longer applicable insofar as the 
735 See ss. 75 et seq. EnWG.
736 Th e competent court for the BNetzA is the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) 
Düsseldorf.
737 For further discussion, see M Burgi, ‘Das subjektive Recht im Energie-
Regulierungsverwaltungsrecht’, (2006) DVBl. 269, and J-C Pielow, ‘Wie “unabhängig” ist die 
Netzregulierung im Strom- und Gassektor?’ (2005) DÖV 1017.
738 No elaborations are made here on other responsibilities of German competition authorities, 
such as merger control.
739 S. 19 GWB introduced the so-called ‘essential facilities’ concept into German law, according to 
which it may be considered an abuse of a dominant position (unless justifi ed) if the operator of 
an energy network (or other infrastructure facility) denies access to a (potential) competitor 
on an upstream or downstream market without which he would not be able to compete there. 
Th is is in addition to the direct enforceability of Articles 81 and 82 EC in Germany law. See 
Ehlers, n. 656, and Heinen, n. 287. See also M Dreher, ‘Die Verweigerung des Zugangs zu einer 
wesentlichen Einrichtung als Mißbrauch der Marktbeherrschung’, (1999) DB 833.
740 Brunekreeft /Bauknecht, n. 656, provide an in-depth analysis of the new EnWG from an 
economist’s point of view and a very instructive overview of the structure of the German 
energy sector.
741 In general, these provisions set out the legal framework for controlling abusive practices and 
the prohibition of discriminatory behaviour and undue impediment.
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provisions of the EnWG, in particular of Part 3 of the EnWG742 or Regulations 
based thereon, are conclusive. Published (and thus authorized) network charges 
bind the BKartA and state competition authorities in proceedings concerning 
energy prices for end consumers.743 As Article 82 EC is generally applicable, even 
in regulated sectors, the competition authorities remain solely responsible for 
enforcing Article 82 EC.744 Consequently, recent interventions of the competition 
authorities based on Article 82 EC (as, for instance in the Marathon case745) show 
that refusal of access to essential infrastructures can still be remedied under 
competition law. Th ey also show that this can be done parallel to and in 
coordination with national regulators, which can impose more detailed access 
rules.746 Although ex ante regulation based on the 2003 Energy Directives and 
their implementation into national law will gradually reduce the need for 
antitrust intervention, the relevance of competition rules will not diminish. Ex 
ante regulation will never be able to control every situation in which network 
operators may be tempted to (ab)use their power.747
As regards the exercise of the general energy price control powers of the German 
competition authorities748, the BKartA has now been empowered to review 
energy prices if it deems them to be unreasonable. Section 29 GWB, which is 
valid until 2012 initially, inter alia introduces the shift ing of the burden of proof 
742 Titled Regulierung des Netzbetriebs, which translates as regulation of network operations. Part 
3 EnWG in particular contains provisions about network connection and access, which are 
also the necessary legislative basis for Regulations detailing these provisions.
743 SS. 130(3) GWB, 111 EnWG.
744 See s. 58 EnWG for the collaboration between regulatory and competition authorities. On this 
issue see also, as regards the old law, Pritzsche/Klauer, n. 656, pp. 155 et seq., and for the draft  
EnWG, see Klauer, n. 656, pp. 91–7. For consumers associations’ right to initiate proceedings 
against abusive practices and their procedural rights, see ss. 66, 75 and 79 EnWG; for the 
regulatory authorities’ ex post regulatory powers, ss. 94 et seq. EnWG and Pritzsche/Klauer, n. 
656, p. 150. See also the elaborations in the context of the Deutsche Telekom case, n. 210 and 
accompanying text.
745 See in more detail, van der Woude, n. 187, no. 3.214, and ‘Recent Developments in EC 
Competition Law – Facing the Network’, in M. Roggenkamp, U. Hammer (eds), European 
Energy Law Report II, 2005, ch. 2, pp. 15 et seq., 25.
746 Article 82 EC is generally applicable, even in the regulated sectors, and the competition 
authorities remain solely responsible for its enforcement. See s 58 EnWG for the collaboration 
between regulatory and competition authorities. For consumers associations’ right to initiate 
proceedings against abusive practices and their procedural rights, see ss. 66, 75 and 79 EnWG; 
for the regulatory authorities’ ex post regulatory powers, ss. 94 et seq. EnWG.
747 Van der Woude, n. 187, no. 3.214. F Säcker, ‘Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Beurteilung von 
Netzkooperationen, Beteiligungen an Netzgesellschaft en, Netzpacht und 
Betriebsführungsverträgen’, (2005) ZNER 270, however, doubts that such a temptation is high 
because such behaviour would be economically and commercially irrational in the current 
European and German regulatory setting.
748 Deduced from s 19(4)(2) GWB. Th is general price control does, however, not extend to the 
published network charges whose control falls into the remit of the BNetzA.
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onto the energy supply undertakings as regards the justifi cation of price increases 
and the immediate enforceability of the BKartA’s decisions in this respect. It is 
supposed to enable the competition authorities to detect and fi ght abusive 
behaviour in the energy supply sector more easily and more eff ectively.749 Th is is 
the response of the German government to soaring energy prices750 given the 
expiration of the Federal Tariff  Ordinance Electricity (Bundestarifordnung 
Elektrizität – BTO Elt) on 1 July 2007, which served as the statutory basis for 
authorized increases in electricity prices for household customers.751
Further, the BKartA complements the BNetzA’s endeavours to enhance TPA to 
the German gas networks by restricting the validity of long-term gas supply 
contracts (LTCs).752
749 See www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=230118.html.
750 In particular electricity prices initially decreased aft er 1998 when the EnWG was fi rst revised. 
Subsequently, however, consumer prices for natural gas and electricity began to rise steadily 
and signifi cantly. Th is is mainly due to rising world market prices for primary energy sources, 
an increase in fi nancial burdens resulting from emerging special taxes on environmental 
protection (so-called Ökosteuer) and the shift ing of costs for the promotion of renewable 
energy sources and CHP onto all electricity consumers. Th ese fi nancial burdens reached a level 
of 40 per cent of the electricity price in 2005 (25 per cent in 1998). Th e implementation of CO2 
emission rights trading in Germany also contributed to this. In addition, VAT was lift ed from 
16 to 19 per cent at the beginning of 2007. Currently, German electricity prices rank in the 
upper third of the price range in the EU. Natural gas prices for household customers are 
somewhere in the centre of the price range whereas gas tariff s for industrial customers are 
amongst the lowest in the EU. For further details, see Federal Ministries of Economic Aff airs 
and Technology and for Environment, Protection of Nature and Nuclear Safety (eds), 
Energieversorgung für Deutschland, March 2006, pp. 27 et seq.; see also the international 
comparison of energy prices in Federal Ministry of Economic Aff airs and Technology (ed.), 
Energiedaten – Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung, updated from time to time.
751 Th e introduction of s. 29 GWB was severally criticized by the Wissenschaft licher Beirat des 
Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft  und Technologie (Academic Advisory Board of the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Aff airs and Technology) in a letter to the Secretary of State for 
Economic Aff airs and Technology, M Glos, on 20 November 2006. It rejects this amendment 
of the GWB because such a change would inhibit competition in the energy sector. To assess 
abuse of market power the current state of the law would suffi  ce, which already empowers the 
competition authorities to set prices at levels which would apply if there was eff ective 
competition: s. 19(4)(2) GWB. High prices and high profi t were, for themselves, no reason for 
the State to intervene, in particular so when similar price trends could be observed in all 
Member States in the European Union.
752 In Germany, the BKartA focuses mainly on long-term gas supply or downstream contracts, 
whereas the European Commission also scrutinizes long-term gas purchase or upstream or 
import contracts with gas producing countries. Th e latter clearly refl ects the confl ict between 
promoting competition in the EU and securing supply security. See also Article 27 Gas 
Directive 2003 as regards the possibility of granting exemptions from the obligation to allow 
TPA in the context of take-or-pay commitments. See also nn. 43, 197. Generally, long-term gas 
supply contracts can be prohibited according to Article 81 EC as they usually aff ect trade 
between Member States. Th ese contracts can, however, also contravene Article 82 EC in that a 
supplier may abuse its dominant position by insisting on supply terms of unreasonable 
duration and/or forcing contractual partners to accept an unreasonably high coverage of their 
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Th e relationship between regulatory and competition authorities in Germany 
can also be better understood by examining the ways consumers are protected 
from excessive energy prices. In principle, there are three such ways: fi rst, 
competition law enforcement753, secondly, protection via legal instruments based 
on the EnWG754 and, thirdly, individual actions to civil courts.755
needs by that supplier. In 2006, the BKartA, n. 43, ruled that E.ON Ruhrgas had to cease, by 
30 September 2006, the enforcement of all terms in gas supply contracts with regional and 
local gas suppliers found to violate competition law. Th is ruling had repercussions for the 
whole sector because of its general prohibition (accompanied by several safeguarding measures) 
of contract terms of more than four years where de facto supply exceeds 50 per cent, or of more 
than two years if de facto supply exceeds 80 per cent of a contractual partner’s overall need. For 
a critical view see Kühne, n. 137. On p. 69, he rightly criticizes the BKartA’s policy as no longer 
protecting the functioning of existing markets but also forcing open new markets even if 
commercially detrimental to downstream suppliers. Th is is because the BKartA prohibits 
additional supply contracts between the majority supplier and the downstream supplier if they 
hit the thresholds just outlined. Th is may lead to the prohibition of contracts, which are more 
lucrative to the downstream supplier than those off ered by competitors. Th us, tensions arise 
between the principle of freedom of contract on the one hand and the idea of competition on 
the other. See also L Hancher, ‘Power plays: the end if the line for long-term energy contracts 
in Europe?’, Oxera Agenda, May 2009.
753 As increases in energy prices can constitute an abuse of a dominant position according to s. 
19(4) no. 2 GWB, which sets out that an abuse takes place if a dominant undertaking demands 
payment or other business terms, which they would not be able to claim if eff ective competition 
was in place. In addition, as has just been outlined above, the BKartA can check such prices on 
its own account on the basis of the new s. 29 GWB. SS. 33–34a GWB (to be read in connection 
with ss. 54–96 GWB, which contain procedural issues) provide for courses of action against 
such an abuse, such as an action in tort (s. 33 GWB), according to which individuals or 
associations representing business group interests (Verbände) can claim damages or fi le for a 
cease and desist order (Unterlassung).
754 With respect to allegedly excessive network charges, the new EnWG provides causes of action 
for the BNetzA or individuals and associations in ss. 30–33 EnWG (to be read in connection 
with ss 65–108 GWB, which contain procedural issues). See in greater detail, G Kühne, 
‘Gerichtliche Entgeltkontrolle im Energierecht’, (2006) NJW 654, 656. See also ss. 130(3) GWB, 
111 EnWG.
755 Energy consumers also frequently resort to refusing to pay the diff erence between the old and 
the new price, or even the entire price, and to forcing the energy supply undertaking to sue for 
recovery under civil law (normally the supplier is not permitted to cut off  supply). Th is can be 
a worthwhile route of action because the legal basis for energy price increases is normally a 
contractual agreement, which authorizes the energy supplier to unilaterally adjust prices when 
costs are increasing. In such a case, section 315(1) BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German 
Civil Code) of 18 August 1896, revised version (Neufassung) published on 2 January 2002, 
BGBl. I, p. 42 (2909); 2003 I, p. 738) becomes applicable, which stipulates that the unilateral 
determination of contractual obligations, here the amount of monies to be paid, must be 
exercised in fair manner. According to section 315(3) BGB, such determination is only binding 
on the party concerned if it is fair (Billigkeit). If the determination is not fair it is for the courts 
to determine the extent of the obligation in question. Th e Federal Supreme Court for Civil 
Matters has, for instance, recently ruled on the adequacy of charges for access to electricity 
networks holding that s. 315 BGB is concurrently applicable with the competition law 
provisions on abuse of a dominant position, see BGHZ 164, 336. See also J Held, ‘Überhöhte 
Preise auf dem Wärmemarkt? – Billigkeitskontrolle von Erdgas- und Fernwärmetarifen nach 
§ 315 BGB’, (2004) NZM 169, 171 (discussing the applicability of s. 315 BGB to gas and district 
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As an interim conclusion, it can be observed that the German competition 
authorities in general and the BKartA in particular have had much of their power 
transferred to the BNetzA and the state regulatory authorities as regards their 
responsibilities to prevent abusive network access tariff s. Th ese are now controlled 
on the basis of the new EnWG. It remains to be seen how well the BNetzA is able 
to perform its tasks when faced with more than 1,500 electricity and gas network 
operators. It seems unlikely that the BNetzA will be able to continuously check 
and approve the access terms and charges of each of these operators, in which 
case the scrutiny of the energy markets by the BKartA remains important.756
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Th e German Grundgesetz does not contain any specifi c reference to the 
energy supply sector.757 Nonetheless, the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) already a long time ago ruled that security of energy 
supply is of the greatest general interest.758 Permanent availability of energy is an 
‘indispensable prerequisite for the functioning of the economy’ and an ‘absolute 
common good’.759 Accordingly, energy supply is a constituent of öff entliche 
Daseinsvorsorge (on the European level also called Service of General (Economic) 
heating cases). Some voices in legal scholarship fi nd, however, that remedies based on 
competition law or energy regulation exclude the applicability of s. 315 BGB, see Kühne, n. 
754. Relying on the remedy of section 315 BGB is normally preferable because the burden of 
proof in civil proceedings lies with the party determining the price to be paid, i.e. the energy 
supplier as claimant, which means that in order to prove the fairness of the price determination 
the energy supplier has to disclose (elements of) its price calculation. See Kühne, ibid., pp. 
656–7 (standard of proof in competition and civil law proceedings).
756 According to Brunekreeft /Bauknecht, n. 656, ch. 8.3.1, the problem of how to manage the 
regulation of this vast number of mostly very small energy distribution network operators 
‘could be by-passed by applying diff erent types of regulation: a strict incentive-based regulation 
at federal level and a “loose” cost-plus approach at state level for many small utilities.’ Th ey 
continue: ‘If all the small DNOs [distribution network operators] are also regulated by the 
same type of incentive regulation, it is unclear what is gained with splitting up the authority, 
while it opens the door for regulatory capture at state level.’
757 Th is is diff erent, however, as regards environmental aspects of energy supply, such as 
environmental protection, climate change and the protection of fossil energy resources. 
Article 20a GG includes in German constitutional law ‘the protection of natural bases of life’ 
as a sort of policy objective: ‘Mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the 
State shall protect the natural bases of life by legislation, and, in accordance with law and 
justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order.’
758 BVerfGE 91, 186, 206.
759 See BVerfGE 30, 292, 323–4.
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Interest)760, which means that the individual must have certain individual goods 
available in order to live in dignity (cf. Article 1(1) GG).761
1. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ALLOCATION OF 
COMPETENCES
State involvement in the energy sector is a consequence of society’s dependence 
on safe and cheap energy supply as well as of the technical, economic and 
ecological characteristics of the sector, i.e. network-bound electricity and gas 
supply requires planning (in terms of land use) and the prevention of abusive 
behaviour, energy production must always be available upon demand and 
production and generation facilities and transportation networks are investment-
intensive and thus require a sound legal framework, which provides for stable 
long-term conditions (legal certainty). Th e immense environmental impact of 
electricity generation and energy transport through networks also has to be taken 
into account. Hence, both the Federal State and its subdivisions (Länder and 
municipalities) are deemed to hold a specifi c ‘responsibility to guarantee’ 
(Gewährleistungsverantwortung) the provision of services of general (economic) 
interest such as energy supply762, also known as the State’s responsibility for 
760 Refl ecting a variety of national concepts, i.e. for Germany the concept of öff entliche 
Daseinsvorsorge. Th is concept has been criticized, however as rather meaningless by 
J-C Pielow, ‘Kommunalwirtschaft srechtliche Sonderregelungen für gemeindliche 
Energieversorgungsunternehmen’, in F Säcker (ed.), Berliner Kommentar zum Energierecht, 
2nd ed., 2009, no. 13, which is even trueer now that many formerly exclusive tasks of the State 
and the public administration have been privatised. See also BVerfGE 107, 59, 93 et seq., which 
confi rms that services of general (economic) interest do not necessarily have to be performed 
by the State. Only such tasks, which the State has to fulfi ll through its own authorities as public 
tasks in a narrow sense, i.e. tasks conferred upon the State by the Constitution, cannot be 
privatized. Th e term “services of general economic interest” refers to “services of an economic 
nature, which are subject to specifi c public service obligations by virtue of a general interest 
criterion. Th e concept of services of general economic interest thus covers in particular certain 
services provided by the big network industries such as transport, postal services, energy and 
communications.” See Communication from the Commission, ‘White Paper on Services of 
General Interest’, COM(2004) 374 fi nal, Brussels, 12.5.2004, p. 22. In the area of energy, 
economic activities subject to special public service obligations are, for example, connection 
and access to energy networks and supply and other universal service obligations. With respect 
to German municipal and private energy supply undertakings, this primarily refers to the 
general obligation to connect according to s. 18 EnWG and/or to the obligation to provide a 
basic supply of energy (Grundversorgungspfl icht) according to s. 36 EnWG. See also nn. 118, 
768, 780 and accompanying text.
761 BVerfGE 66, 248, 258.
762 Cf., e.g., E Schmidt-Aßmann, Das allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee, 2nd ed., 2004, 
pp. 172 et seq. As regards the supply of energy, it is in principle the task of the federal State, the 
states (Länder) and the municipalities, to safeguard the continuous and country-wide supply 




public infrastructure (Infrastrukturverantwortung)763, in order to safeguard the 
provision of services to be delivered via networks. It can be deduced from a 
principle of the German Constitution, which classifi es Germany as a welfare state 
(Sozialstaat)764, and from the State’s duty to protect fundamental rights.765 Th is 
means that even though public utilities are increasingly being privatized and 
liberalized, the State ultimately retains the responsibility to control these utilities 
in order to ensure public and universal services, which include the provision of 
sustainable and economically reasonable services.766 It also remains responsible 
for the supervision of the market behaviour of the former monopolies, which 
oft en continue to hold a dominant position.767
However, this special responsibility of the State as regards the guarantee of energy 
supply is only a residual or last resort responsibility (i.e. if a supplier fails) which 
is considered to complement the primary role of private enterprise. In particular, 
no prerogative or exclusive right of the State (or public undertakings) can be 
deduced from this principle. Indeed, the term Gewährleistungsverantwortung has 
been developed in order to emphasize the fact that the provision of public utility 
services in times of liberalization and privatization no longer constitutes an 
exclusive task of the State but rather a matter for the society itself, i.e. especially 
of private undertakings.768
763 Hermes, n. 641.
764 Article 20(1) GG stipulates: ‘Th e Federal Republic of Germany is a […] welfare State’.
765 Refl ected in particular in Article 1 GG (protection of human dignity) and Article 2 GG (right 
to life and to physical integrity). Th e duty of the State according to Article 109(2) GG to 
safeguard the macroeconomic balance of the State (gesamtwirtschaft liches Gleichgewicht) is 
sometimes also named as a basis for such responsibilities. On statutory level, the communal 
responsibility to guarantee the provision of certain services of general (economic) interest is 
refl ected in the general duty of the municipalities to provide their citizens with the necessary 
public facilities for their economic, social and cultural well-being, which is traditionally deeply 
rooted on communal level, see J-C Pielow, ‘Der Rechtsstatus von Stromversorgungsnetzen: 
“Öff entliche Einrichtung” oder Grundrechtsschutz des Betreibers?’, (2000) RdE 45, 51.
766 See nn. 118, 731, 760, 768 and accompanying text.
767 With regard to the concept of Gewährleistungsverantwortung and its role in the energy and 
other network-bound sectors such as telecommunications and rail transport, see in greater 
detail, J Kühling, Sektorspezifi sche Regulierung in den Netzwirtschaft en, 2004, and Pielow, n. 
641, pp. 344 et seq., both with further references.
768 Th is is what öff entliche Daseinsvorsorge means today. Th is principle merely serves as an 
empirical term for certain ‘existential’ services or services of general (economic) interest. It 
does not imply any private or public nature of the service in question. It can be compared to 
the British term of ‘public utilities’ or to the likewise neutral term ‘services of general 
(economic) interest’ as used in Articles 16 and 86(2) EC, and be contrasted to the legal concept 
of service public in France, which traditionally tends to regard ‘existential’ services as falling 
into the exclusive remit of the State. For a comparison of the German concept of öff entliche 
Daseinsvorsorge with the French principle of service public, see Pielow, n. 641, pp. 111 et seq. 
Th e Gewährleistungsverantwortung is, however, increasingly taking a back seat and is conferred 
upon all (even private) energy supply undertakings as can be inferred from the introduction of 
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Because energy supply in Germany constitutes a primarily private activity, public 
engagement in the energy sector is limited as regards the constitutional 
assignment of legislative and executive powers to the State but also by its duty to 
observe the fundamental rights (Grundrechte) of the stakeholders in this area.769 
With respect to the latter, the regulation of the energy sector must especially 
safeguard the energy market participants’ freedom of occupation and economic 
activity (Berufsfreiheit) as set out in Article 12(1) GG and their right to property 
as set out in Article 14 GG.770
As a federal state, Germany allocates its legislative and executive powers both at 
federal (Bund) as well as at states’ (Länder), regional and municipal level (see 
Article 20(1) GG). Th is division of powers is thus highly relevant for the energy 
sector.
Th e competence to pass legislation regulating the energy and the mining sectors 
is in principle attributed to the federal level as part of the right to regulate the 
economy (see Article 74(1) no. 11 GG). It covers the formulation of energy law in 
general and the regulation of the production, transmission, storage, distribution 
and supply of energy in particular.771 Th e Länder may only legislate if the federal 
level has not made use of its competence. In practice, however, the Bund has fully 
exploited its legislative competences in the area of energy law so that little scope 
for state legislation remains.
a general supplier for end consumers and a supplier of last resort in ss. 36 and 38 EnWG. See 
also nn. 731–733.
769 Th ese rights may be invoked by individuals and by domestic legal persons (undertakings) 
against all acts of public authority and also before the Federal Constitutional Court (see 
Article 93(1) no. 4a GG). As regards the protection of foreign legal persons, nn. 906, 961 and 
accompanying text.
770 Th us, interferences in the energy sector by, for instance, the concept of unbundling, which is 
novel to German law, as well as the extent of regulation of network access introduced by the 
EnWG are highly controversial from a constitutional law point of view. For a fi rst overview, see 
Schmidt-Preuß in Baur et al. (eds), Unbundling in der Energiewirtschaft , n. 539. See also the 
President of the Federal Constitutional Court, H-J Papier, ‘Verfassungsfragen der Durchleitung’, 
in U Büdenbender, G Kühne (eds), Das neue Energierecht in der Bewährung, Festschrift  zum 
65. Geburtstag von J Baur, 2002, pp. 209 et seq., and M Schmidt-Preuß, Substanzerhaltung und 
Eigentum, 2003. See further infra. For more details concerning the increasingly ‘multipolar’ 
confl icts of interests and individual rights in a liberalized energy sector see Kühling, n. 767, pp. 
488 et seq., with further references; Burgi, n. 737.
771 Th us, this competence also extends to legislative matters concerning, for instance, energy 
installations and their safety, energy prices and taxes etc. Additionally, Article 74(1) nos 13 and 




Under German constitutional law federal or Länder governments772 are only 
competent to issue statutory instruments (Rechtsverordnungen) if the content, 
purpose and scope of these regulations have been specifi ed by a parliamentary 
law (see Article 80(1) GG). Th is again is highly relevant in the energy sector as, 
for instance, the EnWG contains numerous authorizations for executive bodies, 
in particular the Federal Ministry of Economic Aff airs, to issue such statutory 
instruments but only within the boundaries of such authorizations.
As regards the particular issue of independent regulatory authorities, i.e. 
independent from political infl uences, under German constitutional law, these 
are diffi  cult to establish. Th is is because such independency would confl ict with 
the German reading of the principle of democracy as construed and provided for 
by Article 20(1) GG, which requires an uninterrupted chain of democratic 
legitimation from executive authority to Parliament, and which can be 
safeguarded by the BVerfG.773 As a result, the Constitution prohibits areas free of 
ministerial supervision (ministerialfreie Räume).774 Consequently, the BKartA 
and BNetzA are both divisions of the Federal Ministry of Economic Aff airs and 
as such subject to its directions. A good example of how this system works is the 
2003 merger of the former Ruhrgas AG with E.ON AG creating E.ON Ruhrgas 
AG, which was initially prohibited by the BKartA but later waived through on 
the basis of a special ministerial permission according to Article 42 GWB.775
772 Executive competences are exercised by federal and Länder administrative bodies, whereby 
the vast majority of such competences are assigned to the Länder. Based on Article 87(3) GG, 
the Bund has, for instance, established the BKartA, which shares responsibilities with the 
competition authorities of the Länder (see ss. 49 and 51 GWB), and, with the entry into force 
of the EnWG, the BNetzA. As to the latter, see Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur für 
Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen (Law on the Bundesnetzagentur 
for electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal and rail services) of 7 July 2005, BGBl. I, pp. 
1970, 2009. In the energy sector, however, the BNetzA shares responsibilities with the Länder 
regulatory authorities, see ss. 54 and 55 EnWG and further infra. Th e execution of federal laws 
on energy matters is normally pursued by Länder. Planning procedures and permissions, such 
as are necessary for the construction of energy networks, are usually assigned to regional 
governments (Bezirksregierungen) as administrative subdivisions of the Länder. Th e Länder 
(and exceptionally also the Bund) may transfer administrative tasks to the regions (Landkreise) 
and municipalities (kreisfreie Städte), which then act as agents of the state (übertragener 
Wirkungskreis) and not within their own responsibilities (eigener Wirkungskreis) as guaranteed 
by Article 28 GG. As to the latter, see further infra.
773 Which is diff erent for the UK where no such court exists, see further Part 2 Chapter 5 on Great 
Britain.
774 See Dreier in Dreier, Grundgesetz, Band 2, 2nd ed., 2006, Article 20, nos 113, 116. Specifi cally 
on the BNetzA, see T Mayen, ‘Verwaltung durch unabhängige Einrichtungen’, (2006) DÖV 45. 
See also Tettinger/Pielow, n. 663.
775 Th e BNetzA is to a great extent more “independent” because it only has to follow general 
directions of the Secretary for Economic Aff airs, see s. 61 EnWG.
Part 2. Fundamental Rights
210 Intersentia
2. MUNICIPAL ENERGY SUPPLY
Most of the approximately 900 energy supply undertakings in Germany are small 
and medium sized municipal undertakings, oft en called Stadtwerke, which 
underlines the traditional involvement of municipalities in the German energy 
sector.776 Traditionally, the use of public roads for supply lines is governed by 
private law concession contracts on the basis of which energy supply undertakings 
have to pay concession fees.777 Th is system, together with the so-called 
Demarkationsverträge778, has allowed municipalities to establish monopolistic 
supply structures within their territories and to maintain their dominance in the 
supply of energy.779
Apart from ensuring local energy supply, a central motive for municipalities to 
engage in this sector is revenue generation to fi nance less profi table municipal 
services such as public transport, waste and water services, which as services of 
general economic interest are traditionally counted towards ‘öff entliche 
Daseinsvorsorge’ and pursued by municipalities. Th is is why most of the 
Stadtwerke have been – and still are – designed as undertakings, which provide a 
wide variety of public utility services (kommunale Verbundunternehmen). As has 
already been outlined above, revenues especially from energy sector operations 
are oft en also used for (horizontal) cross-subsidization of services of general 
interest such as public swimming pools, libraries, theatres, parks etc.780
776 Compared to the tasks of municipalities in other areas of public supply and disposal (such as 
water, public transport, sewage, waste etc), which are explicitly provided for by law there are 
hardly any precise references in the law to energy supply as a task to be pursued by municipalities. 
Th is is because the regulation of the energy supply industry in Germany has traditionally been 
neutral with regard to who is supposed to pursue energy supply and how this should be 
organized, see Pielow with further references.
777 German municipalities traditionally control public ways. Concession fees amount to approx. 
3.5 billion Euro each year.
778 In 1957, the Law against competition restraints, n. 654, exempted demarcation and exclusive 
concessions agreements, on which these supply areas were based, from the prohibition on 
forming cartels and abusing one’s monopoly position (original, now repealed s. 103(1) GWB). 
Th ese provisions secured the monopoly position of the municipal energy supply undertakings 
over decades, and with it their steady income including concession fees. It was only in April 
1998 with the entering into force of the 1998 Energy Industry Act as a consequence of the 
implementation of the EC Electricity Directive 1996, n. 653, that this protective environment 
in which communal energy supply undertakings had operated for so long changed radically. 
As a result of the deletion of the competition law privileges of demarcation agreements and the 
introduction of (negotiated) TPA by s. 6 EnWG 1998, the role of the communal ESUs turned 
from being the exclusive energy supplier of their municipality towards that of a competitor in 
the German electricity and gas sectors from April 1998 and Mai 2003 respectively (which saw 
the implementation of the 1996 Electricity and the 1998 Gas Directives, respectively, into 
German law). See also n. 654 and accompanying text.
779 See in greater detail, Pielow/Koopmann, n. 653, nos 8.28 et seq.
780 I.e. normally social tasks pursued on a non-profi t basis. See the contributions in G Püttner 




Municipalities are public institutions and as such they may not invoke fundamental 
rights under the Constitution.781 Th e extent of the commercial activities that 
municipalities are therefore allowed to pursue derives from the public and 
constitutional law provisions dealing with municipalities.
It is commonly assumed that the supply of residents with electricity and gas falls 
within the ‘aff airs rooted in the local community’782, which is a matter of local 
and thus autonomous self-government guaranteed by Article 28(2) GG and 
similar provisions in the constitutions of the Länder (Selbstverwaltungsgarantie).783 
Th is guarantee, however, only establishes a principal administrative responsibility 
of the municipalities and does not say anything about whether municipalities are 
obliged or entitled to perform energy supply tasks themselves or whether they 
even possess an exclusive right to do so.784 Moreover, the constitutional protection 
of local self-government does not guarantee the continuance of existing 
municipal undertakings nor does it exempt them from competition arising in the 
course of liberalization.785
provisions are not applicable to services of general (non-economic) interest, see J Ruthig, S 
Storr, Öff entliches Wirtschaft srecht, 2005, no. 501. According to Pielow, n. 765, the traditional 
distinction between economic and non-economic activities is no longer applicable. Typical 
services of general interest (Daseinsvorsorge) such as supply and disposal services, in particular 
energy supply, have in the meantime also been off ered by (private) third parties so that 
nowadays municipalities can per defi nitionem only perform them as an economic activity and 
thus as a service of general economic interest.
781 Th e extent to which undertakings, which are (partly) owned by municipalities, can rely on 
fundamental rights protection under the German constitution is, however, debated, see J 
Kämmerer, Privatisierung, 2001, p. 464; M Möstl, Grundrechtsbindung öff entlicher 
Wirtschaft stätigkeit, 1999, p. 89. As to the right of undertakings such as Deutsche Telekom 
AG, which are (de facto) controlled by public institutions (see in this respect, more generally, 
Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, nos 446–8) to invoke fundamental rights protection, see the decisions 
of the BVerwG, BVerwGE 114, 160, 189; 19 December 2003, 20 F 9.03; BVerfGE 120, 54, 59. 
See also, however, n. 940 and accompanying text. On the other hand, public or municipal 
undertakings can rely on the freedoms of the EC Treaty, whose main purpose it is to 
safeguard non-discriminatory access to the internal market.
782 According to the principle of general competence (Allzuständigkeit) there is a presumption in 
favour of the municipalities’ competence to accomplish all local matters themselves, which 
also refl ects the political and democratic aspect of the citizen’s participation in accomplishing 
public tasks, see Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, no. 128.
783 Cf. Article 28(2) 1st sentence GG: ‘Th e municipalities shall be guaranteed the right to manage 
all aff airs of the local community under their own responsibility within the limits of law’. As 
to Länder law, see, for instance, Article 83(1) of the Constitution of the State of Bavaria.
784 P Tettinger, ‘Recht der Energiewirtschaft ’, in R Schmidt (ed.), Öff entliches Wirtschaft srecht – 
Besonderer Teil 1, Springer, Berlin, 1995, § 7, p. 698. Similarly, the fact that municipalities own 
the public highways on their territory may not be interpreted such that this would confer any 
privilege upon them with respect to the energy supply networks built on or underneath them, 
see E Huber, Wirtschaft sverwaltungsrecht, Band (Volume) 1, 2nd ed., 1953, pp. 565 et seq.
785 For further details, see the decision of the Constitutional Court of Rhineland-Palatinate 
(RhPfVerfGH), (2000) DVBl. 992; M Burgi, Kommunalrecht, 2006, pp. 52, 250; contra G 
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On the other hand, as regards the lack of guarantee of the continuance of existing 
municipal undertakings, Article 28(2) GG does have the same eff ect as 
fundamental rights such as Articles 12 and 14 GG (on which municipalities or 
public undertakings are generally not able to rely), in that such rights serve as 
defence rights (Abwehrrechte) against state restrictions.786
However, Article 28(2) GG only allows municipalities to settle their local aff airs 
within ‘the limits of law’. Th us, the Bund and the Länder enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation when regulating the boundaries of such aff airs, as long as the 
traditional institution (i.e. the core or Kernbereich) of municipal self-government 
is left  intact.787 Interferences by the Bund or the Länder which do not remove 
from the municipalities all of their original competences, are only reviewed by 
the courts to the extent that they are in the general interest, reasonable and meet 
the proportionality test.788
Püttner, ‘Der verfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für die Energieversorgung in Deutschland’, 
(1991) Landes- und Kommunalverwaltung (LKV) 209; J Hellermann, J Wieland, Der Schutz 
des Selbstverwaltungsrechts der Kommunen gegenüber Einschränkungen ihrer wirtschaft lichen 
Betätigung im nationalen und europäischen Recht, Köln, 1995, pp. 102 et seq. Municipal supply 
activities are normally subject to the EC competition rules because they are either public 
undertakings or undertakings, which are furnished with special or exclusive rights. 
Article 86(1) EC might also apply to the cross-subsidies between energy supply and other 
public services of municipalities (Querverbund) mentioned supra, see nn. 685, 780 and 
accompanying text. According to the ECJ, subsidies may only be outside the scope of the EC 
state aid rules of Article 87(1) EC if they are necessary in order to warrant the continuation of 
services of general economic interest. Th us, in particular German municipalities and their 
energy supply undertakings seek a more generous application of Article 86(2) EC in conjunction 
with Article 16 EC to the services of general economic interest they pursue. More generally on 
public undertakings, see infra chapter 7 on the European Union.
786 Th e economic operations of municipalities are part of the guarantee of their right to accomplish 
communal tasks under their own authority (eigener Wirkungskreis – original sphere of 
activity), see Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, no. 128. Article 28(2) GG, which is only an objective 
institutional guarantee (not a fundamental right) and which serves as a structuring principle 
of public administration. However this only protects the municipalities against the transfer of 
tasks to state institutions higher in hierarchy, not against the privatization of communal tasks, 
see Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, no. 461. But see also section IV infra as regards the question whether 
municipalities (or, more generally, public undertakings) are exceptionally allowed to invoke 
fundamental rights.
787 Article 28(2) GG also guarantees that municipalities are furnished with a minimum level of 
fi nancial means as a prerequisite for the independent execution of their tasks, and thus also 
such tasks which fall within their own responsibility. Th is does however not give them the 
right to a specifi c source of income. Papier in Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz – Kommentar, 
Article 14 no. 342. Th e State is not allowed, however, to direct the use of the fi nancial means 
available to municipalities too excessively so that their independent responsibility is indirectly 
undermined, see in greater detail, Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, ibid., Article 28 no. 84c. Th e State 
is only allowed to deprive municipalities of administrative tasks with a local character for 
general interest reasons, i.e. if either such tasks are not (or cannot anymore be) executed in an 
orderly fasion or the reasons for deprivation outweigh the constitutional principle of the 
distribution of competences set out in Article 28(2) 1st sentence GG.
788 See BVerfGE 79, 127 – Rastede. Th e diff erence to the usual proportionality test applied (when 
fundamental rights are interfered with) lies in the reduced scope for the court to review the 
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Although Article 28(2) GG does not protect municipal undertakings from 
competition in principle, municipalities are allowed, within certain limits, to 
participate in competition, such as competition for energy supply services. 
Neither the German Grundgesetz nor European law prescribe the subsidiarity of 
public to private economic activity. Th e German Grundgesetz explicitly refers to 
public undertakings and private undertakings, which have (partly) public 
shareholders (gemischt-wirtschaft liche Unternehmen or Eigengesellschaft en).789
Municipalities and (possible legally independent) wholly owned energy supply 
“subsidiaries” remain, however, part of the state executive790 when participating 
in competitive and economic activities. Th is means that energy supply related 
activities of the municipalities, as any other state activity, must be justifi ed by a 
public objective or the general interest. Th e actual energy supply activity of 
municipalities does comply with such objectives on the basis of the residual 
responsibility to guarantee the provision of such services. On the other hand 
activities which are exclusively pursued for reasons of profi t maximization can 
never be legitimate economic activities of municipalities.791
Further, the institutional guarantee of Article 28 (2) GG is limited to local matters 
and the local community, a category which energy supply is generally perceived 
to fall within, at least when concerned with the distribution and supply of 
electricity and gas. Since this task is not exclusively conferred upon municipalities, 
it is thus not an exclusive matter of the local community. Th e Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) by appreciating that the 
decision to perform energy supply at local level is a matter of the local community, 
confi rmed that energy supply can be performed by private, communal and 
private undertakings (partly) held by public shareholders such as municipalities.792 
necessity (second leg of the proportionality test) of legislative measures, which aff ect the whole 
range of communal tasks by, for example, restraining the extent to which municipalities can 
carry out their tasks on their own authority. Restrictions on municipal activities in the energy 
sector may also be imposed by Länder legislation on local government (Gemeindeordnungen). 
As liberalization of the sector progresses, however, some Länder have exempted municipal 
undertakings from such restrictions in order to guarantee unhindered and equal market 
access. It is disputed whether these exemptions are admissible against the background of the 
constitutional principle of local self-government as set out in Article 28(2) GG (see nn. 783, 
797) and given that the fundamental rights of private competitors also need to be considered, 
see in greater detail, Pielow, n. 760, no. 51, with further references.
789 See in more detail as regards the diff erent legal forms of municipal economic operations, 
Ruthig/Storr, n. 780.
790 Cf. Articles 1(3), 20(3) GG. See also Pielow, n. 760. See, however, section IV (1) (d) (bb) infra.
791 See also Pielow, n. 760.
792 Municipalities are not prevented from privatizing or selling their (vertically integrated) energy 
undertakings provided that they ensure that their supply obligations are honoured 
(Privatisierungsfolgenverantwortung). Th is responsibility means that municipalities must 
secure adequate performance and/or liability clauses in the privatization contract, see Ehlers, 
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Accordingly, the legislator is not able to deprive the municipalities of their task to 
supply energy locally and shift  it, for instance, to the districts (Kreise), the 
German states (Länder) or onto the federal level (Bund).793
Th e guarantee of (autonomous local) self-government does not contravene energy 
market liberalization in the EU because EC law treats public or municipal 
undertakings as equal to private undertakings pursuing an economic activity.794 
Such public/municipal undertakings are also covered by the EC fundamental 
freedoms.795 German municipalities are increasingly perceived as normal market 
participants and competitors for services, roles which are not exclusively and 
explicitly conferred upon them by law.796
Th is development is also refl ected by the introduction of the concept of the 
obligation to provide basic energy supply (Grundversorgungspfl icht) according to 
section 36 EnWG, which, however, is likely to keep the municipality-wide energy 
supply in the hands of the municipalities (and their Stadtwerke) for the time 
being. However, this is now open to competition since section 36(2) 1st sentence 
EnWG stipulates that such an ESU will be nominated as a basic supplier which 
“supplies most of the household customers within a network area of general 
n. 697, p. 127. Normally, it can be assumed that private energy supply either in the form of 
operating the distribution networks or supplying energy as a Grundversorger according to s. 36 
EnWG does not raise any concerns in this regard. As to the constitutional and public law 
concerns as regards the communal economic activity in the form of private law undertakings, 
see Pielow, n. 760, nos 68 et seq. As regards the requirement limiting the fi nancial risk 
municipalities are taking when choosing private law legal personality, see Pielow, n. 760, no. 
73.
793 Supra-communal engagement in energy supply, i.e. exceeding the local level and comprising 
of several municipalities or even a whole region, on the other hand, is possible by way of 
consensual cooperation, in particular in order to take advantage of economies of scale in the 
form of communal joint ventures such as, for instance, is the case for EnBW.
794 See further Part 2 Chapter 7 on the European Union. With respect to the relationship between 
municipalities and their private competitors, two issues deserve mention here: one issue, 
which has the potential to distort competition between communal and private energy suppliers, 
is the possibility of municipalities requiring their inhabitants to connect to and use district 
heating (Fernwärme). Th is does not only interfere with the rights of owners of heating 
installations because they cannot use them any longer, but it also excludes actual or potential 
competitors. Th e latter consequence might be seen as an interference with fundamental rights 
of private competitors, in particular Article 12 GG, which protects economic operations. 
Another issue is the virtual incapability of becoming insolvent (and thus ranking higher in 
creditworthiness), which again is a distortion of competition.
795 On the other hand, municipal undertakings are not supposed to enjoy the same level of 
protection as compared to their private competitors, see in more detail, Pielow, n. 760, no. 83, 
and the reference in Article 3(1) Energy Directives 2003 to non-discrimination conditional 
upon institutional organization (of the Member States).
796 Cf. J Kühling, ‘Verfassungs- und kommunalrechtliche Probleme grenzüberschreitender 
Wirtschaft sbetätigung der Gemeinden’, (2001) NJW 177, 182.
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supply.” Th is does not, however, interfere with Article 28 subs. 2 GG because this 
provision, apart from being a continuation of the historic neutrality of German 
energy industry law as regards to who can perform energy supply, refl ects an 
economic decision of the legislature of an allocative nature as regards the 
responsibility for energy supply at local level, which follows the deliberations of 
the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (see above) which concluded that the execution of 
energy supply has historically always been performed by a mix of private, 
communal and private undertakings (partly) held by public shareholders such as 
municipalities. From a more practical point of view, the introduction of the basic 
supply obligation should not meet much resistance by municipalities because it 
merely refl ects the separation of the network operation from energy supply on 
the one hand, and the introduction of competition in energy supply on the other. 
With the introduction of this concept, the municipalities are released from their 
basic responsibility for municipal energy supply, which, with growing 
competition, could have increasingly turned into an economic burden such a 
basic supply obligation usually entails.
Recent developments both in European and German energy law have exerted 
substantial pressure on municipalities to adjust the way they supply services, for 
example by cooperating with other municipalities (public public partnerships 
such as one of the two major shareholders of EnBW), or jointly with private 
undertakings (public private partnerships).797 Also, the trend towards more 
decentralised energy supply by using RES, CHP and district heating, and the 
emphasis on the effi  cient use of energy appear to play into the hands of German 
municipalities.798 Th ese opportunities are even greater because of the 
municipalities’ infl uence on the location of power plants, storage facilities and 
energy networks in the course of city and regional planning.
797 Th ey also become increasingly commercially active outside their territories and even abroad 
(see only RWE). It should be noted though, that the constitutional guarantee of Article 28(2) 
GG (see n. 783) defi nes economic activities of municipalities, see Tettinger in von Mangoldt/
Klein/Starck, Bonner Grundgesetz, Band 2, 5th ed., 2005, Article 28, nos 170, 173, with further 
references; K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 1, 2nd ed., 1984, 
p. 412; E Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Kommunalrecht’, in E Schmidt-Aßmann (ed.), Besonderes 
Verwaltungsrecht, 13th ed., 2005, ch. 1, no. 120. Accordingly, any economic activity 
municipalities seek to carry out (e.g. off ering energy-related services outside their territories) 
must have a specifi c link to matters of the local community. Mere economies of scale are not 
suffi  cient, see B Uhlenhut, Wirtschaft liche Betätigung der Gemeinden außerhalb ihres Gebiets, 
2004, p. 96, with further references. Moreover, a municipality must respect the right of self-
government of other municipalities, Uhlenhut, ibid., p. 203. Consequently, cooperations 
between municipalities are possible, see the example of EnBW. Contra H Jarass, ‘Aktivitäten 
kommunaler Unternehmen außerhalb des Gemeindegebiets’, (2006) DVBl. 1; Kühling, n. 796, 
p. 179.
798 For in-depth analysis, see Pielow, n. 760.
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3. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
In order to develop an understanding of the controversy, which the intention to 
introduce further unbundling measures in the energy supply sector has caused in 
Germany in particular, it is necessary to shed some light on the constitutional 
roles of the BVerfG and the European Convention on Human Rights, and on the 
position the Court is taking with respect to the relationship between EC law and 
the GG.
Article 20(3) GG, one of the core provisions of the German Grundgesetz provides 
that the legislature is subject to the constitutional order of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and the executive and judiciary (apart obviously from also being 
subject to the constitutional order) to law and justice. Article 20(3) GG is 
reinforced by a constitutional judiciary (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit) with the 
Federal Constitutional Court as the highest court in Germany.
Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht is an independent constitutional institution of the 
Federation, and as such, it can force all other institutions and constitutional 
powers to obey the constitution. It can thus also be characterized as the guardian 
of the German Constitution, which, amongst other roles, is the fi nal arbiter and 
interpreter of the constitution. Nevertheless, the German constitution does not 
render the Bundesverfassungsgericht a primus inter pares but creates a coordinated 
order, in which the BVerfG (and the judiciary in general) ranks on equal footing 
with the other constitutional powers.799
Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht participates in the development of the constitution 
constructively, i.e. it not only applies and construes the law but by construing it, 
it also develops it albeit within the limits of the German Grundgesetz.800 Th e 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, is not allowed to review legislation with 
respect to its underlying purpose (Zweckmäßigkeit) as long as the purpose of 
legislation stays within the boundaries of the German Grundgesetz. When it 
declares a provision of law unconstitutional, it must not put its opinion in place 
of the legislature’s view. According to the principle of construing legislation to be 
in conformity with the Constitution to the fullest extent possible, which the 
BVerfG has developed itself, if there are several options of interpretation, it must 
give priority to an interpretation, which renders the legislation compatible with 
the German Grundgesetz.801
799 Maunz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 94 no. 3.
800 Maunz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 94 no. 4.
801 Maunz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 94 no. 6.
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Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht can declare any unconstitutional law, even 
parliamentary legislation, void (ex tunc)802; such a declaration has the force 
of law. Moreover, the so-called reference to the BVerfG by the courts 
(Richtervorlage) according to Article 100(1) GG and the constitutional complaint 
(Verfassungsbeschwerde) according to Article 93(1) no. 4a are an almost absolute 
guarantee that an unconstitutional law will in fact reach the BVerfG for judicial 
review.803
European Convention on Human Rights
Legislation which infringes international law, and in particular international 
treaties, is not void or invalid within German boundaries.804 Th is does, however, 
not apply to the general rules of (in particular customary) international law.805 As 
802 Sovereign acts of the executive and the judiciary, which are based upon laws declared void 
later, remain in force in most cases, see s. 79 BVerfGG (Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(Law on the Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 12 March 1951, revised version (Neufassung) 
published on 11 August 1993, BGBl. I, p. 1473). Above all, however, Article 100(1) GG confers 
a sole right to quash laws (Verwerfungsmonopol) on the BVerfG, which means that nobody 
should rely on a law being void until it has been declared void by the BVerfG. Th e monopoly on 
quashing laws according to Article 100(1) GG also means that any court in Germany, which 
considers a provision of a law unconstitutional must stay the proceedings and refer to the 
BVerfG for judicial review; only the BVerfG can tell the parliamentary legislator who is directly 
legitimized by the German people that it has infringed constitutional law, BVerfGE 17, 208, 
210.
803 Apart from being the fi nal arbiter in questions of interferences with German fundamental 
rights, against the background of the constitutional principle that every act of the executive 
requires an authorization in the law (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes). Together with the principle of the 
priority of the law (Vorrang des Gesetzes, i.e. decisions of the legislator bind the administration 
and take priority over the decision-making powers of the administration), it is the expression 
of the constitutional principle of the legality of administration (Gesetzmäßigkeit der 
Verwaltung). Highly important in the context given, in order to hold the executive and with it 
eventually also the legislature accountable more eff ectively and rendering its acts more 
transparent (legal certainty), the BVerfG has also developed the theory that all material issues 
relevant for the enforcement of parliamentary legislation must be provided for in the law 
(Wesentlichkeitstheorie). Th is principle derives from the authorization of the executive by 
parliamentary law according to Article 80(1) 2nd sentence GG to set secondary legislation (or 
statutory law or regulations) (Rechtsverordnungen). Such an authorization is only constitutional 
if it provides for content and substance, aim and extent of such secondary legislation. Th e 
Wesentlichkeitstheorie requires the legislature to resolve all essential aspects of the subject-
matter to be regulated itself, i.e. it is not allowed to leave the regulation of a subject-matter to 
the executive. Th e legislature should at no time be allowed to shift  its responsibility to the 
executive. Th e jurisprudence on the principle on the Wesentlichkeitstheorie is such that 
according to its deliberations and content, the principle can and must be applied to all and 
every thinkable legislative authorization conferred upon executive organs.
804 See BVerfG, 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, 14.10.2004; see also Herzog in Maunz/Dürig, n. 
790, Article 20 VI no. 20.
805 For the peculiar German defi nition of this term, see Herdegen in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, 
Article 25 nos 19 et seq.
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part of the federal law such rules have direct eff ect in Germany. According to 
Article 25 1st sentence GG, they rank below German constitutional law but above 
formal federal legislation, over which they take priority.806
Th e ECHR and its protocols are international treaties, which have been 
incorporated into German law according to Article 59(2) GG. Th us, they do not 
belong to German constitutional law but have the mere status of a federal law 
(Bundesgesetz), which has to be observed by the courts and applied when 
interpreting national law. Th e guarantees of the Convention and its protocols do 
thus not supersede the provisions of the GG. Th e Convention and its jurisprudence 
do, however, serve as a tool or aid for the interpretation and the determination of 
content and reach of German fundamental rights and the principles of the rule of 
law as set out in the GG, at least insofar as they do restrict or reduce the 
fundamental rights protection of the GG.807
Th e decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention have agreed to adhere to, are, nevertheless 
of particular importance. Th e binding character of decisions of the ECtHR 
extends to all state institutions and obliges them within their sphere of 
competence and without contravening their commitment to law and justice 
(Article 20(3) GG) to terminate continuing violations of the Convention. It is the 
task of the BVerfG to prevent and eliminate any violations of international law to 
the greatest possible extent. Th is is particularly true for the international law 
obligations deriving from the ECHR, which contributes to the promotion of the 
development of fundamental rights in Europe.808
Th e elaborations on the relationship between the GG and the ECHR show that 
Germany possesses its very own fundamental rights standard (compared to the 
other two Member States under review here), which the BVerfG has been 
protecting and developing over the years since the German Grundgesetz entered 
into force in 1949, particularly in the context of an ever growing integration of 
806 Herdegen in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 25 nos 42–3.
807 N. 804.
808 Ibid. According to Article 35 ECHR, the ECtHR deals with a complaint falling under its 
jurisdiction aft er all domestic remedies have been exhausted. Jurisdiction according to 
Article 1 ECHR has to be understood as “primarily territorial”, see ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava 
Yollari Turizm v Ireland, no. 45036/98 (GC), ECHR 2005-VI, no. 136, thus making it possible 
to declare applications connected to Community acts admissible ratio materiae. When 
examining Article 1 ECHR, the Court thus focuses on the concrete national decision rather 
than on its original basis in EC law. If the request of a preliminary ruling of the ECJ according 
to Article 234 EC had been refused at some stage during domestic proceedings, this needs to 
be appealed against before the BVerfG fi rst as the ECJ is considered a legally competent judge 
according to Article 101 GG.
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Germany into the European Union. In particular the issue of whether there is 
suffi  cient fundamental rights protection at EU level has repeatedly called the 
BVerfG into action.
4. APPLICABILITY OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Aft er much scepticism of the BVerfG in its Solange I decision of 1974 as regards 
the standard of fundamental rights protection in the EU, it changed its view aft er 
analysing the development of fundamental rights protection by the ECJ 
culminating in its famous judgement in Hauer809, certifying that the ECJ had 
developed a standard of fundamental rights protection equivalent to German 
fundamental rights protection.810 Th e BVerfG declared constitutional complaints 
against acts of the Community for violating fundamental rights inadmissible as 
long as (Solange) the level of protection of fundamental rights by the ECJ achieved 
so far does not fall short of the level required by the German Grundgesetz as 
indispensable.811
In this so-called Solange II decision of 1986, the BVerfG clarifi ed that Article 
24(1) GG is the constitutional basis, which enables Treaties to transfer sovereign 
powers to supra-national institutions and the law passed by such institutions to 
take priority over national law in terms of validity and applicability, based on a 
corresponding national order of applicability (Rechtsanwendungsbefehl). Th e 
order of applicability contained in the Act approving the EEC Treaty (and hence 
Germany’s accession to the EEC) provides for the direct validity of Community 
Regulations for the Federal Republic of Germany and its applicability in priority 
to national law.812
As a consequence, the BVerfG initially rejected the admissibility of constitutional 
complaints against acts of the Community. It took the view that Regulations of 
809 N. 536.
810 Th is analysis has been undertaken rather superfi cially to date: although the Court in its Solange 
II decision, BVerfGE 73, 339, listed comprehensively the developments in fundamental rights 
protection, it did not go into detail in particular as regards the depth and breadth of 
fundamental rights protection (Kontrolldichte) and did not review whether there has ever been 
an eff ective protection; see in this respect also M Cornils, ‘Article 23 Abs. 1 GG: 
Abwägungsposten oder Kollisionsregel?’, (2004) Archiv des öff entlichen Rechts (AöR) 336, 
375, with further references. In BVerfGE 102, 147, 162 – Bananenmarktordnung, the BVerfG 
avoids any new discussion of the question of compatibility of the two fundamental rights 
standards.
811 BVerfGE 73, 339, 378 et seq., 387 – Solange II.
812 Ibid., 375. Th is is obviously in contradiction to the supremacy claim of the ECJ but can be 
observed in most of the constitutional laws of the Member States, see Cornils, n. 810.
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the Community (according to Article 189(2) EEC, now Article 249(2) EC) are not 
acts of German public authorities.813 In its Maastricht decision814, however, the 
BVerfG reversed its approach in that it emphasized its task to generally safeguard 
the eff ective protection of fundamental rights for the inhabitants of Germany, 
including safeguarding them against the sovereignty of the European 
Communities: “Acts of a special public authority of a supra-national organization 
separate from the public authorities of the Member States also aff ect fundamental 
rights benefi ciaries in Germany. Th ey thus aff ect the guarantees of the German 
Grundgesetz and the tasks of the Federal Constitutional Court, which are 
concerned with fundamental rights protection in Germany and in this respect 
[are safeguards] not only against German state authorities […].”815
Th is can be seen as a confi rmation of the changed view of the BVerfG that 
European law is part of a uniform legal order applicable in Germany. Such 
applicability derives from and is based upon the German Act sanctioning the EC 
Treaty (Zustimmungsgesetz), which is the authority for applicability of the foreign 
law, to which the GG opens itself via Article 23(1) GG.816
Th is new view has basically not changed as of today. Th us, the law of the EU as 
derived law is indirectly also subject to the control of the Federal Constitutional 
Court.817 Since the Maastricht decision of 1993, the relationship of the national 
constitutional courts to the European courts has been problematic in two 
respects. It is still not resolved who actually has the last say as regards eff ective 
fundamental rights protection in the European Union. A further confl ict is about 
who is competent to check compliance with the principle of conferred powers in 
Article 5(1) EC, or in other words, the distribution of competences between the 
Member States and the EC and its observance by the European institutions 
(so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz).
As regards the protection of fundamental rights, in its 1993 Maastricht decision 
on the ratifi cation of the Maastricht Treaty, the BVerfG assumes a relationship of 
cooperation (“Kooperationsverhältnis”) with the ECJ.818 With respect to 
813 BVerfGE 22, 293, 297; 58, 1, 27.
814 BVerfGE 89, 155, 175 – Maastricht.
815 Ibid.
816 Article 23(1) GG is the successor of Article 24(1) GG and incorporates the Solange II case law 
into the German Constitution. Th is will not change with the new Treaty of Lisbon. M Herdegen, 
Europarecht, 2006, § 11 nos 5, 22.
817 Moreover, the membership to the European Union can even be annulled by the Member States 
as “Masters of the Treaties”, see n. 814, 190.
818 Which it actually bases on Article 234 EC (references by national courts to the ECJ for 
preliminary rulings), see BVerfG, 14 May 2007, 1 BvR 2036/05 – TEHG (implementation of the 
EC Emission Trading Directive).
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European legal acts, it is for the ECJ to protect fundamental rights. Only if it can 
be proved that the protection granted by the ECJ generally and evidently falls 
short of the level of protection, which the GG requires as indispensable, will the 
BVerfG resume its jurisdiction over the applicability of EC law in Germany.819 
Th is jurisprudence was confi rmed by the BVerfG in its 2000 decision on the 
Bananenmarktordnung.820 Th is decision, however, introduced high admissibility 
hurdles by requiring a strict burden of proof as regards justifying the claim that 
the level of protection of fundamental rights as demanded by Solange II has 
generally detoriated.821 Th us, only if it is substantiated that the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ has detoriated below a level of fundamental rights protection comparable 
to the fundamental rights protection of the German Grundgesetz in a range of 
decisions or in a grave individual case will the BVerfG assume jurisdiction.822 
Th e requirement of suffi  cient substantiation has so far not been fulfi lled in any 
proceedings.823
However, with the prospect of the introduction of ownership unbundling or 
independent system operation, this might change for the fi rst time. Should the 
proposals for Energy Directives enter into force as they are, the ECJ might 
consider the prescriptions for ownership unbundling and/or “deep” ISOs 
compatible with European fundamental rights. Should, however, the BVerfG (if 
called upon) come to the conclusion that the protection of fundamental rights 
has fallen below a level comparable to the protection of German fundamental 
rights, notably as regards the protection of the right to property, then the question 
might be asked whether this indeed is such a grave individual case.
819 Ibid.
820 BVerfGE 102, 147, 161 et seq., 164 – Bananenmarktordnung; see also Herdegen; n. 816, § 11 no. 
28; K Hailbronner, G Jochum, Europarecht – Teil 1, 2005, no. 588; R Streinz, Europarecht, 5th 
ed., 2001, no. 217. Confi rmed by the BVerfG, BVerfGE, 111, 10: “Community law is not 
measured by the Federal Constitutional Court at the fundamental rights standard of the 
Grundgesetz. Constitutional complaints and references by courts, which invoke a violation of 
fundamental rights of the Grundgesetz by secondary Community law, are per se inadmissible 
if their substantiation does not show that the development of European law including the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice has slumped below the indispensable protection 
of fundamental rights of the Grundgesetz.”
821 Or, it is submitted, has actually never existed taken the superfi cial assessment of fundamental 
rights protection in Solange II, see 810. Such proof can in principle be introduced in any court 
in Germany which is even incidentally concerned with a possible review of European 
legislation, for instance, when assessing the legitimacy of German legislation implementing a 
European Directive; see in this regard, BVerwG, 30 June 2005, 7 C 26.04 – TEHG, p. 18.
822 See, for instance, Herdegen; n. 816, § 11 no. 32.
823 See, e.g., BVerfG in re Bananenmarktordnung, n. 810, and BVerfG, 31 March 1998, 2 BvR 
1877/97 and 50/98.
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In any event, this reservation continues to exist and contrasts with the 
unrestricted primacy of EC law advocated by the ECJ.824 Th is was confi rmed by 
824 ECJ, C-6/64 – Costa v ENEL, (1964) ECR 585, C-106/77, Simmenthal v Administrazione delle 
Finanze, (1978) ECR I-629, no. 21 et seq. Th is is the expression of a monist or monistic legal 
order as described in chapter 6 on the Netherlands. Th e ECtHR also seems not to recognize the 
primacy of the EC fundamental rights protection with the European Union as a reservation 
similar to the BVerfG’s was expressed by the ECtHR (with respect to EC law) in re Bosphorus, 
n. 808. In March 1997, Bosphorus complained to the ECtHR that Ireland violated his right to 
property according to Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR when fulfi lling the obligations 
of its EU membership. Th e ECtHR inter alia examined whether the presumption applies that 
Ireland complied with its commitments under the ECHR in fulfi lling the obligations of its EU 
membership in the case at hand, and whether any such presumption has been rebutted. Th e 
ECtHR took the stance that such a presumption can indeed be rebutted if it was found in a 
particular case that the protection of the Convention rights was manifestly defi cient; Judge 
Ress warned in his concurring opinion that the concept of presumption of Convention 
compliance should not be interpreted as excluding a case by case review by the ECtHR of 
potential Convention violations. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation would 
be outweighed by the Convention’s role as a “constitutional instrument of European public 
order” in the fi eld of human rights, see Bosphorus, n. 808, no. 156. Th e Court continued that 
having examined the legal regime for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, this 
protection can and could at the relevant time be considered to be “equivalent” to that of the 
Convention, see Bosphorus, n. 808, nos 161–165. Th e Court did make it clear that it is prepared 
to examine the specifi c circumstances of future cases in order to eff ectively review potential 
shortcomings in the protection of fundamental rights on the Community level. Th is might, 
however, mean that the ECtHR will not involve itself in fully reviewing Community legislation 
but rather review the Community system of fundamental rights protection more generally and 
abstractly, see K Kuhnert, ‘Bosphorus – Double standards in European human rights 
protection?’, (2006) Utrecht Law Review 177, 185, which might also be what the German 
BVerfG expressed with its Solange II doctrine (see n. 810). Consequently, the presumption was 
upheld that Ireland did not depart from its obligations under ECHR when it honoured its 
obligations under its EU membership. Th e Court also held that the protection of Bosphorus’ 
Convention rights was not manifestly defi cient and, thus, the presumption of compliance with 
the ECHR by Ireland had not been rebutted. Th e application and implementation of primary 
and secondary Community law respectively by the Member States is subject to review by the 
ECtHR because they originally participated in the legislative process and are considered the 
original legislators of Community legislation responsible for any shortcomings in this respect. 
In Cantoni v France, no. 17862/91 (GC), ECHR 1996-V, the ECtHR enabled an applicant to 
challenge a national act based on EC law before the ECtHR aft er having exhausted all other 
remedies available. Following this case, the ECtHR was able to examine whether the national 
act originating in EC law amounted to a violation of the ECHR and whether the ECJ provides 
equivalent protection of the applicant’s fundamental rights. Th e review of the compatibility of 
primary EC law with the ECHR became possible in Matthews v UK, no. 24833/94 (GC), ECHR 
1999-I, because the EC Treaties are the result of the Member States own legislation of 
approval. Th e direct review of EC legislation should become possible at the latest when the EU 
accedes to the ECHR, which the Treaty of Lisbon, see n. 368 in Part 1 Chapter 3, provides for 
once it has entered into force. Consequently, the Court assumes the competence to review 
primary and secondary EC law indirectly through examining (implementation) measures of 
the Member States based on primary and secondary EC law respectively. With the “manifest 
defi ciency” approach, the ECtHR has aff orded itself considerable discretion emphasizing its 
view of being the fi nal arbiter of fundamental rights protection in Europe. In this respect, see 
also Kuhnert, ibid., 188. Th e ECtHR decision in re Bosphorus bears some resemblance to the 
Solange II doctrine of the BVerfG (see n. 810), see also F Schorkopf, ‘Th e European Court of 
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the BVerfG in its 2004 Görgülü decision, in which albeit that it was concerned 
with the relationship to the ECHR it incidentally refers, with respect to the 
European Union, to a “reservation of sovereignty (cf. Article 23(1) GG), which 
has indeed far receded”.825 According to this decision, international law deriving 
from Treaties is only applicable in Germany if incorporated in the national legal 
order both correctly in form and in accordance with substantial constitutional 
law.826 Th is continues to be the case even aft er its 2005 decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant827 where the BVerfG declared the implementing law of the 
framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant void. Th e legislator had not 
suffi  ciently used the existing implementation options in particular with regard to 
crimes with strong national bonds, as required by the GG for the protection of 
German nationals.828 As the framework decision had off ered such options, the 
BVerfG was able to base its decision on its own case law. According to this case 
law, the choice made by the German legislature as a consequence of EC law 
granting the Member States some discretion with respect to national 
implementing measures, is always fully verifi able.829 Th is last statement was 
confi rmed by the BVerfG in re Mischfuttermittel830 and, which is closer to the 
context given here, in TEHG.831
According to the Mischfuttermittel decision, the observance of the EC 
fundamental rights standard depends on the degree to which the provisions of 
an EC Directive are mandatory. Only in the case of an exact implementation 
where national law exactly replicates what has been mandated by the Directive, 
can the implementing Act be measured against the EC fundamental rights 
standard alone. If there is, however, a certain range of interpretations possible 
under the Directive, which confers upon the national legislator some leeway with 
respect to the interpretation and structure of the Directive’s provisions to be 
implemented, the national legislature acts under its national authority and, thus 
the resulting law is to this degree to be evaluated according to German 
fundamental rights.
Human Rights’ Judgment in the Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland’, (2005) 
German Law Journal 1255, 1264.
825 BVerfGE 111, 307, 319.
826 See ibid. Th is is the expression of a dualist or dualistic legal system as in place in Germany and 
the UK.
827 BVerfGE 113, 273 – Europäischer Haft befehl.
828 Ibid., 292 et seq., 302.
829 BVerfG, 9 January 2001, 1 BvR 1036/99. See also J Komárek, ‘European Constitutionalism and 
the European Arrest Warrant – in search of the limits of the “contrapunctual principles”’, 
(2007) CML Rev. 9.
830 See n. 820.
831 See n. 818.
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In its TEHG ruling, the BVerfG confi rmed the decision of the Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht – BVerwG), which measured 
the essential principles of the implementing law (which followed the Directive’s 
essential principles) against the standard of the community fundamental right to 
property, and the specifi c provisions based thereon against the fundamental 
rights standard of the GG. Th e BVerfG, however, stressed again, in another more 
recent decision on the TEHG832, that the national implementation of binding 
provisions of a Directive, i.e. those provisions not leaving any discretion to the 
Member States, are not measured against standard of the GG as long as they fulfi l 
the Solange II doctrine.
As the case European Arrest Warrant shows, the BVerfG restrains itself by means 
of its own “cooperation” doctrine even if it explicitly leaves open its option to 
check the conformity of the Framework Decision (taken by the European Union), 
on which German implementing legislation is based, with the GG.833 
Consequently, this decision can be taken as a good example of the willingness of 
the BVerfG even in the area of the EU’s third pillar law, to grant legal protection 
in cooperation with the ECJ and in line with its Maastricht decision according to 
which the reserve competence (to enforce fundamental rights protection) will 
only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.834 Th is is also refl ected in its 
Teilzeit decision of January 2001835, where the BVerfG clarifi ed that in the case of 
an alleged violation of fundamental rights, the correct route of action for eff ective 
fundamental rights protection against European legal acts is the reference by 
national courts to the ECJ according to Article 234 EC.836 On the other hand, the 
BVerfG does indeed recognize defi ciencies in the comprehensive review of the 
proportionality principle by the ECJ when measuring such a review against the 
level or depth of review (Kontrolldichte) according to German constitutional law. 
According to the BVerfG, this defi ciency was however remedied by the BVerwG 
in its TEHG ruling837 as “part of the dialogue of the courts throughout the 
832 13 March 2007, 1 BvF 1/05.
833 Which it might have done if, for instance, the Framework Decision had not off ered alternatives 
acceptable under the German standard of fundamental rights protection. Th is would have 
actually meant that the implementing law was to be treated as a word for word translation of 
European legislation into German law as if there was no scope for interpretation.
834 See I Pernice, Das Verhältnis europäischer zu nationalen Gerichten im europäischen 
Verfassungsverbund, 2006.
835 See n. 829.
836 Confi rmed by the BVerfG, n. 832. It is still not clear whether the BVerfG must make a reference 
to the ECJ according to Article 234 EC before it quashes secondary Community law because of 
defi cient fundamental rights protection or for a lack of competence. In this context, it seems 
appropriate for the BVerfG to actually have to make such a reference because only aft er 
obtaining the ECJ’s view is it credible for the BVerfG to evaluate whether the German standard 
of fundamental rights protection is maintained or a competence complied with.
837 See n. 821.
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Community”838 by applying the European interpretation of the proportionality 
test with a German standard of review with respect to the proportionality of the 
EC Emission Trading Directive. It is submitted though that had the BVerwG 
come to a negative conclusion as regards the proportionality of the Emission 
Trading Directive, it would have had to make a reference to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling according to Article 234 EC. Had the ECJ declared the 
Directive proportionate according to its own “shallow” proportionality test839, 
this would then have seriously tested the Solange II doctrine as developed by the 
BVerfG for the fi rst time.
Coming back to the Maastricht decision, European legal acts without a 
corresponding competence or exceeding an existing competence, i.e. legal acts 
“ultra vires”, are not applicable in Germany. Th e BVerfG explains that if European 
institutions applied or developed the EU Treaty in a manner, which is not 
envisaged by the Treaty as refl ected in the German Act approving it 
(Zustimmungsgesetz) and, consequently, not by the authorization of Article 23(1) 
GG for Germany to participate in the European integration process840, then legal 
acts resulting therefrom would not be valid within the area of German 
sovereignty.841 German public authorities would be prevented for constitutional 
reasons from applying such acts in Germany. Accordingly, the BVerfG checks 
whether legal acts of European institutions stay within the boundaries of the 
sovereign powers conferred upon them or whether they exceed them.842
Th e BVerfG has as yet not developed any limitations to its control competence 
similar to the self-imposed one in the area of fundamental rights protection. As 
can be inferred from the Alcan843 and Tanja Kreil844 cases where the BVerfG 
checked whether the ECJ acted ultra vires, in the latter case coupled with checking 
whether the application of European legislation was ultra vires, the control 
competence in this respect is not just a reserve competence. Th e BVerfG sees 
itself competent as a matter of principle and without referring to a cooperation 
relationship with the ECJ as it does in the area of fundamental rights 
protection.845
838 See n. 818.
839 See Part 2 Chapter 7 on the European Union.
840 See Hailbronner/Jochum, n. 820, no. 587; possible decisions of incompatability by the BVerfG 
would lead to the corresponding European legal act not having any legal eff ects within 
Germany, see Herdegen; n. 816, § 11 no. 26.
841 See BVerfGE 89, 155, 175; see also Herdegen; n. 816, § 11 no. 29; Hailbronner/Jochum, n. 820, 
no. 587; diff erent R Streinz, Europarecht, 5th ed., 2001, nos 214, 214a.
842 BVerfGE 89, 155, 188.
843 BVerfG, 17 Feburary 2000, 2 BvR 1210/98.
844 ECJ, C-285/ 98 – Kreil v Germany, (2000) ECR I-69; C-186/01 – Dory v Germany, (2003) ECR 
I-2479;.
845 See Pernice, n. 834.
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It can thus be said that the German Federal Constitutional Court reserves a 
control competence in the area of fundamental rights protection as well as 
regards an overstepping of the competences conferred upon the European Union 
(also called “Kompetenz-Kompetenz”).846 Th is competence can also be seen as a 
reservation of sovereignty, which is certainly not an extensive one but is solely 
meant as a last resort. In the area of fundamental rights protection, the control 
only takes place, if at all, within a “relationship of cooperation”; a clear 
determination of when legal acts are “breaking free” acts (ausbrechende 
Rechtsakte) or “ultra vires” remains an open issue for the time being.
Applying what has just been set out in general terms to the unbundling 
requirements of the 2003 Energy Directives but also to future EC Directives 
requiring further unbundling measures, an exact national implementation has 
not and most probably will not be required.847 As regards a future EC Directive, 
further unbundling requirements will inevitably aff ect the ownership rights of 
the respective national energy supply industries. As the ownership structure and 
network composition of the energy supply industries in the Member States is 
rather diverse, a “one size fi ts all” Directive is unlikely to enter into force. Th is is 
further emphasized by Article 295 EC, which allows for diff erent systems of 
ownership rights.848 In order to achieve an EU-wide minimum standard of 
energy supply network ownership, the diff erent national systems would have to 
adjust diff erent components of the property ownership structure of their 
networks and industry structure.849
846 Th e latter control competence might, for instance, also become relevant if the European 
legislature albeit furnished with a competence is not allowed to use it, as might be the case if 
when legislating for ownership unbundling of energy networks based on Article 95 EC, 
Article 295 EC is not suffi  ciently observed.
847 According to Cameron, n. 427, pp. 8, 19, the current EC Energy Directives leave suffi  cient 
scope for diversity in the national implementation procedures “in proper appreciation of the 
wide diversity in their resource base, legal tradition, industry structure, policy choices […].” 
See also albeit more critically, Hancher, n. 118. Th e unbundling provisions of the current set of 
EC Energy Directives lack the precision (Bestimmtheit) required to allow the German 
implementing law, the EnWG, to be measured against the EC fundamental rights standard. 
One example is s. 8(1) and (4) no. 1, 2nd example EnWG, which exceeds the requirements of 
Articles 10(2)(a) and 15(2)(a) Electricity Directive 2003, and Articles 9(2)(a) and 13(2)(a) Gas 
Directive 2003 by not only forbidding the same management from being responsible both for 
the network business and for any other undertaking of the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertaking but also from personnel having the fi nal say in decisions essential for the non-
discriminatory operation of the networks. Another example is the allocation of network 
ownership in the course of legally unbundling the network operations within the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertaking, which leaves it to the Member States to decide whether 
they want to see the network ownership located at holding level or in the network operation 
subsidiary.
848 See already Part 1 Chapter 3.
849 Th us, one and the same Directive directed to all Member States is unlikely to be capable of 
mandating a word for word implementation. In the unlikely case that this nevertheless 
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As an act of the European Union legislature, the fundamental decision to impose 
independent network operation upon the European energy markets would have 
to be measured against European law and fundamental rights as protected by the 
ECJ.850 Any measures prescribed in a Directive and implementing this basic 
decision into national law, however, are to be measured at the GG if they, which is 
very likely, leave the Member States a choice between, for example, diff erent ways 
of guaranteeing independent network operations (such as is the case of the draft  
Energy Directives), which leaves the German Parliament the opportunity to 
implement an option which is still compatible with the German Grundgesetz.851
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES ARISING IN 
CONTEXT OF FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
LEGISLATION
As has been explained above, German legislation introducing further unbundling 
measures (either unilaterally or based on EC legislation) would have to comply 
with the fundamental rights standard of the German Grundgesetz, which is 
outlined in this section IV.
happens, or in the case where an EC Regulation is introduced, the assumption that EC law is 
applicable in the event of review is based upon the further assumption that the Community 
fundamental rights standard is generally equivalent to the German standard (see the BVerfG 
in re Solange II, n. 810).
850 See further in Part 2 Chapter 7 on the European Union.
851 One way of ensuring that such an option is accounted for in EU legislation is by German 
government representatives taking infl uence in the Council of Ministers and voting 
accordingly. In this regard, see, for instance, BVerfG, 12 May 1989, 2 BvQ 3/89, 22 December 
1992, 2 BvR 557/88, M Heintzen, ‘Zur Frage der Grundrechtsbindung der deutschen Mitglieder 
des EG-Ministerrats’, (1992) Der Staat 367, and Cornils, n. 810. In re Europäischer Haft befehl, 
n. 827, the BVerfG states (translation by the author): “Th e legislature was obliged to apply the 
implementation options, which the Framework Decision gives the Member States, with utmost 
respect of (German) fundamental rights. […] Th e legislator could have chosen for an 
implementation showing this utmost respect for (German) fundamental rights without 
infringing the binding goals of the framework decision because the framework decision 
contains exceptions, which give Germany the opportunity to account for the fundamental 
rights requirements fl owing from Article 16(2) GG. […] Th e exhaustion of the option given by 
the framework law in the course of implementing it into national law would have avoided a 
violation by the Law on the European Arrest Warrant (Europäischen Haft befehlsgesetz) of the 
fundamental right to protection against extradition and the principles of the rule of law, which 
are applicable in this regard.”.
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1. RIGHT TO PROPERTY, ARTICLE 14 GG
Th e evaluation of full ownership unbundling, including by way of share split, and 
by the Independent System Operator model as proposed by the European 
Commission852 in the context of fundamental rights as applied in Germany 
touches upon the right to property, the freedom of occupation and of economic 
activity (Article 12(1) GG) and the freedom of association (Article 9(1) GG). Th e 
most obvious fundamental right is discussed here fi rst, which is the right to 
property853, more specifi cally the right to own energy networks.
a. Subject-matter of protection
Th e guarantee of the right to property according to Article 14 GG is to “safeguard 
proprietary freedom, which makes an independent, self-determined way of life 
possible.”854 Th us, this guarantee is closely related to personal freedom855 and of 
essential importance for economic activity (wirtschaft liche Betätigungsfreiheit).856 
Apart from its function of safeguarding proprietary freedom, this guarantee also 
ensures legal certainty in that it protects the confi dence of the benefi ciary of this 
fundamental right (Grundrechtsträger) that such right continues to exist.857 All 
proprietary rights granted by law are protected including share ownership (as 
opposed to asset ownership).858 Further, besides the mere possession of property, 
the protection of Article 14 GG also includes the free use of property and the 
ability to dispose of it859, including the free decision to allow third parties to use 
852 Th ese further unbundling measures have been explained in the Introduction.
853 Article 14 GG reads as follows (translation by the author):
“(1) Th e right to property and the right of succession are guaranteed. Th eir substance and 
limitations shall be determined by law.
(2) Ownership obliges. Its use shall also serve the general interest.
(3) Expropriation is only admissible in the general interest. It may only be enforced if so 
ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation. 
Such compensation is to be determined by way of establishing a fair balance between the 
general interest and the interests of the parties involved. […].”
854 See BVerfGE 79, 292, 303; 83, 201, 208; 97, 350, 371; 102, 1, 15.
855 BVerfGE 24, 367, 389; 53, 257, 290; 100, 226, 241; 102, 1, 15, 17.
856 BVerfGE 51, 193, 218; 78, 58, 73; 101, 54, 75; 102, 1, 18; BVerwGE 81, 329, 341.
857 Wendt in Sachs, GG – Kommentar, 3rd ed., 2003, Article 14 no. 1.
858 BVerfGE 5, 290 (351); see BVerfG 30 May 2007, 1 BvR 390/04; see also n. 905. See also Papier in 
Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 nos 195–6. Th ere are, however, obvious signifi cant diff erences 
between share owners and owners operating the undertaking themselves by assuming personal 
liability, see BVerfGE 50, 290, 342. Th us, this diff erence leads to diff erent repercussions for the 
legislature with respect to the determination of the substance and the limitations of share 
ownership. In its decision in re Montan-Mitbestimmung, the BVerfG, BVerfGE 90, 367, 389, 
has thus concluded that share ownership enjoys a lesser degree of protection whereas the social 
obligation (Sozailbindung, see n. 104) of share ownership is particularly pronounced.




the property, in particular for a consideration.860 As the right to property includes 
the right of the owner to use the property for his private purposes (Privatnützigkeit), 
it also protects the entrepreneurial freedom to use material and fi nancial assets 
(Sach- und Finanzmittel) in the production process (a freedom, which is also 
attributed to the freedom of economic activity in Article 12(1) GG) and to organize 
and structure his business. Th rough Article 19(3) GG, private legal persons also 
enjoy protection of their property. Further, the right to own established and active 
economic operations (Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb) is 
also protected by Article 14 GG.861
Finally, at least in the context of further unbundling measures, it is worthwhile 
to emphasize the right to exercise control as another component of the right to 
property.862 In particular the control rights of shareholders over the undertaking 
they own shares in are worth mentioning and, in this context, their power to 
determine or at least to give global directions with respect to the way the 
undertaking operates, also with regard to its property. According to the 
competition law defi nition of control, the right to control can be defi ned as the 
power to exercise decisive infl uence on the strategic economic behaviour of the 
undertaking.863 Th e right to control derives from the right to use and the right to 
dispose and thus partly overlaps with each of them. As a result, the characteristics 
of the right to property as protected by Article 14 GG comprise of:
– the right to exercise control over the subject matter of property, which is the 
expression of the positive right to proceed with the property as seen fi t (as 
opposed to the negative right to exclude others from benefi ting from one’s 
property);
– the right to use the property in the sense of receiving the profi ts it produces, 
for instance, by way of profi t distribution; and
– the right to dispose or transfer the property to third parties according to the 
owner’s choice.
860 BVerfGE 98, 17, 35. As regards the entrepreneurial freedom to use tangible and fi nancial means 
in the process of production and to organize the structure of the undertaking, see Schmidt-
Preuß in Baur et al. (eds), Unbundling in der Energiewirtschaft , n. 539, no. 8.
861 Th is view is supported by the BGH, BGHZ 23, 157, 162 et seq., and the BVerwG, BVerwGE 62, 
224, 226. Th e BVerfG, in principle, also recognizes the protection of this subject-matter but 
only to the extent that the legal basis on which the business has been established also enjoys 
protection, see BVerfGE 58, 300, 353. Consequently, any circumstances not covered by the 
right to property do not enjoy the protection of Article 14 GG.
862 See already Introduction.
863 For the term ‘control’, see Introduction.
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b. Expropriation and regulation864
Having briefl y established what the subject-matter of the German fundamental 
right to property are, it now has to be appreciated that Article 14 GG contains 
diff erent levels of protection, which have diff erent prerequisites. On an level of 
principle, ownership can be regulated in Germany by way of determining its 
substance and limitations (Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung) and the owner 
may be expropriated. Th e boundaries between regulation and expropriation, in 
particular where compensation payments may become obligatory are, however, 
rather complicated to draw; compensation (Ausgleichszahlungen) to remedy 
basically disproportionate regulation occurs only exceptionally whereas 
compensation payments (Entschädigung) are required in cases of legitimate 
expropriations.
Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG allows for the determination of the substance and 
the limitations of the right to property. Article 14(3) GG sets out the possibility 
for expropriation. Article 14(2) GG prescribes that the use of property must also 
serve the general interest (Wohl der Allgemeinheit).
Th e fact that property must also serve the general interest (Sozialbindung)865 is 
refl ected in two provisions of Article 14. According to Article 14(1) 2nd sentence 
GG, the substance and the limitations of the right to property are determined by 
law.866 Article 14(2) GG stipulates that owning property is a privilege and thus 
must also serve the general interest. Article 14(2) GG is to be understood as a 
guidance of the legislator to pursue, in the context of the determination of 
substance and limitations, the aim of making all property rights subject to 
general interest considerations. Consequently, Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG and 
Article 14(2) GG both uniformly subject to parliamentary legislation all 
determinations made according to the fi rst provision (Gesetzesvorbehalt). It is 
only the legislature which determines the substance and the limitations and thus 
the degree to which property is made subject to the general interest. Th e general 
interest therefore is the reason for and the limitation of the restrictions imposed 
on the use of property.867
864 In ECHR terminology, both would be a deprivation of the right to property. See in greater 
detail the chapters to follow.
865 See already n. 104.
866 Th e term “law” used in Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG does not only mean formal laws but also 
laws in a substantive sense, i.e. any valid legal rule, see Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, 
Article 14 nos 339 et seq.
867 BVerfGE 56, 249, 260; 58, 300, 338; Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 no. 306.
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Th e result of subjecting all determinations to parliamentary legislation 
(Gesetzesvorbehalt) is that only the property as formed by such legislation is 
protected by the guarantee of ownership. Th e legislature must establish a system 
of property ownership, which distinguishes opposing private interests and 
balances private interests with the demands of the general interest. Th ere is no 
priority of one over the other interest.868 Further, the guarantee of the right to 
property is not only a protection subject to the law but also a protection which 
directly derives from the constitution to the benefi t of the owner, which the 
legislator must observe. Th is protection is also in line with other constitutional 
aims and principles such as the principle of proportionality, the guarantee of 
equal treatment (Gleichbehandlungsgebot) of Article 3(1) GG and the principle of 
legal certainty (Vertrauensschutzprinzip) as a principle of the rule of law.
On the other hand, Article 14(1) 2nd sentence also empowers the legislator to 
re-determine or reorganize the substance and the limitations of ownership. Th us, 
the legislator can introduce new rights and can terminate existing rights for the 
future (both to be seen as abstract parts of the right to property, such as the right 
to use, dispose and to control).
Th e discretion of the legislator to determine the substance and the limitations of 
ownership is limited by the guarantee of just balancing (Gebot gerechter 
Abwägung). When making determinations according to Article 14(1) 2nd sentence 
GG, the legislature must take into account both the constitutionally guaranteed 
legal (ownership) position and the guarantee of a system of property ownership 
property ownership which is socially just. Th e legislature must bring the interests 
of all parties which deserve protection, into a just balance and a balanced relation 
to each other.869 Th is guarantee of objective legislative balancing870 and the 
868 If a specifi c property loses its capability to be used for private purpose(s) (Privatnützigkeit) as 
the result of a legislative intervention, which imposes exclusive use by third parties, the general 
public or the State, then this is an intervention which is comparable to the deprivation of the 
right and thus not permissible unless compensation is granted (Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 
790, Article 14 no. 375). Th e owner can only use his right in the general interest, the private 
purpose guaranteed by the constitution has been substituted by the general interest and is thus 
to be seen as a substantial intrusion into the capability of a specifi c property to be used for 
private purposes.
869 Which, it is claimed here, should also involve the analysis of social costs and benefi ts of 
introducing such determinations.
870 Th e objective balancing the legislature has to pursue between safeguarding the guarantee of 
private property and making property subject to general interest considerations follows the 
patterns the legislature must observe when interfering in a fundamental right, which is that 
the legislator has to follow the principle of just balance as regards both the process of balancing 
and the content of the balancing decision. Th is means that the legislative intervention must rely 
on an almost complete process of balancing, which is based on correct factual assumptions. If 
the legislature has been infl uenced by defective assumptions and incomplete considerations, 
Part 2. Fundamental Rights
232 Intersentia
reconciliation of the guarantee of private property with the social reservations of 
Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG and Article 14(2) GG leads, by considering the 
purpose of protection of Article 14 GG, to a graduated, staged fundamental rights 
protection: Article 14 GG guarantees private property to ensure individual 
freedom. On the other hand, the authorization of the legislator to determine 
substance and limitations is more powerful the more that property is situated in 
a social context and possesses a social function.871 Th us, to the extent that 
property is of importance for the safeguarding of the personal freedom of its 
owner, it enjoys special protection; the powers of the legislature are therefore 
much smaller in the case of personal property than, for instance, in the case of 
the property of companies.872
According to Article 14(2) GG, the use of property shall equally serve the general 
interest. Th e eff ects of use of property and its disposal oft en exceed the sphere of 
the owner and touch upon the interest of the general public and other legal 
subjects. Th e more intensively the use or disposal of property interferes with the 
third party or general interest, the more substantial such third party interests are 
and the more the legislator has to take these interests into consideration and the 
more these third party or general public interests need to weigh in the balancing 
process. On the other hand, and this is very important, the legislator must always, 
when determining the substance and the limitations of ownership, obey the 
general limitation on interventions into fundamental rights as proclaimed in 
Article 19(2) GG, i.e. the guarantee to safeguard the essential content of a 
fundamental right (Wesensgehaltsgarantie).873 Th us, any interference with the 
right to property, i.e. the compulsory transfer of ownership (expropriation) as 
well as the restriction of its free use, disposal or exploitation (regulation of 
ownership) are justifi ed only in exceptional circumstances; state measures in 
particular have to observe the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination 
as well as the principle of proportionality with its (strict) requirements of 
suitability, necessity and adequacy/appropriateness (proportionality in its true 
meaning).874 Th e substance of the guarantee of the right to property marks the 
then the balancing of the various aspects including the evaluation of less intrusive measures 
during the legislative process is likely not to have been pursued objectively.
871 Th e guarantee of private property does not protect the use of the property in a way that 
disregards its social function. Th e more other parties need to use another’s property, the more 
therefore the subject-matter of the property is subject to its social function, the greater is the 
scope for implementing limitations for the legislator, BVerfGE 70, 191, 201; 79, 292, 302; 101, 
54, 75; 102, 1, 17.
872 BVerfGE 50, 290, 348; see also BVerfGE 58, 81, 112; 79, 283, 289; 100, 126, 241; 102, 1, 17.
873 Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 no. 322.
874 Or, in other words, the legislature, when determining the substance and the limitations of 
ownership, is prohibited from taking excessive measures (Übermaßverbot). When enacting a 
new law which is not compatible with the legal positions established in the current legal 
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outer boundary of such interference, which comprises of the principal power to 
dispose of and the capability to use the property for private purposes 
(Privatnützigkeit) as the basis of private enterprise.875
Limitations on the rights of ownership must be based on reasonable objectives in 
the general interest.876 Th is requirement is a consequence of the prohibition of 
“excessive measures”.877 Accordingly, it is for the legislature to establish political 
goals. Th is means that in principle the views of the legislature on the requirement 
for legislation to avoid any social or economic consequences occurring (i.e. if the 
legislation in question is not enacted) are decisive. Th e corresponding wide 
margins of prognosis for the legislator and limitations on judicial review are the 
natural consequence if the legislative intervention is suitable according to the 
principle of proportionality.878 Th is is only then not the case if the measure taken 
is objectively or plainly unsuitable, which is to be judged ex ante, i.e. by the facts 
and their evaluation by the legislature when preparing the law.879 Only if the 
legislator has used all means of information available to him, have any 
framework, the legislature is normally obliged to facilitate a smooth transition from the 
current to the new law by providing for transitional measures (Vertrauensschutzprinzip). On 
the proportionality principle, see in greater detail next subsection.
875 BVerfGE 50, 290, 339 – Mitbestimmung.
876 In this context, it may be emphasized that a determination of the substance and the limitations 
of (corporate) property is lawful if the legislature provides for the essential normative 
conditions for a functioning competition process. Th e prohibition of cartels, the control of 
abuses of dominant positions and merger control are thus in principle not objectionable. See 
Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 no. 506. More generally, U Di Fabio, 
‘Wettbewerbsprinzip und Verfassung – Der freie Wettbewerb und die Verantwortung des 
Staates’, (2007) ZWeR 266.
877 See n. 874.
878 In its decision concerning the constitutionality of the Co-determination Act 1976, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has explicitly accepted the assumption of the legislature made in the 
course of its legislative prognosis that the objective which it pursued would in fact be achieved 
and that any negative consequences for the operation of the undertakings concerned and the 
economy as such would not occur, see n. 875, p. 331. However, what can be reviewed is whether 
the legislature has obtained and evaluated the facts, on which its legislative decision is based, 
as comprehensively and correctly as possible thereby minimizing the risk of defective legislative 
prognoses, in particular in cases where the consequences of intervention are not reversible 
such as once ownership unbundling is actually introduced, see also n. 880. Th us, the BVerfG 
has granted the legislator a non-reviewable margin of appreciation with respect to how and to 
what extent legislative intervention aff ects fundamental rights. See also BVerfGE 90, 367, 390. 
Th e margin of prognosis refl ects, primarily with regard to the suitability of a measure, the 
experimental character of legislation supposed to control and direct the economy, the swift ly 
changing economic processes and the reversibility of the consequences of the intervention in 
the case of a later failure or termination of the original legislative purpose. See also n. 880. In 
greater detail, Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 no. 325.
879 It is claimed here that a measure is plainly unsuitable if a social cost benefi t analysis does not 
show a clear positive trend. An ambiguous or tentatively negative analysis would most likely 
result in a disproportionate measure being taken; this is also true if expert opinions are 
substantially divergent, see further nn. 1009–1011 and accompanying text.
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misjudgements as regards future developments to be accepted.880 Th e margin of 
prognosis and limitation on judicial review are compensated by the legal 
obligation of the legislator for rectifi cation should the law later prove to be 
unsuitable.
Th e legislature must when determining the substance and the limitations of 
ownership, further observe the limitations set out in Article 14(3) GG. In other 
words, when determining in an abstract and general way the rights and duties of 
ownership, the legislator has to refrain from taking any measures which lead, 
with respect to existing legal ownership positions, to an expropriation or which 
authorize the execution of an expropriation. Th us, not every unlawful 
determination of the substance and the limitations of ownership is to be classifi ed 
as an expropriation. In particular the non-observance of the principle of 
proportionality or the principle of legal certainty renders a determination of 
substance and limitations unconstitutional, but does not render it an 
expropriation. Th e determination of substance and limitations and expropriation 
are two signifi cantly diff erent independent legal instruments.
Th e legislator must, when determining substance and limitations, observe the 
substance of Article 14(1) GG (Wesensgehalt)881 as a fundamental right and as a 
guarantee of private property as an institution (Institutsgarantie).882 Expropriation 
880 See n. 878. In particular when interferences with the right to property are supposed to control 
and direct the economic process, the legislature oft en faces uncertainty as regards the future 
eff ects of its legislation and thus has to carry out a prognosis. Th e requirements of objectivity 
and conformity of such prognoses with the constitution are primarily of procedural nature. 
Th e legislature must have evaluated the facts obtainable as they stood at the time of passing the 
law in an objective and reasonable manner. It must have used all information available to it in 
order to be able to anticipate the likely consequences of its regulations as reliably as possible. 
Th us, a social cost benefi t analysis should be obligatory practice based on data as complete as 
can possibly be expected, at least in the context of fundamental rights interferences, which 
abolish or come close to abolishing certain fundamental rights as is the case in the context 
given. A mere regulatory impact assessment, which nowadays is almost common practice in 
legislative processes is not suffi  cient because it is normally rather superfi cial and prone to grave 
mistakes as the Impact Assessment of the Commission (n. 15) with respect to its proposals for 
further ownership unbundling measures has shown, see Part 1 Chapter 2, in particular nn. 314 
seq. and accompanying text. Only if the legislator has used all the means at his disposal to 
obtain the knowledge required, must any errors as regards future economic development be 
accepted – without prejudice to the obligation of the legislator to rectify any mistakes made. 
Th e prognosis of the legislature is reasonable if it has observed these requirements.
881 See already n. 873 and accompanying text as regards the Wesensgehaltsgarantie of Article 19(2) 
GG.
882 It should be recalled that the substance of the right to property in the sense of an absolute core 
comprises of the usability of property for private purposes (Privatnützigkeit) and the 
unrestricted power to dispose of the subject-matter of the property. Article 14 GG guarantees 
the possession and the use of property. Th us, as has also already been pointed out, the 
Sozialbindung of property to the general interest is supposed to guarantee that the use of the 
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as ultima ratio can only be pursued if the special requirements for its applicability 
as set out in Article 14(3) GG are satisfi ed. Because of the compulsory guarantee 
of compensation (Junctim-Klausel), the protection of ownership does not 
disappear merely because an expropriation has taken place. Th e primary 
guarantee of the continuity of the right to property (Bestandsgarantie) is only 
substituted by the secondary (complementary) guarantee of the value of the 
property so expropriated (Wertgarantie).883 Th is is, however, only the case for 
lawful expropriations; determinations of substance and limitations, which 
normally mean a reduction in value of the assets of the owner as a whole, or even 
a deprivation of assets (or a part thereof), do not in principle entail an obligation 
to pay compensation.884
Coming back to expropriation, Article 14(3) GG does not contain any defi nition 
or statements about the constituent legal elements of expropriation nor with 
respect to its distinction from the “regular” Sozialbindung of property.
In its decision of 22 May 2001 in re Baulandumlegung885, the BVerfG determined 
the State’s appropriation of an individual’s property, which is directed at the 
complete or partial deprivation of a “concrete subjective legal position” (or 
ownership rights) protected by Article 14(1) 1st sentence GG in order to fulfi l 
certain public tasks to be a core characteristic of expropriation. Th e BVerfG 
explicitly limited the defi nition of expropriation to cases where goods are 
property and the power to dispose of it, also serves the general interest. Consequently, the 
legislative commitment of property must never go so far as to enable the use of the property to 
be exclusively useful for the general public, the State or third parties, see Papier in Maunz/
Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 nos 332 et seq.
883 If property has, however, been lawfully acquired (even if protected from competition by way of 
being exempted from the application of competition law, which, however, leads to a greater 
Sozialbindung), the deprivation of corporate property, more specifi cally energy supply 
networks, for instance by demanding its sale, but also every other state measure of deprivation 
aimed at the divestiture of corporate property are intrusions into the substance of the right to 
property. Th is aff ects the guarantee of the continuity of the right to property, which exceeds 
the Sozialbindung of such property and, thus, cannot be regarded as a mere regulation of 
ownership. In this regard also Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 no. 508. Th e fact that 
the owner receives the proceeds of the sale can only aff ect the amount of compensation to be 
paid, see Papier, ibid.
884 Compensation paments are normally not in the general interest. Only under special 
circumstances are compensation payments to the owner a means of making the determination 
of substance and limitations lawful, see Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 no. 348. 
Th ere is no guarantee of the continued existence or value of assets as regards the assets of an 
individual as a whole.
885 BVerfGE 104, 1, 9 – Baulandumlegung.
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acquired on the basis of sovereign acts (Güterbeschaff ungsmaßnahmen) – goods 
with which a specifi c public project is to be accomplished.886
Th e BVerfG further distinguishes between the special form of (direct) legislative 
expropriation (as opposed to (indirect) expropriation based on a law) according 
Article 14(3) GG and determinations (i.e. the regulation) of ownership rights 
according to Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG in that the fi rst is the deprivation of 
specifi c ownership rights of a determined or determinable group of persons 
whereas the latter are general and abstract determinations of entitlements and 
obligations with respect to ownership.887
However, although expropriation requires the deprivation of specifi c legal rights 
not every deprivation is an expropriation according to Article 14(3) GG. If the 
deprivation of legal rights is intended to balance private interests, then this is just 
a regulation of ownership.
Th e legislative regulation of ownership can be a disproportionate restriction of 
the capability to use and dispose of property for private purposes, which is 
unconstitutional. Th is can under certain circumstance be overcome if the 
legislature allows the deprivation of ownership only if hardship clauses are 
applied and/or compensation payments are possible.888
However, Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG constitutes legislative authority for 
deprivation of ownership rights without compensation obligations in principle. 
As has already been said, a protection of the value of ownership is only granted 
by Article 14(3) GG. Exceeding this by making compensation obligatory even if 
there is no expropriation would run the danger of creating a general claim 
resulting from the prohibition of excessive measures. As has already been 
outlined, Article 14(1) 2nd sentence GG does not contain a general guarantee to 
maintain the value of ownership rights, and the Sozialbindung should not only 
extend to limitations on the use of property but also to limitations with regard to 
the value of ownership.
Th us, compensation in the context of determining substance and limitations of 
ownership must only be provided for along the lines of the Denkmalschutzgesetz 
886 H-J Papier, ‘Der Stand des verfassungsrechtlichen Eigentumsschutzes’, in O Depenheuer (ed.), 
Eigentum, 2005, p. 96. As regards the obligation for the benefi ciary of an expropriation to pay 
compensation, even if such a benefi ciary is a natural or legal person, see Papier in Maunz/
Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 nos 637 et seq., 638.
887 Papier in Depenheuer, ibid.
888 Papier in Depenheuer, n. 886, p. 98.
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case889, where the BVerfG sets out that the guarantee of the continuity of 
owernship rights (Bestandsschutz) contained in Article 14 GG requires that above 
all, precautions need to be taken to ensure that the owner is not disproportionately 
burdened in real terms (by way of legislating for transitions, exceptions and 
exemptions) and that the usability of property for private purposes is maintained 
as far as possible. Only if in individual cases such precautions are not possible or 
only possible by incurring excessive costs, can fi nancial compensation or the 
off er to take the property over at market value be granted to the owner.
c. Margin of appreciation and proportionality
Th e last subsection already contains some discussion on the margin of appreciation 
(of the legislature) and the proportionality principle in the specifi c context of the 
fundamental right to property. Th is subsection briefl y expands on those 
elaborations, in a more general manner.
Th e prohibition on acting excessively (Übermaßverbot) or the principle of 
proportionality (Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit) has evolved into a decisive 
prerequisite in the area of the rule of law under the jurisprudence of the BVerfG. 
It is based on the concept that state measures should in principle not be unlimited 
and unfounded but be justifi ed by a determinable objective and measured against 
such objective as regards its scale and scope (Umfang und Ausmaß). Th e principle 
of proportionality fi nds its main basis in the rule of law. It is not only applicable 
as between the State and individuals seeking fundamental rights protection but 
also as between diff erent state institutions in circumstances where a division of 
the State possesses an entitlement in law or a subjective right such that it can 
dispose of such a right or entitlement autonomously or because a division of the 
State possesses competences, which take the form of a subjective right such as 
Article 28(2) GG for municipalities.890
Th e structure of the principle of proportionality requires that state measures are 
suitable, necessary and proportionate (or reasonable or not excessive) for the 
achievement of its legitimate objective.
Th e point of reference for the principle of proportionality is the legitimate 
objective or aim of state conduct. For the legislature such conduct consists of the 
889 N. 551.
890 Grzeszick in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 20 VII no. 109.
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passing of legislation in pursuance of an objective, which it has determined to be 
within the boundaries of the constitution.891
Th e state measure must be suitable to achieve its aim or it must at least be capable 
of promoting this aim. It is not necessary, however, to prove that the declared 
aim can be achieved entirely by the means applied; it is suffi  cient that the means 
increase the probability that the goal will be achieved at least to some extent.892
Further, the state measure must be necessary to achieve the aim. Th e necessity 
leg requires that the State must chose the least intrusive means amongst all the 
possible means available (assuming them to be equally eff ective), i.e. such means, 
which impair the protected right or entitlement the least.893
“Equally eff ective” in this context means that the available alternatives would 
have an equal eff ectiveness in achieving the relevant.894 An alternative is however 
not considered equally eff ective if although the subject of the measure suff ers 
less, third parties or the general public are burdened more; in particular if the 
alternative’s costs are unreasonable such that, for instance, the State would face 
unreasonably higher fi nancial burdens, the alternative is not considered equally 
eff ective.895 Th is has rightly been criticized in that in a case such as the one just 
described, it was not the equality of the alternative, which was questionable; the 
alternative would actually be equally eff ective but the consequence for third party 
891 If the German legislature, either on its own account or on the basis of EC legislation decided to 
restructure (up to ownership unbundling) the energy supply sector in order to achieve the 
objectives set out in Part 1 Chapter 1, the BVerfG would not intervene (as long as these 
objectives are in the general interest of Germany) only because competition law based remedies 
are available (including the theoretically possible EC competition law remedy of forced 
divestiture of energy supply networks). Measures based on European legislation would be in 
the national public interest to the extent that European integration objectives are pursued as 
can be inferred from Article 23 GG; the objective of European integration includes undistorted 
competition in an internal market and can thus in principle also be pursued by forced 
divestiture permissible at EU level if proportionate. Further, the BVerfG would accept the 
decision of the legislature to restructure the energy sector in order to promote competition (as 
a legitimate objective under the German Constitution) because it would regulate the whole 
sector whereas competition law intervenes only in individual cases. Th e BVerfG would consider 
the legislative decision whether to pursue a certain objective to be within the political remit of 
the legislature. Th e question, however, how or in which manner it should be pursued, i.e. which 
measures are proportionate to achieve the objective, would be reviewable by the BVerfG, see 
further in turn.
892 BVerfGE 16, 147 et seq., 183; 30, 292 et seq., 316; 33, 171, 187; 67, 151, 173 et seq; 96, 10, 23 et 
seq.
893 See, e.g., BVerfGE 100, 313, 375.
894 BVerfGE 25, 1, 20; 30, 292, 319; 77, 84, 109 et seq.; 81, 70, 91; 100, 313, 375.
895 BVerfGE 77, 84, 110 et seq.; 81, 70, 91 et seq.; 88, 145, 164.
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rights or entitlements might be more severe in the sense that they would be more 
impaired.896
Finally, the state measure must not be disproportionate to the objective or aim of 
the measure; the usefulness or eff ectiveness of the measure must not be 
disproportionate to the impairment its causes. Th us, the measure must be 
appropriate, or, for the target of the measure, reasonable. Th is requires that the 
usefulness of the measure and the impairment caused by the measure is weighed 
within set coordinates within which the result of the weighing process is arrived 
at. To determine these boundaries unequivocally is rather problematic, however, 
because a rational evaluation of the result (of the weighing process) is hard to 
achieve and to review and prone to subjective valuations. In the context of this 
last leg of the proportionality test, the BVerfG allows state institutions a margin 
of appreciation in that it assumes an infringement only in cases of manifest 
inappropriateness.897
Because of its democratic legitimation and its task of passing legislation with a 
wide general application, which of necessity oft en cannot fully refl ect the 
complexity and diversity if the situation, the BVerfG allows the legislature 
considerable room for manoeuvre as regards the proportionality of legislation. 
When assessing the suitability of legislation, the standard of review with respect 
to measures of the legislature is attenuated by allowing a prognostic margin of 
appreciation in the context of assessing the suitability898 and also as a political 
room for manoeuvre of the legislature.899
As regards the requirement to use the least intrusive or the mildest means, the 
BVerfG shows a general tendency that only relatively obvious infringements of 
the requirement to use the mildest means are objected to900; here also, the 
896 Grzeszick in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 20 VII no. 114. But see n. 260 and accompanying 
text.
897 BVerfGE 44, 353, 373; 96, 10, 23 et seq.
898 BVerfGE 25, 1, 12 et seq.; 30, 250, 263; 39, 210, 230 et seq.; 83, 1, 18; 87, 363, 383; 94, 315, 326; 98, 
265, 309 et seq.; 104, 337, 347 et seq.; 105, 17, 34. It has also been accepted that the legislator 
bases its decision upon a justifi able prognosis. Th e legislature can test diff erent concepts, see 
BVerfGE 78, 249, 288; 85, 80, 91, but must rectify the results if necessary, BVerfGE 25, 1, 13; 30, 
250, 263; 50, 290, 332; 57, 139, 162; 95, 267, 314 et seq. A provision is unconstitutional if it is 
evidently or per se unsuitable, BVerfG 30, 250, 263; 39, 210, 230; 47, 109, 117; 65, 116, 126 ; 103, 
293, 307.
899 BVerfGE 25, 1, 12 et seq.; 30, 250, 263; 39, 210, 231; 96, 10, 23 et seq.; 103, 293, 307. Th e scope of 
this latitude depends on the peculiarities of the subject-matter, the sources available to the 
legislator to reach a judgment and the prominence and importance of the interest protected in 
law, which is to be impaired, BVerfGE 50, 290, 332 et seq.; 73, 40, 92.
900 BVerfGE 25, 1, 19; 30, 292, 319; 53, 135, 145; 81, 70, 91; 98, 265, 308 et seq.; 96, 10, 23 et seq.; 101, 
106, 128; 101, 331, 349 et seq.; 102, 197, 218; 105, 17, 36.
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legislator is aff orded a margin of “tenability”901 or appreciation.902 Th e same 
applies, as has been said above, to the last leg of the test, i.e. the evaluation of 
proportionality in a narrow sense where the weighing of the diff erent interests 
takes place.
d. Subject of protection
Th e protection of private subjects, which includes private shareholders, seems 
to be a rather straightforward matter under German constitutional law. 
However, the fundamental rights protection of network owners under German 
constitutional law has been questioned. Th us, aft er some brief discussion of 
the protection of private subjects, it will be clarifi ed that network owners do 
enjoy fundamental rights protection under German constitutional law. It will 
also be discussed whether and to what extent public undertakings and 
public shareholders should, in the context given, also – exceptionally – enjoy 
fundamental rights protection.903
aa. Private subjects
It is beyond any doubt that any privately owned energy supply undertakings or 
vertically integrated undertakings such as network companies (owning and/or 
operating energy supply networks) in principle enjoy protection of their right to 
property under German law.904 Under German constitutional law, for privately 
owned energy supply undertakings incorporated under German law, this follows 
from Article 19(3) GG. Also protected are (their) shareholders905, at least private 
901 Vertretbarkeitsspielraum: BVerfGE 98, 265, 308 et seq.
902 Einschätzungsspielraum: BVerfGE 102, 197, 218.
903 See the discussion in section III of this chapter.
904 See, however, Hermes, n. 641, who puts infrastructure networks in telecommunications, 
energy and railway on the same footing with road infrastructure and thus generally categorizes 
them as public institutions, which do not enjoy fundamental rights protection because of the 
privilege of infrastructure owners to expropriate land owners in the course of infrastructure 
construction (see s. 45(1) EnWG). But see for instance Pielow, n. 641, pp 625 et seq., representing 
the vast majority of legal opinion, and Pielow, n. 765, pp. 45–54. See also in more detail infra.
905 Apart from the fundamental right to property of the vertically integrated ESUs according to 
Article 14, 19(3) GG, German constitutional law also protects the right to property of (at least) 
private shareholders of such undertakings, see BVerfG, 30 May 2007, 1 BvR 390/04, with 
comments by L Leuschner, ‘Gibt es das Anteilseigentum wirklich?’, (2007) NJW 3248, BVerfGE 
14, 263, 276. See H Jarass, B Pieroth, GG – Kommentar, 5th ed., 2000, Article 14 no. 9. In a 
corporate setting the property of the shareholders in the holding company must be 
distinguished from the property sphere of the holding company, which holds the shares in the 
network subsidiary (principle of separation of corporate property spheres as a consequence of 
the separate legal personality of corporate bodies). See in this respect the at times confusing 
approach of the ECtHR, n. 1190 infra. By contrast and just mentioned in passing, the protection 
in this regard of shareholders under the ECHR seems not to be as far reaching as the victim 
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ones, which are either German nationals or legal persons incorporated in 
Germany.906
Excursus: network owners and German fundamental rights protection
Having said this, it is nevertheless worthwhile to look into the arguments, which 
seek to deny network owners fundamental rights protection in Germany, as this 
plays some role in the context of the Sozialbindung of ownership in Germany and 
the proportionality of further unbundling measures. It also serves as a link to the 
discussion whether public or public private energy supply undertakings or their 
public shareholders (should) enjoy fundamental rights protection in Germany.
It is claimed that infrastructure networks such as energy supply networks are 
public infrastructures whose owners are therefore not eligible for fundamental 
rights protection when the State determines their obligations in the general 
interest.907 Th is view has been expressed in the context of the debate as to whether 
and to what extent network owners have to grant TPA to their networks, in 
particular when capacity is constrained.908
Previously, the discussion of the eligibility of network undertakings for 
fundamental rights protection had mainly taken place in the context of public, 
mainly municipal or communal, undertakings or private undertakings controlled 
by the State or municipalities. Th e HEW decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
in 1990 denied their capability to rely on such protection because the State or 
public institutions, which are part of the state organization, such as municipalities, 
are generally not protected by fundamental rights but are bound by them 
status of shareholders according to Article 34 ECHR for shareholders is not entirely clear. So 
far, the ECtHR has only in exceptional circumstances recognized the right to property of 
shareholders by “piercing the corporate veil”, see only ECtHR, Agrotexim v Greece, 24 October 
1994 (also referred to as Fix Brewery), Ser. A330-A, in particular no. 66. See further chapter 5 
on Great Britain.
906 See n. 961 as regards fundamental rights protection for shareholders, which are foreign 
nationals or foreign legal persons. Th ey do also enjoy, in the context given here, equivalent 
fundamental rights protection in Germany and also under Germany constitutional law but 
based on diff erent legal bases.
907 Hermes, n. 641.
908 See in this regard the current state of the law: Articles 9(e), 14(2), 20(2) Electricity Directive 
2003, Articles 8(1)(b), 12(2), 21(1) Gas Directive 2003; see also ss 20(2), 21(1) EnWG. See Papier, 
n. 770, pp 221 et seq., for expressing doubts about the validity of such provisions under German 
constitutional law; Papier is president of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Similar also Pielow, n. 
765, p. 46, note 10 with further references. Th e following discussion relies to a large extent on 
Pielow, n. 765.
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according to Article 1(3) GG, and by reference to their objective to serve the 
public or general interest.909
Th ese views are, however, disputed because it is claimed that such undertakings 
would indeed be capable of relying on fundamental rights protection as long as 
they did not pursue an objective, which could only be fulfi lled by the State but 
one which participates in competition like every private undertaking and are 
bound by the same competitive obligations.910
Th e view that denies fundamental rights protection to infrastructure network 
owners refers to the comprehensive state responsibility for the infrastructure 
classifying the provision of supply networks, in particular in the areas of rail 
transport, telecommunications and energy supply, as a public task. Private 
undertakings controlled by private or public shareholders are regarded as bound 
to serve the general interest, which is the expression of the right of third parties 
to use and access such infrastructures. Th is right is to be valued signifi cantly 
higher than the interest of network owners. Th is view is based on the argument 
that these infrastructures were built by using the property of third parties, which 
had to be expropriated for this purpose. Th us the benefi ciaries of such 
expropriations would be bound by an obligation to serve the general interest, 
which takes priority over private ownership interests, and which is determined 
by planning and network access decisions of the State.
Th e special responsibility of the State to guarantee the provision of infrastructure 
(Gewährleistungs- or Infrastrukturverantwortung) has already been outlined. In 
particular with respect to infrastructure networks, this responsibility is said to 
be determined by their extensive space requirements (Raumbedarf), which can 
oft en only be satisfi ed by relying on rgw property of third parties and which in 
turn would further increase the State’s responsibility to guarantee the provision 
of such infrastructure. Th e degree of this responsibility would depend on whether 
one deals with primary (transmission) networks, such as roads, rail tracks, 
canals, and high voltage grids – or with secondary more locally confi ned 
(distribution) networks.
Th is view that energy supply networks are public facilities would deprive privately 
controlled network operators of their fundamental rights expressed in Articles 
12(1) GG and 14(1) GG, which they could otherwise invoke against the regulation 
909 BVerfG, 16 May 1989, 1 BvR 705/88 – HEW.
910 See M Fehling, ‘Mitbenutzungsrechte Dritter bei Schienenwegen, Energieversorgungs- und 




of such facilities and any arbitrary decisions of the legislature. Any obligations or 
restrictions imposed on the use of the networks such as wide-ranging network 
access obligations (TPA) or the obligation to invest into the networks as well as a 
possible duty to accept the third party use of their energy networks below cost 
would have to be accepted by the network owners without any possibility to 
object.
Th e vast majority of legal opinion in Germany, however, opposes this 
rather singular view. State intervention in the form of determining 
network ownership and operation is rather and primarily seen as regulation of 
ownership (determination of substance and limitations – Inhalts- und 
Schrankenbestimmmungen), which is inherent in the right to property as laid 
down in Article 14(1) GG, which is subject to the proportionality test.911
Further, this singular view outlined before has been comprehensively rebutted912: 
Th e assumption that the provision of infrastructure networks always requires the 
expropriation of third parties’ property is rather doubtful. Apart from the fact 
that oft en simple rights of way suffi  ce, an expropriation according to Article 14(3) 
GG always has to observe the principle of proportionality and is the ultima ratio 
in order to obtain the means required to create the space for infrastructure 
networks, which also signifi cantly constrains the powers of the infrastructure 
undertakings in this regard.
It is an overriding legal requirement, which is also observed in practice, that the 
various interests have to be weighed and balanced fi rst, before any confl icts can 
arise with respect to the use of the space required. Th is means that the property 
owners and the undertaking pursuing an infrastructure project normally 
negotiate and agree the transfer of rights in rem or the rights to use (parts of) the 
relevant property.913 Th is does, however, not negate the fact that expropriations 
in particular to the benefi t of electricity network projects occur frequently.914
911 H-J Papier, ‘Durchleitungen und Eigentum’, (1997) Betriebs-Berater (BB) 1213, and n. 770; 
Fehling, ibid.; also critical to Hermes, J Dannischewski, Unbundling im Energierecht, 2003, 
pp. 199–242.
912 Pielow, n. 765, with further references.
913 Th e incentive for voluntary agreements is that the relevant property can usually be sold at a 
price at or near to its market value even though the mere threat of expropriation oft en infl uences 
the sales negotiations to the detriment of the property owner.
914 An additional argument against the claim that the expropriation powers of infrastructure 
undertakings lead to an increased general interest in the infrastructure is that the obligation to 
guarantee the provision of energy infrastructure in order to safeguard the general interest 
would primarily depend on whether and to what extent a specifi c energy infrastructure project 
has required an expropriation according to Article 14(3) GG.
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Further, the conclusion that the State is not bound by the fundamental rights of 
the network owners but, on the contrary, bound by the fundamental rights of 
those whose property was expropriated in favour of an infrastructure project in 
the public interest, is biased towards the interest of property owners whose 
property rights are only potentially aff ected (in the future).915 Such a conclusion 
does not suffi  ciently refl ect the general prohibition on excessive measures 
(Übermaßverbot) fl owing from the rule of law, which is an inherent element of 
expropriation as set out in Article 14(3) 1st sentence GG. Th e danger is that the 
proportionality principle risks becoming meaningless if it is accepted that the 
general interest is applied to network operators more strictly.
More generally, linking private network property indistinctively to the general 
interest appears doubtful. Th is is because expropriations in the context given 
normally force property owners to transfer the right in rem to use the property, 
exceptionally also through the complete deprivation of a part of the property 
concerned. Th e property so expropriated thus serves the general interest in 
network-bound supply of energy to the general public and the expropriation 
exclusively concerns the use of this specifi c property.916 It thus remains unclear 
in the face of the relationship between the subject of expropriation and the 
purpose of the expropriation how the general interest can extend to the private 
investment or even to the ownership of such parts of the network as are clearly 
not based on state intervention. Should the general interest subjection of private 
network property be correct then network owners could also be forced to invest 
into the networks additionally to their maintenance obligations, an extra 
obligation, which has not been seriously proposed so far.
Further, the power to impose general transport and transmission (common 
carrier) functions on the network ensue neither directly nor indirectly from 
Article 14(3) GG, but require a foundation in law (Gesetzesvorbehalt), which 
would then fi rst have to be measured against the fundamental rights standard of 
Articles 12(1) and 14 GG.
915 Even more so because it is not taken into account that property aff ected by infrastructure 
projects also serves the general interest. Electricity customers, for instance, which are 
connected to the local grid, are usually obliged to accept the laying of cables and other 
appliances related to electricity supply across their property. Such an obligation refl ects the 
attachment to the general interest, the solidarity of each property owner with the community 
of electricity consumers.
916 Th e expropriation of property is indeed supposed to enable the infrastructure owner to fulfi l a 
task in the general interest, not to deprive private owners of their property. Further, if network 
connections or reinforcements become necessary as a result of the need for more network 
capacity, expropriations are not necessarily in the interest of the network owner only, but 




Consequently, the contention that in so far as the construction and operation of 
networks are concerned, the position of an energy supply undertaking results 
solely from expropriation, which itself is the consequence of the state responsibility 
to provide infrastructure is not true in two respects. First, expropriation is not 
the sole means to being able to build supply networks. Secondly, a network 
undertaking does not obtain its position from expropriation but primarily from 
its investment in the networks. To confer upon the energy networks a general 
transport and transmission role (common carrier) as soon as they start operating 
would result in a (legal) fi ction, which is not compatible with the limits inherent 
in the regulation of the right to property according to Article 14 GG.
To regard private investment as being the result of the conferral to private parties 
of a public responsibility to build and operate networks as public facilities is not 
unproblematic. First of all, such a responsibility would initially have to be a 
responsibility of the State or its subdivisions, either explicitly or based upon an 
authorization within the limits of the constitutional order to assume such a 
responsibility or task. If private parties act for the State, the question is whether 
they do so for genuinely private economic reasons and protected by the relevant 
fundamental rights or whether such economic operation is the result of a 
functional privatization of tasks, which are actually in the remit of the State. A 
prerequisite for the latter is that the fact that the task to be pursued falls within 
the responsibility of the State must be made public. Such a responsibility must be 
based on a law or even on a constitutional provision, which clearly indicates the 
specifi c task as falling within the responsibility of the State. If energy supply was 
to be a public task, the underlying responisbility or pulic nature of this task would 
thus have to be laid down in a formal law. Th is is because such a “public” task is 
something which can in principle also be pursued by the private sector because it 
does not require the exercise of sovereign rights.917 Th e designation of a task as 
falling within the public responsibility thus requires a legal basis. Th is follows 
from the principle that substantive issues must be dealt with by parliamentary 
laws (Wesentlichkeitsgrundsatz), as such a designation would shift  the boundaries 
of the relationship between the State and society, which would entail a limitation 
of the range of activities guaranteed by fundamental rights.
As has already been pointed out, there are no legal provisions, which make the 
actual operation of energy networks a public task. Th e responsibility for 
guaranteeing the provision of (energy network) infrastructure based on the 
Sozialstaatsprinzip (see already above) comprises a general duty to aff ord 
917 Which is an argument for municipalities actually acting as competitors to private parties in 
the energy supply market, which should thus give them protection similar to what private 
parties enjoy, in order to create and maintain a level playing fi eld. See further infra.
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everybody access to basic supply or universal services under socially adequate 
conditions in situations of market failure, i.e. where private provision has failed. 
However, the responsibility for fulfi lling specifi c services such as the operation of 
energy networks or energy supply on the network, are not nationalized, i.e. in the 
sole remit of the State. At most, there is a residual duty of the State to take over 
energy supply in cases where the private sector performs poorly or is clearly 
failing.
Th e EnWG is neutral with regard to who should carry out energy supply, i.e. there 
is no bias towards the State to fulfi l this task. On the contrary, the generalized 
right to use public ways (subject to paying concession fees) according to section 
46 EnWG indicates that the creation of a public monopoly on networks is indeed 
not intended (as can also been inferred from the general supply obligations of the 
EnWG, see above). All of this shows that the State has actually declined pursuing 
the energy supply task itself but confi nes itself to regulating the private 
performance of this task.918 It is thus not a question of identifying energy supply 
as a public task, which would exclude fundamental rights protection but rather to 
establish the compatibility of regulatory requirements of network ownership and 
operation with the fundamental rights and their application in each individual 
case.
To infer from section 19(4) no. 4 GWB919 that the operation of energy networks is 
a public task is not correct either. Th is provision merely mandates the obligatory 
conclusion of contracts between competitors as a consequence of an abuse of a 
dominant position by infrastructure owners, which, in any event, must be 
established fi rst in each individual case, and not as the result of the existence of, 
or with the eff ect of establishing a public task. Recognizing the need to force 
dominant infrastructure owners to enter into access agreements means that the 
right to dispose of such an “essential facility” for the owner’s benefi t and, thus, 
the ability to rely on the protection of the right to property according to Article 
14 GG has been implicitly recognized.920
918 As to the comparison with other network-bound sectors delivering similar results, see Pielow, 
n. 765, p. 53, also rightly indicating that any apparent reference in the EC Treaty or secondary 
European legislation, for instance as regards trans-European networks in Article 154(2) 1st 
sentence EC, to national networks should not lead to the conclusion that the operation of 
networks has been made a public task. Th is would be in contradiction to the neutrality of the 
EC Treaty expressed in Article 295 EC with regard to the property systems of the Member 
States, and would also be in confl ict with the exclusive competence of the Member States to 
defi ne services of general (economic) interest according to Article 86(2) EC.
919 Which in a competition law context, see Part 1 Chapter 2, deals with the refusal to grant access 
to essential infrastructure facilities in the context of the abuse of a dominant position.
920 Again, a similar protection should be aff orded to municipalities via Article 28(2) GG; s. 19(4) 




It has already been explained that in principle, public undertakings or public legal 
persons, or better, legal persons under public law (juristische Personen des 
öff entlichen Rechts) such as municipalities (Körperschaft en des öff entlichen Rechts 
– legal corporations under public law) and private legal persons wholly owned by 
such public legal persons are not able to invoke fundamental rights such as 
Articles 12, 14 and 9 GG. Th e State and its subdivisions are committed to observe 
fundamental rights (Article 1(3) GG), which means they are in principle not 
entitled to fundamental rights protection, which they are committed to 
observe.921
In this context, the BVerfG922 assesses the function, “in which the legal person 
under public law is pursuing an act of state sovereignty. If such a function consists 
in fulfi lling public tasks, which have been assigned by law, then the legal person is 
to that extent not capable of fundamental rights protection [emphasis added].” 
Th us, Article 19(3) GG923 applies to the extent that the legal person “is directly 
attributable to an area of life, which is protected by fundamental rights.”924 Th e 
BVerfG925 interprets the “essence” formula of Article 19(3) GG in such a way that 
the inclusion of “legal persons in the scope of protection of certain substantial 
fundamental rights is only justifi ed if their incorporation and activity is the 
expression of the free development of private natural persons.” In other words, 
the inclusion of legal persons in the scope of protection of certain fundamental 
rights is nothing else than a form of collective exercise of fundamental rights by 
individuals entitled to these fundamental rights.926
Th us, it appears that it does not primarily matter whether the legal person is 
constituted under public or private law. Th is is refl ected by the fact that legal 
persons under public law can participate in public private undertakings 
(gemischt-wirtschaft liche Unternehmen), which can be incorporated in a private 
legal form (which they oft en are) or in a public legal form927 where genuinely 
sovereign tasks are not at stake but such tasks, which can also be accomplished 
them.
921 In this respect also Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 108.
922 BVerfGE 68, 207.
923 “Th e fundamental rights shall also apply to domestic legal persons to the extent that the 
essence of such rights is applicable.”
924 See only BVerfGE 107, 299, 309 et seq.
925 BVerfG, 16 May 1989, 1 BvR 705/88.
926 Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 108.
927 See in greater detail, Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, no. 450.
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by private parties, such as services of general (economic) interest.928 Th us, when 
services of general (economic) interest, which the State must in principle 
guarantee (Gewährleistungsverantwortung), are pursued by public private 
undertakings, then the function of such undertakings is a private economic or 
private law one, to the extent that full fundamental rights protection of the 
private shareholders of this public private undertaking must be guaranteed.929 In 
other words, it is not so much a matter of what legal form a legal person has but 
solely of the specifi c function such a legal person fulfi ls and whether and how far 
this function can ultimately be attributed to the exercise of fundamental rights 
by private persons930, so that it actually does not matter whether such public 
private undertakings are publicly or privately controlled.931
Coming back to the principle that legal persons of public law, which pursue an 
economic activity, cannot rely on fundamental rights protection, and taking into 
account what has just been said, there are obviously exceptions to this rule where 
the “functional identity of activities” (funktionale Tätigkeitsidentität) exists.932 
Such an identity exists where areas of life protected by fundamental rights have 
been opened (not necessarily exclusively) to the fulfi lment of public tasks such as 
for universities, religious communities and public broadcasting corporations933 
but also, for instance, where legitimate public economic activities (such as energy 
supply, which, as has already been explained above, belongs to the original sphere 
928 See, for instance, H Jarass, Die EU-Grundrechte, 2005, § 4 nos 32 et seq.; W Cremer, 
‘Eigentumsschutz’, in T Marauhn, R Grote (eds), Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen 
und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, 2006, ch. 22, no. 61; Müller-Michaels, n. 535, p. 43; even 
more comprehensively, M Burgi, ‘Die öff entlichen Unternehmen im Gefüge des primären 
Gemeinschaft srechts’, (1997) EuR 261, 287 et seq. Services of general (economic) interest is a 
mere sociological defi nition, which does not tell anything about whether they are to be pursued 
by the State or private parties, see Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 108.
929 Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, no. 450, rightly distinguish between private shareholders protected by 
fundamental rights such as Article 14 GG and the question whether their fundamental rights 
protection continues to exist in public private companies, which can only be answered aft er 
applying Article 19(3) GG.
930 See Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 108.
931 Th e German legal order has conferred upon legal persons under private law legal autonomy 
and independence without looking at their shareholding structure as this would not only 
confl ict with the non-discrimination principle but would also infringe the neutrality of the 
competitive process. Th e question of whether public shareholders control an undertaking 
cannot be the decisive criteria because normally, the undertaking is entitled to fundamental 
rights protection, not its shareholders.
932 Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 108.
933 BVerfGE 15, 256, 262; 18, 385, 386 et seq.; 21, 362, 373 et seq.; 51, 77, 87; 53, 366, 386; 59, 231, 
254; 61, 82, 102; 68, 193, 207; 74, 297, 317 et seq.; 78, 101, 102 et seq.; 107, 299, 309 et seq.
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of activity of municipalities)934 compete with private ones in the context of 
services of general (economic) interest.935
As long as there exists such (legitimate) competition, it is thus suggested here 
that public undertakings enjoy fundamental rights protection according to 
Article 19(3) GG as construed by the BVerfG936 with respect to exactly this sort 
of competition, i.e. they enjoy the right to competitive equality (wettbewerbliche 
Chancengleichheit) according to Articles 12 and 3 GG, which prohibit the giving 
of unfair advantage to private competitors.937
As regards the right to property according to Article 14 GG, it also seems not to 
contradict the jurisprudence of the BVerfG as outlined above if one distinguishes 
between property, which municipalities (and other public undertakings) dispose 
of when fulfi lling public tasks assigned by law, and that which they dispose of 
when they participate in activities other than acts of state sovereignty. For state 
measures against the latter sort of property, they should also be able to invoke 
fundamental rights protection according to Article 14 GG.938
934 Original sphere of activity (eigener Wirkungskreis) as opposed to the sphere of activity 
conferred upon the municipalities by the State (übertragener Wirkungskreis), the associated 
tasks of which have to be fulfi lled by the municipalities as original state activities. Whether, 
how and when legal persons under public law (are allowed to) become active economically 
depends on the relevant regulations which allocate competences to them. For municipalities 
and their economic operations, this results from the guarantee of municipal self-administration 
according to Article 28(2) GG, which means that limitations of municipal economic activity 
on the basis of laws regulating municipal matters (Gemeindeordnungen) can not be 
circumvented by invoking fundamental rights protection, in particular Article 12 GG. In this 
respect, municipalities can only rely on Article 28(2) GG itself, which approximates, in the 
context given, to the role of Articles 12 and 14 GG, see already supra.
935 See Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 110. M Schmidt-Preuß, ‘Energieversorgung’, 
in J Isensee, P Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Band IV, 3rd ed., 2006, § 93, nos 37 et seq., goes as far as arguing that wholly publicly owned 
undertakings such as Eigengesellschaft en and other forms of legal persons in complete public 
ownership, should enjoy fundamental rights protection if they take part in competitive energy 
supply. Gemischt-wirtschaft liche Unternehmen and Eigengesellschaft en both have in common 
that their budget is separate from that of the public shareholders.
936 See supra.
937 See Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 115.
938 See Maunz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 28 no. 59. Th is can also be based on the fact that 
the area of fundamental rights protection can be extended beyond federal constitutional law 
by Länder constitutional law (see Article 142 GG), see Maunz, ibid., with further references. 
Th us, it is indeed possible in special cases that municipalities can according to Länder 
constitutional law rely on their right to property against acts of a Länder legislature, see, for 
instance, the jurisprudence of the Bavarian Constitutional Court BayVGH, BayVGHE 10, 113; 
19, 16; 20, 114; 22, 48; 23, 62; 26, 144. Th us, this should similarly also be assumed for 
municipalities relying on fundamental rights such as Article 9 GG (freedom of association) 
and Article 12 GG, see Maunz, ibid.
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As has already been indicated above, the BVerfG has denied public and public 
private undertakings, the latter active in energy supply, fundamental rights 
protection in earlier decisions.939 For the reasons given above, it is, however, 
doubtful whether this ruling would be upheld today. A recent decision of the 
BVerfG indeed indicates that the Court might actually seriously reconsider the 
position taken in its 1990 HEW ruling.940
Finally, another argument why the distinction between public private 
undertakings under public control on the one hand and private control on the 
other does not seem appropriate is that it would impair legal certainty 
considerably if in the case of an energy supply undertaking (such as RWE, for 
instance, which has a very strong public shareholder base)941 listed at the stock 
exchange, the admissibility of a reliance on fundamental rights protection would 
depend on quick movements of share transactions. Th us, publicly controlled 
energy supply undertakings such as EnBW, which is de facto controlled by a 
45,01% stake owned by an association of communal bodies (and by another 
45,01% stake of the French state owned EDF) should indeed be capable of relying 
939 BVerfGE 75, 192; BVerfG, 15 August 1994, 2 BvR 1430/94 – Sparkassen; BVerfG in re HEW, n. 
909. See generally V Epping, Grundrechte, 3rd ed., 2007, no. 154. As regards critical comments 
and more recent tendencies in the literature and case law, see Schmidt-Preuß, n. 935. As regards 
the latter decision, the Court, however, neglected the fundamental rights protection of the 
public private energy supply undertaking at least to the extent that it also replicates the 
economic activity of its private shareholders. Th e protection of the private shareholders’ 
fundamental rights in their capacity as shareholders is indeed a question to be considered 
separately here. More generally in this respect, Ruthig/Storr, n. 780, no. 450.
940 BVerfG, 14 March 2003, 1 BvR 2087/03, 2111/03, nos 71 et seq., accepting Deutsche Telekom 
AG’s (which is de facto controlled by the Federal Republic of Germany with its approx. 43% 
shareholding) ability to benefi t from the fundamental rights of Articles 12 and 14 GG; it, 
however, emphasizes that the German State is, for factual and legal reasons, not able to exercise 
control over Deutsche Telekom. Otherwise, the reliance of Deutsche Telekom, and more 
generally of undertakings with public shareholders, on fundamental rights protection might 
still be doubtful, see no. 72 of the decision. In BVerfG, 18 May 2009, 1 BvR 1731/05 – Mainova, 
the BVerfG indeed upholds its stance (already articulated in its 1989 HEW decision, n. 909, 
that at least a public shareholding (by a municipality) in a private (energy supply) undertaking 
amounting to more than 75% (which includes the corrsponding control rights) does not allow 
such an undertaking to rely on fundamental rights protection, which would not be obtainable 
by simply conducting a business in a private legal form (so-called “Flucht ins Privatrecht”). Th e 
Court bases its decision also on the qualifi cation of energy supply as a public task. It has, 
however, been argued here that this qualifi cation should not lead to the refusal of fundamental 
rights protection. Contrary to what has been discussed here the Court has also not taken into 
consideration whether sovereign powers are exercised; only if this was the case should 
fundamental rights protection be refused.
941 Th e transmission system operators RWE, E.ON and EnBW have minority municipal 
shareholders whereas the fourth transmission system operator Vattenfall is wholly owned by 




on fundamental rights protection.942 Th e case of EnBW actually provides another 
argument why German public shareholdings should enjoy fundamental rights 
protection: the fact that foreign state owned shareholders such as EDF and 
Vattenfall do enjoy fundamental rights protection in Germany943 would put 
German public shareholders at a further disadvantage.
According to what has just been discussed, the view is taken here that 
municipalities are able to rely on the fundamental rights protection of Articles 12 
and 14 (as well as 9) GG in the context given. Th ey, however, can only rely on 
these fundamental rights as long as the economic activity of energy supply has 
not been legitimately taken away from them by the State or their undertakings 
have not been legitimately privatized by the State.944
2. FREEDOM OF OCCUPATION AND ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, ARTICLE 12(1) GG
Th e freedom of occupation and the right to property according to Article 14 GG 
are closely related. In their economic functions, both fundamental rights in 
principle protect the same subjects. Subject-matter of the protection of Article 14 
GG is – via the right to own established and active economic operations (Recht 
am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb)945 – the substance of the 
property rights used for economic purposes such as ownership of production 
assets.946 Article 12(1) GG, on the other hand, protects free economic activity947, 
which directly relates to the economic safeguards of Article 14 GG.948 Subject-
matters of both fundamental rights are thus the general freedom of economic 
and entrepreneurial activity, which comprises, inter alia, of the freedom of 
942 M Schmidt-Preuß, Kollidierende Privatinteressen im Verwaltungsrecht, 2nd ed., 2005, pp. 68 et 
seq., 717 et seq.
943 See, in greater detail, n. 961.
944 Against these state organizational measures, municipalities can only rely on Article 28(2) GG, 
whose eff ects have already been discussed above. Th us, municipal energy supply undertakings 
do not enjoy the same degree of guarantee of continued existence (Bestandschutz) as their 
private competitors do.
945 See Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14 nos 95 et seq.
946 Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 nos. 130–132, 147, 150, with further references.
947 BVerfGE 50, 290, 363. Th is right is also applicable to domestic legal persons. For municipalities, 
see already supra.
948 According to the BVerfG, Article 14(1) GG protects what has been acquired, i.e. the result of an 
activity, whereas Article 12(1) GG protects the acquisition of it, i.e. the activity itself, See only 
BVerfGE 88, 366, 377. In other words, the freedom of occupation and economic operation 
protects the freedom of acquisition whereas the right to property protects the continuity of an 
acquisition (resulting from a business activity or from practising an occupation) and the 
property rights deriving from economic acquisition.
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competition or the participation in the competitive process949 including free 
market access950 and the freedom to invest951, without obstacles or distortions 
raised by the State.952 Article 12(1) GG is thus applicable parallel to Article 14 GG 
(Idealkonkurrenz).953
On the other hand, the right to property according to Article 14 GG does not 
protect against the loss or restriction of the opportunity to earn money or of any 
sales markets or market shares, i.e. to put it more generally, entrepreneurial 
opportunities are not protected. Th e freedom of occupation and economic 
activity according to Article 12(1) GG does not protect against competition or 
reductions in business volume or in opportunities to earn money as a result of 
competition.954 Th e freedom of occupation according to Article 12(1) GG, 
however, protects against restrictions on how (or whether at all) an occupation 
can be chosen and how is should be pursued.
With regard to goals of economic and social policy, the legislator possesses a wide 
margin of appreciation.955 As Articles 12 and 14 GG normally carry essentially 
the same limitations956, in particular as regards the constitutional reservation 
that limitations can only be set by law (Gesetzesvorbehalte) which is contained in 
Articles 12(1) 2nd sentence, 14(1) 2nd sentence GG957, the proportionality aspects 
discussed in the context of the possible introduction of an ISO model are also 
applicable here.958
949 See BVerfGE 32, 311, 317.
950 Which, according to the BVerfG, is solely protected by Article 12 GG, see, for instance, 
BVerfGE 110, 274, 288.
951 Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12.
952 Th us, the exemption of energy supply undertakings from the application of competition law 
according to the old s. 103(1) GWB, see supra, which resulted in the creation and acceptance of 
monopolistic energy supply closed to competition, infringed the rights resulting from 
Article 12(1) GG of those undertakings which did not have the “privilege” to be part of this 
“energy supply circle”.
953 Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12.
954 Papier, n. 770, p. 222. Th is is the reason why, in the context of current legislation, the reductions 
in sales caused by competition can be taken into account when establishing whether there are 
any free network capacities for the vertically integrated network undertaking to honour 
network access requests from third parties.
955 Haslinger, n. 35, p. 349.
956 BVerfGE 50, 290, 364.
957 More diff erentiated, Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 12 no. 150.
958 See Papier, n. 770, p. 223.
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3. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, ARTICLE 9(1) GG
Th e freedom of association according to Article 9(1) GG (Vereinigungsfreiheit) 
guarantees the freedom to form associations and corporations (Vereine und 
Gesellschaft en). Article 9(1) GG inter alia protects the autonomy of the association 
to organize itself internally, which includes the choice of the group structure (incl. 
the legal form of the undertaking) and the allocation of undertakings within the 
group (Konzerngestaltungsfreiheit)959, subject to regulation by company and 
corporate law.960
More importantly, however, Article 9(1) GG particularly protects those purposes 
of association, which are already protected by fundamental rights granted to 
individuals. Th us, Article 9(1) GG oft en applies in the context of, for instance 
Articles 2(1) (general freedom of action – allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit)961, 12 
(freedom of economic operation – Freiheit der wirtschaft lichen Betätigung) and 
14 GG (right to property).962 In other words, the freedom of association can be 
described as a mere right to “exercise” collectively a certain purpose legitimized 
by fundamental rights (“Ausübungsrecht”) where this purpose fi nds its 
959 For the principle of autonomous organisation and free (and collective) self-determination, see 
BVerfGE 50, 290, 354 – Mitbestimmung. See also Schmidt-Preuß, n. 539, p. 38, and P Badura, 
‘Netzzugang oder Mitwirkungsrechte Dritter bei der Energieversorgung mit Gas?’, (2004) 
DVBl. 1189, 1196. Public entities and corporations are not protected, see Scholz in Maunz/
Dürig, n. 790, Article 9 nos 73 et seq. See, in greater detail, as regards the subject-matters of 
protection of Article 9(1) GG, Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 9 nos 42 et seq.
960 Because the freedom of association is aimed at collective action, it does not help against 
restrictions which would apply to the individual to the same extent as they apply to the 
association. Th us, the activity of the association is subject to the law (for instance, company 
law) in the same way as the actions of individuals, see Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 9 
nos 86–7.
961 Th e fundamental right of Article 2(1) GG, which guarantees the general freedom of action 
(and thus, for instance, also economic activity and contractual freedom) only comes into play 
if no special fundamental right is applicable, such as Articles 14, 12(1) and 9(1) GG. Article 9(1) 
and 12 GG only protect German nationals, while Article 14 (albeit a fundamental right 
applicable to any natural person) as a result of the eff ect of Article 19(3) GG (which facilitates 
the applicability of fundamental rights to domestic legal persons if suitable), does not protect 
foreign legal persons and any of their share ownership. Th us, foreign natural and legal persons 
(such as Swedish Vattenfall and French EdF) if not protected by these rights can only rely (to a 
limited extent) on Article 2(1) GG, which guarantees the general freedom of action (and thus, 
for instance, also economic activity and contractual freedom) and, if applicable, the 
fundamental rights and freedoms as protected on EU level as well as by the ECHR and its 
protocols and by, for instance, Article 10 of the Energy Charter Treaty; as to the Energy Charter 
Treaty, see n. 97. Th e latter, i.e. ECHR and Energy Charter Treaty do, however, not rank as 
fundamental rights in Germany, see supra. See, in greater detail, Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 
790, Article 9 nos 41, 47, 111, Article 12 no. 104; Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, nos 
217, 218.
962 Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 9 no. 39.
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constitutional legitimacy in certain fundamental rights defi ned in content and 
substance (“Inhaltsrecht”), such as Articles 2(1), 12 and 14 GG.963
As explained above, more restrictive unbundling measures are sought to be 
enforced inter alia for competition reasons. Th us, the primary target is not the 
structure of the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings which is “only” 
a necessary consequence. Consequently, it is primarily Articles 14 and 12 GG 
which are interfered with964, and with them Article 9(1) GG, which protects the 
(collective) exercise of these rights, i.e. the way and in the structure in which 
these undertakings want to use them.965 Consequently, as Article 9(1) protects 
the (collective) exercise of the “substantial” rights deriving from Articles 14 and 
12 GG, the restrictions of these rights966 also restrict the right in Article 9(1) 
GG.967
Th ese restrictions can, however, only be applied to Article 9(1) GG as long as they 
pass the proportionality test. Consequently, no further explicit discussion of the 
compatibility of the unbundling measures assessed here with the freedom of 
association according to Article 9(1) GG is required968; any (new) company law 
related restrictions in the area of (private and public) limited liability companies 
963 Th e commercial activity of the association is then not primarily protected by Article 9(1) GG 
because to that extent the association and its activity do not in themselves need fundamental 
rights protection. In this respect, the protection rather derives from substantive fundamental 
rights, such as Articles 14 and 12 GG, see BVerfGE 70, 1, 25.
964 As will be examined in greater detail with respect to Article 14 GG in section V. For the 
interference with Article 12(1) GG, see n. 1008.
965 As in the present context, the structure of the association and its purpose oft en cannot be 
clearly distinguished; rather, the structural requirements associated with the purpose of the 
association also determine the organizational structure of the association, which makes the 
determination of the applicable fundamental rights being restricted problematic. As soon as 
Article 9(1) GG is to be applied in combination with other fundamental rights, as is the case 
here, the restrictions to Article 9(1) GG as well as to the other fundamental rights, here Articles 
14 and 12 GG, are applicable. Only if the motives and resulting therefrom the aim of state 
intervention can be determined, is only one or the other of the restrictions applicable (otherwise 
both are applicable).
966 Which will also be elaborated upon in section V.
967 Apart from the restrictions of Article 9(1) GG as set out in Article 9(2) GG, the legislator is 
entitled to restrict the operation of an association in so far as it is necessary to protect other 
legally protected interests and in so far the interests of common welfare as safeguarded by the 
State are of equal importance to the encroachment upon the freedom of association, see 
BVerfGE 30, 227, 241 et seq.
968 Assuming that Eff ective and Effi  cient Unbundling and an ISO model without investment 
decision and commissioning powers is a justifi ed restriction of Articles 14 and 12 GG, see 
further infra, Article 9(1) GG (which is merely ancillary to Articles 14 and 12 GG in the context 
given here) can also be restricted, or vice versa, any unbundling measure exceeding the model 
of an ISO without investment decision power, would also violate Article 9(1) GG.
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(GmbH and AG)969, which would in particular occur in the context of stricter 
legal unbundling measures, would be permissible because Article 9(1) GG does 
not contain a guarantee of the status quo.970
4. PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, ARTICLE 3(1) GG
Th e principle of equality as set out in Article 3(1) GG is unlikely to play a role in 
Germany, at least with respect to further unbundling measures relating to energy 
transmission networks. It may become relevant at energy distribution level if 
Germany allowed such networks which are owned by municipalities to be 
transferred to a local government department diff erent from the department, 
which is responsible for the remainder of the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertaking. In such a case, the discussions concerning the equity principle in 
chapter 7 on the European Union are relevant by analogy.
V. APPLICATION TO FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
MEASURES
In this section, only the September 2007 ownership unbundling and (“deep”) ISO 
proposals of the Commission (as outlined in the Introduction) will be discussed 
as regards their compatibility with German constitutional law, in particular with 
Article 14 GG. As these Directives give choices, this section will discuss which 
alternatives can live up to German fundamental rights standards. Th e alternative 
proposal put forward by, inter alia, Germany, Austria and France, i.e. the so-called 
Eff ective and Effi  cient Unbundling, which also features the current draft  Directives 
agreed in October 2008 and which promotes more stringent legal unbundling 
measures971, will be briefl y examined at the end of this section but without an 
in-depth analysis as it is unlikely to raise severe constitutional problems in 
969 Th ese two types of companies are the predominant way of organizing energy supply activities 
in Germany, see Volz, n. 670.
970 See Scholz in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 9, no. 69; Höfl ing in Sachs,GG – Kommentar, 3rd 
ed., 2003, Article 9, nos 36–7. Th e constitutional validity of such measures only becomes 
questionable where they interfere with the principles of autonomous organization (Grundsatz 
der privatautonomen Organisation) and free self-determination (Grundsatz der freiheitlichen 
Selbstbestimmung), which guarantee free incorporation and organisational operational 
capability (Funktionsfähigkeit), see ibid. See also BVerfGE 50, 290, 353 et seq. – Mitbestimmung. 
Th e BVerfG sees shareholdings being primarily protected, and the law related to public limited 
companies (AG) primarily determined, by Article 14 GG rather than by Article 9(1) GG. See 
also Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, no. 196, as regards the protection of the 
operational capability of undertakings by Article 14 GG.
971 For a basic outline, see Introduction.
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Germany.972 More stringent legal and operational unbundling rules, such as the 
above mentioned alternative proposal, are likely to be considered a legitimate 
regulation (Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung) or reorganization of the 
ownership of energy networks, which do not (even) require compensation. 
Similarly, the ISO model as applied in Great Britain973 will only play a role here 
when showing what is still possible in Germany in terms of compliance with 
German constitutional law, because such a further unbundling measure even if it 
included the requirement to transfer the ownership of network assets to the 
vertically integrated network operation company would be unlikely to pose too 
great a challenge to German constitutional law.974
1. OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING INCL. SHARE SPLIT
Ownership Unbundling as the most intrusive form of separation of vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings would according to what has been said in 
section IV only be possible by way of expropriation or, indirectly, through 
legislation ordering a compulsory sale.975 It is arguable whether the latter is to be 
seen as expropriation in terms of Article 14(3) GG or as a mere determination of 
substance and limitations of ownership. What needs to be considered, however, is 
972 As regards the (constitutional) legitimacy of the current legal and operational unbundling 
legislation, see Schmidt-Preuß, n. 539, who, however, emphasizes that these provisions test the 
limits of constitutionality, which seems rather exaggerated.
973 And thus be explained in greater detail in chapter 5 on Great Britain. In Great Britain, the two 
vertically integrated Scottish electricity supply undertakings have retained their investment 
decision powers albeit in coordination and under dispute resolution before the sector-specifi c 
regulator OFGEM (in case of confl ict with the plans of the national electricity network operator 
NationalGrid).
974 In Germany, this transfer has already been executed by the four vertically integrated electricity 
supply undertakings E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW operating the transmission networks. 
More generally, the transfer of network ownership onto the vertically integrated network 
operation company would support more stringent operational unbundling by preventing even 
more eff ectively undue infl uence and potential abuse when setting the lease rates (Pachtzins), 
which, by the way, is already reviewed by the German regulatory authority BNetzA.
975 In the case of expropriation, the good so expropriated does not necessarily have to be at the 
disposal of the State resp. does not necessarily have to be used by the State in order to fulfi l the 
public task defi ned by the State as the basis for acquiring (i.e. expropriating) the good in the 
general interest. Th e public task would be the introduction and promotion of competition in 
the sector, safeguarding non-discriminatory TPA etc. Th e State can also, what is likely to be 
the case in the context given, have this public task be pursued by private parties, see Papier in 
Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, nos 578, 582, as long as the purpose of the private undertaking, 
which receives the expropriated good, can be counted towards the generally accepted services 
of generally (economic) interest, such as energy supply undertakings, and as long as the State 
ensures that the public task is pursued diligently, see BVerfGE 74, 264, 285 – Boxberg.
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that the network owner976 would although disposing of its property itself (i.e. not 
by way of an act of expropriation) still be forced to completely give up the 
ownership (whether direct or through shareholding) of its networks. Although 
this does not, at fi rst sight, look like an outright expropriation or an acquisition of 
a good (i.e. a network) based on a (direct) sovereign act by the State in order to 
accomplish a public task in the general interest, the depriving act, i.e. the sale of 
the shareholding in the undertaking which owns and operates the network is the 
result of a sovereign act, i.e. the legislative order to sell, which in itself is the 
performance of the public task of introducing and promoting competition in the 
energy sector. Hence, it is argued here that this can also be seen as an 
expropriation977, a view, which seems to be confi rmed by the BVerfG when it 
states that an “expropriation is directed at the deprivation of specifi c subjective 
legal rights guaranteed by Article 14 subs. 1 1st sentence GG in order to fulfi l 
certain public tasks (cf. BVerfGE 79, 174 <191>; 104, 1 <9>) [emphasis added].”978 
Here also, the BVerfG explicitly speaks about the act of deprivation, which fulfi ls 
a public task.
Consequently, as ownership unbundling is in fact to be characterized as 
expropriation, it would only be allowed if it is in the general interest and if 
proportionality has been observed. Th e general interest or the rationale and 
objectives behind the economic regulation of energy supply networks has been 
outlined in Part 1 Chapter 1 above; all or most of these objectives are also valid in 
the German context. Moreover, as has also already been said, European 
integration and thus the general interest of the European Union is also in the 
general interest of Germany, which Article 23 GG confi rms.979 In particular the 
safeguarding of competition is a general interest980, which is central to the free 
and social economic order of Germany (soziale Markwirtschaft ), which is based 
on the market as an essential mechanism for the operation of this order. 
Monopolies in general and thus also vertically integrated energy network 
monopolies in particular can substantially impede competition in energy supply. 
In this regard, the legislature has changed its view as regards the role competition 
should play in the sector, i.e. that a secure, aff ordable and sustainable energy 
supply cannot be achieved through a system of closed energy supply areas, which 
976 Albeit network owner can currently mean a vertically integrated energy supply undertaking 
not necessarily being the undertaking operating the network, it is assumed here that the 
network property has already been transferred to the network operating undertaking so that a 
compulsory sale would concern the shares the parent undertaking is holding in the network 
owning network operation undertaking.
977 In this respect also Schmidt-Preuß, n. 539, p. 47, no. 32.
978 BVerfG, 26 July 2005, 1 BvR 782/94, 957/96.
979 See in this respect also Article 10 EC. See also n. 543 and accompanying text.
980 See n. 876.
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are characterized by protected monopolies, but only through promoting 
competition in the energy supply sector. In this regard, the legislature has the 
ability to develop its view over time, a so-called “prerogative of appreciation” 
(Einschätzungsprärogative).981 Th e fact that the safeguarding of competition is of 
general interest can also be derived from the federal legislative competence in 
Article 74(1) no. 16 GG to prevent the abuse of dominant positions.
In terms of proportionality of such a measure982, ownership unbundling must be 
suitable to achieve its aims983, which are primarily the promotion of competition 
in energy supply in order to establish a true internal energy market, mainly for 
the benefi t of consumers, but also for energy supply security. When it comes to 
the suitability of a measure for achieving the ends aimed at, the legislature has a 
wide margin of appreciation because of the diffi  culties in arriving at the right 
prognosis (see more extensively, section IV(1)(b) and (c)). Only evidently 
unsuitable measures or measures, which interfere with ownership rights such 
that they do not serve to achieve what is aimed at, cannot be regarded as 
reasonable.984 Further, in order for the legislator to judge the eff ectiveness of the 
measures envisaged, it should also consider the experiences made abroad with 
such measures.985 As a model for ownership unbundling of electricity and gas 
transmission networks, the experiences made in England and Wales are oft en 
referred to. However, as analysed in much greater detail below, electricity 
transmission in England and Wales was restructured before privatization. 
981 See Papier, n. 770, p. 219.
982 Th e act of expropriation must be suitable for the achievement of the public task intended to be 
achieved by the relevant measure, in addition the act must be unavoidable or ultima ratio for 
the achievement of the intended purpose (necessity principle), and the act of expropriation 
must be proportionate, i.e. means and ends must not be disproportionate. Th e expropriation is 
thus not permissible if the damage caused by the act is in its severeness and its magnitude out 
of proportion to the benefi t of the act for the general interest. See, in greater detail, Papier in 
Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, nos 589, 590. See also the elaborations in section IV(1)(b) and 
(c).
983 See Part 1 Chapter 1. See also, in overview, the 2007 Sondergutachten of the German 
Monopolkommission, n. 646, p. 230, no. 606. However, the German Competition Commission 
also gives concise insights into why ownership unbundling might not be too ideal to remedy 
the problems persisting in the energy markets. More particularly, the Competition Commission 
questions the suitability of ownership unbundling for resolving the high concentration in 
electricity generation, particularly in Germany, and sees the incentives to invest for network 
operators and owners and operators and owners of generation capacity endangered by this 
measure, see only ibid., nos 607 et seq.
984 See BVerfGE 21, 150, 155; 50, 290, 340 et seq.; 52, 1, 29 et seq.; 58, 137, 148. It has, however, 
already been claimed supra that the legislature must endeavour to obtain a thorough knowledge 
of the consequence of the measures they are intending to implement, which in the current 
context also means that they have to conduct a thorough social cost benefi t analysis of such 
measures. Only if such an analysis is tentatively positive can the legislator regard such measures 
as suitable to achieve the ends aimed at. See section IV(1)(c) supra.
985 See BVerfGE 50, 290, 334.
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Evidence of the consequences of this sort of “ownership unbundling” has been 
requested by the Bundesnetzagentur but, to the knowledge of the author, has to 
date not been received.986 Th e voluntary break-up of British Gas, which was 
initially privatized in a vertically integrated form, has also been extensively 
criticized from an economic point of view.987
In any event, at the latest when considering whether there is a necessity for 
ownership unbundling, it becomes clear that there are indeed less intrusive and 
equally eff ective alternatives available, which will be discussed in subsection 2 
below.
But even if one agrees with the necessity for ownership unbundling, aft er what 
has already been said in Part 1 Chapter 2 on its proportionality, the question of 
the compensation becomes relevant, in that Article 14(3) 2nd sentence contains 
the so-called Junktim-Klausel, according to which an expropriation can only be 
legitimate if the law ordering the expropriation also contains details of the form 
and extent of the compensation to be paid. Normally, the market value must be 
paid988, or, if one follows the assumption that compulsory sale is also an 
expropriation, the diff erence between what is actually paid for the expropriated 
good and its true market value must be paid. As it is unlikely that there are too 
many buyers for energy networks on the market or, to put it diff erently, as buyers 
know that these network must be sold, it is likely that the price to be achieved by 
the seller will be comparatively low or, in other words, the defi cit to their market 
value will be rather high.989 Th e circumstances under which compensation is to 
be paid by the European Community will be discussed in chapter 7 below.
One might, however, disagree with the proposition that compulsory sale is to be 
seen as expropriation, but see it instead as a deprivation of an existing legal 
position, which is intended to be an adjustment of private interests (in the same 
sense that, for instance, third parties not owning networks require non-
986 See K Bourwieg in his presentation ‘Bestandsaufnahme und Ausblick zur Entfl echtung in 
Deutschland’ in Brussels on 17 September 2007. See also the recent independent study by AT 
Kearney, n. 323, which concludes that the Commission’s claim that ownership unbundling 
leads to more competition cannot be empirically proven (study was conducted with a view to 
the European electricity markets).
987 See SERIS, nn. 38, 1213.
988 See BVerfGE 58, 137, 149; 100, 226, 245. Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, no. 609, is 
more restrictive as to the amount of compensation to be paid.
989 See also Schmidt-Preuß, n. 539, p. 48, no. 35, arguing that in the case of compulsory sale, the 
stock exchange value of the network undertaking cannot be the measure because it is likely to 
decrease as the bargaining advantages are on the (potential) buyers’ side so that only a valuation 
by independent accountants would enable the determination of an adequate compensation. 
More generally, the market value is determined according to generally accepted accounting 
standards, see in this respect also ECtHR, n. 1515.
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discriminatory TPA), or, in other words, as a regulation or determination of the 
substance and limitations of ownership.990 Even then, such a measure would not 
990 As to the regulation of ownership, see again, BVerfGE 101, 239, 259; 104, 1, 10. Some basic 
observations seem appropriate here as regards the proportionality of determinations of the 
substance and the limitations of ownership by way of granting TPA. In this regard, one has to 
come back to the general formula that limitations of property rights can be more extensive the 
more the exercise of ownership rights is bound up with general interest considerations. Such 
situation results from the natural monopoly character of such infrastructure. Consequently, 
parties not owning energy supply networks are signifi cantly dependent on its use. Th us, in 
principle, limitations on the owner’s power to dispose of free network capacity, such as the 
introduction of TPA, which is supported by unbundling measures, are proportionate as long 
as the owner’s own capacity needs enjoy priority in situations of capacity restraints (shoratges) 
and as long as this does not endanger the existence of the undertaking owning the network. 
Similar Papier in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, no. 521. Th is seems not to be observed 
suffi  ciently in situations where the owner is to be treated equally (i.e. without enjoying priority 
in the case of capacity restraints) to other parties requiring access to its network, such as is the 
case when an ISO is introduced. Th e network owner’s own capacity does not in principle have 
to be reduced in order to create more capacity for competitors, see ibid. Only if the network 
owner has “lost” customers so that there is less need for capacity, have capacities to be freed for 
competitors, i.e. capacity hoarding is not permissible. Th is results from the fact that Article 14 
GG does not protect a aprticular level of sales or market share. Th ese are comments prominently 
made by an incumbent judge of the BVerfG, before the current legislation entered into force. 
On the other hand, the nature of network infrastructure property is peculiar in several 
respects, which in principle also justifi es equal access for third/all parties: fi rst, the construction 
and extension of network infrastructure can only work by also using the property of third 
parties and with it at least the threat or possibility of expropriation (see already section IV(1)
(d)). Because expropriation is only possible subject to the requirements of Article 14(3) GG (in 
particular general interest requirements), it must be ensured that network infrastructure, 
which has only been able to be construed partly as a result of the expropriation powers of the 
infrastructure project undertaking, also serves the general interest (and not only the private 
interest). See BVerfGE 129, 264, 286 et seq. – Boxberg. Th ird Party Access (TPA) can thus also 
be seen as the use of infrastructure property to further the general interest. Granting TPA can 
be seen as being based on the State’s particular (residual) responsibility to guarantee the 
provision of (network) infrastructure. Th is does not mean, however, that network property is 
not in principle worthy of protection. In relation to this discussion, see already section IV(1)
(d). What it means is that the scope for the legislator to regulate is wider with respect to 
ownership limitation in the general interest. In such circumstances, the network owner must 
accept as a minimum those limitations which safeguard the interests of the general public by 
ensuring that these are not threatened by the owner’s behaviour. See BVerfGE 21, 150, 158 et 
seq., which, however, concerned state aid; see also, more generally, D Ehlers, ‘Eigentumsschutz, 
Sozialbindung und Enteignung bei der Nutzung von Boden und Umwelt’, (1992) VVDStRL 
211. A further tool for protecting the interest of the general public is obviously competition law 
enforcement, in particular s. 19(4) no. 4 GWB. However, the private enjoyment of rights in 
network infrastructure property by the owner, which can be regarded as generally subject to 
limitations but which cannot simply be abolished, is only safeguarded if the network owner 
receives an adequate consideration for the use of its property by third parties. For a similar 
view, Fehling, n. 910, p. 92, with further references, and Storr, n. 35. However, what also needs 
to be considered with respect to the private enjoyment by the owner of rights in network 
infrastructure property is that network owners are normally corporate entities. Th us, the 
concern for “personal” freedom particularly protected by Article 14 GG is to a lesser extent 
relevant here. Property in the current context does not serve an individual’s personal 
requirements but corporate profi t maximization. See also Storr, n. 35. Further, the magnitude 
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lose its character of being a depreciation of the complete property, i.e. not just a 
re-determination of the right of property, which the legislator is allowed to 
pursue. As has already been shown above, the BVerfG has indeed decided that an 
interference with the right to property can be a mere regulation of ownership 
even if in its eff ects it comes close to or is similar to an expropriation.991 A 
regulation, however, which can ultimately be considered to be a circumvention of 
Article 14(3) GG, is constitutionally not permissible so that the objective of such 
a (State) measure can (then) only be achieved by way of expropriation.992
Share split
From the point of view of energy supply undertakings, the above analysis also 
applies to the unbundling option of a share split. From the point of view of 
shareholders, a share split would, on the face of it, be a mere redefi nition of their 
of interference with the right to property requires the legislator to rectify any malfunctions of 
an ISO model, which may occur should it be introduced. Th e latter is another important reason 
why outright ownership unbundling can hardly ever be regarded as lawful: any rectifi cations 
or even reversal are simply not possible. For reasons of legal certainty and the protection of 
investment as part of the right to property, there must be a transitional period which enables 
the network owner to honour existing supply obligations (see Fehling, ibid., 93) similar to 
those provided for in the 2003 Gas Directive; in this respect see also Badura, n. 959. A further 
aspect of the special social function of network property is that the relevant private interests 
have to be balanced amongst each other. Consequently, the limitations on network ownership 
which are associated with equal TPA have to be balanced against the protected fundamental 
rights of third parties (such as the freedom of economic activity according to Article 12(1) GG) 
who do not own a network but who require network access. Although the freedom of occupation 
and economic activity according to Article 12(1) GG or the right to property according to 
Article 14 GG do not give third parties requesting network access a claim against the State to 
expand their sales markets or to reuire the State to legislate for it (Papier, n. 770, p. 218), it must 
be taken into account that the State previously excluded competition in energy supply (see 
already above). Changing this by allowing competition in energy supply means that restrictions 
to the fundamental rights of third parties (who have been kept out of energy supply by 
restricting competition over the years) are now reduced or even removed altogether. Papier, 
ibid., p. 219. Since the legislature is removing the exemption of energy supply from competition 
and liberalizing the market as a consequence of a paradigm change in the appreciation of the 
role of competition in furthering the general interest in a secure, low-priced and sustainable 
energy supply (or, in other words, since the legislature assumes that the general interest is best 
served by more competition (including the promotion of an internal energy market) rather 
than exempting energy supply from competition) it is not only entitled to reduce or rectify 
existing fundamental rights restrictions but actually obliged to do so for reasons of 
proportionality or, more specifi cally, because of the prohibition on excessive measures 
(Übermaßverbot). Facilitating TPA and the unrestricted construction of energy networks thus 
is an indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of the aim of creating competition in 
energy supply, and ultimately dictated by the principle of proportionality. Papier, ibid., p. 219.
991 See BVerfG in re Denkmalschutz, n. 551.
992 BVerfGE 100, 226, 243. For the national implementation of ownership unbundling, it is 
questionable whether legislating for a compulsory sale would be permissible at all, or whether 
the only way open to the legislator is to formally legislate for expropriation.
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property (in the guise of a determination of substance and limitations)993, at least 
as long as their overall shareholdings and their value remain unchanged.994 
Should, however, one of the two resulting shareholdings have to be sold (because 
the other shareholding controls either the network or the remaining energy supply 
activities), then this is likely, at the least, to be a determination of substance and 
limitation, to which the analysis of the issue of compulsory sale in the previous 
paragraph can also be applied.995
2. “DEEP” INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR
“Deep” Independent System Operation as proposed by the Commission is also a 
suitable means to achieve the objectives sought. Th is unbundling measure also 
seems to be an equally eff ective but less intrusive means996, which, contrary to the 
993 It has been established in section IV that both energy supply undertakings and the parent 
companies of (currently legally unbundled) transmission system operators (despite municipal 
minority or dispersed public shareholdings in individual cases) enjoy property rights 
protection in Germany.
994 Dutch municipalities are currently facing a similar situation: there, separate electricity and gas 
distribution network operators have to be in place from 2011, seaprated from the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings, which are exclusively in municipal ownership. Th ese 
new distribution system operators are to be directly controlled by the municipal owners of the 
remaining energy supply holdings (which aft er the separation are only left  with production, 
retail and other competitive energy supply activities). See in greater detail chapter 6 on the 
Netherlands.
995 Th e forced sale of shares and company capital only up to a certain shareholding threshold 
caves into the share ownership to such an extent that the core of the right to property, its 
private utility (Privatnützigkeit), is de facto no longer existent. Similar J Kühling, G Hermeier, 
‘Eigentumsrechtliche Leitplanken eines Ownership-Unbundlings in der Energiewirtschaft ’, 
(2008) 1/2 et 134.
996 Th e German Competition Commission (Monopolkommission), which favours independent 
system operation, regards this alternative as “almost” as eff ective as full ownership unbundling. 
Th is refers, however, to the eff ective promotion of competition. With respect to safeguarding 
supply security, which is as important a goal of European energy policy as the promotion of 
competition, a well designed independent system operator model, however, should not entail 
the uncertainties of full ownership unbundling with respect to negative incentives to invest 
into network as well as generation capacity, see the 2007 Sondergutachten of the German 
Monopolkommission, n. 646, pp. 230 et seq., and G Brunekreeft , J Gabriel, D Balmert, 
Independent System Operators – ein Überblick, Gutachten, bremer energie institut, Bremen, 
3 May 2007. But see also n. 130 as regards the so-called strategic investment withholding 
argument used by the Commission in its sector inquiry in order to push its ownership 
unbundling plans. See also the notes in Part 1 Chapter 2 referring in the context of the 
proportionality assessment, which refer to Haucap (n. 38). Th e introduction of independent 
system operation, however, requires careful designing, in order to realize its full eff ectiveness 
and economic effi  ciency, but more importantly, to avoid incurring compensation obligations. 
See Brunekreeft  et al., ibid.
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claim of the Commission, would also not involve so much more regulatory 
cost.997
Generally, the ISO model has signifi cant advantages over full ownership 
unbundling. It seeks a balance between two goals, which is the promotion of 
non-discriminatory competition on the one hand, and the reconciliation and 
coordination of the diff erent levels of production (system operation and 
transmission network ownership) on the other, and because generation and 
networks remain in one set of hands, possible “spill-overs” (as economists call 
overlapping and thus superfl uous investments) are internalized or can be 
prevented because both stages of production remain vertically integrated.998
To give up network operation and leave it to an independent TSO regulates or 
determines the substance of network ownership because the network owner 
would not be able to make full use of its property any longer; the forced surrender 
of network operation could not be classifi ed as an outright expropriation because 
the network owner would be able to retain its network property.
Th e ISO model is another signifi cant restriction of the property rights of the 
network owner aft er the only relatively recent introduction of regulated network 
access secured by legal and operational unbundling; the use of network property 
for private purposes (Privatnützigkeit) would ultimately be reduced to a mere 
monetary consideration for putting the property at the disposal of independent 
997 See Frontier Economics, ‘Further unbundling in European energy markets’, Energy briefi ng, 
Regulation & Unbundling, February 2007, according to which it is not clear why the separation 
of individual activities into two organisations (which can both be fi nancially incentivized by 
way of regulation) would result in a need for more regulation of the individual activities than 
if they were combined in one organisation. If not incentivized, splitting activities across two 
organisations would lead to placing signifi cant reliance on the contract between them. Th is 
contract would have to replicate the incentives internalised within a TSO owning the networks. 
Th is would indeed lead to a need for signifi cantly greater regulation and thus an increased 
regulatory burden. Frontier Economics, however, argues that because of the individual 
interests of either activity to achieve an effi  cient outcome, the additional regulation, which 
would induce the two activities to achieve such an effi  cient outcome by fi nancially incentivizing 
them, would be limited in scope. See also Part 1 Chapter 2 supra.
998 Brunekreeft  et al., n. 996. Both options, ownership unbundling and independent system 
operation, indeed have the advantage that networks can moer easily be interconnected across 
transmission system zones, which for Germany would mean easier control over the four 
transmission zones existing there, but in the medium-term also cross-border, which would 
enhance the European-wide interconnected energy infrastructure, and help to reduce 
congestions on the interconnectors. See the 2007 Sondergutachten of the German 
Monopolkommission, n. 646, pp. 230 et seq. See also the discussion in Part 1 Chapter 3 in this 
regard.
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network operators999, which will be determined by the sector regulator.1000 
Depending on the extent of powers an ISO can exercise, the owner also loses the 
control over its property and power to dispose of it freely (apart from obviously 
selling it). Although the network owner can still receive income from its network 
property and decide whether to sell it, the owner can no longer make decisions 
about the use of the network and the admission of certain users to it.
In the context of what has been just said, should the plans of the Commission 
become reality (which appears will be the case according to the draft  Directives 
of October 2008, albeit as one option amongst three in total), conferring the 
investment decision and commissioning (i.e. by way of tendering) powers to an 
ISO1001 to benefi t all access seekers (by way of TPA) would downgrade network 
owners to simple investors in their own grids (without even the ability to decide 
whether they want to invest) while also being service providers to, and 
maintaining and rendering technical services for, such grids.
All of this can be seen as a side eff ect of a reorganization of energy supply which 
will have an eff ect for the future.1002 For such a re-determination of ownership, 
the legislator in principle possesses a wide margin of appreciation as regards the 
ends it wants to achieve1003, which, however, is not unlimited. Such a limitation 
would, for instance, be reached with the introduction of a duty for the network 
owners to invest in order to fulfi l access demands by third parties (or with 
allowing third parties to tender for investment)1004, as this is widely seen as 
999 See also Storr, n. 35, p. 236.
1000 Already before and shortly aft er the second energy package was released in 2003, it was claimed 
that the restrictions such a regulatory measure imposed on the right to property would be very 
close to the borderline of what was constitutionally allowed. See, for instance, M Schmidt-
Preuß, ‘Verfassungskonfl ikt um die Durchleitung? – Zum Streitstand nach dem VNG-
Beschluß des BGH’, (1996) RdE 1; U Büdenbender, ‘Durchleitungen in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft  
und Eigentumsschutz’, (2000) WuW 119; Badura, n. 959; H-J Papier, Die Regelung von 
Durchleitungsrechten, 1997, pp. 13 et seq., and in Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, no. 521 with 
further references.
1001 It is characteristic of ISO models that tensions arise between the power to operate the networks 
and the fi nancial risk, which are to a large extent in diff erent hands. Accordingly, if an ISO is 
competent to decide about investments, there is a separation between the decision maker and 
the bearer of the risk who is held responsible and fi nancially liable if the investment was a 
commercially fl awed decision. Th e core problem is that intentionally an ISO does not possess 
any major assets, which would put it in a position to cover failed investments out of its own 
pocket. See in greater detail, Brunekreeft  et al., n. 996.
1002 See Haslinger, n. 35, p. 344, with further references.
1003 BVerfGE 83, 201, 212. As regards the means, the proportionality principle must be obeyed.
1004 See the extensive discussion on TPA in n. 990.
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incompatible with the guarantee of the right to property, which also includes the 
“negative” freedom not to invest.1005
It is thus submitted that the investment decision and commissioning powers of 
ISOs as proposed by the Commission would also be incompatible with 
fundamental rights because if the powers of the network owners to use or dispose 
are restricted in such a massive way so that only an “empty shell” of the right to 
property remains1006, a complete devaluation of the right to property is the 
consequence and would thus be equal to a depreciation of property which would 
entail similar strict justifi cation requirements to an expropriation1007 (i.e. a 
general interest justifi cation, the observance of proportionality and the provision 
of compensation (see above) would be required).1008
1005 Papier, n. 770, p. 22 with further references. Such investment duties should be distinguished 
from what is already a fact today: in the course of performing services of general economic 
interest, network operators have the basic duty to maintain and reinforce energy networks in 
order to contribute their share to secure and reliable energy supply (for German law, see ss. 12 
et seq., 17 et seq. EnWG). Further, they have the general duty to connect except where there are 
technical and economical reasons, i.e., for instance if there is a capacity restraint. Th e latter 
duty is, furthermore, reinforced by the very recent implementation of the Kraft NAV, see nn. 
660 and 716, n. 1011 and Part 1 Chapter 2 supra. See also Höppner, n. 617. It is the aim of this 
regulation to facilitate new generation projects, thereby reinforcing competition. Th e 
connection can only be refused if the point of connection does not fulfi l the technical 
requirements for the feeding-in of electricity. Th e network operator must undertake all 
measures necessary to establish the technical requirements, which include the reinforcement 
of the grid to the next network hub. Possible capacity restraints must not lead to the refusal to 
connect. Th e party to be connected must bear the costs of connection and any necessary works 
to establish the technical requirements for connection including the reinforcement of the grid 
up to the next network hub (so-called shallow connection charges) if the connection is 
exclusively used by this party and if the equipment does not become the property of the 
network operator. In case of capacity restraints, new generation plants have to have priority 
access to the grid, which is supposed to promote the modernization of the global generation 
plant assets and competition. Apart from these regulatory requirements, network access can 
also be ordered by applying s. 19(4) no. 4 GWB (see supra) in cases where the network operator 
abuses its dominant position.
1006 Th e requirement to use private property to further the general interest is not allowed to result 
in an excessive burden or violate the owner’s proprietary sphere unreasonably, see BVerfGE 21, 
150, 155; 50, 290, 340; 52, 1, 29, 32; 53, 257, 292; 58, 137, 148.
1007 BVerfG in re Denkmalschutz, n. 551, already discussed supra.
1008 In this respect also Badura, n. 959. In the context of the freedom of occupation and economic 
activity protected by Article 12(1) GG, see section IV(2), the unbundling provisions regulate 
the modalities of entrepreneurial activity and the exercise of an occupation. From this it also 
follows that should an ISO model in whatever form be introduced, vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings, which are network owners, are not allowed to operate as network 
operators any more. More detailed on the question of whether network operation is a protected 
occupation, see Haslinger, n. 35, p. 347 et seq. Th e prohibition on such undertakings pursuing 
network operation is an objective restriction of the free choice of an occupation (objective 
Berufszulassungs- or Berufswahlbeschränkung) because to allow a person to become a network 
operator does not depend on the personal characteristics of a network operator or any personal 
conditions a network operator has to fulfi l but rather on objective criteria, which do not relate 
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From a legal point of view, it is indeed claimed that there exist even less intrusive 
means than the introduction of an ISO model, such as more stringent legal and 
operational unbundling.1009 Economists, however, suggest the necessity of 
independent system operations outside vertically integrated structures.1010 And 
although several economists demand full ownership unbundling, this is usually 
a broad brush claim on a theoretical basis made without even looking into the 
empirical foundations of such a claim. As soon as they obtain empirical evidence 
or gain specifi c insights into the functioning of particular national energy sectors, 
this picture changes, tentatively favouring non-vertically integrated independent 
system operation.1011
to the person of a network operator. See Haslinger, n. 35, p. 348 with further references. Th is is 
because one is generally free to choose and exercise an occupation but as soon as the choice is 
made, choosing a certain other occupation is not possible any more. See ibid. Such objective 
restrictions are only permissible if they are absolutely necessary in order to avoid a threat to an 
outstandingly important common good, which is both evident and the damage frlowing from 
it is highly likely, BVerfGE 102, 197, 214. As this objective restriction does not concern the 
choice of the fi rst occupation but merely the second occupation (i.e. either being a network 
operator who then wants to become active in competitive up- and downstream energy supply 
activities or being a vertically integrated energy supply undertaking active in competitive up- 
and downstream activities which then wants to become a network operator), this restriction is 
easier to justify, cf. BVerfGE 21, 173, 181. Th e proportionality of such a restriction must be 
weighed against the importance of the common good, i.e. low-priced, secure and country-wide 
supply of energy, to be safeguarded by this restriction, see BVerfGE 54, 301, 331. As Articles 12 
and 14 GG are normally subject to essentially the same limitations, BVerfGE 50, 290, 364, the 
proportionality aspects discussed in the context of the possible introduction of an ISO model 
are also applicable here. See also Papier, n. 770, p. 223.
1009 See, e.g., Säcker, nn. 30, 682. Th is is indeed a less intrusive alternative but considerably less 
eff ective as it does not sever the ties between network operation and the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertaking with all the confl icts of interests and problems this entails and 
which have been identifi ed by the vast majority of economists. See also the elaboration on 
Eff ective and Effi  cient Unbundling infra.
1010 According to the 2007 Sondergutachten of the German Monopolkommission, n. 646, the 
introduction of an ISO model would indeed suffi  ciently sever the infl uence a vertically 
integrated energy supply undertaking, which is network owner, could have on the up- and 
downstream markets.
1011 See also the extensive discussion in Part 1 Chapter 2 supra. With regard to the plans of the 
Commission as applied to the circumstances in Germany, see the 2007 Sondergutachten of the 
German Monopolkommission, n. 646, and Brunekreeft , n. 9, who has just carried out a social 
cost benefi t analysis with regard to the competition eff ects of ownership unbundling in 
Germany, and discovered that the competition eff ects of ownership unbundling are rather 
small on the assumption that generation capacity remains stable in the medium- and long-
term. Although nuclear energy is being reduced in Germany and capacity mothballed (5 GW 
in total), the new Regulation regulating the connection of new generation capacity, Kraft NAV, 
see nn 660, 716, 1005 and Part 1 Chapter 2, appears to be an eff ective tool to promote 
independent generation capacity, i.e. capacity not build by incumbents. Th e conclusion that 
ownership unbundling does not have too great an eff ect (if any) on the promotion of 




Having said that conferring investment decision and commissioning competence 
on an ISO would be a regulation of property which amounts to an expropriation, 
and also in view of the indications in particular in economic literature that such 
additional powers would not be conducive1012 to achieving the objectives 
sought1013, the thrust of the argument is turned around here to claim that only 
an ISO model without such wide-ranging powers would be admissible under 
German constitutional law. Such an ISO model, it is claimed here, would be the 
maximum of what complies with the principle of proportionality. As it is crucial 
for an ISO model (without such wide-ranging powers) to function eff ectively and 
effi  ciently, the corporate governance issue comes to the fore. Economists have 
already identifi ed the investment issue as the “Achilles heel” of ISO models.1014
A solution in conformity with German constitutional law could be the 
implementation of an ISO model in Germany along the lines of what is current 
practice in the Scottish market.
In summary1015, in Scotland an entirely independent TSO (NationalGrid) exists, 
which operates the Scottish electricity transmission networks and which is 
responsible for balancing the grids, for taking precautions against black-outs, for 
entering into connection and access agreements with network users, and for 
coordinating the investment planning which is also carried out by the two 
vertically integrated Scottish transmission network owners. Th e latter put their 
networks at the disposal of the TSO but remain responsible, in parallel with the 
TSO, for the planning, the development and the maintenance of the network in 
their network zone; they also provide transmission network services to the TSO. 
Th e TSO determines and invoices the network access charges regulated by the 
sector regulator OFGEM. Th e Scottish transmission owners (TO) determine 
their own charges which are invoiced to the TSO, which are also regulated by 
1012 More details in Part 1 Chapter 2, in particular in the context of the analysis rendered by 
Haucap.
1013 See Part 1 Chapter 1 supra.
1014 Brunekreeft  et al., n. 996, which tend towards a club ownership structure when pleading for 
the participation of market actors in the ISO. Accordingly, club ownership would deal with the 
typical ISO tension arising between the competence to operate the networks and the fi nancial 
risk, which are to a large extent in diff erent hands (i.e. the independence of the ISO can confl ict 
with the the interests of the party who has to bear the risk for network investments), by 
involving the bearer of the investment risk, albeit with only a little infl uence. Indirectly, all 
stakeholders are represented in a club ownership solution: generators, transmission owners, 
suppliers, traders and customers. All participants (including any associated or affi  liated 
undertakings) entitled to vote would have the same voting right no matter how big they are, i.e. 
according to the principle: one party, one vote. Th e board of executive directors would consist 
of independent members, whose primary task it would be to select and supervise the managers 
of the ISO, and to approve the budget.
1015 More details are to be found in the next chapter on Great Britain.
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OFGEM and which include the charges for the TSO using the Scottish networks 
and for maintenance and investments provided by the TOs. Th e TSO does not 
have the competence to demand investments from the TOs. Should, however, the 
TOs not comply with an application of the TSO to invest, then the dispute is 
resolved by OFGEM.
Translated to the situation in Germany, the implementation of an ISO model 
comparable to the Scottish would mean that the then (four) German TOs and 
one independent TSO would all fi ve plan the investments they deem necessary. 
In the case of confl ict, the BNetzA would be competent to resolve such 
confl icts.1016 Th is would happen on the basis of BNetzA’s competition law powers 
with regard to network access issues (see above), i.e. checking whether the refusal 
of a TO to comply with an investment request of the TSO is an abuse of a 
dominant position in that the TO prevents competitors from entering the market 
or endeavour to keep them out of its supply area in order to shelter its up- and 
downstream businesses from competition.1017
Th e distinguishing element in Germany compared to the UK could be that in 
Germany, the party “losing” such a dispute resolution would be able to appeal to 
the competent courts (in the UK, dispute determinations by OFGEM are 
normally fi nal without an opportunity for appeal).
1016 Th e regulator, which secures the refi nancing of the investment via approving the network 
charges, thus becomes part of the negotiation process. It is one of its predominant tasks, 
however, not to endanger the existence of the undertaking owning the networks. Th e regulator 
thus steps into the shoes of the undertaking owning the network (operating) undertaking, 
which is at least under the current scenario able to determine the global indebtedness limits 
and the annual fi nancial plans of the network operator.
1017 Th is is also one of the most important arguments in the unbundling debate, also known 
strategic investment withholding, see n. 130. Th is assumption is also the basis for the argument 
followed in the energy sector inquiry, and which is also a dilemma in ISO models (i.e. the lack 
of investment incentives which is also an important argument against the enforcement of 
ownership unbundling though; see only the 2007 Sondergutachten of the German 
Monopolkommission, n. 646. Th is is because if the investment decision is made by the 
transmission owner and not by the ISO, the investment withholding problem does not go 
away. On the other hand, should the ISO have investment decision powers without investing 
itself, then a separation between the decision maker and the risk bearer occurs. Such a 
separation would be acceptable more easily according to Brunekreeft  et al., n. 996, if the TO 




3. EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT UNBUNDLING
Coming back to the claim that there exist even less intrusive means, which are 
equally as eff ective as independent system operation1018, the draft  Directives as 
agreed on 9 and 10 October 2008 (and approved by the European Parliament) 
contain an option additional to ownership unbundling and “deep” independent 
system operation, the so-called Independent Transmission Operator (ITO)1019, 
which goes back to a proposal of 29 January 2008 by, inter alia, France and 
Germany.1020
Th e ITO model allows a vertically integrated energy supply undertaking to retain 
its energy transmission networks, to operate them as a subsidiary and to 
consolidate its results thus protecting the fi nancial interest of the vertically 
integrated undertaking.
Th e network operation subsidiary would have to be transformed into a limited 
liability company (not necessarily a public limited company any more) with a 
separate management and supervisory board.
Th e TSO subsidiary would have to have all the assets necessary to operate the 
networks; it must in particular own the networks.1021
1018 Which has, however, already been rebutted by economists, see supra.
1019 See Recital 12, Articles 9(8), 17 et seq. (chapter V) of the draft  Energy Directives as agreed by 
the European Council in October 2008 and approved by the European Parliament in April 
2009. See already nn. 31, 33, 94, 372, 426, 569. See also n. 1525.
1020 See nn. 29, 30, 32 and accompanying text. See Säcker, n. 682. Th e ITO model seems largely to 
go back to the suggestions made by Säcker.
1021 Requiring that the network assets have to be transferred to the vertically integrated network 
operating subsidiary (a requirement, which the (four) German electricity TSOs already fulfi l) 
is a (re-) determination of the substance and limitations (or regulation) of ownership, which 
the legislator is in principle allowed to pursue according to Article 14 (1) 2nd sentence GG 
without being required to pay compensation. Should one, however, consider such a “shift ” to 
be an expropriation, then according to what has already been said about the general interest 
requirement, which needs to be fulfi lled in order to render an expropriation lawful, the general 
interest with respect to tighter legal unbundling measures is certainly fulfi lled. What is more, 
compensation is not an issue in this respect either as such compensation would have to be paid 
by the vertically integrated network operating undertaking receiving the expropriated network 
assets from its vertically integrated sister (generation or supply) or parent (holding) 
undertaking, which is thus a measure fi nancially neutral to the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking as a whole. As regards the obligation for the benefi ciary of an expropriation 
to pay compensation, even if such a benefi ciary is a natural or legal person, see Papier in 
Maunz/Dürig, n. 790, Article 14, nos 637 et seq., 638. Th e re-determination or expropriation, 
if any, would naturally both have to fulfi l (and according to the reasoning followed here, also 
pass) the proportionality requirement.
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Th e parent undertaking would not have any control over the day-to-day 
operations of the TSO. Th e supervisory board of the TSO subsidiary would be 
competent to approve the annual and longer term fi nancial plans, the level of 
indebtedness of the TSO and the dividends payable to the shareholders.
As regards the composition of the supervisory board, the ITO option allows for 
at least half of its members minus one, i.e. the minority, to be exempted from the 
“professional independence” rules, i.e. more the half of its members can come 
from the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking.1022
Th e ITO option further requires that the majority of the management of the TSO 
is not allowed to have worked for the vertically integrated electricity or gas supply 
undertaking within three years before appointment and cannot return to the 
employment of the vertically integrated company for a period of 4 years aft er 
leaving the TSO management (so-called “cooling-off ” period).
Th e ITO option gives the regulator considerably greater powers. In particular 
these are the power to veto the appointment of members of the supervisory board 
and management board of the transmission company (TSO) on the grounds of 
lack of “professional independence”, and the ability to levy fi nes if the TSO fails 
to comply with the obligations imposed on it as a result of the provisions of the 
Energy Directives. In case a TSO does not execute an investment specifi ed in its 
rolling 10-year investment plan, accepted or amended by the national regulator, 
the regulator can amongst other measures put this investment out to tender, 
which will then be fi nanced from the regulated tariff .
Th e ITO model is a stricter enforcement of legal and operational unbundling, 
which is merely giving the current European Directives more contours; it does 
not remove the confl ict of interest between network operation and production or 
supply within the vertically integrated company, which might lead in practice to 
a lack of independence as regards the exercise of decision making rights, which 
might in theory exist as a result of incorporating the network operation as limited 
liability company. As this proposal is a less intrusive option in terms of 
1022 As regards the fundamental diff erence in the perception of professional independence in a 
corporate governance context in anglo-saxon countries compared to Germany, see B Nagel, 
‘Unabhängigkeit der Kontrolle im Aufsichtsrat und Verwaltungsrat: Der Konfl ikt zwischen 
der deutschen der angelsächsischen Konzeption’, (2007) NZG 166; see also F Säcker, ‘BB-Forum: 
Corporate Governance und Europäisches Gesellschaft srecht – Neue Wege in der 
Mitbestimmung’, (2004) BB 1462. Together with the fact that more than half of the supervisory 
board members can be associated with the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking, 
the independence of the supervisory board from the infl uence of the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertaking seems more than questionable.
Chapter 4. Germany
Intersentia 271
fundamental rights interference than the introduction of an independent system 
operator model and as the ISO model under certain conditions is likely to pass 
the fundamental rights test, the ITO model is likely not to violate any fundamental 
rights.
VI. ARTICLE 56 EC
Article 56 EC would apply to further unbundling measures taken by Germany 
unilaterally, i.e. not as a result of implementing European legislation, if foreign 
nationals planned to invest (and/or provide services and/or establish themselves) 
in the energy supply sector in Germany or are already invested (and/or providing 
services and/or established) there.1023 As such a scenario is, however, extremely 
unlikely to happen in Germany, it suffi  ces to refer to the discussion and conclusions 
in this regard in chapter 5 on Great Britain, which would in principle be applicable 
here by analogy.1024
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Germany’s energy supply sector is characterized by vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings, which comply with the current legal and operational energy 
supply network unbundling requirements of the 2003 Energy Directives. Energy 
transmission is vertically integrated in private and private public energy supply 
undertakings whereas energy distribution is characterized by a mix of vertically 
integrated private, public private and public energy supply undertakings.
A sector regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur, only become operational in summer 
2005 with regulatory and competition law powers in the area of energy network 
1023 With regard to the question of the relationship of the freedom of free movement of capital 
(Article 56 EC) and the freedom of establishment (Articles 43 et seq. EC), see n. 571. As has 
already been said there, only the fi rst is subject to analysis here. If Germany opted for complete 
ownership unbundling on the basis of European legislation and opting for the introduction of 
an ISO model was also possible under European legislation and other Member States, 
undertakings of which are invested or planning to invest in Germany, opted for the latter, 
Article 56 EC would also be applicable to German legislation because it would according to 
what is claimed here implement an illegal option, see in this respect the text accompanying n. 
557. Th is is apart from the fact that EC legislation would itself be in breach of Article 56 EC as 
outlined in Part 1 Chapter 3 section V(4). Th e situation would be similar to what is going to be 
established for the UK described in chapter 5. It will, however, be diff erent to what is going to 
be established for the Netherlands which is described in chapter 6 because of the Dutch State’s 
involvement in the sector.
1024 Th e situation in the Netherlands is somewhat diff erent, see n. 1023, and chapter 6 on the 
Netherlands.
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operations, the latter of which it shares with the German competition authorities, 
in particular the Bundeskartellamt. Since the beginning of 2009, the networks 
have been regulated by way of incentive regulation.1025 Further, specifi c legislation 
is in place to promote and safeguard new generation capacity.
It is against this background, in particular as regards the private (public) structure 
of energy transmission, which is “only” legally unbundled that the Commission 
proposals of September 2007 are a cause of great concern. Th is is exacerbated by 
a rather elaborate and detailed fundamental rights protection in Germany, which 
is guaranteed by a Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
and its rather robust stance with respect to fundamental rights protection 
aff orded by the European Union in general and the European Court of Justice in 
particular (see further in chapter 7 on the European Union). In this context, it is, 
however, not clear whether public energy supply undertakings and public 
shareholders of energy supply undertakings would enjoy protection under 
German constitutional law; it is in fact pleaded here in favour of such protection 
given the current context.
Th e introduction of the further unbundling measures of ownership unbundling 
of energy transmission networks would mean an expropriation of the vertically 
integrated ESUs concerned (or of their shareholders). It would be likely to be 
unconstitutional, and the introduction of independent system operation together 
with adequate network regulation along the lines of what is currently in place in 
Scotland, i.e. an ISO without investment decision and commissioning powers 
(see further in chapter 5 on Great Britain), would be a less intrusive but equally 
eff ective unbundling measure and probably the furthest stricter unbundling 
measures could go in Germany.
Th is result holds even more (at least for electricity) if the recent social cost benefi t 
analysis of Brunekreeft  is adequately taken into account according to which it is 
actually suffi  cient generation that matters and not ownership unbundling of 
electricity transmission networks whose competition promotion eff ects in the 
German electricity market are relatively small (as long as there continues to be 
suffi  cient generation capacity in the German market in the medium- and long-
term).
It is against this background that the “deep” independent system operator model 
proposed by the Commission, i.e. an ISO with investment decision and 
1025 As regards the expectations imposed on this regulatory mechanism in Germany, see 
Brunekreeft /Bauknecht, n. 656.
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commissioning powers, which equally amounts to an expropriation of the energy 
supply undertakings concerned, would also be unconstitutional.
Should the draft  Directives of October 2008 enter into force (largely) unamended, 
these discussions are likely to remain hypothetical for the time being. Th ey 
would, however, be likely to become relevant again in a few years time when the 
Commission reviews the success of these new legislative measures. Germany will 
be likely not to impose more than Eff ective and Effi  cient Unbundling onto the 







Th e UK is the pioneer of energy market liberalization, which by far predates 
similar eff orts by the European Commission. Th e UK legislation for liberalization 
predates the corresponding Energy Directives by seven years in the case of 
electricity1026 and by twelve years in the case of gas.1027
Th is chapter deals with the most signifi cant constitutional issues arising in the 
United Kingdom should more intrusive forms of unbundling be introduced, such 
as proposed by the European Commission. It will, however, be more concise than 
the discussion on Germany. Th is is because the transmission ownership structure 
of the (downstream) gas supply sector of Great Britain1028 as well as the 
transmission ownership structure of the electricity supply sector of England and 
Wales are already ownership unbundled. Electricity transmission in Scotland, on 
the other hand, albeit still vertically integrated, is independently operated by the 
electricity transmission owner and operator of England and Wales. Although the 
Scottish independent system operation model comes close to and has certainly 
inspired for the current unbundling demands of the European Commission in 
this area1029, the Commission proposals would, despite the extensive unbundling 
already in place in Great Britain, still require further changes to be made.
1026 1996 Electricity Directive vs Electricity Act 1989.
1027 1998 Gas Directive vs Gas Act 1986, which, however, was substantially amended by Gas Act 
1995.
1028 While with respect to electricity and gas a uniform regime applies across England, Wales and 
Scotland (which in the latter case contains some specifi cities of great interest in the context of 
this work), whereas Northern Ireland has a separate regime for both electricity and gas which 
is of no particular interest in the context of this work. Accordingly, only the legal regime for 
the electricity and gas industry in England, Wales and Scotland (Great Britain) will be looked 
into here. For information about the legal regime in Northern Ireland, see http://ofreg.nics.
gov.uk. For some introductory remarks on Northern Ireland, see Dow, n. 333, nos 15.01, 
15.206, and J Bremen, ‘Th e United Kingdom’, in P Cameron (ed.), Legal Aspects of EU Energy 
Regulation, OUP, 2005, no. 15.01.
1029 See, for instance, Financial Times, ‘Barroso warns on EU energy dominance’, 20 November 
2006.
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First, the evolution, structure and regulation of network-bound energy supply in 
Great Britain (GB) will be outlined in brief in section II. Because the United 
Kingdom is a unitary State and municipalities do not play an independent role in 
energy supply, section III will instead focus on other aspects of the exceptional 
constitutional setting of the United Kingdom to the extent relevant here. It will 
predominantly feature the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which entered into 
force in 2000, and deal with the repercussions of one of the most important 
characteristics of British constitutional law, the legislative sovereignty of 
Parliament.
Th e HRA makes most of the ECHR directly applicable in the United Kingdom1030 
and thus initially open to interpretation by British courts. As the entire energy 
supply sector in Great Britain is in private corporate hands today, any further 
unbundling measures would hit private legal persons. Section IV will thus focus 
on legal theory issues of property right protection (including its relationship to 
economic activity) against the background of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the 
ECHR and of the subject of protection of fundamental rights in the current 
context, in particular whether the shareholders of the legal entities subject to 
further unbundling measures can claim victim status.
Against the background of the original proposals of the European Commission 
of 19 September 2007 for third generation Energy Directives1031, three 
transmission unbundling issues relevant in Great Britain will be scrutinized in 
section V as regards their compatibility with the ECHR as applicable in the UK. 
Th e fi rst issue is the introduction of complete ownership unbundling of electricity 
transmission in Scotland, the second issue the introduction of independent 
electricity system operation in Scotland as demanded by the original Commission 
proposal and the third issue is what would the legal implications be if the national 
energy transmission system operator applied for a electricity generation or energy 
supply licence, which the sector regulator OFGEM would be likely to reject.
Because further unbundling measures would mainly aff ect the two vertically 
integrated Scottish energy supply undertakings, Scottish and Southern Energy 
plc and ScottishPower Ltd (the latter is a subsidiary of the Spanish energy supply 
undertaking Iberdrola), section VI will focus on possible violations of Article 56 
EC, the fundamental freedom of free movement of capital.
Section VII summarizes the fi ndings of this chapter and concludes.
1030 Issues of common law fundamental rights will not be discussed here for reasons outlined 
where relevant. As regards the relevance of these rights aft er the introduction of the HRA, see 
T Allen, Property and Th e Human Rights Act 1998, 2005, p. 16.
1031 N. 15.
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II. NETWORK-BOUND ENERGY SUPPLY
In 2004, the UK turned into a marginal net gas importer for the fi rst time aft er 
having been self suffi  cient in gas before. Th e gas pipeline interconnection with 
Belgium (Bacton-Zeebrugge)1032 was thus originally built for the purpose of 
exporting gas to the European countries on the mainland. Since then, however, 
this interconnection has become crucial for the future security of gas supply in 
the UK through imports of gas as has the Langeled pipeline to Norway, which 
connected the UK to new northern Norwegian fi elds in 2006.1033
As regards electricity, one important feature of the UK, in comparison with 
Germany, for instance, has been the closure of redundant generation capacity. 
Th e UK still has a signifi cant excess of capacity1034, which has been conducive to 
the liberalization or creation of competition in the UK electricity market, and 
which is highly relevant in the context of the later assessment of the proportionality 
of further unbundling measures as regards electricity transmission in 
Scotland.1035
Aft er privatization in the second half of the 1980s, both sectors including nuclear 
energy are characterized by an absence of state ownership and control with the 
only involvement of the state being as energy sector regulator.
1032 Th ere are a further two interconnectors to supply gas to Ireland and Northern Ireland. Th e 
principal rights to capacity in this UK-Belgian interconnector are currently held by a total of 
seventeen parties. Other parties may access the capacity in the interconnector via arrangements 
with these parties by way of assignment or sub-letting of capacity rights or use of third party 
shipping services. At both ends of the UK-Belgium gas interconnector, there are gas trading 
hubs off ering the opportunity for arbitrage between the mainland and the UK markets. Bacton 
is also a major landing point for gas produced from the UK sector of the North Sea, as well as 
being the entry point for the Langeled pipeline with Norway. Dow, n. 333, no. 15.189. On the 
Bacton-Balgzand pipeline, see also M Roggenkamp, ‘Establishment and Role of the Bacton-
Balgzand Pipeline within the Internal Gas Market’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), 
European Energy Law Reports II, 2005, chapter 11.
1033 On the Langeled gas pipeline, see A Brautaset, ‘Th e Ormen Lange Field, the Langeled Pipeline 
and the New UK – Norway Framework Agreement Concerning Cross-Boundary Petroleum 
Cooperation’, in M Roggenkamp, U Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Reports II, 2005, 
chapter 12, pp. 199, 200.
1034 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.12 (note 7).
1035 Although concerned with the electricity sector in Germany, Brunekreeft , n. 9, in his recent 
social cost benefi t analysis considers suffi  cient generation capacity as an important limiting 
aspect of the eff ectiveness of ownership unbundling.
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1. EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE
Energy industries in the UK were started by private companies but became heavily 
state-controlled and mostly state-owned over time. It was assumed that the state 
could best serve the public requirement for energy; ownership and control enabled 
the state to guarantee supply.1036 As a result, the electricity industry was taken 
into state ownership, the (downstream) gas supply industry run by the state gas 
supplier British Gas Cooperation (formerly British Gas Council), which had the 
monopoly purchase rights (monopsony) over all gas produced in the UK sector of 
the North Sea.1037 Th e State returned its interests to private hands some 20 years 
ago because it did not deem it necessary any longer to act as the country’s energy 
provider; this privatization involved a simultaneous fundamental restructuring 
of the electricity supply sector, which will be further outlined in turn.
Th e only infl uence the state has on the UK energy sectors is by way of regulation, 
which ensures that persons other than the government will deliver secure, 
diverse, and sustainable supplies of energy in the way required and at competitive 
prices.1038
Because the UK was for many years self suffi  cient in gas and a net gas exporter, it 
never had to think about security of supply until recently, which put it in a 
completely diff erent position from many other European countries1039; only the 
Netherlands, Norway and, maybe, France were and still are in a similarly 
comfortable position.1040 As a result of the UK turning into a net importer of gas, 
the government seems to be prepared to play a greater role again in the UK energy 
sector to ensure security of supply.1041
Gas sector privatization was enforced by the Gas Act 19861042, which simply 
moved the former monopolist, the British Gas Corporation, in all stages of 
1036 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.18, which bears some resemblance to the German concept of 
Gewährleistungsverantwortung, see in greater detail chapter 4 on Germany.
1037 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.19.
1038 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.21.
1039 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.24.
1040 If one considers energy from nuclear in France as a comfortable position, which nevertheless 
still requires the import of nuclear fuels. As regards the Netherlands, the Dutch energy sector 
has always been largely the domain of the State and its subdivisions, whereas Norway is 
exceptional in that in its domestic market it uses electricity from hydro but hardly any of its 
vast gas reserves thus making it a major gas exporter.
1041 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.22. To some extent this refl ects the concession that the State does indeed 
hold a “Gewährleistungsverantwortung” for energy supply, an insight, which continental 
countries such as Germany and France have never given up.
1042 As substantially amended by the Gas Act 1995.
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(downstream) gas supply (including the gas pipelines)1043 into the private sector 
as British Gas plc. (BG), a decision, which was fundamentally fl awed.1044 Th is is 
because leaving the structure of the gas industry vertically integrated1045, 
especially in one single incumbent undertaking without creating a number of 
new gas supply companies from outset of the liberalization progress, did not at 
all address the fundamental issue of competition.1046 Th e responsibility for the 
development of competition in the sector was eff ectively put into the hands of the 
industry regulator, and it took him about a decade to establish. As a consequence, 
this way of privatization and liberalization entailed the immense practical cost of 
delayed competition: the benefi ts of privatization were not felt in the UK for some 
years, leaving signifi cant opportunity cost to be borne.1047
In GB today, National Grid Gas plc. (NGG – formerly Transco)1048 is the owner 
and operator of the National Transmission System (NTS), which transports gas 
from beach terminals and interconnectors to 12 Local Distribution Zones (LDZs), 
which are organized as eight regional gas distribution networks, and large 
industrial customers. Th e NTS is a high-pressure pipeline system. All except for 
1043 Th e state monopoly only comprised of onshore gas transmission and distribution inclusive of 
the supply of gas to consumers.
1044 For an historical account, see Volz, n. 670; for the economic motives behind this move, see 
Dow, n. 333, no. 15.141; see also SERIS, n. 38, with respect to the claim that even aft er voluntarily 
divesting the gas transport pipelines, economic benefi ts have not occurred.
1045 With legal unbundling of the transportation business being put in place between 1994–1996.
1046 As the monopolist was privatized intact, its private sector successor took over the benefi ts 
(contractual entitlements) of the monopsony. Further, BG was the only supplier from the 
beginning. Because the UK was self suffi  cient in gas before the interconnector to Belgium 
became operational, there was simply no gas for anyone else to sell. As a consequence, the 
sector regulator had to order gas release to competitors. See Dow, n. 333, no. 15.146.
1047 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.143.
1048 National Grid Transco is the (indirect) result of two voluntary demergers (ownership 
unbundling) executed by British Gas plc. in 1997 and 2000: First, in February 1997, the 
shareholders of British Gas approved the demerger of its legally unbundled suppy function 
(gas trading company) Centrica plc. (with the trading names British Gas and Scottish Gas) and 
British Gas was renamed BG plc. mainly consisting of production and gas transportation 
assets. In October 2000, BG divested itself of Lattice Group plc. (gas transportation) creating 
two separate companies. In October 2002, Lattice merged with National Grid to form National 
Grid Transco. Both demergers were driven by purely commercial considerations, see SERIS, 
‘Ownership unbundling and downstream investment by UK gas companies 1985–2005’, 
Sheffi  eld, March 2007. What has to be conceded though is the fact that only because of the 
regulatory enforcement of strict legal and internal unbundling did British Gas take the 
commercial decision, which was also in the interest of its shareholders, to divest itself of 
Centrica, its supply business. Regulatory intervention thus indirectly contributed to this 
commercial decision, which was taken aft er attempts in 1992 and 1993 to enforce ownership 
unbundling when fi rst OFGEM proposed the divestment of British Gas’ trading activities in 
terms of ownership unbundling and later the Competition Commission (then called 
Monopolies & Merger Commission). Both attempts were, however, rejected at the time by the 
Secretary of State. See in greater detail, Volz, n. 670.
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four LDZs, i.e. the medium and low-pressure pipeline systems, are also owned 
and operated by NGG. Th e remaining four were sold by NGG in 2005.1049 In the 
context of the gas market, there is no distinction made in law between 
transmission and distribution activities.1050
In addition to NGG, there are also so-called Independent Gas Transporters 
(IGTs), which develop and operate smaller gas transportation networks 
connecting to the main pipeline system. IGTs and NGG compete amongst them 
to provide gas transportation services in new areas such as housing 
developments.1051
Th e UK electricity supply industry, on the other hand, was privatized by the 
Electricity Act 1989 aft er taking into account the mistakes made in the 
privatization of the gas sector, mainly by privatizing British Gas vertically 
integrated without ensuring that suffi  cient competition existed right from the 
start of the privatized sector. Th e position in Scotland is diff erent from that in 
England and Wales, and will be of particular interest in the subsequent legal 
analysis of further unbundling measures.
Th e state monopoly over electricity covered the complete electricity supply chain 
from generation, transmission and distribution to supply. Th e most important 
state company, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was responsible 
for generation and transmission activities. Regional monopolies (twelve in 
England & Wales plus two in Scotland), the Area Boards, dealt with 
distribution1052 and supply. Th e CEGB was in control of the system with the Area 
Boards subordinate.1053
Th e two Scottish Area Boards were initially privatized vertically integrated with 
generation and supply of electricity leaving electricity transmission and 
distribution in Scotland in the ownership of two companies, Scottish Power (SP) 
and Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE).1054 Separation has taken place in the 
form of legal unbundling; the operation of the electricity transmission networks 
1049 Bremen, n. 1028, no. 15.20. As a consequence, OFGEM had to change the regulatory structure 
because aft er the sale Transco was not the only provider of gas transportation via distribution 
networks.
1050 Gas transporter activities are licensed according to s. 7 of the Gas Act 1986.
1051 Bremen, n. 1028, no. 15.17.
1052 Electricity distribution networks in the UK range from 132kV to 230V. It is their role to provide 
a connection between the transmission grid and customers but there are also some generating 
plants connected directly to the distribution system (so-called embedded generation), see on 
this issue, Brunekreeft /Ehlers, nn. 8, 38.
1053 Volz, n. 670.
1054 As to the history, Volz, n. 670, and Dow, n. 333, no. 15.24.
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were, however, taken over by National Grid Electricity Transmission plc. (NGET 
– formerly National Grid Company plc. or NGC), the England and Wales 
electricity transmission network owner and operator.1055 Group integration in 
Scotland today thus covers electricity transmission network ownership, 
distribution ownership and operation and electricity generation and supply. 
Electricity supply in Scotland therefore consists of two vertically integrated 
companies, with the opportunity for other companies to establish generation and 
supply businesses.
In England and Wales, the break-up of the CEGB led to the transfer in 1990 of its 
electricity transmission network ownership and operation to a new company, 
NGC (now NGET), which was owned by the 12 Regional Electricity Companies 
(RECs) through a holding company, National Grid Group plc. (now National 
Grid plc.). In 1995, shares in this holding company were listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Within a year, most of the RECs had disposed of their interests. 
National Power took over approximately 50% of generation1056 in England and 
Wales and was soon taken over by German RWE. PowerGen took over 30% and 
was soon taken over by German E.ON. Electricity generation from nuclear was 
initially (not substantially but only formally) privatized as two new state-owned 
companies, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear, registered as private companies 
under the Companies Act (with all shares owned by the Secretary of State), which 
owned and operated the nuclear power plants.1057 As the law did not require any 
parliamentary approval for a sale of the shares to the private sector (substantive 
privatization), Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear could be sold by the 
Secretary of State on his own authority. British Energy plc., the successor to 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear, was sold (substantively privatized) by the 
UK government in 1996.1058 At the time of privatization, it had more than 20% 
market share, which has only slightly dropped since.
In 1990, the twelve English and Welsh and two Scottish Area Boards were 
replaced by Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), which were then privatized 
vertically integrated as 14 Public Electricity Suppliers (PES). Th e activities of 
distribution and supply were not separated but retained the monopoly distribution 
right over the authorized area plus, before full liberalization, the supply monopoly 
1055 Which was the result of the introduction of BETTA by the Energy Act 2004. For further details 
on BETTA, see infra.
1056 It was originally planned to be 70%, which would have included nuclear, which accounted for 
approx. 20% of generation, see Dow, n. 333, no. 15.12, and Volz, n. 670.
1057 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.213.
1058 Th e UK government, which initially retained 35.2% of the shares has in the meantime sold its 
share to French incumbent energy supply undertaking, state owned EDF, see http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/business/7632853.stm.
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to consumers within that area who were not “eligible” at the time (i.e. they were 
below a certain demand threshold above which they could have chosen their 
supplier). What was imposed, however, was accounts separation.1059 Th e 
Distribution Network operators (DNOs) are the successors of the distribution 
arms of the PESs as a result of the Utilities Act 2000, which required separate 
licences for their supply and distribution businesses to be held by diff erent legal 
entities, thus eff ecting legal unbundling. As the geographical areas of the former 
PESs remained unchanged, the former PES areas are used as the basis of the 
distribution areas which exist today. Th e post-privatization structure in the 
electricity sector was signifi cantly altered at the end of 1995 when the PESs were 
required to dispose of their shareholdings (up to 14.9%) in NGC.1060
In addition to DNOs, there are also so-called Independent Distribution Network 
Operators (IDNO) since 2001. IDNOs own and operate electricity distribution 
networks which will predominately be network extensions connected to the 
existing distribution network, e.g. to serve new housing developments.
In April 2007, seven distribution companies operating twelve licensed distribution 
areas were active in England and Wales; some remained vertically integrated 
with electricity supply, some others are stand-alone.1061 In Scotland, distribution 
is operated by the two above mentioned vertically integrated energy companies, 
Scottish Power (ultimately owned by Spanish Iberdrola) and Scottish and 
Southern. Each distribution company holds a separate licence for each area they 
cover.
Largely as a result of privatization, England and Wales is compliant with 
ownership unbundling of its electricity transmission. Th e continuation of 
ownership unbundling (in gas as well as electricity) is, however, not a result of 
formal legislation but exclusively enforced via licensing, which will be discussed 
further below in this section.1062
1059 In 2002 when as a result of market consolidation, nine distribution companies operated the 
twelve England and Wales areas, six of them were vertically integrated with electricity supply 
whereas the remaining three were ownership unbundled. See in greater detail, Volz, n. 670, 
p. 89.
1060 See Volz, n. 670, pp. 88–9. Th e fundamental rights relevance of this compulsory divesture will 
not be discussed here any further. At the end of 1995, National Grid sold its remaining 
generation activity as well, see in greater detail Volz, n. 670, p. 88.
1061 Volz, n. 670, p. 89.
1062 Electricity transmission in England & Wales and gas transmission in GB is not allowed to 
engage in electricity generation, or electricity and gas trading or supply except for balancing 
purposes, see National Grid’s electricity transmission Standard Licence Condition C2 
‘Prohibited Activities’ and TransCo’s gas transporter Special Licence Condition 26 ‘Prohibited 
procurement activities’.
Chapter 5. Great Britain
Intersentia 283
Although the approach to electricity privatization compared to gas privatization 
certainly resulted in the creation of competition in generation, the market was 
dominated by two major players.1063 In addition, it also happened that some 
RECs/PESs were taken over by privatized water utilities in the same geographical 
area leading to the creation of multi-utilities.1064 On the face of it, this type of 
horizontal integration should not cause competition authorities the same 
problems as vertical integration.1065 However, private for-profi t multi-utilities 
can draw fi nancial support for (fi nancially volatile) supply activities (including 
cross-subsidization) from (fi nancially stable) revenues of other activities within 
the horizontally integrated utility, which might put them at an advantage over 
“purely” regulated vertically integrated mono-utilities.1066
2. REGULATION
Th e framework for regulating the energy industry in the UK consists of primary 
gas and electricity legislation, conditions of licences, which industry players are 
required to hold, and industry codes, compliance with which is required by 
relevant licence conditions.
Th e Electricity Act 1989 and the Gas Act 1986 provide the legal framework for 
the structure of the electricity and gas industries, respectively. Th e Utilities Act 
2000, which amended the Gas and the Electricity Act, brought about extensive 
changes to the regulation of the gas and the electricity markets. Most importantly, 
the Utilities Act established the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA) 
merging the regulators for the gas and electricity markets in GB. Most recently, 
further changes have been introduced by the Energy Act 2004 and the Gas (Th ird 
Party Access) Regulations 2004.1067 Th e Gas Regulations implement the 2003 
Gas Directive in relation to gas storage and LNG facilities by amending the Gas 
Act to extend the application of TPA.
1063 For a critical view as regards vertical foreclosure between energy wholesale and retail and the 
lack of liquidity in the visible wholesale markets in the UK, which are dominated by six 
integrated energy supply companies, see Th omas, n. 25.
1064 Similar to some formally privatized but municipality owned undertakings in the Netherlands 
(such as Delta) and municipality-owned Stadtwerke in Germany where such horizontally 
integrated multi-utilities are also called “Querverbund”.
1065 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.237.
1066 Which are usually prevented from drawing on such fi nancial support by regulation. On cross-
subsidization in the electricity sector, see Willems/Ehlers, n. 2. Th is situation diff ers from the 
“Querverbund” in Germany, which is usually not private and not-for-profi t and which cross-
subsidizes other services of general (economic) interest, see chapter 4 on Germany.
1067 SI 2004 No. 2043.
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Th e Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform with its 
Energy Minister as junior Minister are responsible for energy policy at Cabinet 
level. Powers and duties under the Electricity Act 1989 and the Gas Act 1986 are 
shared between the Secretary of State and the regulatory authority OFGEM1068, 
although in practice the Secretary of State delegates his authority to OFGEM’s 
Director. Th e powers are given to the Director personally, a characteristic of all 
UK utility regulators. Th e Director is appointed by the Secretary of State but as 
separate statutory body (largely) independent of government and political 
infl uence, at least with respect to the competences conferred upon the Director 
exclusively. He is, however, accountable to Parliament and appointed for a fi ve-
year, once renewable term and cannot be removed except on grounds of incapacity 
or misbehaviour.
Th e regulator is an economic regulator (technical regulation remains the province 
of the Secretary), overseeing the development of competitive gas and electricity 
markets.1069 Th e Minister’s inherent powers mentioned above may provide a 
mechanism for future government involvement, particularly in licensing 
decisions, which would, if exercised, result in a signifi cant impairment of the 
regulator’s independence. Th e Utilities Act also confers an additional power to 
the Secretary of State to give general directions to the regulator, which does not 
seem to be too conducive to the regulator’s independence. In specifi c cases, 
however, the Secretary is still not allowed to intervene.
OFGEM has powers to grant licences and modify the conditions of licences and 
powers and duties to monitor the activities of gas and electricity companies, and 
to take enforcement action necessary to ensure compliance with their statutory 
and licence obligations. It has the power to impose fi nancial penalties on licence 
holders for breaches of those obligations up to a maximum of 10% of their annual 
turnover.
A principal tool for OFGEM to achieve its regulatory objectives is the ability to 
modify licence conditions. OFGEM’s powers to modify licence conditions allow 
it to adapt the regulatory framework to achieve desired market changes and to 
address developments in the market including the conduct of mergers. In the 
1068 Offi  ce for Gas and Electricity Market, through which GEMA operates and which is represented 
by the Director General of Gas and Electricity Markets, who is the successor to the Director 
General of Electricity Supply and the Director General of Gas Supply; both offi  ces (Offi  ce for 
Electricity Regulation OFFER and Offi  ce for Gas Supply OFGAS) have been merged by the 
Utilities Act 2000 to create the Offi  ce of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), see also 
Bremen, n. 1028, no. 15.03.
1069 With an emphasis on price control of the non-competitive element of the electricity and gas 
supply chains, i.e. transmission and distribution.
Chapter 5. Great Britain
Intersentia 285
absence of the consent of the licensee(s) to a modifi cation of a licence condition, 
OFGEM may only impose the modifi cation if the Competition Commission (CC) 
has endorsed the proposed modifi cation.
A further tool for OFGEM is the power to modify the various industry codes. 
Th is power is conferred by the relevant licence condition under which a network 
operator is required to maintain the code in question, and currently is not subject 
to any specifi c statutory constraints. Th e Energy Act 2004 introduced provisions 
allowing OFGEM’s decisions about electricity and gas code modifi cations to be 
appealed against to the CC in some circumstances.1070
OFGEM’s actions are inter alia subject to accountability through general 
administrative law.1071 Under English administrative law, judicial control over 
the decisions of public bodies is exercised through judicial review, at which judges 
can quash decisions, require them to be taken again (according to the judges’ 
requirements), prohibit bodies from acting outside their powers, and issue 
declarations as to the correct interpretation of those powers and the relevant law. 
Th e HRA brought the ECHR into English law which adds a further dimension to 
the administrative law framework within which regulators such as OFGEM 
operate.1072
Parliament plays an important role in holding regulators to account for their 
performance of their duties at a strategic level. Most parliamentary scrutiny takes 
place in Select Committees, such as the Trade and Industry Select Committee 
and the Environmental Audit Committee, which may call the regulators before 
them.
Th e energy industries also remain subject to competition law. Accordingly, both 
the Offi  ce of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC) are also 
involved in energy industry matters. Th e OFT is responsible for the protection of 
1070 Th e Energy Act 2004, however, also confers upon the Secretary of State the power to make an 
order specifying which codes this appeal process will apply to and any types of decisions, 
which may be excluded from the right of appeal.
1071 Its decisions are administrative in nature, rather than judicial and can thus be subject to 
judicial review, in the same way as other administrative decisions in the UK. Th e body of law 
dealing with judicial review in the gas and electricity context is no diff erent to other judicial 
review procedures.
1072 Judicial review is concerned with the legality of decisions and thus only to a very limited extent 
includes features of an appeal mechanism on the merits of a decision, namely when it comes to 
the application of the proportionality test. Th e introduction of the proportionality test by way 
of common law into English administrative law as a consequence of the HRA and thus the 
ECHR means a substantial adjustment to the distinction between appeal and judicial review 
because it balances the merits of a case against their proportionality. See Tomkins, n. 543, 
p. 199, and n. 1148.
Part 2. Fundamental Rights
286 Intersentia
general consumer interests, which links into the behaviour of participants in 
competitive markets, while the CC is specifi cally concerned with mergers, 
maintaining competition in markets, and the regulation of the regulated 
industries such as energy. Generally, the OFT is involved in complaints about 
specifi c company behaviour aff ecting consumers while the CC is concerned with 
anti-competitive behaviour aff ecting an industry sector. Both have in common 
that they investigate competitive abuses; in particular the CC must report on 
whether the activity under scrutiny operates against the public interest. However, 
it should be noted that the CC reports to the Secretary of State who is under no 
obligation to accept its recommendations; indeed, he can ignore them.1073 Th e 
CC can deal with general investigations as well as with specifi c investigation of 
takeovers and mergers.1074
Th e regulatory regime applying to the gas and electricity markets is a ‘standalone’ 
regime in that it does not rely on general competition law to create a competitive 
and liberalized market that complies with the 2003 Energy Directives. However, 
general competition law does apply to the gas and electricity markets. In 
particular the provisions of the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 
2002 dealing with anti-competitive practices play a particularly important role. 
Importantly, OFGEM has concurrent powers1075 with the Director General of 
Fair Trading (DGFT) to apply the Competition Act and Enterprise Act 
prohibitions in the gas and electricity sector.1076 Th ese concurrent powers also 
1073 Which has happened in the case of CC’s proposal in the mid 1990s to break up British Gas, see 
in greater detail, Volz, n. 670.
1074 See in greater detail, Bremen, n. 1028, no. 15.106, and Dow. n. 333, no. 15.31. Th e Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT) inter alia hears appeals on the merits (review of law and facts) in 
respect of decisions made under the Competition Act 1998 (as amended) by the OFT and the 
sector-specifi c regulators such as OFGEM, and reviews decisions made by the Secretary of 
State, OFT and the CC in respect of merger and market references or possible references under 
the Enterprise Act 2002.
1075 Th e Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004 No. 1077) govern the 
interface between OFGEM and the DGFT. In particular, the Regulations deal with the 
exchange of information between DGFT and OFGEM for the purposes of determining who 
has jurisdiction to exercise concurrent functions in relation to a case; determine who should 
exercise prescribed functions in relation to a case and resolve any disputes which may arise in 
relation to this issue; the prevention of simultaneous exercise of functions by both bodies in 
relation to a case; the transfer of cases from one body to another; and the provision for the 
DFGT and OFGEM to use each other’s staff . Th e Regulations are supplemented by a Concordat 
between the DGFT and OFGEM as to the exercise of their concurrent powers in relation to gas 
and electricity markets.
1076 Th e relevant provisions of the Competition Act are prohibitions on agreements that prevent, 
restrict or distort competition (so-called Chapter I prohibitions) and on conduct by 
undertakings which amounts to an abuse of a dominant position (so-called Chapter II 
prohibitions). Under the Enterprise Act, the DGFT (or OFGEM in the case of the gas and 
electricity sector) may make a reference to the Competition Commission if there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that any feature, or combination of features, of a market in the UK for 
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apply with respect to the application and enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 
EC.1077
Th e merger control provisions under the Enterprise Act also apply to the gas and 
electricity sector. Under the Enterprise Act, the Director General of Fair Trading 
must refer an acquisition for a detailed investigation by the Competition 
Commission if it believes the transaction may be expected to result in a 
substantial lessening of competition within any market in the UK. In accordance 
with the Concordat between OFGEM and the Offi  ce of Fair Trading1078, the 
DGFT consults OFGEM in relation to mergers relating to the gas and electricity 
markets.1079
Th ese concurrent powers apply only to activities for which a licence is required 
under the Gas Act and the Electricity Act, and activities ancillary to those 
activities. All other sectors of the economy (such as upstream and off shore 
activities not ancillary to those activities) are overseen exclusively by the DGFT.
Network regulation
Th e duties of the regulator are aimed at ensuring that his functions are carried out 
‘in a manner which he considers is best calculated’ to achieve the relevant 
objective.1080 In addition to his duties in the context of network regulation, further 
duties relate to ensuring the fi nancial capability of licensed electricity and gas 
suppliers, the protection of the consumer interest in respect of prices charged and 
other terms of supply, the promotion of effi  ciency and economy on the part of 
suppliers, the protection of the public from the dangers associated with electricity 
and gas supply and the special consideration of the interests of the disabled and 
those of pensionable age.
goods or services prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the supply of 
acquisition of any goods or services in the UK.
1077 OFGEM’s powers under the Competition Act include the power to consider complaints about 
breach of the prohibitions, to impose interim measures to prevent serious and irreparable 
damage, to carry out investigations both on its own initiative and in response to complaints, to 
impose fi nancial penalties taking account of the statutory guidance on penalties issue by the 
DGFT, to give and enforce directions to bring an infringement to an end, and to issue general 
advice and information on how the Competition Act applies to the gas and electricity sector. 
See OFGEM, ‘Competition Act – Application in the Energy Sector’, August 2004.
1078 See n. 1075.
1079 As regards judicial review of decisions made in this context, see n. 1074.
1080 S. 4 of the Gas Act 1986 sets out the duties of the Director, which have been amended by the 
Gas Act 1995, the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992, and the Utilities Act 2000. 
Similar, see s. 3A of the Electricity Act 1989.
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One of the main tasks of the regulator is to set the gas transportation and 
electricity transmission and distribution tariff s1081, i.e. to regulate the monopoly 
aspects of the gas and electricity markets through a price control regime. Th ere 
are separate price controls for electricity network ownership and system 
operation.1082
A price control typically lasts for fi ve years at the end of which a new control is 
set, aft er detailed consultations within the industry, by means of modifying the 
relevant licence condition. Th e setting of a price control requires OFGEM to 
decide the value of the existing regulatory asset base and future capital 
expenditure to develop the network during the next control period, an allowed 
cost of capital, which (together with depreciation) dictates the revenue required 
to cover such past and future investments, and the fi xed and variable operating 
expenditure during the price control.
Licensing
Th e primary means of regulating electricity and gas supply is by requiring 
participants to hold licences. Th e licence is also a convenient method of identifying 
those involved in the industry1083, that is, establishing who is the subject of 
regulation as well as being the instrument of control over that participant and in 
addition it enforces general competition law by, for example, making the energy 
1081 Until the market was completely liberalized but even for some time aft er full competition was 
introduced (i.e. until 2003), the regulator was also involved in setting the consumer price for 
gas. Tariff s are set according to the RPI-X formula. Th e formula restricts price increases to a 
level (the X factor) below the retail price index (a measure of infl ation). Accordingly, the 
regulator sets the increase in the price the utility may charge the consumer. Th e eff ect is to 
provide an effi  ciency incentive for the utility. For example, if X were to be set equal to the rate 
of infl ation, there would be no real revenue increase for the utility. It must therefore cut costs 
to remain as profi table as before, bearing in mind that infl ation will aff ect its costs while the 
price control prevents a corresponding rise in revenues. Th e incentive is increased by allowing 
the utility to keep any additional effi  ciency savings it might make. For example, if the formula 
requires a 2% gain to maintain profi tability, but the utility manages a 5% effi  ciency gain, the 
extra 3% is profi t for the utility. Dow, n. 333, no. 15.156.
1082 Non-monopoly activities of electricity generation and gas and electricity supply are not subject 
to price controls. It should be noted, however, that this freedom to set prices is subject to a 
variety of consumer protection obligations imposed on the licensees by their licence 
conditions.
1083 Th e UK continues not to have any specifi c list of public service obligations. Th ere is, however, 
a set of standard conditions attached to all licences, which are approved by the regulator in 
order to protect the public interest in the way in which the licensee carries out its activity. 
Public service obligations are refl ected in these conditions, such as obligations to off er 
connection, and occasional restrictions on disconnection. Further, the Grid Code for electricity 
and the Network Code for gas, see nn. 1096, 1100 and accompanying text, also contain detailed 
provisions on access rights.
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transport licences of NGET and NGG independent of other energy chain activities 
elsewhere in the group.
In the gas sector, OFGEM has the power to issue three distinct types of licence: 
fi rst, those involved in arranging transport of gas with the pipeline company, 
so-called shippers, require a licence. Th is is aimed at intermediary gas marketers, 
which appeared on the scene as a consequence of the liberalization of the gas 
market aft er which persons who to date had not usually been involved in the gas 
market could in principle become involved, such as banks or supermarkets. Th e 
shipper would arrange for the gas to be supplied, dealing with the pipeline 
company, and the bank, supermarket or the like would deal with “its” customers 
and the payment.
Another type of licence is required for so-called public gas transporters, which 
consist of NGG, a subsidiary of National Grid plc.1084, as national gas transporter 
and some other (much smaller) companies, four of which hold public gas 
transportation licences for regional gas distribution networks1085 and some 
others for small areas covering new developments “carved out” of NGG’s 
licence.1086 Under section 7A of the Gas Act 1986 as amended by the Utilities Act 
2000 and Energy Act 2004, the holder of a gas transporter licence is precluded 
from holding a gas supply or gas shipper licence.1087 In theory this means legal 
unbundling, as in the case electricity, because diff erent legal persons within a 
group of undertakings can hold diff erent gas and electricity supply related 
licences. However, NGG’s gas transporter licence enforces ownership unbundling 
by way of licence condition.1088
Th e third type of licence concerns the competitive activity of gas supply, which is 
the contracting with a customer to sell the product. Th e most signifi cant (legal) 
hurdle for a prospective supplier is the requirement to satisfy the regulator that 
the applicant is an appropriate person to hold the licence, which does not cause 
too great a problem as long as the ability to perform this activity can be 
1084 For the history, see Volz, n. 670.
1085 In 2004, NGG sold four of its regional gas distribution networks but retained ownership of 
four others, which comprise almost half of GB’s gas distribution network.
1086 Storage services are off ered by independent storage operators. Neither the operation nor the 
ownership of gas storage facilities is a licensed activity under the Gas Act. However, the Gas 
Act 1986 (and the Petroleum Act 1998) impose obligations on onshore and off shore gas storage 
facility owners, which facilitate third party access.
1087 Bremen, n. 1028, no. 15.15. Th e Energy Act 2004 amended the Gas Act 1986 to provide that the 
holder of a gas interconnector licence is also precluded from holding a gas supply or gas shipper 
licence.
1088 See Special Licence Condition 26, n. 1062 and accompanying text.
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demonstrated and there is no history of fi nancial irregularities or other 
inappropriate activities.
As in the case of gas, in the electricity sector each activity has its own licence. A 
further form of licence is the electricity transmission licence and the electricity 
distribution licence. Th e former is held by NGET, a subsidiary of National Grid 
plc. (as is NGG, its gas equivalent), and by the two Scottish electricity transmission 
network owners.1089 Th e latter is held by the DNOs, which own and operate local 
electricity distribution networks within their geographical areas.
In addition to the (onshore) transmission licence, the Energy Act 2004 introduced 
a licensing regime for electricity interconnectors allowing connection to and 
from other countries onto or from the UK transmission grid.1090
Similarly to gas, section 6 of the Electricity Act 1989 as amended by the Utilities 
Act 2000 prescribes that one (legal) person cannot hold an electricity distribution 
licence and an electricity supply licence. Th is implements legal unbundling in the 
1089 Th ere are two types of electricity transmission licences. NGET’s licence refl ects its function as 
national electricity transmission system operator (in addition to its ownership function in 
England and Wales), for which assets required to operate the system in Scotland have 
“voluntarily” been transferred to NGET by the two Scottish electricity transmission network 
owners – “voluntarily” because otherwise they would have been expropriated. See in this 
regard, the ‘Explanatory Notes to Energy Act 2004 Chapter 20’, nos 351, 352 (available at www.
opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/en/04en20-g.htm). According to nos 351 and 352, section 141 of the 
Energy Act 2004 (which laid the foundation for the introduction of BETTA) gives Schedule 18 
eff ect, which provides for a scheme for the transfer of property (i.e. expropriation). OFGEM in 
its Memorandum (Appendix 11 to the Minutes of Evidence of the House of Commons Trade 
and Industry Committee’s 5th Report of 1 April 2003 (Session 2002–03) on ‘Th e British 
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements’) in note 18 comments on the enabling 
powers to make a property arrangements scheme as follows: “[…] Th ere may be a need to 
transfer some assets to the new system operator to enable it to undertake this function across 
GB. It is expected that such transfers will be agreed voluntarily between the companies 
concerned, but if they cannot agree, the [property arrangement] scheme [contained] in the 
[draft ] Bill is present as a backstop to ensure that timely implementation cannot be frustrated. 
[…] Th e companies may apply to the [Gas and Electricity Markets] Authority [GEMA] for a 
determination, and that determination can be subject to appeal to the Competition Appeals 
Tribunal (CAT).” Th e other licence refl ects the “mere” transmission ownership function of the 
two Scottish companies. See also n. 1062 as regards the licence conditions enforcing ownership 
unbundling of energy networks. Th e relationship of these two transmission functions is subject 
to the so-called System Operator/Transmission Owner (SO/TO) Code (available at www.
nationalgrid.com).
1090 Th e UK is connected to France with a rather signifi cant interconnector capacity. Additionally, 
there is a smaller interconnector to Ireland (and until BETTA became operational, Scotland 
and England and Wales were connected through an interconnector, which has now become 
part of the Great Britain transmission grid operated by NGET). Th e most recent interconnector 
project is the Isle of Grain interconnector to the Maasvlakte in the Netherlands, which received 
consent in July 2007 according to s. 6A(5) Electricity Act 1989.
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law.1091 Within a group of undertakings, two separate legal persons within a 
group are, however, not precluded from holding the other of the two licences or, 
more generally, diff erent gas and electricity supply related licences.
As regards National Grid plc., which owns inter alia the England and Wales 
electricity transmission network owner and GB electricity transmission network 
operator NGET and the GB gas transmission owner and operator NGG, the 
holding of a licence other than an electricity transmission (and distribution) or 
gas transporter licence is prohibited group-wide (i.e. for any affi  liate or related 
undertaking).1092 Th is amounts to a requirement to refrain from vertical 
integration, which is not required in other cases.1093 As a result, the entire group 
of National Grid plc. is prevented from pursuing any activity in the gas and 
electricity supply chain other than electricity transmission (and distribution) and 
gas transporter and related activities such as system balancing (in both cases), i.e. 
in particular the purchase or acquisition in any other way of electricity or gas for 
the purpose of sale.
Th is cements the energy sector structure as established by the electricity sector 
privatization and the voluntary breaking-up of BG, thus amounting to the 
enforcement of ownership unbundling, or better, the prevention of vertical 
integration of the national transmission and transportation networks with 
electricity generation and energy supply. What this also means on the other hand, 
however, is that energy suppliers can (still) vertically integrate with electricity 
generation thus reinforcing the concentration in the energy markets.1094
1091 Similarly, the holder of an electricity interconnector licence will be precluded from holding a 
licence with respect to any of the four other electricity activities licensed under the Electricity 
Act 1989, which is targeted against the possibility of anti-competitive practices such as capacity 
hoarding in the operation of interconnectors. In addition to legal unbundling, there are also 
various provisions in the relevant licences dealing with accounting and management separation 
relating to the various businesses that may be undertaken by the licence holder. Th e purpose of 
all these provisions is to ring-fence the regulated, licensed activities from each other and 
(possibly) from other activities (not related to energy supply) that may be undertaken by the 
licensee. In the case of network businesses, there are also licence requirements to ensure 
management and fi nancial independence of other business or group companies. Th e 
unbundling and separation provisions are supplemented by various licence conditions 
prohibiting discrimination and cross-subsidies.
1092 See nn. 1062, 1089.
1093 Apart, obviously, from the fact that, since the introduction of BETTA with NGC appointed as 
GB electricity transmission system operator, the two vertically integrated Scottish energy 
supply undertakings are not, as electricity transmission owners, allowed to pursue electricity 
transmission system operations elsewhere within their respective group of undertakings.
1094 Such an issue arose fi rst when the PES Manweb was taken over by Scottish Power. As Scottish 
Power already owned generating plant, there was a risk that self-generated electricity would be 
sold to a vertically integrated supply business for a favourable price and not at market price. 
Th e takeover was nevertheless allowed but controlled by way of imposing additional licence 
Part 2. Fundamental Rights
292 Intersentia
Th e justifi cation for licensing is partly strategic and partly administrative. Given 
the strategic importance of energy supply, licensing is a manner of retaining state 
control in order to safeguard reliability and security of energy supply. Licensing 
is intended to control the activities of the participants in the electricity supply 
industry, i.e. their (choice of) economic activity. Licensing provides a means to 
ensure that all participants are subject to the same rules because the licence 
conditions display the minimum requirements for the participation in the 
industry. Licence conditions are also aimed at ensuring that service standards 
are maintained in the competitive environment, and at reducing the risk that 
insuffi  cient expert (or under-capitalized) companies enter the market, which 
would pose a threat to supply security.
However, licensing also serves as a tool to enforce competition policy. As there is 
no absolute bar in the law to holding more than one type of licence within a 
(legally unbundled) group of undertakings and thus no sector-wide regulation in 
this respect, it is the licensing regime which off ers the means to eff ect such a bar 
in individual cases as can be seen in the case of NGET and NGG where such 
licence conditions exist. Th e post-privatization structure in the electricity sector 
and post-divestiture structure in the gas market is thus controlled and maintained 
by means of general competition law1095; licensing can thus be said to be a means 
conditions. An economic purchasing or “arm’s length” clause was introduced limiting the 
amount of power a supplier could buy from a related generator. Any power above 15% of 
Manweb’s total needs had to be purchased on terms demonstrated to be the most economically 
advantageous available in the market. Otherwise, OFGEM would be able to unwind the 
transaction. See in greater detail, Dow, n. 333, no. 15.237. Th e shift  of the burden of proof 
sounds familiar in the context of the German law environment. In Germany, the competition 
authority BKartA (not the regulatory authority BNetzA) has the power according to s. 29a 
GWB to invalidate energy price rises (exclusive of network charges, which are exclusively 
regulated and supervised by the regulator) if the energy undertaking is not able to show that 
such price rises are justifi ed as market adequate. See in greater detail, chapter on Germany. For 
a harmful example of vertical integration leading to anti-competitive concentration, see New 
Zealand. For more detail on New Zealand, see infra.
1095 It appears that the imposition of these prohibitive licence conditions on NGET and NGG, 
which are not directly derived from legislative provisions, fl ow from OFGEM’s general 
competition enforcement powers conferred upon it by both the Gas and Electricity Acts. In the 
case of off shore electricity transmission, ownership unbundling does not seem to be enforced 
(via licence conditions). See in greater detail OFGEM’s recent consultation on the 
implementation of a regulatory regime for off shore electricity transmission, ‘Off shore 
Electricity Transmission – A further Joint OFGEM/DECC Regulatory Policy Update’, 
Consultation, Ref: OFGEM (153/08), DECC (URN 08/1185), 20 November 2008. Off shore 
electricity transmission means the cables bringing off shore electricity generation on land and 
feeding it into the onshore electricity transmission network. Th e operation of off shore 
electricity generation (OFTO) and the consultation in this respect is a good example of the 
anticipated application of the draft  Electricity Directive, n. 33, where a Member State has not 
yet decided to implement a specifi c option or where it wants to leave such decision open. 
Accordng to the plans of OFGEM published in the before said consultation, an electricity 
generation undertaking cannot own an OFTO; a legally independent OFTO, however, could 
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to maintain the ownership unbundled structure of gas and electricity 
transmission.
Access rules
Under the Gas Act gas transporters have a duty, so far as it is economical to do so, 
to comply with any reasonable requests to connect to their pipeline system, and to 
facilitate competition in the supply of gas.
Th e terms of access to the whole pipeline system owned and operated by NGG 
are set out in the Network Code1096, which NGG is required to maintain under 
the terms of its gas transporter licence. Th e Network Code is given eff ect to by a 
Framework Agreement, in the form of a contract between NGG and individual 
gas shippers. In addition to NGG’s Network Code, each Independent Gas 
Transporter (IGT) has its own network code to maintain.
Access to the gas network is provided on an entry-exit basis rather than a point-
to-point basis. Access rights comprise entry and exit capacity at entry and exit 
points. Th e cost of access to the network is based on entry charges and exit 
charges (both capacity and commodity charges) and there is a single notional 
balancing point for the network.1097
be integrated in a vertically integrated energy supply undertaking if the OFTO also owns the 
cables (thus a property transfer scheme of already existing cables is supposed to be put in 
place). Such legal unbundling would be in accordance with the draft  Directives (and their 
minimum requirements, i.e. the ITO model).
1096 Th e Network Code sets out the rules for the use of the transportation network. It is basically a 
contract with regulatory elements. Since signing the Code is a licence condition all users of the 
gas pipelines and the network operator are bound by its terms, which are approved by the 
regulator. One of the most important provisions of the Network Code is the implementation of 
daily balancing, the fi nancial responsibility for which lies no longer with the pipeline company 
but with the suppliers. Satisfying this requirement involves metering, another major issue of 
the Network Code, which is also important i with respect to the payment of suppliers by 
customers. Upon privatization and liberalization metering was taken over by the suppliers. 
NGG is merely acting as balancing agent of last resort. Th e Network Code provides for a degree 
of fl exibility: a supplier who is short of gas can buy gas from a supplier who has gas in excess, 
which might be cheaper than paying a penalty to NGG for being out of balance, or he can 
purchase gas on the spot market, trading on which is not for instant delivery, i.e. not on the 
balancing day, which enables direct trading between suppliers. Alternatively, the supplier can 
withdraw gas from storage. Th e arrangements for storage and access to it are also prescribed by 
the Network Code. See also Dow, n. 333, no. 15.178.
1097 Similarly, at one notional point in the onshore UK gas pipeline network, the International 
Petroleum Exchange in London off ers spot contracts for trading gas within the UK pipelines. 
Additionally, producers can simply put gas into the network; the Network Code (n. 1096) shift s 
the obligation to deliver the right amount of gas at the consumption point onto the public gas 
transporter so that the seller fulfi ls his delivery obligation when putting the gas on the network. 
See Dow, n. 333, no. 15.188.
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As part of New Gas Trading Arrangements introduced in October 1999 an 
auction mechanism was implemented for the allocation of entry capacity by 
NGG. Th e right sold in the auctions is the right to enter up to a maximum daily 
volume of gas at a given point for a given period of time. Access to the National 
Transmission System (NTS) is available on a short-term1098 and a long-term 
basis. 80% of the system entry is off ered in long-term entry capacity auctions; the 
remaining 20% is reserved for release in shorter-term auctions allowing new 
entrants and existing players to secure entry capacity in the short-term. In 
addition to bidding to purchase entry capacity from NGG, gas shippers can also 
trade entry capacity with other gas shippers. Th is secondary market is an 
important component of the way capacity rights to the NTS are allocated.
Similarly to gas, under the electricity transmission licence, NGET is required to 
maintain various industry codes dealing with the operation and use of the 
transmission system, including the Connection and Use of System Code 
(CUSC)1099 and the Grid Code (GC).1100 Th e CUSC is given contractual eff ect by 
the CUSC Framework Agreement, which is signed up to by all persons wishing 
to connect to or use the transmission system.
Under the Electricity Act 1989, DNOs have the obligation to make a connection 
between their distribution system and any premises when requested to do so by 
the owner of the premises or an authorized electricity supplier. Similarly to the 
obligations of NGET under its transmission licence, under the terms of their 
distribution licence DNOs are each required to maintain and comply with a 
Distribution Code dealing with the technical aspects relating to connections to 
and the operation of the licensee’s distribution system, and which must facilitate 
competition in the generation and supply of electricity.
1098 In daily and monthly blocks with six months of capacity off ered twice a year. Interruptible 
entry capacity for individual days is also released in daily auctions. NGG also releases a daily 
interruptible entry capacity product, based on the extent to which holdings of fi rm capacity 
rights exceed the quantity of deliveries of gas at each NTS entry point. Th is is referred to as 
‘use-it-or-lose-it’ capacity and is intended to operate as an anti-hoarding device.
1099 Th e CUSC constitutes the contractual framework for connection to, and use of, NGET’s 
transmission system, and contains commercial provisions governing that connection and use. 
It inter alia sets out the right of system users to obtain and maintain connection to the 
transmission system.
1100 Th e GC deals in detail with all material technical aspects relating to connections to and the 
operation and use of the transmission system. All users of the transmission system are required 
to comply with the GC.
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Infrastructure investment
Th e Electricity Act expressly imposes a duty on transmission and distribution 
licensees to develop and maintain effi  cient, coordinated and economical systems 
of electricity distribution and transmission and to facilitate competition in the 
supply and generation of electricity. An equivalent obligation applies to gas 
transporters under the Gas Act.1101 Th ere are, however, no specifi c powers for 
OFGEM or the Government to direct electricity transmission and distribution 
licensees or gas transporters to expand their networks. OFGEM thus provides 
fi nancial incentives for NGC and NGG as part of its tariff  regulation to invest into 
new capacity.
Liquefi ed natural gas
Liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) is becoming an ever increasing part of the UK gas 
market. To encourage the building of expensive LNG infrastructure, the UK has 
granted exemptions from TPA under section 19C of the Gas Act 1986 as amended. 
In the case of the regassifi cation plant at the Isle of Grain, the fi rst phase became 
operational in 2005. Aft er initial concerns on the part of OFGEM, the arrangement 
was adjusted by obliging the terminal operator to put eff ective anti-hoarding 
measures in place.1102 Th e exemption relating to TPA was granted for the 
expansion of the facility rather than for the initial construction, and applies to 
auctioned capacity (open season) only.1103
British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA)
In April 2005, the British Trading and Transmission Arrangements became 
operational in GB extending the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) 
for England and Wales1104 by providing a set of trading, balancing and settlement 
1101 See Bremen, n. 1028, nos 15.09, 15.13, 15.18.
1102 Th us executing the so-called ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ allocation of infrastructure capacity in order to 
prevent primary capacity-holders from electing not to use the facility but nevertheless 
withholding the unused capacity from the market.
1103 Approval of the Commission according to Article 18 Gas Directive 2003 was granted late 2007, 
see also Part 1 Chapter 3 supra.
1104 NETA is the successor of the (compulsory) Pooling and Settlement Agreement between all 
electricity generators and all electricity suppliers, which was established upon privatization. 
Th e two main generating companies National Power and PowerGen were compelled to sell 
plant and reduce market share resulting in an increase in the number of generators, which 
together with the reduction in the ability of the dominant generating companies to predict the 
identity of the marginal generator, largely removed the abuse which had taken place under the 
Pooling Agreement, and thus the competition problem in the UK electricity wholesale market. 
See in greater detail, See Dow, n. 333, nos 15.239 et seq., 15.244 et seq. Th e key feature of the 
bilateral systems NETA and BETTA is the so-called Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) 
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arrangements common to all players in the electricity supply industry1105, even 
where electricity supply undertakings with a vertically integrated structure are 
part of the market.
BETTA introduced a common electricity transmission system operator, which is 
separate from generation and supply interests, marking a radical change in 
Scottish arrangements, whereby electricity transmission was split into 
transmission ownership and transmission operation. Th e fi rst function remained 
within the two vertically integrated Scottish electricity supply undertakings 
(which remain legally but not ownership unbundled), of which Spanish electricity 
group Iberdrola owns Scottish Power, and the second function was transferred to 
NGET, which now owns and operates electricity transmission in England and 
Wales (and the gas transmission and parts of gas distribution in Great Britain) 
and operates electricity transmission in Scotland.1106 Consequently, NGET 
operates as a regional system operator1107, operating the electricity (and gas) 
transmission systems of England, Wales and Scotland.1108
approved by the regulator, which sets out the trading rules between the licensed generators and 
suppliers. Accordingly, all parties are able to enter bilateral contracts. Th e balancing 
requirements are met through self-dispatch by the generators. Generators are responsible 
under the Code for ensuring that their output matches their net contracted positions. Suppliers 
are responsible for ensuring that their net contracted positions meet the total demand of their 
customers. If there is an imbalance, system security is maintained by the network operator. 
Th ere are three separate bilateral contract markets where the price of electricity is freely 
negotiated, i.e. long-term, medium-term and short-term contracts. Th e latter potentially pose 
a threat to supply reliability because short-term markets mean less security for generators in 
particular in terms of fi nancing. Although such short-term contracts benefi t (the fi nancing of) 
merchant plant which sell into the market with no long-term off -take contract in place, 
traditional electricity generation plant fi nancing has been on the basis of off -take contracts of 
fi ft een years or more, creating reliability of supply and security of demand. Th at will almost 
certainly disappear as bilateral trading reduces the incentive for buyers to sign up to long-term 
deals. Th at has contributed to a lack of new electricity generation capacity in the UK in recent 
years, which so far has not really mattered as there is excess capacity. Th e fact is, however, that 
substitute capacity cannot be made bankable as there is no guarantee of selling output, which 
potentially aff ects long-term supply reliability. Th e result has been no new building of big 
electricity generation plants. See in greater detail, Dow, n. 333, nos 15.249 et seq.
1105 See, however, Th omas, n. 25, who is rather sceptical as regards the proper functioning of this 
new wholesale arrangement against the background of an increasing vertical concentration of 
generation and supply in the UK market. See further infra in the context of analysing the fair 
balancing of further unbundling measures in GB.
1106 NGET (formerly NGC) was appointed GB system operator on 1 September 2004.
1107 See B Moselle (Th e Brattle Group), ‘Th e ISO model for Scotland: Lessons from UK experience’, 
presentation at UNECOM workshop in Brussels, 27 April 2007.
1108 OFGEM as regulator has the last word in disputes about investment decisions with respect to 
the Scottish transmission networks, see in greater detail supra at the end of chapter 4 on 
Germany; it is nonetheless the TOs that are ultimately responsible for investment decisions 
planning based on input from and co-operation with the ISO.
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In addition, the pricing arrangements for transmission and the access regime 
apply across all jurisdictions. Th e previous problems with access to the 
interconnector between Scotland and England, which were (partly) due to 
capacity constraints, have vanished in that the interconnector now forms part of 
one British electricity transmission system and BETTA eff ectively compels 
capacity auctions and creates a secondary market for capacity bought in advance 
but not going to be used (according to the “use-it-or-lose-it” principle).
BETTA brought about some changes to the licence arrangements in Scotland in 
that it adjusts the licences of Scottish Power plc. and Scottish and Southern plc. 
by making them subject to the same regulatory requirements as in England and 
Wales. It should be noted in this context that the improvements to the 
transparency of legal unbundling, which the introduction of BETTA injected 
into the regulation of the separately licensed activities including the separate 
transmission activities of NGET and the Scottish energy companies were 
considered suffi  cient to safeguard the competitive working of the electricity 
market in GB.1109
Regional cooperation
Within the seven electricity regional markets established in the context of the 
Regional Initiatives, also called Mini Fora, GB makes one such market together 
with France and Ireland (Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland).1110 For gas 
there are three such regional markets; the UK is part of the North-West market, 
along with Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the Republic 
of Ireland, Sweden and Poland.1111
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Th e United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a Unitary State 
with a central government consisting of three separate legal systems with the 
largest jurisdiction being England and Wales. Th e government of Scotland is 
1109 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.276; Bremen, n. 1028, no. 15.11; similar Moselle, n. 1107.
1110 N. 479 and accompanying text.
1111 N. 479 and accompanying text. Whereas generally, the Gas Regional Initiatives focus on issues 
such as interconnectors, market transparency and gas trading hubs, in the specifi c case of the 
North-West gas market, capacity auctions at specifi c interconnector points are the priority 
because there, the use of the existing network and total pipeline capacity are considered 
problematic. Auctions are designed to address the fi rst issue and give signals about investment 
to solve the second issue. See European Commission, ‘Progress in creating the internal gas and 
electricity market’, Report, COM(2008) 192 fi nal, Brussels, 15.4.2008.
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devolved and limited powers have been given to the Welsh assembly. Devolution 
has created greater political independence but energy policy remains a matter for 
the UK government in Westminster. Planning matters have however been 
devolved so that the Scottish executive does become involved in individual energy 
related projects.1112
Th e devolved regional governments and local government are both creatures 
entirely of statute.1113 Unlike central government, local authorities have no 
reservoir of prerogative power.1114 Th e competences and tasks of local authorities 
have no independent constitutional basis but are exclusively conferred upon them 
by Acts of Parliament. And Parliament has never, unlike the Netherlands with its 
Provinciewet and its Gemeentewet1115, in general terms conferred upon local 
authorities the competence to set up and manage their own budget, which only 
happens on a case by case basis to fulfi l specifi c tasks.1116
1. SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT IN A UNITARY STATE
Th e doctrine of legislative supremacy or sovereignty of Parliament provides that 
as a matter of English law, there is no source of law higher than a statute, which 
means that Parliament1117 may pass or cancel any law whatsoever, and that no 
court or other authority may override or set aside any Act of Parliament as a 
matter of English law. Th e doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament is a doctrine 
of the common law.1118 Th is means that as any other rule of the common or judge-
made law, it may be developed, refi ned, re-interpreted, or even changed by the 
judges. Th us the doctrine of legislative supremacy on the one hand is fundamental 
1112 Dow, n. 333, no. 15.01.
1113 Greater London has consisted of 32 boroughs since 1963 (with the medieval Corporation of 
London as the old centre of London still in place) headed by the Greater London Council. 
Counties and districts are two-tier systems of local government in England and Wales 
according to the Local Government Act 1972, some of which have been replaced by unitary 
authorities in England in 1985, 1996, 1997 and 1998 and in Wales in 1996. Scotland, on the 
other hand, has been divided into 29 unitary councils since 1996. All local divisions in Great 
Britain are headed by councils. See in greater detail, Prakke, ‘Het Verenigd Koninkrijk van 
Groot-Brittanniё en Noord-Ierland’, in L Prakke and C Kortmann (eds), Het staatsrecht can de 
landen van de Europese Unie, 5th ed., 1998, pp. 853–4.
1114 Th e Royal Prerogative is a body of customary authority, privilege, and immunity, recognised 
in common law as belonging to the Queen alone. Today, most prerogative powers are directly 
exercised by government ministers with the approval of Parliament.
1115 See chapter 6 on the Netherlands.
1116 Prakke, n. 1113, p. 855.
1117 More accurately, Queen-in-Parliament, see Tomkins, n. 543, p. 93.
1118 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 103.
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to the Constitution of the United Kingdom1119, on the other it is no more 
entrenched or unchangeable that any other rule of English law.1120
a. Relationship between EC and national law
Th e doctrine of legislative supremacy, more particularly the principle that as a 
matter of English law, Parliament may bind its successors neither as to the 
substance nor as to the manner and form of subsequent legislation and that no 
court may set aside any Act of Parliament1121, seems to have been put into question 
by the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community, today’s European 
Community, in 1972. Th is is because as a matter of EC law, Community law 
prevails over national law, even over national constitutional law.1122
1119 Horspool in Tettinger/Stern, A V (‘Die Anwendung des Human Rights Act 1998 im Vereinigten 
Königreich’), no. 2, p. 55.
1120 Th e doctrine has indeed changed over time: it was only aft er Parliament had won the 
seventeenth century confl ict with the Crown, i.e. aft er the English Civil War, that the courts 
formally recognized Acts of Parliament ranking higher in legal status than judge-made law, 
i.e. common law. Th us, Acts of Parliament enjoy supremacy in the hierarchy of legal norms, i.e. 
even over decisions of (Her Majesty’s) judiciary. However, although the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy is a strictly legal doctrine, it nevertheless shows the English courts’ deference to 
political reality, which means that should this reality change once again, there is nothing to 
stop the common law or judge-made law from changing with it, Tomkins, n. 543, p. 104. It is 
thus submitted that this judicial deference or openness to change together with the 
constitutional fl exibility off ered by an unwritten constitution can lead to a systemic change of 
the organization of the state and a reorganization of the trias politica or balance of powers. On 
the other hand, the English state order, as a consequence of the unwritten constitution, does 
not include a clause like the German constitution, which absolutely safeguards the structure of 
the state organization, i.e. the structural coordinates of German state organization can not be 
altered at all, not even if all Members of Parliament vote in favour of an alteration. In Germany, 
the Federal Constitutional Court to some extent supervises the functioning and working of 
the state organization and German way of democracy; in the UK, conversely, by not having a 
constitutional court, the English judiciary, as has just been said, follows political change and 
does not have the role of ensuring that such change stays within the boundaries of the 
constitution. See also n. 1128.
1121 See Tomkins, n. 543, p. 106. As regards the confl ict of two Acts of Parliament where the later 
Act has not expressly repealed the earlier one, the doctrine of implied repeal has been developed 
by the common law. According to this doctrine, the provisions of the later Act prevail over 
those of the earlier one even where the later one has not expressly repealed the earlier one. 
Accordingly, Parliament can alter an Act previously passed by enacting a provision, which is 
clearly inconsistent with the previous Act. It is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a 
subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal. See 
Tomkins, n. 543, p. 107, referring to the leading authority on this important aspect of legislative 
supremacy, Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health, (1934) 1 King’s Bench Division Law 
Reports (K.B.) 590, 595–6.
1122 Th e doctrine of the supremacy of EC law was laid down by the ECJ in C-6/64 – Costa v ENEL, 
n. 824, in which the Court held that by the creation of the European Community ‘the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fi elds, and have thus created a 
body of law, which binds both their nationals and themselves.’ Th is principle was subsequently 
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Th e Act of Parliament legislating for the accession is the European Communities 
Act 1972 (hereinaft er ECA).1123 Th e most important provisions are set out in 
sections 2(1), 2(4), and 3(1) ECA.
Section 2(1) ECA gives domestic legal force to all present (at the time of accession) 
and future provisions of Community law, which are to be given legal eff ect 
‘without further enactment’, i.e. those provisions, which are directly applicable 
(Treaty provisions as primary law, which includes the EC fundamental 
freedoms1124, and Regulations as secondary law) and/or directly eff ective (all 
such provisions, which are suffi  ciently clear and unconditional to be invoked in 
litigation before a national court, which may also be Directives and other sources 
of Community law).1125
amplifi ed in C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft , n. 238, in which the ECJ held that 
Community law ‘cannot be overridden by rules of national law, however framed.
1123 Which according to the doctrine of legislative supremacy can be altered or withdrawn with a 
simple majority of the Westminster Parliament, see further infra; compare this with Germany 
where the accession to the European Union is enshrined in Article 23 GG and can thus not be 
withdrawn save by a two thirds majority in Parliament, Article 79 GG. Th e ECA refl ects the 
dualistic legal order of the UK, see further chapters 4 and 6 on Germany and the 
Netherlands.
1124 Because the fundamental freedoms are primarily aimed at the Member States; they, however, 
also bind the EC itself, see R Streinz, Europarecht, 8rd ed., 2008, nos 767 et seq. It does, however, 
not incorporate the fundamental rights protection in the EU as developed by the ECJ as it 
primarily binds the EC institutions, see Streinz, ibid. Community fundamental rights do, 
however, bind Member States in the context of legitimately restricting EC fundamental 
freedoms, Streinz, no. 768, with further references. Member States are nevertheless bound by 
Community fundamental rights when an action of the Member State is initiated or determined 
by EC law, and then only to the extent that such provisions are mandatory, see ECJ, C-5/88 – 
Wachauf v Federal Republic of Germany, (1989) ECR 2609. Only in the case of an exact 
implementation where national law just repeats what has been mandated by EC law, is the 
implementing legislation also to be measured against EC fundamental rights. Th is is the case, 
for instance, for EC Regulations and Directives, which impose the implementation of minimum 
standards. As regards the latter, see ECJ, Joint Cases C-20/00 & 64/00 – Booker Aquaculture, n. 
241. If there is, however, a certain range of interpretations provided for in the Directive, which 
confers upon the national legislator some leeway with respect to the interpretation and 
structure of the provisions of the Directives requirements that require implementation, the 
national legislature acts under its national authority and, thus, the resulting law is in this 
respect to be evaluated according to the national fundamental rights standard alone. See 
already chapter 4 on Germany. See also Blanke in Tettinger/Stern, Article 15, no. 38. Th is is 
also due to the fact that like Germany, the UK is a dualistic legal system, see already nn. 98, 
543, 826, 1123. See also nn. 1132, 1136, 1142, 1257, 1342.
1125 Th e notion of direct eff ect was invented by the ECJ in its seminal decision C-26/62 – Van Gend 
& Loos, n. 170, in 1962. Th e direct eff ectiveness of a provision does not depend on its source but 
on its substantive content, which must be suffi  ciently clear and unconditional. Provisions of 
Community law that are neither directly applicable nor directly eff ective but which are 
nonetheless required by EC law to be brought into force in the national legal systems of the 
Member States are dealt with for the UK by s. 2(2) of the ECA. Th is subs. empowers the relevant 
government Minister to make the necessary provision by means of delegated legislation.
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Section 2(4) requires all courts in the UK to construe and to give eff ect to all 
legislation (primary and secondary) including Acts of Parliament, whether 
passed before 1973 or thereaft er, ‘subject to’ the terms of directly applicable and 
directly eff ective Community law1126, regardless of the date of either.1127
Since section 2(4) also applies to legislation passed aft er the accession date, it 
appears that the Parliament of 1972 attempted to bind its successors and thus to 
suspend the doctrine of legislative supremacy.
Section 3(1) of the ECA further provides that “[f]or the purpose of all legal 
proceedings any questions as to the meaning or eff ect of any of the Treaties or as 
to the validity, meaning or eff ect of any Community instruments, shall be treated 
as a question of law […].”
When something is ‘treated as a question of law’, this means that the domestic 
courts have the competence authoritatively to determine it and to adjudicate on 
disputes arising under it. Th us, Parliament has conferred upon domestic courts 
in the UK the jurisdiction to hear and to decide cases concerning EC law and if 
necessary also to set aside (provisions of) an Act of Parliament.1128
1126 See in this regard n. 1124.
1127 Combining subs. 2(2) and (4) leads to the result that domestic courts must also construe and 
give eff ect to parliamentary legislation subject to any delegated measure made by a Minister 
under s. 2(2). Such delegated measures must obviously live up to the HRA, which by and large 
implements the ECHR into the English legal system, see further infra. Th e proper enactment 
of delegated measure is thus also (incidentally) reviewed by the courts. Section 2(4) of the ECA 
only states what the courts have always done and this is that all statutes are, if at all possible, to 
be interpreted by the courts so as to be in conformity and not in confl ict with the Crown’s 
treaty obligations including its obligation under the treaties that constitute the European 
Community. See Tomkins, n. 543, p. 111. Th e doctrine of supremacy does not prevent the 
courts from interpreting statutes. When it comes to interpreting a statute in the light of a 
subordinate EC measure such as a Directive, English courts normally accord a purposive 
reading to English statutes in order to ensure that English law complies with Community law 
even where narrower or more literal interpretations of domestic law might have led to a 
diff erent result. Tomkins, n. 543, p. 112. Th is is in line with the ECJ’s guidance given in C-14/83 
– Von Colson & Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, (1984) ECR 1891, where the ECJ ruled 
that as a matter of Community law, ‘in applying […] the provisions of a national law specifi cally 
introduced in order to implement [a] Directive […] national courts are required to interpret 
their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive’. Th is rule of 
construction, also called the doctrine of indirect eff ect was extended in C-14/83 – Von Colson 
& Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, (1984) ECR 1891, in which the Court stated that 
whenever there is an apparent confl ict between the terms of a Directive and those of national 
law, the national court is, as far as possible, required to interpret the national law in the light of 
the Directive, regardless of whether the national law was designed to implement the Directive 
or not, and regardless of whether the national law was adopted before or aft er the Directive.
1128 Because of the common law doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the UK does not possess a 
constitutional court which would protect the UK constitution even against the parliamentary 
legislator as does, for instance the German BVerfG. Whereas in the UK, Parliament would 
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A series of cases summarized as Factortame may illustrate the working of the 
ECA in the context of the doctrine of supremacy.1129 In Factortame I and II, it 
was claimed that certain provisions of an Act of Parliament (‘Act’) were contrary 
to EC law and should be set aside accordingly.
Th e substantive question was referred to the ECJ under Article 234 EC. In the 
meantime, the applicants sought interim or interlocutory relief to the eff ect that 
the relevant provisions of the Act would be disapplied pending the outcome of 
the substantive question. Th e House of Lords decided in Factortame I that the 
courts did not have the power to grant interim relief under English law, the eff ect 
of which would be to suspend the operation of an Act of Parliament.
Th e House of Lords, however, considered whether a remedy could be granted 
under EC law because rights under EC law were claimed to have been 
compromised by the Act. It referred the question of whether in Community law 
the courts have the power to grant interim relief the eff ect of which would be to 
suspend the operation of an Act of Parliament to the ECJ under Article 234 EC. 
Th e ECJ held that the applicants were indeed entitled under EC law to interim 
protection. Accordingly, the House of Lords eventually granted interim relief by 
applying EC law (Factortame II). Th e eff ect of the order however was that the 
operation of an Act of Parliament was suspended, which raised the question 
whether granting this remedy could be reconciled with the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy.
Th e House of Lords granted the remedy not in its capacity as a court of English 
law but in its capacity as a court empowered to determine questions of 
Community law. As the House of Lords was enforcing EC law, legislative 
supremacy of Acts of the UK Parliament was not interfered with as it has never 
been a doctrine of Community law but of English law only.1130 According to the 
doctrine of legislative supremacy, Parliament may make or unmake any law 
whatsoever, a power, which it did not lose as a result of Factortame. Factortame 
does not suggest that Parliament cannot make a law that is contrary to EC law. 
Th e doctrine of legislative supremacy does on the other hand not provide that as 
“simply” disregard international treaty obligations if it saw its national fundamental rights 
standard under threat, in Germany, the BVerfG would, for instance, measure the national 
implementation of binding provisions of an EC Directive (i.e. provisions not leaving any 
discretion to the Member States), against the standard of the German Grundgesetz according 
to its Solange II doctrine (see chapter 4 on Germany). See also n. 1120.
1129 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (Factortame I), (1990) 2 Appeal Cases 
(A.C.) 85, R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) (Factortame II), 
(1991) 1 Appeal Cases (A.C.) 603.
1130 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 117.
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a matter of Community law an Act of Parliament cannot be set aside because 
from the case law of the ECJ, it has always been clear that in a confl ict between 
national law and directly applicable or directly eff ective EC law, the latter would 
prevail over the former as a matter of EC law.1131 As soon as the UK courts 
became empowered by section 3(1) of the ECA to determine questions of 
Community law, it was clear from reading the text of the 1972 Act alongside the 
pre-existing jurisprudence of the ECJ that it was no longer true that nobody in 
England could set aside an Act of Parliament.
Accordingly, it remains the case that under English law nobody has the power to 
override or set aside a statute but it is no longer the case that English law is the 
only law applicable in England. Since 1 January 1973, there have been two legal 
systems operating in the UK, not one.1132 Th e doctrine of the legislative 
supremacy of statute is a doctrine known to only one of those two systems, i.e. 
the English one.1133
As a consequence of what has been shown in this subsection, if Parliament 
wanted to enact a statute, which would fall foul of EC law (contrary to section 
2(4) ECA) but which it nevertheless wanted to be upheld by the English courts 
(contra to section 3(1) ECA), Parliament would have two options. Th e fi rst would 
be that Parliament withdrew the UK from the EU and repeal the ECA, which 
albeit rather drastic would not be a problem because national sovereignty is only 
shared with the European Community for the time being, which is not beyond 
the recall of Parliament.1134 Th e second less drastic option would be that 
Parliament simply enacted the statute and provided that the Act was to be 
construed and had eff ect notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in 
either the ECA 1972 or EC law, which would oust the jurisdiction of the domestic 
courts to enforce EC law over this particular Act and over this particular Act 
only.1135 Th is is because aft er all domestic courts only held the power to enforce 
EC law because Parliament has conferred such a power on them, and what 
1131 See, however, the Solange II case law of the German BVerfG, n. 810 and chapter 4 on Germany, 
which puts this into question.
1132 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 118. Th is refl ects the dualistic character of the UK legal order.
1133 Th e doctrine of implied repeal is also not interfered with by Factortame. Th is is, fi rst, because 
the Act was not in confl ict with the ECA but rather with the EC Treaty. Th e doctrine of implied 
repeal concerns confl icts between one statute and another and not confl icts between statutes 
and other sources of law such as the EC Treaty. Secondly, even if the Act was in confl ict with 
the ECA, the doctrine would not apply. Th is is because implied repeal is about incompatibilities 
between two statutes, which both deal with the same subject-matter, as was made clear in Ellen 
Street Estates, n. 1121. Th e two Acts do not however deal with the same subject-matter.
1134 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 120.
1135 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 120.
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Parliament can confer on the courts Parliament can take away according to the 
doctrine of legislative supremacy.
Th e discussion on the relationship between EC and English law shows, to some 
extent in parallel to the German BVerfG, that the primacy of EC law (such as in 
the context of further unbundling legislation) as proclaimed by the ECJ does 
have (theoretical) limits in both Member States.1136 Th e German Solange doctrine 
and the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, however, diff er in that the 
German BVerfG makes it clear that what counts in Germany is the German 
fundamental rights standard and not any less protective standard (which further 
unbundling legislation would have to comply with). Th e English doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, to the contrary, does not (necessarily) seek recourse 
in the protection of fundamental rights but simply expresses that it is the political 
will of Parliament (even if contrary to the UK’s Treaty obligations), which limits 
the primacy of EC law in the UK (such as, for instance, unwanted further EC 
unbundling measures).
b. Human Rights Act 1998 and judicial review of Acts of Parliament
Another, more recent challenge to the doctrine of legislative supremacy is the 
HRA, which incorporates the ECHR into domestic law.1137 Th e terms of domestic 
incorporation of the ECHR by the HRA are however signifi cantly diff erent from 
those contained in the ECA with respect to the EC.
While the UK has been bound by the ECHR as a matter of international law since 
the early 1960s1138, the ECHR was not part of English law until incorporated into 
domestic law in October 2000 with the coming-into-force of the HRA. Between 
then and 2000, domestic courts could not enforce the terms of the ECHR but 
only take its terms into consideration when enforcing domestic law.1139
1136 Which is also the result of the dualistic legal systems governing both Member States as opposed 
to the monistic legal order of the Netherlands, see further chapter 6 on the Netherlands.
1137 All Convention rights applicable are specifi ed in an exhaustive list in s. 1 HRA. Th is does, 
however, not abolish the common law concept of constitutional rights (which has been 
criticized for its uncertainty as to what might be recognized by the courts as a ‘constitutional 
right’) because the catalogue of Convention rights is not a complete list of all rights known to 
modern legal systems, which becomes clear if one compares the HRA list of Convention rights 
with the rather extensive list of rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. Th us, s. 1 HRA is a codifi cation of certain human rights, which adds to the non-codifi ed 
judge-made common law constitutional rights in the UK.
1138 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 121.
1139 During this period only the ECtHR could enforce the ECHR in respect of the UK, which is still 
the case for Acts of Parliament, which are in breach of ECHR.
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A similar question to the one above with respect the relationship of the ECA to 
legislative supremacy is whether the HRA potentially interferes with the doctrine 
of legislative supremacy in that Parliament might not be free any more to legislate 
in contravention to the Convention rights incorporated into English law by the 
HRA.
Th is relationship is governed by sections 3 and 4 of the HRA. Section 3 reads: “So 
far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation […] must be read and given eff ect 
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.”
Accordingly, whenever possible courts must interpret enacted statutes so as to be 
in conformity with Convention rights. Section 4 stipulates that if such an 
interpretation is not possible, the court may grant a newly created remedy, which 
is the so-called declaration of incompatibility. With such a declaration the court 
expresses its view that a certain statute is incompatible with a Convention right, 
which according to section 4(6) does however “not aff ect the validity, continuing 
operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given.” Th is 
declaration thus leaves it to Parliament to continue with the statute, to amend it 
or to repeal it. As the fi nal decision rests with Parliament, it continues to retain 
the supreme legislative authority to legislate in contravention of Convention 
rights, which cannot be overturned or set aside by any domestic court, 
notwithstanding any incompatibility. Th e doctrine of legislative supremacy is 
thus not disturbed.
2. DIRECT APPLICATION OF ECHR
As a result of the legislative supremacy of Parliament, which has not lost its 
absoluteness as a result of the ECA and the HRA, and which cannot be challenged 
by the English courts, any primary legislation, i.e. legislation initiated and passed 
by Parliament1140 can in principle disobey human rights and not be overturned or 
even set aside or disapplied by the English judiciary.1141 English courts can only 
show their disapproval of primary legislation by way of a declaration of 
1140 More accurately Tomkins, n. 543, p. 48. Parliament is not a ‘public authority’ in terms of s. 6 
HRA.
1141 Tomkins, n. 543, p. 189 (n. 50), however, emphasizes that as “a principle of statutory 
construction […] Parliament does not lightly intend to legislate so as to be in breach of the 
Crown’s international treaty obligations. If Parliament does so intend, it will make its intentions 
clear. Where legislation is clearly in breach of international law the courts will give eff ect to the 
statute, but where the statute is unclear or ambiguous the courts will endeavour to construe it 
so that it complies with, rather than is in confl ict with, the Crown’s international treaty 
obligations.”
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incompatibility. Only the ECtHR can decide that the UK is in breach of human 
rights as protected by the ECHR; according to Article 46 ECHR, such a decision 
would be binding on the UK and must be complied with for the UK would 
otherwise be in breach of its international treaty obligations.
Delegated legislation and public authorities
Legislation delegated to the UK Government Minister concerned by primary 
legislation, i.e. the European Community Act, to implement EC Directives must, 
as a Statutory Instrument and according to section 2(2) of the ECA in conjunction 
with section 2(2) of Schedule 2 of the ECA, be laid before Parliament and approved 
by it according to an affi  rmative resolution procedure, meaning it must be 
(affi  rmatively) approved by both Houses of Parliament.1142
Where such delegated legislation is supposed to be merely an exact implementation 
of an EC Directive1143, the English courts would review such delegated legislation 
to the extent that it is ultra vires1144, i.e. whether it is compatible with the HRA 
1998, the ECA 1972 (and thus the initiating EC legislation) and EC fundamental 
rights (see above).1145
1142 Rejecting it could mean that if the delegated legislation was a proper implementation of a EC 
Directive Parliament would explicitly or impliedly repeal in this particular case the powers 
granted in the ECA and thus in this particular case the ECA itself; by legislating against 
directly applicable or eff ective European legislation Parliament would explicitly or impliedly 
repeal s. 2(1) ECA and thus in such a specifi c case the ECA itself. Th is repeal power compares 
to Article 79(3) GG, which in absolute terms prohibits any change of structure of the German 
Grundgesetz (see also the accompanying text to nn. 542 and 1340) and is also a refl ection of 
the UK’s dualistic legal order.
1143 In the case, however, that delegated legislation implements an EC Directive, which leaves the 
Member States options for implementation, which would be the case if the Commission’s 
proposals for further unbundling measures were enacted in an EC Directive, English courts 
(acting as English courts) would review this delegated legislation as they would review purely 
domestic legislation, i.e. not initiated by EC legislation, on the basis of the ECHR as incorporated 
into domestic law by the HRA, and (acting as European Courts) review it for compliance with 
EC primary law, in particular Article 56 EC; the originating EC legislation would be checked 
against EC law including Community fundamental rights on EC level.
1144 Ultra vires delegated legislation means that it is illegal, i.e. not covered by the empowering Act 
of Parliament, and irrational, see Tomkins, n. 543, pp. 177, 192. Th e concept of irrationality has 
developed from the famous (infamous?) Wednesbury reasonableness concept, according to 
which a decision could only be quashed if it was ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority 
could ever have come to it’ (Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v 
Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 King’s Bench Division Law Reports (K.B.) 223, 230) or ‘so 
outrageous in its defi ance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who 
had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it’ (Lord Diplock in 
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) Appeal Cases (A.C.) 374, 
410), to a common law doctrine of proportionality, see in more detail towards the end of this 
section, infra.
1145 In which case, a confl ict between the ECHR as applied by the HRA and Community law might 
arise. Since the coming-into-force of the HRA, the English courts have to interpret all 
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Such a case, however, seems unlikely to happen given that it has been approved 
by Parliament because such approval would imply that the implementation of an 
EC Directive by way of delegated legislation was done in accordance with the 
parliamentary intentions expressed by the ECA. Generally though, according to 
s. 6(1) HRA, if a public authority such as Government or a sector regulator which 
is formally independent like OFGEM acts in a way that is incompatible with a 
Convention right, such an action is prima facie unlawful. Actions such as 
subordinate or delegated rule-making by Ministers could thus be quashed by an 
English Court as a result of judicial review.
On the other hand, section 6(2) HRA provides that it would not be unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right if, 
as a result of a provision of primary legislation, the authority could not have acted 
diff erently. Consequently, if an Act requires a public authority (such as a Minister) 
to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right, such executive 
action is not unlawful but the provision of primary legislation could of course be 
declared incompatible with Convention rights according to section 4 HRA. A 
further, second exception is provided for in section 6(2) HRA according to which 
it would not be unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right if the authority was acting so as to give 
eff ect to or to enforce a provision of primary legislation which itself cannot be 
read or given eff ect to in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.1146
legislation, even legislation of EC origin, compatibly with the Convention rights (s. 3 HRA) 
and act compatibly with the Convention rights; as regards the latter, English courts are public 
authorities under s. 6 of the HRA. See A Dignam, D Allen, Company Law and the Human 
Rights Act 1998, 2000, p. 144. Th e confl ict might arise because the ECJ recognised that at times 
it may be legitimate to restrict ECHR rights and freedoms to achieve the overall aims and 
objectives of the EC. See Blanke in Tettinger/Stern, Article 15, no. 11; Dignam/Allen, ibid., 
p. 144. Th us, Community law might prove incompatible with the Convention rights. As a 
result, the functions of English courts acting as English courts (which have to apply the HRA 
1998) and, at the time, acting as European courts (which have to apply EC law under the ECA) 
might clash. While the English courts have no power to disapply Community legislation 
because it violates ECHR rights, it could grant interim relief and refer the case to the ECJ 
according to Article 234 EC to determine the validity of the EC legislation in question. Th e 
victim could also bring an action before the ECtHR because English courts can only declare 
primary legislation incompatible with the HRA and thus the EHCR. If the victim was 
successful there, the UK would be in a diffi  cult situation facing a Bosphorus like situation, see 
the outline of this ECtHR case in chapter 4 on Germany, n. 824, where it would have to give 
way to the judgment of the ECJ or the ECtHR. Assuming that the ECJ rules that the EC 
legislation in question was in line with EC law, thus also rendering UK primary legislation in 
line with EC law, the Westminster Parliament would have to decide which international treaty 
obligation it would have to disregard and thus violate: Parliament could either disapply the 
working of the ECA in the specifi c case at hand and legislate in contravention to the EC Treaty 
thus breaching its EC treaty obligations, or it could simply ignore the ruling of the ECtHR and 
thus be in breach of its ECHR treaty obligations.
1146 Th e wording here refers back to sections 3 and 4 HRA, which are the provisions that govern the 
relationship between human rights and legislative supremacy. See in greater detail Tomkins, n. 
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For the purpose of this work, however, only the ECHR as applied by the ECtHR, 
more precisely Article 1 of the First Protocol, which protects the right to property, 
will serve as the standard of review here because the standard of protection 
aff orded by the HRA 1998, whose section 1(1)(b) incorporates the First Protocol 
of the ECHR into domestic law, is not enforceable for the reason of legislative 
supremacy.1147 Consequently, as part of the human rights protection aff orded by 
the ECHR as developed by the case law of the ECtHR, further unbundling 
measures are to be tested measured at the fair balance test developed by the 
ECtHR.1148
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES ARISING IN 
CONTEXT OF FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
LEGISLATION
As just outlined, further unbundling measures to be enacted in the UK would 
primarily have to be reviewed as to whether they comply with the fundamental 
right to property as set out in Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR.1149
543, p. 190.
1147 Th e case law of the ECtHR must ‘only’ be taken into account by the English courts according 
to s. 2 of the HRA; they are, however, not obliged to follow it. Th e application of Article 56 EC 
as primary EC law will also be discussed because English courts in their capacity as European 
courts under the ECA can disapply any incompatible domestic legislation and thus as a 
consequence of the ECA enforce overriding EC law even against Acts of Parliament.
1148 Tomkins, n. 543, pp. 188 et seq., 195 et seq.; Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 267 et seq. Th e concept 
of proportionality is not expressly mentioned in the text of the ECHR but has been developed 
by the ECtHR in its case law. Th us, because English courts only have to take the ECtHR case 
law ‘into account’, they are not compelled to incorporate the doctrine of proportionality into 
domestic judicial review law. Nevertheless, the House of Lords has in the meantime entirely of 
its own volition moved to embrace a doctrine of proportionality in English judicial review law 
thus creating this doctrine in common law. Th e leading case in this regard is R (Daly) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2001) 2 Appeal Cases (A.C.) 532. See also Horspool 
in Tettinger/Stern, A V (‘Die Anwendung des Human Rights Act 1998 im Vereinigten 
Königreich’), nos 17 et seq., 19 et seq., pp. 58 et seq. Lord Hoff mann in R (Alconbury) v Secretary 
of State for the Environment, (2001) 2 Weekly Law Reports (W.L.R.) 1389, no. 76, however, felt 
that he had to stress the fact that because English courts are not bound by ECtHR case law 
according to s. 2 HRA, they are also not bound by the proportionality principle developed by 
ECtHR, in particular if such case law is at odds with the distribution of powers under the 
British constitution (such as legislative supremacy).
1149 For reasons laid out in the previous section, the freedom of economic activity, mainly in the 
form of the freedom of contract, and the right to property as protected by common law will not 
be discussed here. Th e freedom of economic activity as protected under common law will, 
however, play a role at section V(2) to the extent that it potentially aff ords a higher level of 
protection than the ECHR. Both fundamental rights are of central importance to the common 
law. As regards the latter, see in great detail R Clayton, H Tomlinson, Th e Law of Human 
Rights, OUP, 2000, pp. 1292 et seq. It however seems that there has never been a clear expression 
of the right to property as a constitutional principle in the common law. As Allen, pp. 16–7, 
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1. ARTICLE 1 OF 1ST PROTOCOL ECHR
Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR can be divided in three parts: (1) 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions is the principle and there exists (2) a 
qualifi ed protection against the deprivation of property and (3) the possibility to 
regulate ownership. Parts 2 and 3 are the consequence of the general principle 
expressed in part 1. Th e three rules are not to be seen as separate parts but as 
intertwined with each other.
a. Subject-matter of protection
Th e ECHR contains an autonomous defi nition of property, i.e. independent of 
the laws of any of its signatories. In the existing case law, it has become clear 
that the scope of Article 1 of the First Protocol is rather broad. Th e most important 
reason is that the ECHR does not contain a specifi c right or freedom of economic 
activity, profession or occupation1150 so that the ECtHR defi nes possessions (or 
property) not only as covering legally owned property objects, which includes 
shareholdings1151, but also “certain other rights and constitutions”.1152 One 
precondition surely is that some economic value is involved, i.e. only rights and 
interests, which can be valued in money, are protected by Article 11153; they must 
puts it, the constitutional protection of the right to property applies “only in the most general 
sense that the State should treat its citizens fairly. In any case, even if there is a general binding 
principle of fairness in relation to property rights, it is so ill-defi ned that it is of little practical 
force. […] Hence, P1(1) [Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR] does not represent a radical 
departure from traditional principles. Th e body of case law under P1(1) is plainly far more 
detailed than the fundamental law ever was […] (comment in square brackets added).” Th e 
protection of the right to property in domestic law has been limited because this right as all 
fundamental rights in English law, has always been subject to unfettered interference by 
Parliament. Clayton/Tomlinson, ibid., p. 1321, thus claims that Article 1 of the First Protocol 
ECHR could provide stronger protection. Seeing the protection of property stronger in the UK 
than guaranteed by the ECtHR, however, Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 269–70.
1150 Nor does it contain any guarantees such as the German fundamental right of association in 
Article 9(1) GG with respect to the organizational freedom of associations such as corporate 
bodies.
1151 ECtHR, Bramelid & Malmstrom v Sweden, 12 October 1982, Decision and Reports (D.R.) 29, 
64, and Ruiz-Mateos v Spain, 23 June 1993, Ser. A 262.
1152 See, for instance, ECtHR, Latridis v Greece, no 31107/96, ECHR 2000-XI, no. 54, and Beyeler v 
Italy, no. 33202/96 (GC), ECHR 2000-I. See further, T Barkhuysen, M van Emmerik, ‘De 
eigendomsbescherming van article 1 van het Eerste Protocol bij het EVRM en het Nederlandse 
bestuursrecht’, (2003) JBplus 2, 4–5, for an overview of the rights recognized by the ECtHR as 
possessions. See also ECtHR, Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden, 10 October 1985, Ser. A 159, 
confi rmed by Fredin v Sweden, 18 January 1991, Ser. A 192, as regards the protection of the 
economic interest (betriebliches Vermögen) in the context of entrepreneurial activity (Recht am 
Unternehmen). Th e term ‘possessions’ means the same as the term ‘property’, see in greater 
detail, Müller-Michaels, n. 535, p. 64.
1153 See ECtHR, Beyeler, ibid. Moreover, the right or interest must exist suffi  ciently certainly, such 
as the right to use or operate networks.
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be based on “legitimate expectations”.1154 Th e mere expectation of future income 
does not suffi  ce, however. It can thus be said that Article 1 protects existing rights, 
which also includes the existing exercise of a profession1155, and expectations of 
monetary value which can be substantiated, but not the process of acquiring such 
rights or expectations.
With respect to the protection of economic interests, private law claims, for 
instance, are in principle protected by the right to property as long as they exist 
and can be claimed.1156 Th is general rule has, however, been subjected to severe 
limitations. In Mellacher1157, the Court saw a deprivation of property in the 
statutory introduction of a system of fi xed real estate rents, which led to a 
reduction in existing real estate rents. Th e object of protection, however, was not 
the individual rental claims but the real estate as a whole. Th e ability to enter into 
rental agreements was only one aspect of the right to property in land. Th is right 
aff ords its owner diff erent possibilities of use. If every right arising from the 
realization of each of these possibilities had been interpreted as property, the 
regulation or the control of use of property as set out in Article 1(2) of the First 
Protocol would have been deprived of its applicability, which contradicts the 
purpose of Article 1 as a whole.
b. Deprivation
Article 1 distinguishes between deprivation of (the entire right to) property1158 
and the deprivation of individual components or rights forming part of the right 
to property.1159
Th e most intrusive interference with the right to property is the deprivation of 
property or expropriation, which means the forced transfer of ownership either 
in a legal or in a factual sense resulting in the loss of the right to dispose of or to 
1154 See only ECtHR, Kopecky v Slovakia, no. 44912/98 (GC), ECHR 2004-IX, Maurice v France, no. 
11810/03 (GC), ECHR 2005-XV, and Anheuser-Busch v Portugal, no. 73049/01 (GC), ECHR 
2007.
1155 ECtHR, van Marle & Others v Th e Netherlands, 26 June 1986, Ser. A 101.
1156 Müller-Michaels, n. 535, p. 66; ECtHR, Stran Greek Refi neries & Stratis Andreadis v Greece, 
9 December 1994, Ser. A 301-B; European Commission for Human Rights (ECnHR), Pudas v 
Sweden, 27 October 1987, Ser. A 125-A, and Batelaan & Huiges v Th e Netherlands, 3 October 
1984 Decision and Reports (D.R.) 41, 170.
1157 ECtHR, Mellacher and Others v Austria, 19 December 1989, Ser. A 169, confi rmed in Pine 
Valley Developments and Others v Ireland, 29 November 1991, Ser. A 222, no. 56.
1158 Comprising of expropriation and de facto expropriation, see infra.
1159 Being the regulation or control of the use of property, see infra. For the individual components 
of the right to property, see the Introduction.
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deal (or not to deal) with one’s property as one pleases.1160 Deprivation of 
property can happen in a strictly legal sense but also as a matter of fact if certain 
measures lead in reality to similar consequences. Th e latter, which is also named 
de facto expropriation, can according to the case law only be found to occur if a 
measure renders any sensible use of the right to property impossible or strips 
property off  all its value.1161
A less intrusive form of interference is the deprivation of the right to use, let or 
sell the property1162 or, in other words, the regulation of ownership without 
completely removing the right to dispose of the property.1163
To draw the line between deprivation and regulation is rather diffi  cult. One 
important criterion is the exact defi nition of property or ownership. Appreciating 
whether a measure such as the withdrawal of permission has the eff ect of a 
deprivation, one should not look at the measure in an isolated way but against the 
background of the entire situation in which such a measure is taken. Where, for 
instance, all animals of a farmer are killed upon offi  cial order because of an 
animal epidemic but the farmer is still allowed to continue his business thereaft er, 
it is more the economic activity which forms the property rather than his animals. 
Consequently, killing all the animals is not to be seen as a deprivation but as a 
regulation of the farmer’s property as he is still able to continue his economic 
activity.1164
Further, as has just been said above, the deprivation of private claims or certain 
competences, for instance, is not necessarily a deprivation of property but can 
1160 ECtHR, Papamichalopoulos v Greece, 24 June 1993, Ser. A 260-B, and Brumaresco v Romania, 
no. 28342/95 (GC), ECHR 1999-VII.
1161 See only ECtHR in Katte Klitsche de la Grange v Italy, 27 October 1994, Ser. A 293-B, where it 
states that “[w]here […] the owner retains the ownership subject to restrictions which reduce 
to virtually nothing the economic value of the use or exchange of the property, this is known 
as “value expropriation” and gives rise to an entitlement to compensation. Th is situation arises 
where the restriction is very severe – absolute prohibition – and where it is imposed for an 
indefi nite period of time or remains in force for longer than is reasonable.” See also n. 559.
1162 ECtHR, Mellacher, n. 1157.
1163 In James & Others v United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, Ser. A 98, the Court established that 
regulating private ownership as part of a socio-economic programme is within the state’s 
margin of appreciation. See Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 268–9.
1164 See also ECJ, Joint Cases C-20/00 en C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture, n. 241, according to which 
the killing of animals in a similar context was classifi ed as a restriction of ownership rights 
since the continuation of the economic activity had not been prohibited. It was only because of 
the measure was taken, the Court claims, that the applicants were actually enabled to continue 
their economic activity. In ECtHR, Fredin, n. 1152, the applicant had to close down one of his 
gravel pits but the withdrawal of the mining permission did not result in the remaining land 
owned by the applicant and surrounding the gravel pit being worthless or any sensible use of it 
having been made impossible. Th us, a de facto expropriation was rejected.
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also be a deprivation in the form of the regulation of property if these claims or 
competences form part of a certain right to property, which aff ords its owner 
diff erent possibilities of use. Accordingly, the deprivation of, for instance, rental 
claims or certain competences with respect to the use of private infrastructure is 
not an expropriation in the sense of Article 1(1) 2nd sentence but a control of the 
use of land or real property measured against the standard as set out in subsection 
2 of Article 1.
What can thus be generally inferred from the case law of the ECtHR is that 
private law claims and individual competences with respect to property are only 
protected as rights to property under Article 1 of the First Protocol if they are not 
merely ancillary to the right to property in the principal object for protection.
c. Margin of appreciation and fair balance
Th e right to property is not an absolute fundamental right but can be subject to 
restrictions if justifi ed. Th e Court’s requirements to justify such a restriction are 
similar for all forms of interference with the right to property, may it be deprivation 
of property in the form of (de facto) expropriation or its regulation.
First, the Court checks whether the interference is in accordance with the 
principle of lawfulness of state action. Th e interference must thus be based on 
legislation1165 and suffi  ciently accessible, clear, precise and predictable.1166 As 
this does not usually lead to the fi nding of a violation of ECHR rights, this 
principle also fi nds its way into the Court’s specifi c proportionality test1167, more 
properly called the fair balance test, which is outlined in the paragraph aft er 
next.
Secondly, the Court scrutinizes whether the interference can be justifi ed by the 
general interest. Th e ECtHR aff ords its signatories a rather broad margin of 
appreciation when it comes to the question of whether a general interest can 
justify the interference.1168 Th e Court thus only rarely reaches the conclusion 
that a certain infringement of ownership does not pursue legitimate objectives of 
general interest even though the Court does review the reasons given by the state 
1165 ECtHR, Scordino v Italy, no. 43662/98, ECHR 2007, nos 87–94, with references to earlier case 
law.
1166 ECtHR, Beyeler, n. 1152, no. 109, pacek v Czech Republic, no. 26449/95, ECHR 1999, and 
Belvedère Alberghiera v Italy, no. 31524/96, ECHR 2000-VI.
1167 ECtHR, Beyeler, n. 1152, no. 10, referring to legal certainty aspects of the law and to the latitude 
aff orded to authorities by the law to be taken into account when assessing whether a measure 
complained of struck a fair balance.
1168 ECtHR, James, n. 1163.
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for the restriction and examine whether they are relevant and suffi  cient.1169 Th is 
is because the Court considers national authorities best equipped to know about 
the needs of their society in order to establish what is necessary in the general 
interest.1170 Only in exceptional cases does the Court come to the conclusion that 
the interference did not serve any objectives of general interest.1171 Th is has only 
happened in evidently unreasonable cases.1172
Th irdly, the ECtHR assesses whether the interference is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued or, more accurately, whether there exists a fair balance 
between the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the individual (victim or applicant).1173 Th e principle of 
proportionality thus attempts to achieve a fair balance between individual and 
community needs. Both the principle of proportionality and the margin of 
appreciation are complementary in operation.
Fair balance is lacking when a disproportionate or excessive burden is imposed 
on the victim. From the case law of the ECtHR, it can be inferred that this 
assessment is the most important test for determining whether Article 1 of the 
First Protocol of the ECHR is violated.1174 Th e tests of whether an interference 
1169 See, for instance, ECtHR, Holy Monasteries v Greece, 9 December 1994, Ser A 301-A.
1170 T Barkhuysen, M van Emmerik, De eigendomsbescherming van artikel 1 van het Eerste 
Protocol bij het EVRM en het Nederlandse burgerlijk recht: het Straatsburgse perspectief, 
Preadvies Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht, 2005, p. 67. Th is is why Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 
268–70, claims that property protection under domestic courts would give more protection 
than the ECtHR.
1171 Th e ECHR does not distinguish between various types of general interest, i.e. whether they are 
of economic or non-economic nature, but such a distinction does play a role within the 
justifi cations of impediments to EC fundamental freedoms such as Article 56 EC, see R Streinz, 
Europarecht, 8rd ed., 2008, no. 833.
1172 See, for example, ECtHR, Zwierzynski v Poland, no. 34049/96, ECHR 2001-VI. See in this 
respect for a critical view, Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 268–9. Dignam argues that the level of 
discretion aff orded to the state by domestic courts is unlikely to be as wide as the Strasbourg 
court would accord, i.e. to be as deferential to factual assertions of the state in realtion to the 
balancing of private and public interests and the respective merits of each.
1173 Th e proportionality test of Article 5(3) EC as applied by the ECJ is not applicable here because 
it only applies to measures of Community institutions. Here a national measure is under 
scrutiny, whose compatibility with, inter alia, primary EC law is assessed. Th e ECJ will not be 
concerned with these measures apart from, possibly, in the context of a preliminary ruling 
according to Article 234 EC, and will thus not be able to decide on EC measures in this context 
so that it is not able to apply the EC standard of proportionality, which at least in theory 
appears to be stricter. See in greater detail, Part 1 Chapter 3 and chapter 7 on the European 
Union.
1174 Th e structure of the ECtHR’s proportionality test is not the same as the structure of the 
German and the EC proportionality tests (with respect to a comparison with the German style 
test, see Müller-Michaels, n. 535, p. 84, which consist of evaluating the appropriateness or 
suitability of a measure to achieve a general interest objective, its necessity (or whether milder, 
less intrusive but equally eff ective means exist) and the actual proportionality or the weighing 
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with fundamental rights is “based on legislation” or “in the general interest” are 
rarely an obstacle.
An important feature of the fair balance test is also what someone whose right to 
property is at issue should legitimately expect from legislation. Th e owner of a 
company, for instance, should base its expectations not only the profi tability of 
its property but the owner should also take into account any (foreseeable) 
restrictions resulting from legislation.1175
Th e proportionality test is also the place where compensation is considered for 
any losses incurred as a result of the interference with someone’s right to property. 
It is the rule that compensation is to be paid. Th e amount to be paid depends on 
the nature of the interference. As regards the deprivation of property in the form 
of (de facto) expropriation, the basic assumption is that compensation equals the 
full market value.1176 By contrast, in the case of regulating ownership, the 
regulation of ownership rights without payment of compensation is not 
necessarily perceived as a disproportionate burden.1177 Th is can also be inferred 
from Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR itself where the regulation of 
property is in principle permissible. Whether compensation is required depends 
on the circumstances of the individual case. Th e graver the consequences of the 
or balancing of general with private interests. However, for the sake of comparability, a 
structure similar to the German and EC proportionality tests is applied here.
1175 ECtHR, Fredin, n. 1152, and Pine Valley Developments, n. 1157. Th e predictability of a state 
measure is part of its legality and requires, for instance, proper warning and consultation 
before enforcement of such a measure whereas legitimate expectations are about the reliance 
on the continuation of the original use of property for a certain purpose or to what extent its 
regulation or even deprivation was foreseeable at the time when the use for such purpose 
began.
1176 ECtHR, Holy Monasteries, n. 1169.
1177 However, where regulation causes an excessive burden to certain individuals, an obligation to 
off er at least some compensation can follow, see the judgement of the Dutch Hoge Raad (HR), 
LJN: AD5493, C00/142HR, 16 November 2001, (2002) AB 25, in which it refuted an earlier 
judgement of the ECtHR, see J Hoitink, De ontbrekende schakel – Een beschouwing over 
eigendomsbescherming als fundament voor schadevergoeding, 2006, p. 34. Th is to some extent 
resembles the outdated so-called “Schwere” (ponderosity) oder “Sonderopfer” (special 
sacrifi ce) theory of the BVerfG and the civil law courts in Germany, according to which a 
deprivation of property was widely construed in that regulation restricting rights to private 
property could also mean a deprivation if demanding a special sacrifi ce. Th e case law of the 
BVerfG has, however, changed towards a formal defi nition of expropriation (as one type of 
deprivation), see in greater detail the discussion in chapter 4 on Germany, which uses the 
above mentioned theories only to assess whether the regulation (Inhalts- und 
Schrankenbestimmung) of private property can, without being a deprivation, be regarded as 
exceeding the Sozialbindung (the legitimate use of private property to further the general 
interest) thereby imposing a disproportionate burden on the property owner. In this respect, 
see the German BVerfG in re Rheinland-pfälzisches Denkmalschutzgesetz, n. 551, discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 4 on Germany. See more generally, Papier in Depenheuer, n. 886, pp. 
93 et seq.
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interference, the more likely it is that compensation has to be off ered in order to 
create a fair balance.1178 On the other hand, the general interest can justify the 
payment of less compensation.1179 Th e Court always focuses on the question of 
the disproportionately of the burden and whether opposing interests, of which 
the main one is the level of compensation, are suffi  ciently in balance. Deprivation 
of property without compensation is only permissible in exceptional cases.1180
Th is compares to the position in Germany where in the case of expropriation 
compensation must per se be provided for.1181 Th is is a consequence of the formal 
defi nition of expropriation applied there, which only refers to the forced transfer 
of property.1182 Th e extent of interference and the consequences for the ownership 
position does thus not matter in Germany, whose law diff ers from the ECHR 
because deprivation of property according to Article 1 of the First Protocol does 
not only mean a deprivation in a formal sense where property is being transferred 
but also any measures, which achieve similar eff ects and consequences de 
facto.1183 Th is means in consequence that the interference must in fact be such 
that the right to dispose of the property is lost.1184
Coming back to the ECHR fair balance requirement, the fact that there are less 
intrusive alternative measures, which can in the situation at issue lead to a similar 
1178 ECtHR, Chassagnou & Others v France, nos 25088/94, 28331/95, 28443/95 (GC), ECHR 1999-
III. See in greater detail infra.
1179 In Scordino, n. 1165, the ECtHR lists earlier jurisprudence in which diff erent types of general 
interest justify less than market value compensation, such as in, for instance, ECtHR, James, n. 
1163, Lithgow v United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, Ser. A 102, Kopecky vs Slovakia, n. 1154, 
Broniowski v Poland, no. 31443/96 (GC), ECHR 2004-V, Von Maltzan & Others v Germany, nos 
71916/01, 71917/01, 10260/02 (GC), ECHR 2005-V, Jahn & Others v Germany, nos 46720/99, 
72203/01, 72552/01, (GC) ECHR 2005-VI, and Papachelas v Greece, no. 31423/96 (GC), ECHR 
1999-II.
1180 See, for instance, the recent example in re Jahn, ibid., where the Court considers “that in the 
unique context of German reunifi cation, the lack of any compensation does not upset the “fair 
balance” which has to be struck between the protection of property and the requirements of 
the general interest.”
1181 Similar to the position in the Netherlands with respect to the right to property according to 
Article 14 Grondwet, see Hoitink, n. 1177, p. 39.
1182 See n. 1177.
1183 See ECtHR, Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden, 23 September 1982, Ser. A 052 (Court Plenary); on 
the other hand, de facto deprivation of property is to some extent comparable to the German 
construct of regulation of ownership (Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung), which exceptionally 
comes close to expropriation and thus can also entail the obligation to provide for compensation, 
see the accompanying text to n. 889, in particular the decision of the German BVerfG in re 
Denkmalschutz.
1184 Th is is only the case if any sensible use is made impossible, or if the property is dispossessed of 
all its value, see already supra. For instance in ECtHR, Elia v Italy, no. 37710/97, ECHR 2001-
IX, this was not the case because the applicant was not prevented from entering his land, his 
control over the land was not lost entirely, and albeit that it was more diffi  cult, he still retained 
the power to sell the land.
Part 2. Fundamental Rights
316 Intersentia
result, is not a decisive consideration for deciding the question of whether the 
contested measure is justifi ed as long as it is not evidently unreasonable.1185 
Possible alternatives may, however, play a role in the context of determining 
whether a fair balance has been struck when choosing the contested measure.1186 
Th e severity of the interference plays an important but not decisive role because it 
must be measured against the interest which the State is pursuing. Sometimes, 
there are additional circumstances, which can play a role in deciding whether a 
measure is disproportionate such as procedural guarantees with respect to the 
interference1187, the predictability of the interference1188 or the question of 
compensation.1189
2. SUBJECT OF PROTECTION
Th e primary target of further unbundling legislation in the UK with respect to 
energy transmission networks (either based on EC Directives or purely domestic) 
would be the two private vertically integrated electricity supply undertakings in 
Scotland.
Further, National Grid as the national gas transmission network owner and 
operator and electricity transmission network owner in England and Wales and 
GB electricity network operator might wish to expand into energy generation 
and supply and apply for the corresponding licence(s). Th is would mean that its 
licence restrictions in this respect had to be lift ed. Should OFGEM refuse this, 
which would be likely, then National Grid would be subject to an interference 
with its right to pursue an economic activity resulting from the application by 
OFGEM of its competition law enforcement powers deriving from s. 3A of the 
Electricity Act 1989 as amended. Such a decision by OFGEM would eventually be 
subject to judicial review and could theoretically be quashed. Th us, some brief 
discussion of the main issues in this respect is called for. Before looking in greater 
detail into how far further unbundling measures might confl ict with Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the ECHR, the question of who is protected, or in ECHR 
terms who is or can be the victim of state interference, requires clarifi cation.
1185 Hoitink, n. 1177, pp. 34 et seq.
1186 It usually only infl uences the amount of compensation to be paid (instead of the state measure 
being struck out as disproportionate) where the fair balance or proportionality test shows that 
milder (and equally eff ective) means were available to achieve the general interest objectives.
1187 See, for instance, ECtHR, Beyeler, n. 1152, and Kirilova & Others v Bulgaria, nos 42908/98, 
44038/98, 44816/98, 7319/02, judgment 9 June 2005.
1188 See, for instance, ECtHR, Fredin, n. 1152, and Pine Valley Developments, n. 1157.
1189 See, for instance, ECtHR, Străin v Romania, no. 57001/00, ECHR 2005-VII, and Plakatou v 
Greece, no. 38460/97, ECHR 2001-I.
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Th e obligation of the State to refrain from certain interferences with the right to 
property applies to natural as well as to legal persons. In Agrotexim vs Greece, the 
ECtHR states that
“[…] the Court considers that the piercing of the “corporate veil” or the disregarding 
of a company’s legal personality will be justifi ed only in exceptional circumstances, in 
particular where it is clearly established that it is impossible for the company to apply 
to the Convention institutions through the organs set up under its articles of 
incorporation or – in the event of liquidation – through its liquidators. Th e Supreme 
Courts of certain Member States of the Council of Europe have taken the same 
line.”1190
It is thus not the rule but an exception to disregard the legal personality of a 
company as corporate body. Th is is also the case in the jurisdictions under review 
here, i.e. under English1191, Dutch (see below) and German law (see above with 
respect to the protection granted under the GG), and also in EC law according to 
the case law of the ECJ. Th ere, the legal person of the company is dealt with 
separately from its shareholders. However, it is the national company law as sub-
constitutional law which determines what constitutes a corporate legal person. 
Th is means that as long as the constitutional laws of these countries are complied 
with, the coordinates for the establishment and the organization of such corporate 
1190 ECtHR, Agrotexim, n. 905, no. 66, at least in cases where a breach of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol ECHR is claimed, see Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 182, 190–1. Compare this more 
recent approach to the earlier approach expressed in cases such as Pine Valley Developments, 
n. 1157, nos 40–3, where the corporate veil was disregarded because the corporate personality 
was just seen as an artifi cal vehicle through which majority shareholders conducted their own 
business. It appears that the ECtHR’s model of the corporate entity is not so much “focussed 
on the preservation of the collective rights subsumed into the corporate form” but rather 
recognizes the individual rights within the collective, see Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 190–1, 
raising issues, which are also relevant in the context of Article 9 GG, see chapter 4 on Germany. 
Th us, it seems that the ECtHR does at times not distinguish between the company’s property 
and the property of the shareholder(s). Accordingly, any interference aimed at the property of 
the company will violate the company’s rights under the ECHR as well as those of the 
shareholders (where possible according to Article 34 ECHR read in conjunction with Article 1 
ECHR).
1191 Th e Agrotexim approach to respecting the corporate veil substantially resembles the domestic 
UK position. Whereas in Salomon v Salomon & Co., (1897) Appeal Cases (A.C.) 22, it was 
clearly established (and has remained good law ever since) that a company is a legal person in 
its own right, which is a legal entity separate from that of its members, allowing the company 
to hold property in its own right, Foss v Harbottle, (1843) 67 English Reports (E.R.) 189, 
established the rule that the internal power structure of the corporation is focused on the 
corporate exercise of power rather that the individual shareholders’ exercise of rights. Th is, 
however, also means that companies decide their own policies and settle their own disputes by 
majority decision, see Cooper v Gordon, (1869) L.R. 8 Eq. 249 (Law Report Equity Cases). See 
in greater detail, Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 176–7.
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legal persons can be adapted.1192 On the other hand, if, as is the case with the 
British energy supply undertakings holding vertically integrated electricity 
network undertakings which are subject to further unbundling legislation, an 
undertaking possesses the status of a legal person according to national law1193, it 
does in principle enjoy the protection off ered by Article 1 of the First Protocol of 
the ECHR.
V. APPLICATION TO FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
MEASURES
Th e basis for the following discussion is the Commission’s proposals (as outlined 
in the Introduction) for revised Electricity and Gas Directives tabled in September 
2007. As these Directives aff ord the Member States a choice, the further discussions 
focus on the question whether one or all of the options proposed comply with the 
UK fundamental rights standard in the form of the ECHR. Only the two options 
are relevant here, i.e. not including the “Th ird Way” proposed under the lead of 
France and Germany, because only these would change the situation of the energy 
supply industry in GB, which is almost completely vertically separated since 
electricity sector privatization and the voluntary divestiture by British Gas of its 
gas pipeline system.
1192 EC law must obviously also be complied with, and in particular the fundamental freedoms of 
establishment and to provide services, Articles 43 et seq. and 49 et seq. EC must be observed. 
In particular in the area of these freedoms, legal persons established in the EU are treated in 
the same way as natural citizens of the EU Member States. See T Oppermann, Europarecht, 3rd 
ed., 2005, § 18 nos 46 et seq., § 26 nos 8 et seq., in greater detail on these freedoms and the far-
reaching and ever-growing harmonization in the area of company and corporate law, also on 
the European company Societas Europaea (SE). Th e establishment of legal persons takes place 
according to national law, and their organization is thus primarily subject to national 
regulation. Legal persons can thus be said to be citizens of the Member State they are established 
in with their constitution being national in nature. Company law is a form of regulation of the 
fundamental right to property. Th e adaptation of national company law appears to fall into the 
sole remit of the Member States, which according to Article 295 EC are responsible in principle 
for the rules governing the system of property ownership in their territory, subject to 
compliance with EC law. In this respect, see already Part 1 Chapter 3 section V.
1193 In Great Britain, the legal forms of private limited and public limited companies (Ltd and plc), 
in which the holding companies of the vertically integrated energy network operators are 
incorporated (Scottish Power Ltd and Scottish and Southern Energy plc), fulfi l the prerequisites 
of legal personality, see the Companies Act 2006, necessary in the context of the application of 
the ECHR. Corporate entities or (public or private) limited companies are a body corporate 
separate from its incorporating shareholders, i.e. an independent institution with its own 
organization and competences.
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1. FURTHER UNBUNDLING IN SCOTLAND
As has already been indicated above, further unbundling of the electricity 
transmission networks in Scotland could either be the consequence of either a 
new EC Directive or be pursued by the UK of its own volition and either by way 
of complete ownership unbundling or by enlarging the powers of the independent 
system operation pursued by National Grid.
Th e implementation would be likely to happen by amending the Electricity Act 
1989, i.e. either by prescribing that transmission (owner) licensees, i.e. the two 
vertically integrated Scottish electricity transmission network subsidiaries, which 
do not operate their electricity networks, would not be allowed to be part of a 
group of undertakings, which also pursues other energy supply related activities 
such as electricity generation and supply, or by laying the basis for a further 
transmission licence amendment, granting the GB transmission system operator 
further powers including investment decision and tendering powers, and in turn 
taking such powers away from the transmission (owner) licensees.1194
Such amendment would either be enacted by way of a statutory instrument 
draft ed by the government minister responsible and approved by Parliament 
(when implementing an EC Directive according to the ECA 1972) or by way of an 
amending Act of Parliament if further unbundling is enacted on the UK’s own 
initiative.
a. Ownership unbundling of electricity transmission
Th e proposal of the Commission for complete ownership unbundling as translated 
into the UK situation would prohibit the Scottish electricity transmission network 
owners from being part of a vertically integrated energy supply undertaking 
pursuing commercial activities such as generation, supply or the trade of electricity 
and gas. Th is would mean that the two Scottish undertakings holding transmission 
network ownership subsidiaries would have the choice of either selling their 
network ownership interests or their competitive activities to third parties outside 
the current vertically integrated holding structure, who must also have diff erent 
ultimate shareholders; a similar “choice” would exist for the shareholders of the 
1194 Currently, NGET and the two TOs develop investment plans; NGET, when it requires 
investments to be made, applies for construction to the TO concerned. OFGEM resolves 
disputes and can thus, in theory, order certain investment to be executed/constructed, see SO/
TO Code (in the form of 31 July 2007), section D, Part 1(2) and Part 2. Critical on this procedure, 
Th e Brattle Group, ‘International Review of Transmission Planning Arrangements – Report 
for the Australian Energy Market Commission’, October 2007, pp. 62 et seq., 71; Moselle, n. 
1107.
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Scottish undertakings when (forced to) sell one of the two shareholdings aft er a 
possible share split.1195
Since the relevant undertakings are already pursuing the competitive activities, 
or, in other words, the rights to pursue an economic activity are already exercised, 
it is clear that ownership unbundling would interfere with existing economic 
rights and interests of the energy supply undertakings concerned and that these 
represent a suffi  ciently certain economic value.
Th e competitive activities are legally owned by the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings as are the electricity transmission networks.
Surrendering the competitive activities in the course of executing ownership 
unbundling would thus result in a deprivation of property in the form of a 
straightforward expropriation of commercial property and of an economic 
activity. Similarly, surrendering the ownership of the networks would also be a 
deprivation of property in the form of an expropriation.
It is questionable though whether ownership unbundling can be interpreted as a 
deprivation of property at all in the sense of forced transfer of ownership in a 
legal sense because ownership unbundling as demanded by the Commission 
does not require the surrender of a specifi c property, which thus results in a 
specifi c deprivation; on the contrary, as just described it leaves the owner the 
choice of the activity to be sold. Th e only thing the demand for ownership 
unbundling makes clear is what is not allowed to happen, which is that the 
network property remains part of a group of companies in which other group 
companies generate electricity or supply energy. Ownership unbundling can 
equally be fulfi lled by selling the competitive activities or the network property.
However, the sale or transfer of property to third parties is indeed to be regarded 
as deprivation of property under the ECHR never mind that it is not a forced 
transfer of property to the State. Th is is because the transfer is mandated by a 
state measure and not based on free will; the fact that there is a choice between 
alternatives is not relevant because in the ultimate analysis, one or the other 
property must be surrendered, all of the alternative choices leading to a 
deprivation of property.
1195 Th is alternative will not be discussed further but the position of the shareholders will 
nevertheless be mentioned when establishing whether rights protected under the ECHR are 
interfered with.
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Th is view is supported by the ECtHR according to which it seems to suffi  ce that 
the State has ordered the sale in order to invoke Article 1 of the First Protocol of 
the ECHR in a case like this. Th is can be inferred from Kanala (a case of sale by 
compulsory auction) where the ECtHR states1196:
“Th e applicant’s ownership share in the real property in issue was transferred to the 
other co-owner in the context of execution proceedings brought with a view to 
obtaining sums of money which the domestic courts had earlier ordered to be paid to 
the applicant’s creditor. Even if the interference in question did not involve an 
expropriation by the State, the contested measure resulted in deprivation of the 
applicant of his property. Th e Government has not contested that there was a 
deprivation of property within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 and the 
Court will accordingly examine it under the “rule” set out in that provision.”
Th e Court thus establishes that an order for execution by a judge can not be 
regarded as an expropriation by the State but nevertheless leads to a deprivation 
of the applicant’s property.1197
To sum up, ownership unbundling is to be classifi ed as deprivation of property 
rather than a deprivation of the right to use, control, let or sell (regulation of 
ownership). Th e property protected here is either the commercial property and 
economic activity or the legal ownership of the networks. In both cases, the 
deprivation of property takes place as a straightforward expropriation.1198
As the property transfer is enforced by a state measure, i.e. by the relevant 
legislation, and has thus been ordered by the State, the State can be held 
responsible for the deprivation of property. In principle, the UK would therefore 
have to make provision (in or by law) for just compensation.1199
1196 ECtHR, Kanala v Slovakia, no. 57239/00, ECHR 2007. Th e applicant’s complaint was actually 
successful in that the forced sale was out of fair balance because the consideration was much 
lower than the market value.
1197 Th e German terminology in this respect is that any transfer of the property forced by or on the 
basis of legislation either to the State or to (private) third parties (subject to observing the 
further requirements of Article 14(3) GG) is to be regarded as expropriation; de facto 
expropriation as a further form of the deprivation of property under the ECHR would be 
classifi ed as the regulation of property in Germany, possibly being treated similarly to an 
expropriation under the special requirements set out by the BVerfG in decisions such as in re 
Denkmalschutzgesetz, see further n. 551, and accompanying text.
1198 As already mentioned supra, Article 1 of the First Protocol is extensively interpreted by the 
ECtHR. In Germany, the protection of the right to property according to Article 14 GG is 
unlikely to cover the economic activity as well; rather, this would be covered by the freedom to 
take up and pursue an occupation protected according to Article 12 GG.
1199 See further infra where the proportionality of further unbundling measures is discussed. If 
ownership unbundling was imposed unilaterally, i.e. without preceding EC legislation, the UK 
would not only have to provide for just compensation but also be liable to pay such compensation 
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b. “Deep” Independent System Operator
Th e alternative proposal of the Commission for introducing Independent System 
Operators (ISO) with investment decision and commissioning powers (subject to 
approval by the regulatory authorities)1200 as translated into the UK situation 
would confer greater powers upon NGET, the GB electricity transmission system 
operator, in that it would become solely responsible for investment planning and 
decisions, requiring OFGEM’s approval because such investments would become 
part of the regulatory asset base, on which the network charges are based. If the 
owners of the Scottish electricity transmission networks were not prepared to 
execute the investment ordered by NGET themselves (under the terms set by 
NGET), NGET would solely be able to put such investment out to tender to the 
market.1201 Th e owners would be downgraded to mere market participants and 
investors in their own grids. Th ey would not only not be able to decide about 
investments in their own grids, they would also be compelled to accept investments 
by third parties in their grids.
Th us, further unbundling in the form of forcing network owners to also surrender 
their investment decision (and tendering) powers over their networks to the 
existing GB electricity transmission system operator must also be classifi ed as 
deprivation of property in the form of a de facto expropriation of network 
property1202, rather than a deprivation of the right to use, control, let or sell 
(regulation of ownership). Although it would “merely” transfer one property 
competence amongst several (use and control were already transferred to NGET 
in the course of introducing BETTA) to NGET and thus on the face of it a 
out of its own budget. If the UK, however, imposed ownership unbundling following 
corresponding EC legislation, the EU would be likely to be liable for full compensation out of 
its budget, see further chapter 7 on the European Union.
1200 Th e idea behind introducing a “deep” ISO is that without it the problem of strategic investment 
withholding is supposed not to be adequately addressed. Th e strategic investment withholding 
argument claims that vertically integrated utilities have insuffi  cient incentives to invest in 
interconnector capacity in order to hold off  competition from abroad. Strategic investment 
withholding is the connecting element between electricity generation and network investment. 
It is assumed that only a “deep” ISO guarantees the severance of this connection by transferring 
the right to decide on network investment from the TO to the ISO. On the one hand, the 
additional power of the “deep” ISO to put an investment out to tender avoids the need for the 
State to compel the TO to invest, and it would still counter the problem of strategic investment 
withholding. On the other hand, tendered investment causes legal complications for 
investments, which are to take place on existing networks, such as the upgrade of existing 
lines. Th is is particularly true for with respect to ownership, governance, revenue allocation 
and liability issues. See in more detail, Brunekreeft  n. 9.
1201 On the other hand, an ISO putting an investment out to tender would uncover whether such 
investment is suffi  ciently economical to be implemented.
1202 Th is would be against the trend because it seems that the ECtHR normally does not follow such 
claims, see Müller-Michaels, n. 535, pp. 75–6.
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deprivation in the form of regulation, there is now a complete loss of control, 
which leaves the legal right or title to the network ownership as an “empty shell” 
(with the formal right to sell the property as a mere relic of the ownership right). 
One of the most important competences of legal ownership is taken away, i.e. the 
decision to deal with one’s property freely, which includes the competence to use 
or not to use one’s property as one pleases. Th e owner is left  with the mere 
physical property without being able any longer to decide about its use or non-
use or to decide any more whether to permit certain uses and users.
For the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, which own the 
networks, there would no sensible alternative use of the network property be left ; 
sensible use of the networks can only be made by those who actually dispose of 
the networks (which includes operation and investment decision powers). Th e 
current network owners would lose every aspect of their ability to deal with the 
networks as their own (apart, obviously, from selling it), and in particular the 
ability to decide (at least jointly with others) about network investment. Th e TSO 
can order the network owners to do everything it requires to operate the grid 
including the maintenance of “their” grid. Th e network owners are downgraded 
to mere and exchangeable providers of service on their own grids, which does 
not give them any economically benefi cial use of their property but only out of 
their economic activity as service provider.
Th e loss of use and control of the networks are the decisive factors for the 
determination of the value of the network property. Th e right to use property for 
one’s own purposes, which is the fundamental function of property (apart from 
serving the general interest (social function)), would be converted to a mere right 
to receive a mere monetary consideration in return for putting property at the 
disposal of the ISO, which is in any event determined by the regulator.1203 Th e 
regulated nature of this return further contributes to the almost complete 
devaluation of the network assets.
In the current context, there would not even be a fair conversion to a mere 
monetary consideration, which might in itself (if fair) be considered to be a 
suffi  cient (sensible) alternative use of the networks. Th ere would also be a 
deprivation of the last major right, i.e. to decide what to do with one’s property, 
or what not to do with it. Th is “negative” right is part of the right to property and 
in this context means the “negative” freedom not to invest.
1203 Th e owners charge the operator for the services they have rendered on the basis of charging 
methodology approved by the sector regulator OFGEM; a specifi c network lease or rental fee is 
not charged, see Special (Licence) Condition J2, which is based on Schedule 10 of the SO/TO 
Code as amended. In greater detail on the relationship between the transmission owners and 
the system operator, see Th e Brattle Group, n. 1194, pp. 55 et seq.
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It can also not be argued that the preservation of the value of the network 
property constitutes a sensible alternative use of the network property. Th is is 
because assuming that the book value of the network assets remained on the 
balance sheet of the legal network owners, their trading value is lost for the 
reasons set out above; if, for accountancy reasons, the assets appeared in the 
balance sheet of NGET, this would be a further indication that the introduction 
of this further unbundling measure should be considered as a deprivation as 
opposed to a regulation of property.1204
c. Margin of appreciation and fair balance of further unbundling
As outlined above, the legislative measures just discussed have to be justifi ed by 
the general interest objectives pursued by the UK legislature and to pass the fair 
balance test of the ECtHR, i.e. to be proportionate.
As regards the fi rst, i.e. the general interest justifi cation of a state measure, it 
needs to be recalled, is interpreted such that a state intervention is only declared 
illegal in cases where the State has evidently overstepped its wide margin of 
appreciation with respect to whether a general interest justifi es the interfering 
state measure, or in other words if the motives of the state for pursuing certain 
measures are manifestly unreasonable.1205
With respect to the fair balance or proportionality test, it is submitted and has 
also already been discussed in some detail in Part 1 Chapter 2 (proportionality of 
competition law enforcement) and Part 2 Chapter 4 (on Germany), that as part of 
the balancing of the general with the private interest of those targeted by the state 
measure, a social cost and benefi t analysis would contribute to a comprehensive 
balancing by inquiring from an economic point of view whether, on balance, the 
measure in question benefi ts or costs society. Such an analysis would also have to 
be unambiguously positive in order to justify such a measure. Th is is because the 
legislature must endeavour to obtain a thorough knowledge of the consequences 
of the measures it is intending to implement, which in this context also means 
that it has to inform itself thoroughly about the costs and benefi ts of the measure 
envisaged for society. Only if such an analysis is unambiguously positive can the 
legislator be confi dent that the envisaged interference with private interests is in 
1204 Th e issue of in whose balance sheet the assets would appear bears some resemblance to the 
Dutch analysis, see infra chapter 6 on the Nehterlands.
1205 Th e degree of reasonableness of the general interest becomes relevant when weighed against 
the private interests of the complainant in order to fi nd out whether a fair balance has been 
struck between the general interest and the private interest, or, in other words, whether the 
measures taken are proportionate to the aims pursued.
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fair balance or proportionate to the objectives of general interests it is aiming to 
achieve.1206
Margin of appreciation
Starting with the margin of appreciation, there is no cause for doubt that in 
principle the general interest argument for introducing further unbundling 
legislation includes legitimate aims. Th e Commission pursues the establishment 
and promotion of an internal market for energy supply (greater market 
integration), the promotion and protection of competition in energy supply 
throughout the EU and the safeguarding of supply security and reliability; in 
order to achieve all these aims, and to achieve them for the benefi t of the consumer, 
suffi  cient investment in energy transmission and interconnection network 
capacity is considered a sine qua non condition by the Commission.1207 All of 
these are also aims pursued (and largely accomplished) by the UK, partly as a 
result of being a member of the European Union; Union-wide competition and 
the creation of an internal market are part of the UK’s general interest as a result 
of implementing EC law through the ECA 1972.
Further unbundling of the energy supply undertakings aims at safeguarding the 
structural independence of the network operations and related thereto increasing 
the transparency of the energy markets, which is considered to contribute to the 
achievement of the above objectives of the general interest.
Fair balance or proportionality test
For the two legislative measures discussed above not to be in breach of the 
fundamental right to property according to Article 1 of the First Protocol of the 
ECHR, they need to strike a fair balance between the State’s objectives in the 
general interest and the private interests of the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings which are subject to these two measures.1208
1206 If there are strong indicators that show that any further state measure is not likely to deliver 
any signifi cant additional benefi t, this would already aff ect the suitability of the measure to 
achieve the general interest objectives. It is thus argued here that if this was the case further 
impairment of private fundamental rights would indeed have to be considered to be out of fair 
balance or disproportionate.
1207 See Part 1 Chapter 1. See also the Recitals (motives) of the 2003 Energy Directives and of the 
proposals of the European Commission of 19 September 2007, n. 15; in the context of the latter, 
see their Explanatory Memorandum.
1208 See for details of the proportionality test, Part 1 Chapter 2, which is in principle also applicable 
here. Some issues are nevertheless expanded upon in the specifi c context of the GB energy 
sector.
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Th e measures have to be suitable to achieve the general interest aims. On the face 
of it, both measures assist in achieving the objectives laid out before, by 
disintegrating the natural monopoly of electricity transmission or at least 
separating it more thoroughly in order to achieve greater independence of the 
natural monopoly and thus equal competition conditions for everyone 
participating in the market. However, it has been observed that separating the 
networks from electricity generation implies that the coordination of investment 
decisions of power plants and networks is no longer carried out as an internal 
process within one fi rm (i.e. “fi rm-internal”). Instead, external market 
coordination would have to take over, which might lead to non-optimal 
investment, in particular in electricity generation but also as regards the energy 
networks.1209 Further, with respect to network investment, although it is true 
that conferring upon ISOs investment decision authority would address concerns 
that a TO with generation ownership could under-invest to block competition1210 
and help to limit the asymmetry of information that would otherwise tend to 
favour the TO and its affi  liates over other market participants, there is, however, 
also the potential for ineffi  cient distortions. For instance, network investments 
can oft en reduce operating costs. But if the ISO is incentivized to reduce its 
operating costs it might do so by requiring ineffi  ciently high levels of investment 
by the TO. Minimising these distortions would require careful work in designing 
the ISO/TO interface and regulatory oversight1211, which would require high 
regulatory involvement and expertise. Th us, there seems to be no additional 
benefi t to what is already in place in Scotland.1212
Further, some observations made by SERIS with respect to gas liberalization in 
the UK are also relevant here and support the previous observations made for 
electricity.1213
1209 See also the more detailed discussion of Brunekreeft ’s social cost benefi t analysis infra in the 
context of the actual balancing of the interests concerned.
1210 So-called strategic investment withholding, which has already been explained in Part 1.
1211 In this respect, see the Th e Brattle Group, n. 191, p. 3.
1212 As regards the changes envisaged for the Scottish ISO arrangements, see Th e Brattle Group, n. 
1194, pp. 72–3. Th e Brattle Group, ‘Regulating unbundled TSOs: rules, incentives or an ISO?’, 
November 2007, on p. 20 also identifi es the high concentration of Scottish generation as 
exacerbating any possible incentives for distortion of investment decisions, which many regard 
as inherent in the Scottish ISO arrangements.
1213 What follows is a brief summary of SERIS fi ndings, also in response to the UK regulator 
OFGEM’s criticism of its initial fi ndings, which are relevant in the current context thereby 
expanding on the observations made in Part 1 Chapter 2 on the UK unbundling experience. 
See in greater detail SERIS, nn. 38, 1048 and ‘A Reply to OFGEM’s criticism of SERIS’s Briefi ng 
Paper’, Sheffi  eld, June 2006. What SERIS does is not so much to provide a social cost and 
benefi t analysis of the eff ects of unbundling but rather to assess the working of the UK gas 
market aft er what it calls internal unbundling (to include legal unbundling within a corporate 
group) had been introduced and enforced strictly.
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Following these observations, it appears that the widespread claim1214 that the 
UK market experience of full ownership unbundling suggests that it signifi cantly 
changes the behaviour of the energy transport undertaking in that a fully 
unbundled TSO will focus on optimizing the use of its network, seems not to be 
true, at least not for the UK gas sector; indicators actually show the contrary.
With respect to the degree of capacity utilization, access arrangements and gas 
balancing, no relationship between ownership unbundling and ‘optimization’ 
could be observed. Improvements occurred could be attributed to other factors 
such as the mandatory release of gas, the introduction of the Network Code, and 
regulatory intervention.
As regards suppliers’ transportation costs and adequate levels of capital 
investment, there was some evidence to suggest that these actually deteriorated 
following the ownership changes.1215 With respect to gas infrastructure, there is 
thus no empirical support from the UK for the Commission’s claim that 
ownership unbundling has or will result in more infrastructure investment. 
What is more, the signifi cance of the evidence to the contrary increases if one 
takes into account that while investment was falling during the 1990s, UK gas 
demand was rising by almost 25%.1216
It can thus be concluded that with respect to full national gas network ownership 
unbundling, the empirical evidence does not support any assertion that the 
behaviour of the transport undertaking had signifi cantly changed or that a fully 
unbundled gas TSO would focus on optimizing the use of its network.
Moreover, it seems that legal unbundling had already suffi  ced to cure the failure 
to provide for neutrality between British Gas’ trading and transportation 
interests.1217
1214 Which underlies one of the most important motives of the Commission for the introduction 
of ownership unbundling or a “deep” ISO, i.e. the network investment motive.
1215 Th e average annual level of investment in the system falls markedly. Further, without the 
intervention of the UK Health & Safety Executive, the fall in gas infrastructure investment 
between 1996 and 2005 would have been considerably greater. See further, SERIS, n. 1213.
1216 SERIS, n. 1048, p. 8.
1217 According to SERIS, n. 1213, during the years 1994–1996, which were the years when British 
Gas’ transportation and supply business were only legally unbundled, there was no signifi cant 
obstruction to network access and competition in gas supply fl ourished. British Gas had 
indeed abused its position to obstruct third party access but these abuses were resolved by 
internal unbundling and not only aft er voluntary ownership unbundling of British Gas.
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It can thus be established that the eventual success of the UK’s gas supply market 
liberalization1218 was solely based on legal unbundling. It appears that the 
indicators used to assess the optimization of the UK gas network, which also 
included access arrangements, and thus one of the main reasons for the 
functioning of the UK gas market, turned out to be positive mainly as a result of 
regulatory intervention. As soon as it became clear that internal unbundling was 
suffi  cient to safeguard non-discriminatory access and competition in gas supplies, 
no further demand for ownership unbundling was voiced.1219
Consequently, as a result of serious problems of either underinvestment or at 
least attempts to ‘game’ the regulatory system1220, improvement of network 
optimization in the UK aft er ownership unbundling has in fact not taken place. 
Th ere has not been any empirical evidence put forward to show that full 
ownership unbundling in the UK gas market has resulted in signifi cant changes 
in the behaviour of the transport undertaking or that a fully unbundled 
Transportation System Operator will focus on optimizing the use of its network. 
On the contrary, a gas release programme and the introduction of a Network 
Code appear to have been more conducive to achieving gas market 
liberalization.
Although there are signifi cant diff erences in sector characteristics (non-
storability and non-controllability of the fl ow of electricity as opposed to (limited 
or full) storability of gas (in gas storages along the pipelines or by way of line-
pack in the pipelines) and the controllability of its fl ow), the apparent lack of 
investment in the ownership-unbundled UK gas sector should at least prompt an 
adequate social cost and benefi t analysis of any proposed further unbundling 
measures in Scotland, which must also include a review of ownership unbundling 
1218 As a consequence of massive entry of new gas supply, which was independent from British Gas, 
onto the competitive sector (at the time only non-domestic customers) of the market at the 
beginning of 1994, the gas price for industrial customers plummeted, which, inter alia, led the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1998 to conclude that the introduction of competition 
into the UK gas supply market “led to changes in the structure of prices, in real pre-tax gas 
prices in parallel with rising volumes delivered. Consumer choice, including the range of 
services on off er, has expanded. Th ese trends suggest that gas is being produced, transported 
and delivered more effi  ciently and these effi  ciency improvements are fl owing directly to end-
users.” Reference in SERIS, n. 1213.
1219 SERIS (June 2006), n. 1213, reply, p. 3. No such demand has been made since 1993, well before 
British Gas decided to break itself up voluntarily. See n. 1048 as regards the attempts of OFGEM 
and the Competition Commission to enforce ownership unbundling of British Gas between 
1992 and 1993.
1220 By overestimating investment requirements prior to the setting of the price control both before 
and aft er full ownership unbundling. In this regard, see SERIS (June 2006), n. 1213, referring 
to corresponding reports by OFGEM and the UK Health & Safety Executive.
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of electricity transmission in England and Wales comparable to the review which 
was carried out for the UK gas sector.1221
What should be noted at this stage is that any need for additional regulatory 
measures to trigger or incentivize investment should be regarded as further 
undermining the Commission’s claims that ownership unbundling would 
actually lead to less regulation and not more and thus question the suitability of 
ownership unbundling itself.1222 At least for the UK, it seems that post-ownership 
unbundling the demands on the regulatory regime have increased signifi cantly.1223 
Th is is to some extent not immediately obvious because regulatory costs in the 
form of, for instance, compliance with rather lengthy and detailed licence 
documentation, which has necessitated the employment of specialized personnel, 
have been shift ed from the regulator to the industry. Th is refutes the claim that 
the cost of regulation of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings were 
higher than those of regulating the unbundled network undertakings alone.
What should also be borne in mind is that as a result of ownership unbundling, 
vertical integration or concentration of energy production and supply seems to 
entail increasingly detrimental eff ects on energy prices1224, which foils the 
primary aim of further unbundling measures, i.e. the introduction of more 
competition into energy supply for the benefi t of consumers. Th is has been the 
experience in New Zealand. Vertical concentration of energy production and 
supply and the increase in energy prices are also highlighted in the Commission’s 
sector inquiry1225, which confi rms the consolidation of the energy markets which 
also suff er from a lack of new market entry.
For New Zealand, it has been shown that as a result of the far reaching unbundling 
requirements for electricity transmission and distribution1226, the development 
of competition failed and household consumer prices increased, which has lead 
to a gradual change in policy away from an ownership unbundled energy industry 
1221 See SERIS, n. 1213.
1222 SERIS, n. 1213, also observes that the “regulation of private sector capital investment in gas 
pipeline industries presents some very serious problems of an ‘agent/principal’ nature which 
seriously challenge the […] statement […] that, ‘[f]ull ownership unbundling would reduce the 
need for increasingly burdensome regulation as the regulatory oversight could be less 
detailed.’.”
1223 An observation which underlines the fi ndings made in this respect in Part 1 Chapter 2.
1224 See in this respect already Th omas, n. 317, and accompanying text.
1225 See Introduction.
1226 New Zealand has forced ownership unbundling of the transmission and distribution networks 
onto its energy sector.
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structure with ex-ante sector regulation being tightened.1227 Th is was the result 
of the fact that aft er the separation of the retail businesses from the distribution 
networks, most of these businesses became vertically integrated in the fi ve large 
generators. Retail competition stopped as soon as vertical integration by 
generators was consolidated in 2001. Th is process quickly foreclosed any 
subsequent retail entry to the market.
Growing vertical integration can also be observed in the UK electricity sector. 
Aft er separation of generation and retail from transmission and subsequent 
privatization in 1990, the UK electricity industry experienced a growing tide of 
electricity generation companies integrating with retail and vice versa.1228 Th e 
UK energy industry has also been experiencing horizontal integration between 
gas and electricity supply undertakings. With the full opening of the energy 
supply (retail) market electricity supply undertakings have been moving into the 
gas retail business and British Gas has been targeting electricity customers. 
Further, the growing importance of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants, 
which accounted for 43% of power generation in Britain in 2002, has intensifi ed 
the linkages between gas and electricity at generation level.1229
What has also to be borne in mind when assessing the suitability of further 
unbundling measures is that the oft en cited cross-subsidies from stable network 
income to the volatile supply business, which are supposed to disturb the 
so-called level playing fi eld between energy market participants, simply do not 
take place if there is eff ective regulation in place, which has never been disputed 
to be the case in the UK.1230
1227 On the New Zealand experience, see only Nillesen, P., Pollitt, M., Sitompoel, R., 
‘Eigendomssplitsing in Nieuw Zealand’, ESB of 20 October 2006, pp. 533–5, and n. 319. See in 
greater detail also Brunekreeft /Ehlers, n. 38, also as regards the problems involved in rolling 
back ownership unbundling there. One consequence of the ownership unbundling of the 
network companies from the commercial electricity supply (generation & retail) businesses in 
New Zealand was that household customer prices increased, see Brunekreeft /van Damme, n. 
38, pp. 21–2, relying on observations made in G Brunekreeft , Regulation and Competition 
Policy in the Electricity Market – Economic Analysis and German Experience, 2003, ch. 10. 
Another reason why this “experiment” failed was that this structure seems to block the way 
forward with respect to the promotion of distributed generation to counterbalance the 
projected decrease in gas availability.
1228 See NERA Economic Consultants, ‘Consolidation in the EU Electricity Sector’, Report for the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Aff airs, London, 30 April 2003, p. 155, with detailed examples. 
See also sceptical in this regard, Th omas, n. 1105, who considers the imperfect working of the 
UK energy wholesale markets against this background.
1229 See NERA, ibid., p. 156, with detailed examples.
1230 If there is eff ective regulation, cross-subsidization does not take place and is unlikely to take 
place in the future. Th is has been established, at least for the Netherlands, by the Dutch 
competition authority NMa in May 2007, see n. 156. With respect to the doubtful relevance of 
cross-subsidies in electricity sector regulation, see Willems/Ehlers, n. 2.
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By way of preliminary summary, it can be said that the two measures discussed 
seem not to have any eff ect of signifi cance or are even detrimental for achieving 
those general interest objectives, which are mainly targeted at remedying the 
claimed defi ciencies of vertical integration. Consequently, there is considerable 
doubt as to whether further unbundling measures in the UK would be suitable 
for achieving the general interest goals of increased competition and supply 
security for the benefi t of the consumers.
Turning to the issue of proportionality or weighing or balancing the general with 
the private interest, economic analysis becomes relevant here: More general 
observations with respect to the benefi ts of further unbundling of electricity 
transmission have very recently been made in the fi rst comprehensive social cost 
and benefi t analysis (SCBA)1231 of ownership unbundling of electricity 
transmission in Germany, the principal arguments and insights of which are 
however also applicable to the energy markets of other European Member States 
and thus also to the UK.1232 Th e main results have already been outlined in Part 
1 Chapter 2 in the context of the analysis of the proportionality of competition 
law enforced divestiture of energy networks. In the context given, however, it is 
worthwhile to go into greater detail:
Th e SCBA analyses three groups of eff ects.1233 First, it analyses the arguments 
that unbundling increases competition.1234 To the extent that unbundling 
triggers more or faster investment in generation capacity, an increase of total 
available capacity and more intense competition would be the result. If total 
generation capacity is short, unbundling can have quite substantial price eff ects, 
whereas if capacity turns out to be adequate, the eff ects seem to be small, as one 
would expect for GB.
Secondly, the SCBA analyses the arguments that unbundling would lead to the 
building of new interconnector capacity. As explained above the strategic 
investment withholding argument claims that vertically integrated utilities have 
insuffi  cient incentives to invest in interconnector capacity in order to hold off  
1231 To quantify the step from the status quo in Germany of legal and operational unbundling to 
ownership unbundling.
1232 See Brunekreeft , n. 9. Th e following is a very brief summary of this social cost and benefi t 
analysis.
1233 See for detailed discussions on the pro’s and con’s of ownership unbundling, Brunekreeft , 
ibid.; Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38; Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37; Pollitt, EPRG 0714, n. 37.
1234 Th is eff ect may be direct by intensifying the competition among existing players, or indirect, 
by facilitating more or faster entry of third parties. More competition can result in lower prices 
and thereby benefi t consumers, and can also increase cost pressure and thereby increase sector 
productivity.
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competition from abroad.1235 Reversing the argument, unbundling would 
improve the incentives to build interconnector capacity. It is hard, however, to 
predict how much new interconnector capacity is needed and to calculate how 
much of this new capacity can be contributed to unbundling. Th e eff ects of new 
interconnector capacity on competition diff er depending on whether they are 
predominantly used for imports or exports. Further, it should be noted that even 
if all the incentives to invest are good actual investment may still be impeded by 
legal obstacles such as delayed building permissions. Th e SCBA thus suggests 
that the eff ect of unbundling on interconnector capacity may actually be very 
small.
Th irdly, the SCBA analyses how unbundling aff ects the cost of investment. 
Additional generation and interconnector capacity in an unbundled environment, 
notwithstanding the positive eff ects on competition and trade, will imply higher 
costs of capital. Also, separating the networks from electricity generation 
necessarily implies that the coordination of investment decisions of power plants 
and network is no longer fi rm-internal.1236 Instead, external market coordination 
should take over. Th is can lead to non-optimal investment. In particular, power 
plants may be built at the “wrong” location, or, the network may be “oversized”, 
an eff ect already observed above where the suitability of further unbundling is 
discussed. A pricing or contractual mechanism will be required, which 
appropriately signals the investment needs. Such a mechanism, however, requires 
increased regulation and regulatory oversight.
According to this SCBA, the net weighted eff ect for society (i.e. the balance of 
social cost and benefi t)1237 is likely to be positive overall, but small.1238 Available 
generation capacity and the eff ects of unbundling on that capacity make all the 
diff erence. If, as is still the case in the UK, adequate generation capacity is 
assumed, so that investment will not be needed, the positive eff ects become 
negligible.
1235 Th e “stratetic investment withholding” argument has, however, its limitations. Vertically 
integrated utilities may be long or short in electricity generation compared to electricity supply 
or retail. Short means that on balance the fi rm may have an interest to increase interconnector 
capacity in order to increase the purchase of electricity. Long means that vertically integrated 
utilities with excess generation capacity (and thus low variable costs) will want to export their 
electricity, for which they need interconnector capacity. See Brunekreeft , n. 130.
1236 See already supra when discussing the suitability of further unbundling measures.
1237 Th e SCBA calculates the eff ect on the weighted social welfare (social-cost-benefi t). Weighting 
means that the producers’ interests are given slightly less weight to than consumers’ interests, 
which follows the Commission’s and national approaches to energy supply sector restructuring 
for the benefi t of consumers. See in this regard already nn. 114 and 305.
1238 Much depends on the relative weight of the interests of consumers and producers (shareholders). 
With equal weighing the net-eff ect would be slightly negative.
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Th us, it appears that the debate on ownership unbundling is not based on 
economic facts. From a legal point of view, however, the enforcement of further 
unbundling measures in GB would appear disproportionate to the encroachment 
such measures will have on private property rights.
Another important issue to consider when assessing whether a fair balance is 
struck by further unbundling measures, is the question of the foreseeability of 
such a legislative measure, or in other words whether further unbundling can be 
regarded as a normal economic risk, which was to be legitimately expected by the 
energy supply undertakings aff ected. In 1989, when the energy supply 
undertakings were privatized, ownership unbundling and thus the deprivation 
of their property was not foreseeable for the new private legal owners of the 
electricity transmission networks because in England and Wales, ownership 
unbundling was implemented right from the beginning.1239
Should one come to agree with the proportionality of further unbundling 
measures in GB contrary to the conclusions drawn here, then compensation 
would in principle have to be provided for by law and paid to the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings concerned in Scotland for their (de facto) 
expropriation as a result of further unbundling measures.1240 Such compensation 
would have to be paid by the receiving parties because they are benefi ting directly 
from the expropriations, i.e. the transfer of property to them.1241 Th e transfer of 
the networks is to be treated in a similar way to a private transaction – one 
exception being that because of the general interest, one might come to the 
conclusion that the full market value should not be reimbursed.1242 However, 
because in the current context, domestic courts cannot off er a higher level of 
protection because they cannot invalidate parliamentary legislation, which is the 
reason why the ECHR is applied directly here, it can be argued, also against the 
background that the further unbundling will apply not to the whole industry but 
only the Scottish undertakings, that they would have to be compensated at no 
1239 More generally on this issue, see the ECtHR in re Fredin, n. 1152.
1240 As regards the question of who is ultimately responsible for paying compensation, i.e. the 
Member State implementing an EC Directive or the European Union, see supra in this chapter 
and chapter 7 on the European Union (section II).
1241 It has been established supra that a deprivation of property in the form of a formal expropriation 
does not necessarily have to result in a transfer being made to the State but can also be for the 
benefi t of third parties.
1242 An expropriation without compensation corresponding to the market value can normally be 
regarded as disproportionate, see Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, p. 270. Even when a “mere” regulation 
of ownership is at stake, compensation might have to be paid in exceptional circumstances; in 
this respect, see the discussion refl ected in the decision of the BVerfG in re Denkmalschutz, n. 
551.
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less than market value.1243 Th ey should receive the diff erence between, on the 
one hand, the sum received for the transfer of the network property (in the case 
of ownership unbundling) or of the further competences surrendered (in the case 
of the enforcement of stricter independent system operation) and, on the other, 
their theoretic market value (were networks freely tradable).1244 Th is is because 
the market for electricity transmission networks is a buyer’s market, i.e. not many 
buyers are probably willing and capable of buying network assets, so that buyers 
might be able to dictate the price unless it is determined by an independent and 
neutral institution.
2. NATIONAL NETWORK OPERATOR TO ENGAGE IN 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION OR ENERGY SUPPLY?
NGET and NGG are currently prevented by licence condition from being part of 
a vertically integrated group of energy supply companies which pursues energy 
production, transportation and supply in the form of retail. As this is part of their 
licence conditions for competition policy reasons and not explicitly prescribed by 
law, National Grid Group might want to have these licence conditions reversed in 
order to obtain a licence to pursue energy production and/or supply.
A claim based on common law, which is not precluded by the HRA 19981245, 
against OFGEM’s likely refusal to lift  the licence conditions and to grant another 
licence to another legal entity within National Grid Group, is, however, unlikely 
to be successful. Th e setting up and pursuing of an economic activity or trade 
and the exercise of a profession or occupation of one’s own choice are protected 
by the common law, mainly by the freedom of contract.1246 However, this 
freedom is subject to the doctrine of restraint of trade, which is a common law 
doctrine relating to the enforceability of contractual restrictions on freedom of 
1243 Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 270–71, infer this from Lithgow, n. 1179, no. 122, where the ECtHR 
distinguishes compensation for whole industries from other cases and requires compensation 
to be reasonably related to the value of the property taken.
1244 In this respect see also chapter 7 on the European Union.
1245 Th e Act itself does not provide for protection because, as has been explained supra, the ECHR 
does not include the fundamental freedom of economic activity or freedom to pursue an 
occupation or business of one’s own choice, which would cover any endeavours to take up an 
activity which has not previously been pursued.
1246 Th e freedom of contract is the right to choose one’s contracting parties and to trade with them 
on any terms and conditions one sees fi t. Negatively understood, freedom of contract is 
freedom from government interference and from imposed value judgments of fairness. For the 
notion of freedom of contract, see Sir George Jessel MR in Printing & Numerical v Sampson, 
(1875) L.R. 19 Eq. (Law Report Equity Cases) 462, 465.
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conduct of business.1247 Th e doctrine in its modern form is set out in Nordenfelt 
where it says that “[t]he public have an interest in every person’s carrying on his 
trade freely: so has the individual. All interference with individual liberty of 
action in trading, and all restraints of trade themselves […] are contrary to public 
policy, and therefore void. Th is is the general rule. But there are exceptions: 
restraint of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be 
justifi ed […] if the restriction is reasonable – reasonable, that is, in reference to 
the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests 
of the public […].”1248
From this, a two-limb reasonableness test can be deduced according to which the 
free choice and exercise of economic activity can be restricted where the 
restriction is reasonable in the interests of the parties and reasonable in the 
interests of the public. Th e underlying public purpose of this doctrine is the 
protection of the individual’s right to economic activity, which can only be 
restrained if the impact of the restraint on the party concerned is fair and if 
economic development is not inhibited (principles of fairness and economic 
development).
Th e licence granted by OFGEM is a regulatory contract between OFGEM and 
NGET and NGG to which the licence conditions apply. Th ese licence conditions 
and thus also the conditions in question here are a restraint of NGET’s and NGG’s 
and consequently of National Grid Group’s freedom of contract and freedom to 
trade. With the licence conditions, OFGEM regulates the monopolists in GB-wide 
gas transmission and electricity transmission network operation, and thus the 
modalities of economic activity and the exercise of an occupation, which includes 
the prohibition on the National Grid Group pursuing energy supply activities 
other than energy network operations. Th is is an objective restriction of the free 
choice of an occupation.1249 Th is restriction must thus be reasonable or fair to 
1247 Instructive in this respect is P Goulding (of Blackstone Chambers), ‘All Bets are off  – Th e 
Future of Garden Leave aft er William Hill v Tucker’, paper delivered to the Industrial Law 
Society on 14 April 1999. Th e formation of this doctrine reaches as far back as Mitchel v 
Reynolds, (1711) 24 English Reports (E.R.) 347, and Printing and Numerical v Sampson, ibid. 
Th e doctrine has played an important part in the development of the common law of 
employment and is mainly applied to employment cases such as post-termination restrictive 
covenants and restrictions on competition in contracts for the sale of businesses.
1248 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd., (1894) Appeal Cases (A.C.) 535, 
565. Th e right not to be unjustly excluded from the exercise of a trade or profession has been 
recognised, for example, in Nagle v Feilden, (1966) 2 Queen’s Bench Division Law Reports 
(Q.B.) 633.
1249 Permission to operate as an energy producer or energy supplier does not depend on any 
personal conditions a producer or supplier must fulfi l but rather on an objective criterion, 
which is that someone who owns or operates an energy network is not allowed to pursue any 
other occupation within the energy supply chain.
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National Grid, and reasonable from an economic development or public policy 
perspective.
It does not, however, concern the choice of the subject’s initial occupation but is 
an objective restriction to pursue an additional second economic activity, i.e. a 
network operator either wants to become active in competitive up- and 
downstream energy supply activities, or someone active in competitive up- and 
downstream activities as energy producer or supplier wants to become a network 
operator. Consequently, such a restriction is easier to justify.
For National Grid being the party of the contract with OFGEM which is subject 
to the licence condition, it was clear (from the acquisition of Transco which was 
eff ected in the course of merging with the Lattice Group) that, as national energy 
transmission system operator and the owner of substantial parts of the energy 
transmission networks, it would only be allowed to assume (and retain) such a 
position if it was to accept these conditions.1250 Th us, no legitimate expectations 
could arise, because NGET and NGG were aware that they would not be able to 
pursue another additional activity within the energy supply chain.
On the other hand, the competitive working of the energy supply markets is in 
the predominant general interest of market economies, which can provide a 
justifi cation for preventing threats to the working of competitive markets from 
arising as can be inferred from, for instance, merger regulation and the special 
responsibility of dominant market participants towards the maintenance of 
competition in the market.1251
National Grid, which holds the national energy transportation monopolies, 
could, as dominant player in the market for energy transportation, participate in 
competition in related markets which depend on the services of National Grid. 
Albeit this does not per se mean that National Grid would abuse its dominant 
position, in this respect there is at least a potential risk of this happening. As the 
1250 As regards this merger, see already supra. In the context of the merger, in 2002, OFGEM 
modifi ed NGET’s (NGC at the time) and NGG’s (Transco at the time) licences, see OFGEM, 
Regulatory issues arising from the merger of National Grid Group plc and Lattice Group plc to 
create National Grid Transco plc, Decision document, September 2002. Th e modifi ed licence 
conditions ensured that, inter alia, none of NGC, Transco nor any of their affi  liated or related 
undertakings can be involved in the purchase or sale of electricity, other than with the consent 
of OFGEM or, as permitted by their respective licences for system balancing purposes. More 
discussion of these licence conditions can also be found supra at n. 1062 and accompanying 
text.
1251 Once this has happened, however, as is the case with the undertakings at issue here, the special 
responsibility such a vertically integrated monopoly entails need to be enforced, which does 
not, however, mean that it is per se anticompetitive. In this respect, see also Part 1 Chapter 2.
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prevention of vertical integration occurring is a less intrusive form of interference 
(because the vertical integration has not occurred yet), it can be justifi ed in order 
to safeguard the functioning of competitive markets for energy supply in GB. 
From the perspective of economic development and public policy, in particular 
within an industry of such strategic importance as energy supply, the upholding 
of such licence conditions by OFGEM as the sector-specifi c competition authority 
would be justifi ed.
VI. ARTICLE 56 EC
Should the UK introduce further unbundling measures without being required to 
do so by a lawful EC Directive (or by lawful parts thereof)1252, then it might run 
into confl ict with two EC fundamental freedoms, the free movement of capital 
according to Article 56 EC and the freedom of establishment according to Article 
43 et seq. EC.1253 Th is might be the case because the shares of Scottish Power plc. 
are wholly owned by the Spanish energy group Iberdrola.1254
1252 See also n. 1023. In the case where UK legislation is based on lawful EC Directives or parts 
thereof (which can be upheld in isolation should some parts, e.g. the prescription of complete 
ownership unbundling as one option, of a Directive turn out to be unlawful, see in this respect 
also the text accompanying n. 557), these Directives (or parts thereof) as secondary law are in 
accordance with primary EC law and thus also with the EC fundamental freedoms, all of 
which is made applicable in the UK by way of the ECA 1972 and would thus have to be obeyed 
by the UK. Th e implementation of the Directives would, however, still have to be checked to 
ensure they are in accordance with the HRA 1998, see supra.
1253 With regard to the question of the relationship between these two EC freedoms, see already n. 
571. See also at the end of n. 1254. As has already been said there, in the context under 
discussion, only the restrictions in the context of the free movement of capital are are subject 
to analysis here; thus the freedom of establishment will not be further assessed here.
1254 Only legislation which deprives Scottish Power of its property rights is dealt with here. 
Legislation depriving Scottish and Southern Energy plc. is not dealt with here because its 
ownership is dispersed and there does not seem to be any controlling share held by non-UK 
shareholders. From the viewpoint of the EC fundamental freedoms, only cross-border 
activities are protected, not purely domestic discriminatory activity. See in greater detail and 
with further references, Ress/Ukrow in Grabitz/Hilf, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Bd. 
II, Article 56 EGV, no. 39. Should the UK introduce sector-wide legislation (as opposed to 
individual competition law enforcement such as currently enforced in NGET’s and NGG’s 
transmission licences, see supra) prescribing that (legal) persons holding energy production or 
supply licences are not allowed to hold energy transmission licences (or vice versa) (not even 
when the holder of the other type of licence is a part of the same group of related or affi  liated 
undertakings), then in theory, questions would arise in the context of fundamental freedoms 
such as the lawfulness of potential obstacles to the free movement of capital or the freedom of 
establishment. In practice, however, this does not play a role and is therefore not dealt with 
here, because GB only has one national energy transmission system operator, National Grid, 
which is already restricted by the licence conditions of its subsidiaries NGET and NGG. 
Furthermore, issues relating to non-EU countries, which might arise here or in the context of 
EC law evaluation, are also not dealt with here. With respect to the applicability of the two 
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Th e UK might invoke the improvement of competition in its energy markets in 
order to achieve energy supply security in the long-term as public security reason 
according to Article 58(1)(b) EC for depriving the Scottish electricity supply 
undertakings of their property. Further, the UK might want to achieve greater 
market transparency in order to enhance consumer protection through greater 
market transparency and the improvement of the competition in the markets in 
order to achieve greater environmental protection, such as a more eff ective 
emission trading scheme, and easier and non-discriminatory market access of 
renewable energy sources (RES) and combined heat and power (CHP) in order to 
fi ght climate change. It would thus invoke these aims as overriding restrictions 
in the general interest of Article 56 EC to justify further unbundling.
Th e legal analysis made in Part 1 Chapter 3 on Article 56 EC with respect to the 
European Union’s competence to introduce further unbundling measures also 
applies here, with the same results. Further unbundling legislation as discussed 
in this chapter cannot be considered to be a measure that if proportionate would 
legitimately restrict the free movement of capital according to Article 56 EC.
If one does not follow what has just been established, then further unbundling 
measures enforced by the UK must be proportionate, i.e. in order to be justifi ed, 
they must be suitable for securing the claimed overriding objectives in the general 
interest and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain them. With 
respect to the proportionality of further unbundling measures, it is referred to 
the above elaborations on the proportionality of further unbundling measures in 
the context of assessing their fundamental rights impact.
What needs to be considered additionally in the specifi c UK context, however, is 
that the UK still disposes of suffi  cient generation capacity and possesses a largely 
vertically separate and eff ectively regulated energy supply sector, which is 
particularly true for the energy transmission networks and the separately licensed 
interconnectors to Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands. Th us, with respect to 
the issue to energy supply security, it would seem that any further unbundling 
measure would be disproportionate and thus violate the free movement of capital 
according to Article 56 EC.
fundamental freedoms at issue here, the controlling shareholding of Iberdrola in Scottish 
Power is a direct investment and at the same time the establishment of a subsidiary of Iberdrola 
in Scotland. Th us, Articles 56 and 43 EC are both in principle applicable. However, what can 
be inferred from Articles 43(2) and 58(2) EC is that activities relevant in respect of both 
freedoms are covered by the level of protection as laid out in Article 56 EC, only the scope of 
the restrictions of the fundamental freedoms are extended in that lawful restrictions of both 
freedoms are applicable.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Th e UK certainly is one of the pioneers in energy supply market liberalization in 
Europe. Great Britain, which is nowadays characterized by energy supply being 
entirely in private hands, also possesses one of the most extensively unbundled 
energy supply markets in the European Union, with further (transmission 
network) unbundling measures only possible in Scotland. Th ere, two vertically 
integrated electricity supply undertakings, one of which is in the hands of a 
Spanish energy supply undertaking, still exist albeit not operating their electricity 
transmission networks themselves, which is done by a national energy transmission 
network operator.
Th e rather advanced state of Great Britain with respect to energy market 
liberalization was possible for several reasons: in terms of energy supply, the UK 
was a net gas exporter until recently with (still) suffi  cient electricity generation in 
place. Th e electricity supply market was unbundled before privatization, and the 
gas supply market has seen the voluntary divestiture by British Gas. Further, the 
constitutional setting governed by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
with the courts playing a subsidiary role (albeit becoming more robust since the 
coming-into-force of the HRA 1998) certainly contributed signifi cantly to this 
development. In such a setting, licenses for every stage of the energy supply chain 
could become highly eff ective with an almost completely independent and rather 
powerful sector regulator enforcing the licence conditions ever since privatization. 
Such individual licences also enforce legal ownership unbundling of the energy 
transmission networks on the basis of the general competition law powers of the 
regulator (and not on the basis of sector-specifi c legislation).
However, not all that glitters is gold: the current state of the market did not come 
for free; in particular the privatization of British Gas vertically integrated has 
delayed the liberalization process and the evolution of eff ective regulation 
considerably with potentially very high costs for the national economy. Wright 
showed in his analysis of the development of the British gas market that the 
voluntary divestiture by British Gas can actually not be taken as support for the 
claim that the European energy supply markets require further unbundling of 
the energy transmission networks. It actually seems that legal unbundling is 
suffi  cient to achieve the competition and internal market as well as the security 
of supply objectives sought by the European Commission. According to Wright’s 
analysis, the divestiture by British Gas has actually led to deteriorating network 
investment levels. Also of concern are the neglect of energy supply security for 
too long as well as the increasing vertical integration of energy wholesale and 
retail, which threatens to stifl e competition in the energy supply market.
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Th e analysis in this chapter has led to the conclusion that further (electricity 
transmission network) unbundling in Scotland would be disproportionate, in 
particular against the background that there is still suffi  cient generation in place, 
which marginalizes the benefi t of further unbundling measures. Such measures 





Th is chapter deals with the most signifi cant constitutional issues arising in the 
Netherlands as a consequence of the recent implementation of energy distribution 
network unbundling within the state organization. However, some discussion 
will also be necessary as regards electricity transmission networks, which in the 
Netherlands comprise of lines of 110 kilo Volts (kV) and upwards (see Article 
10(1) Elektriciteitswet), which compares to the UK where such lines start above 
132 kV and to Germany where they begin above 110 kV.1255
As the Dutch energy supply networks are traditionally either owned or 
controlled1256 by the Dutch State or its subdivisions (municipalities and 
provinces), the discussion of network-bound energy supply in the Netherlands 
(section II) can be kept rather concise compared to Germany where extensive 
explanation was necessary in order to lay the foundations for the legal analysis of 
further unbundling measures. Because of the structure of the Dutch energy 
supply sector, the Netherlands already largely satisfi es the demands of the original 
Commission proposals of 19 September 2007 for third generation Energy 
Directives.
Th e Netherlands is a decentralized Unitary State as is the United Kingdom.1257 
Th us, section III will focus on the status of municipalities and provinces in 
such a unitary system. An exceptional feature of Dutch constitutional law 
will also be discussed here, and this is the judicial review of Acts of Parliament. 
Th e consequence of this feature is that the hotly debated energy distribution 
1255 See Brunekreeft /Ehlers, n. 38, with further references.
1256 Th e problem where exactly the ownership of the energy networks lies is discussed in the text 
infra.
1257 In contrast to the UK and Germany, the Netherlands are, however, a monistic constitutional 
system whereas Germany and the UK are dualistic constitutional systems. See n. 1342 and 
accompanying text.
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network unbundling legislation1258 will have to comply with the ECHR and EC 
law.1259
Th is legislation required, fi rst, that the operation of all electricity transmission 
networks from 110 kV upwards transfers by operation of the law to the national, 
State-owned electricity transmission system operator TenneT with eff ect from 
1 January 2008. Secondly, the economic “ownership”1260 of energy distribution 
networks must be transferred to the vertically integrated network operation 
undertakings from 1 July 2008. Th irdly, within 2 ½ years from 1 July 2008, i.e. by 
the end of 2010 at the latest, the operation and the economic “ownership” of 
energy networks must be transferred to an undertaking outside the current 
vertically integrated corporate energy supply undertakings whose shares are 
publicly owned by Dutch municipalities and provinces; such a network 
undertaking must also be owned directly or indirectly by these public entities.
 Th us, section IV will briefl y the fundamental rights issues arising in the 
context of the above legislation. Since the ECHR applies directly in the 
Netherlands, only such issues will be elaborated upon, which have not already 
been discussed in the same section of chapter 5 on Great Britain. In this context, 
it is of particular relevance whether the private corporate holding companies 
heading the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings1261, which are 
wholly owned by Dutch municipalities and provinces, are capable of enjoying 
fundamental rights protection under the ECHR.
Section V will apply the conclusions of the previous sections to the further 
unbundling measures introduced in the Netherlands. Section VI will discuss 
whether the splitsingswet1262 poses obstacles to the free movement of capital 
1258 Consisting of the so-called splitsingswet, n. 81, and of the Wet van 1 juli 2004 tot wijziging van 
de Elektriciteitswet 1998 en de Gaswet ter uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 2003/54/EG, (PbEG L 
176), verordening nr. 1228/2003 (PbEG L 176) en richtlijn nr. 2003/55/EG (PbEG L 176), 
alsmede in verband met de aanscherping van het toezicht op het netbeheer (Wijziging 
Elektriciteitswet 1998 en Gaswet in verband met implementatie en aanscherping toezicht 
netbeheer), Stb. 2004, 328, thereaft er “I&I-wet”. As regards the l&I-wet, J Janssen and L 
Hancher in (2004/2005) 1 Utilities Law Review 9 already asled ‘Energy Regulation in the 
Netherlands: Th e Toughest Regime of All?’.
1259 Compliance with the latter when it comes to fundamental freedoms such as the free movement 
of capital in Article 56 EC.
1260 For the defi nition of economic “ownership” (economisch eigendom), see the text following n. 
1297.
1261 Th e issue of formal organizational privatization (i.e. by establishing private (corporate) law 
entities (oft en with a view to substantively privatize them later) as opposed to substantive 
privatization (where (some or all) assets/shares are sold to privatizing sector investors) will 
also be discussed in the text accompanying n. 1268.
1262 See n. 1258.
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which are not in compliance with Article 56 EC; in this context, the interpretation 
of Article 295 EC, which has already been discussed in chapter 3, will also have to 
be taken into account here.
Section VII summarizes the fi ndings of this chapter and concludes.
II. NETWORK-BOUND ENERGY SUPPLY
1. EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE
Public electricity supply in the Netherlands began at the end of the 19th century 
based on the objectives that electricity generation should be free of state 
intervention but nevertheless serve the public interest, that the wholesale market 
should be run by the Dutch provinces, that supply be pursued by the Dutch 
municipalities or provinces and that central government approval would be 
required in special circumstances such as electricity supply by persons other than 
public institutions.1263
As a result, until 1998, the electricity sector was only rudimentarily regulated by 
an Act of Parliament, and the downstream gas sector, i.e. exclusive of gas 
production, was not regulated at all until August 2000.1264 Electricity and gas 
distribution companies were established in the nineteenth century as municipal 
1263 M Roggenkamp, ‘Energy Law in the Netherlands’, in M Roggenkamp, C Redgwell et al. (eds), 
Energy Law in Europe, OUP, 2nd ed., 2007, no. 11.200.
1264 For electricity, the Electriciteitswet 1989, the predecessor of the E-wet 1998, introduced a 
system of government control through central government planning and provided for a system 
of centralized generation of electricity and the planning of generation capacity led by Sep N.V. 
(Samenwerkende electricteits-productiebedrijven) and the setting of electricity tariff s both for 
wholesale and retail by the Minister of Economic Aff airs (except for some special tariff s for 
large industrial customers), see also n. 1267, and V Aarts, ‘Th e Netherlands’, in P Cameron 
(ed.), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation, OUP, 2005, ch. 12.
 For gas, until August 2000 only distribution and minimum gas pricing was regulated by the 
Energy Distribution Act 1997 (revoked in November 2006), which was also valid for electricity 
distribution and supply, and the Natural Gas Prices Act, respectively. Instead, energy policy 
notes or papers, so-called energienotas, and government policy rules, so-called beleidsregels , 
such as referred to in n. 1269, applied to the (electricity and) gas sector, see Roggenkamp, n. 
1263, nos 11.112, 11.132–3. An early policy note of then Minister of Economic Aff airs, De Pous, 
which followed the discovery of the Groningen gas fi eld in 1959, aimed at a close coordination 
between the production and sale of gas, and established the principle that the public supply of 
gas is a state task, see in more detail Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.115. Since 2000, the Dutch 
gas sector is governed by the G-wet (of 22 June 2000), n. 81, which as the fi rst statutory Act 
regulating the gas sector led to major changes in the sector and the position of the gas 
transmission company Gasunie.
 Th e most important amendments to the E-wet and the G-wet, apart from the splitsingwet, was 
the implementation of the 2003 Energy Directives by the I&I-wet, see n. 1258, and the 
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and provincial companies. In the 1970s, were, upon governmental and 
parliamentary initiative, these utilities were horizontally integrated by 
establishing new distribution companies, which supplied gas as well as electricity 
and heat and at times also water. Th is restructuring led to changes in the legal 
form of the distribution companies, which saw the original public law undertaking 
gradually converted into private law corporate entities (limited companies), in 
which the municipalities and provinces held all the shares.1265
Th e organization of energy transmission for the gas sector was infl uenced by the 
discovery of the Groningen fi eld in 1959 which resulted in the joint marketing of 
the gas from this fi eld by the Dutch State and NAM, a joint venture company of 
Shell and ExxonMobile. It was then that the gas transmission undertaking 
Nederlandse Gasunie NV (thereaft er Gasunie) was established, a public private 
partnership, in which the Dutch State held (directly and indirectly) 50% of the 
shares and NAM the other 50%.1266
By contrast, the electricity transmission company Sep NV was established in 
1949 and operated as a public limited company, in which the municipally and 
provincially owned vertically integrated energy supply companies held all the 
shares via the then four national electricity generation companies EPON, EPZ, 
EZH and UNA.1267
As can be seen from this brief account of the development of the Dutch electricity 
and gas supply sector, in particular as regards energy distribution, these sectors 
facilitation of the application of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003, n. 219, and Regulation (EC) 
1775/2005, n. 421. On the I&I-wet, see Janssen/Hancher, n. 1258.
1265 Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.19.
1266 Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.20. Th e organization of the gas production sector is rather 
complicated and for the purposes of this work of lesser relevance. Th e focus here is on the 
transmission of gas aft er landing, its distribution and supply. As regards Gasunie, it was given 
a key role in the gas supply chain because in addition to the requirement that all gas extracted 
in the Netherlands had to be sold to Gasunie, it was also responsible for overall Dutch gas 
supply as well as most gas exports. Consequently, it supplied three classes of consumers: 
foreign consumers, large industrial consumers in the Netherlands and the Dutch distribution 
companies. See in more detail, Roggenkamp, n. 1263, nos 11.123 et seq.
1267 Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.20. Th e national electricity transmission network as a whole was 
operated (at the time at 220/380 kV) by Sep (as were the interconnectors with Germany and 
Belgium) although it owned just 65% of the network with the remaining 35% owned by the 
shareholding electricity generation companies. Th e energy supply companies operated the 
regional networks at 110/150 kV and the distribution networks at up to 50 kV. Sep was also 
responsible for the planning and coordination of electricity generation and its dispatch, and 
pooled the generation costs. Licensed generators (from 5 MW) had to submit their electricity 
to Sep, which acted as pool, and then buy it back from Sep in order to supply energy supply 
undertakings in the area assigned to them. See in more detail, Aarts, n. 1264, nos 12.03–
12.06.
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have gradually been “privatized” in terms of organization (formal or 
organizational privatization), which was originally considered to facilitate any 
later substantive (part) privatization of these energy (distribution) companies by 
way of transferring them to private investors1268, which, however, has not and for 
the energy transmission and distribution networks will also not take place for 
the time being.
From 1995, it was offi  cially recognized that (substantive) privatization would take 
place sooner or later aft er the energy market had been liberalized, which was 
included in the E-wet and the G-wet as a general objective.1269 As a result, 
1268 Privatization in its original meaning means the transfer of state or communal property rights 
to private entities. Th us, privatization in a narrow sense only takes place if an undertaking is 
sold in its entirety and unconditionally (i.e. without contractual means of infl uence) to private 
investors, see P Erdmeier, Die Privatisierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen des Landes Berlin 
seit der Wiedervereinigung, 2000, pp. 20, 21, with further references; see also OECD, Glossary 
of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, 16 Jluy 1993, no. 161 (‘Privatization’), 
pp. 69, 70, with further references. Th is classical defi nition of privatization has been extended 
signifi cantly during recent privatization discussions. Accordingly, the term privatization is 
nowadays oft en also associated with the incorporation of public undertakings in private legal 
forms, i.e. public undertakings are undertakings the majority of whose capital and/or voting 
rights are directly or indirectly owned by public bodies or local authorities. In economic 
theory, the defi nition of privatization is largely based on the so-called property-rights-theory, 
according to which privatization means the transfer of rights of disposal, which have so far 
been in the public sphere, to private entities, leading to the reduction of control by the public 
sector in fi nancial, legal or factual form, and in its most extreme form, to complete surrender. 
See Erdmeier, ibid. Privatization can in principle be enforced with respect to capital or assets 
or with respect to tasks; only the former is relevant in the current context. For further 
discussion of privatization with respect to tasks, see Erdmeier, ibid., pp. 26 et seq., 93 et seq. 
Privatization with respect to capital or assets can take the form of privatization in form only 
(also known as organizational privatization or Organisationsprivatisierung) but only if public 
rights of disposal are in fact being reduced and private law economic structures are created. 
Th e property rights, however, remain in public hands. A formal privatization is thus normally 
not a fi nal privatization in the sense of a permanent loss of rights of disposal but rather 
provisional and reversible. Oft en, such formal privatizations are the fi rst step towards a 
substantive privatization. Accordingly, the transfer of an undertaking from a public into a 
private legal form only creates the necessary prerequisite for a sale to private parties. By 
contrast, in the course of substantive privatizations, rights of disposal of public property are 
entirely or partly transferred to private entities. Substantive privatizations thus do not only 
change the extent but also the bearer of rights of disposal. See in this respect also Erdmeier, 
ibid., p. 25, with further references. Complete substantive privatizations, which transfer public 
assets to the private sector, correspond to the original narrow meaning of the term 
privatization.
1269 See, in greater detail, Roggenkamp, n. 1263, nos 11.22 et seq. At the time this attitude became 
offi  cial policy the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings had already been operating 
as private corporate undertakings, i.e. organizationally privatized, so that the recognition that 
privatization would follow energy market liberalization can only be interpreted as meaning 
substantive privatization. Moreover, for some years now, the Minister of Economic Aff airs 
generally interprets the term privatization as substantive privatization, see the notice (notitie) 
‘Publieke belangen en marktordening’, Tweede Kamer, 1999/2000, 27018, nr. 1). What is more, 
the Dutch government applies this defi nition in particular to energy sector privatization, see 
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privatization “only” required the Minister of Economic Aff airs’ consent to any 
change in ownership of shares in energy companies which led to the substantive 
privatization of most of the electricity generation sector.1270 Th e energy sector 
downstream of production and generation, however, was reorganized in that the 
vertically integrated energy supply companies were required to appoint 
independent network operators in the form of separate limited companies 
responsible for the operation of the energy networks.1271
Th is initially positive attitude towards substantive privatization turned into 
growing scepticism fuelled by the dissatisfying experiences with the liberalization 
and privatization of national railways in the UK and the Netherlands, which has 
led to the desire to keep the energy supply networks in state ownership and retain 
control over their regulated operation. Consequently, the shares in the companies 
operating the gas and (most of the) electricity transmission networks (Gasunie 
and TenneT) were acquired by the State aft er negotiations with the parties 
involved.1272
‘Beleidsregels privatisering energiedistributiebedrijven’, Stc. 2001, nr. 131 / pag. 8, and the 
provisions in the E-wet and the G-wet dealing with privatization issues. Th e ECJ also seems to 
interpret the term privatization as meaning substantive privatization: as is refl ected in the 
strict neutrality of the EC Treaty towards public and private ownership of economic actors and 
the ‘Golden Share’ cases of the ECJ, n. 512, and also the discussion of Article 295 EC in Part 1 
Chapter 3 and, with respect to the strict neutrality of the EC Treaty, see chapter 7 on the 
European Union, in particular n. 1488 and accompanying text), in which the Court seems 
predominantly interested in the relationship between the size of shareholding in a company 
and the degree of infl uence on the company or the rights of disposal resulting from the 
shareholding. In general terms, it can be said that only if the degree of infl uence of a (public or 
private) investor is disproportionately large compared to the size of the shareholding, the 
mechanisms behind it are scrutinized as regards their potential impediment to the free 
movement of capital according to Article 56 EC (and the freedom of establishment according 
to Article 43 EC), in particular whether they are based on a sovereign national measure to 
establish and preserve this infl uence. Th is means, however, that the question of whether an 
undertaking is public or private is not decided by formal terminology but by economic reality. 
In this respect, the State is treated like every private investor.
1270 Th e original Electricity Act 1998 and the Gas Act stipulated in Articles 93(2) E-wet and 85(2) 
G-wet that any change in ownership of shares in energy companies required the approval of 
the Minister of Economic Aff airs, a provision initially valid until the end of 2002, which from 
1 January 2001 has been extended indefi nitely. Ministerial approval was granted as regards the 
sale of the shares of the electricity generation companies UNA, EZH and EPON. Th e shares 
were directly or indirectly held through the energy supply companies owned by Dutch 
municipalities and provinces and were sold to Reliant (now NUON), E.ON and Electrabel, 
respectively. Currently, 40–50% of Dutch electricity generation is based on CHP.
1271 See Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.22. On the structure of the Dutch electricity and gas market 
more generally, J Janssen, L Hancher, M Pigmans, ‘Th e Electricity Market in the Netherlands’, 
(2003) Utilities Law Review 39, and ‘Th e Gas Market in the Netherlands’, (2003) Utilities Law 
Review 85.
1272 See Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.23. In 2004, Gasunie appointed Gas Transport Services B.V. 
(GTS) as operator of its gas transmission networks, thereby accomplishing the legal unbundling 
requirements of Gas Directive 2003. Shortly aft er, Gasunie was ownership unbundled on 1 July 
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It was around the turn of the millennium that the privatization debate extended 
to vertically integrated energy supply companies operating energy distribution 
networks. Here as well, the Minister’s consent to transfer the shares in these 
companies was required. In 2001, the Minister issued upon the request of 
Parliament (Tweede Kamer) guidelines requiring ministerial approval of any 
change in ownership of energy networks, network operation companies or of 
supply licences, which were revoked in September 2002.1273 During this 
transitional period, the energy sector in fact saw a substantive (49%) minority 
privatization of a (relatively minor) gas supply company operating gas distribution 
networks (Obragas) by sale to RWE, which the Dutch legislator then had to make 
provision for in the splitsingswet1274: Th is minority privatization has, however, 
been reversed in the meantime because RWE has sold its networks “back” to one 
of the parties of the original circle of public stakeholders at the end of 2006, 
which reinforced total public ownership and operation of energy networks in the 
Netherlands.1275
Today, the E-wet and the G-wet contain a prohibition of any substantive 
privatization of energy supply networks and their operators (even of minority 
shareholdings).1276 Th e networks and their operators now have to remain entirely 
under the control of the State. Th e reason for this is that the Parliament (Tweede 
Kamer) did not want to create a situation which could not be reversed; it 
2005 with retroactive eff ect as of 1 January 2005, which split Gasunie up into the autonomous 
gas transport company Nederlandse Gasunie N.V. and the equally autonomous gas trading 
and supply company Gasunie Trade & Supply B.V., now GasTerra B.V. on 1 September 2006. 
Th e gas transport company Gasunie, of which the State became sole shareholder as of 1 January 
2005 buying Shell and ExxonMobile out for a net purchasing price of €2.78 billion, consists of 
all transport assets of Gasunie, the national transmission system operator GTS and all the 
relevant contracts belonging to it, including those for carrying out transport services and gas 
quality conversion. Gasunie also holds a 60% interest in the gas interconnector pipeline 
between Balgzand in the Netherlands and Bacton in the UK, see also n. 1331 and accompanying 
text. As regards GasTerra, this remains a private-public partnership in that Shell, ExxonMobile 
and the Dutch State continue to hold shares. For more detail on the restructuring of Gasunie, 
see Roggenkamp, n. 1263, nos 11.149 et seq.
1273 See the beleidsregels mentioned in n. 1269. For the revocation, see Stc. 2002, nr. 174 / pag. 9.
1274 N. 81.
1275 RWE, ‘RWE Energy Nederland verkoopt netwerkbedrijven’, Persbericht (press release), 
23 March 2007.
1276 From August 2003, ministerial approval was forbidden for any transfer of rights to natural or 
legal persons outside the circle of network owners or shareholders of network operation 
undertakings. At the time, RWE was still (the only) private shareholder of a network operation 
undertaking so that the prohibition of privatization could indeed have confl icted with 
Article 56 EC at that time (see more about this problem infra). In July 2004, this prohibition 
became permanent but only as regards networks and their operations.
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particularly did not want the energy networks and their operation to pass to 
foreign investors.1277
Disposing of network operators and networks still requires ministerial approval 
according to Articles 93(2) and 85(2) E-wet and G-wet but is forbidden by law if a 
transfer to organizations outside the state sphere is envisaged (subsection 3 and 4 
of Articles 93 E-wet and 85 G-wet respectively).1278 Consequently, substantive 
privatization of energy networks and their operators is no longer an issue unless 
legislated for by Parliament; the prohibition of substantive privatization could 
not be more defi nite.1279
On the other hand, municipalities and provinces are (and have even been prior to 
the entering into force of the corresponding parts of the splitsingswet (see below)) 
allowed without any requirement for approval to sell (parts of) their competitive 
energy supply activities. However, such substantive privatizations are only 
possible if any ownership of energy supply networks (see on this issue below) and 
their operations have been separated from the energy supply undertakings to be 
1277 In the so-called Memorie van Antwoord of 29 September 2006, Eerste Kamer, 2006–2007, 
30212, D, Eerste Kamer, p. 6, which forms part of the motives of the splitsingswet, the Dutch 
government declares, translated into English: “[…] Th e separation of the property ensures that 
the networks, which are crucial for energy supply, cannot pass into the hands of foreign parties 
vertically integrated with competitive energy activities. Further, the splitsing of the energy 
undertakings ensures that the network operator is structurally independent and thus 
guarantees an honest functioning of the market, which the consumer benefi ts from. 
Additionally, the splitsing of the energy undertakings contributes to the reliability of the 
energy networks. An important consequence of splitsing is that a deadlock over privatization 
lasting many years has been removed. Aft er all, splitsing off ers the current public shareholders 
the opportunity, should they wish to do this, to sell the commercial parts of the energy 
undertakings.” It continues on p. 8: “Th e separation of the technically orientated network 
operation and the commercially orientated trading and supply activities means for the 
management of the network operations that it can focus on reliable and effi  cient network 
operations. Th is reinforced supply security.”
1278 Translated into English, subs. 3 of these Articles reads as follows: “Our Minister [i.e. the 
Minister of Economic Aff airs] will refuse the approval required according to subsection 2 if a 
change in ownership referred to in that subsection of a [gas transport] network results in a 
natural or legal person obtaining rights with respect to a [gas transport] network, which is 
outside the circle of the state organization. […].” Subs. 4 reads: “By way of general administrative 
directives, rules are established with respect to the granting of the approval required by 
subsection 2 for a change of rights with respect to shares in a network operator. [Such an 
approval] will not be granted as long as the general administrative directive has not been 
enacted. Th e fi rst time such a directive is about to be enacted, this will not happen until a draft  
has been forwarded to both chambers of Parliament. Within four weeks aft er forwarding, the 
wish can be expressed by or in the name of one of the chambers or by at least one fi ft h of the 
constitutional number of members of one of the chambers that the content of the draft  be 
established by way of an Act of Parliament. […].”
1279 Recently confi rmed by the Dutch court Rechtbank ’s Gravenhage, n. 574.
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sold in order for such networks to remain within the sphere of the current public 
owners and shareholders.
2. REGULATION
Th e central state, the provinces and the municipalities all have regulatory and 
administrative powers within the state organization outlined in the Constitution. 
Acts of Parliament may delegate further regulation to both central government 
and subordinate levels. At central level, delegated legislation can be issued by 
central government in the form of Orders of Council (Algemene Maatregelen van 
Bestuur), which are enforced by way of Royal Decree (Koninklijk Besluit). Delegated 
legislation can be further delegated to government ministers, which would then 
issue Ministerial Regulations.1280 For economic regulation, it is customary that 
most of the substantial regulation is left  to delegated legislation. Accordingly, as 
the Minister of Economic Aff airs is responsible for Dutch energy policy, he or she 
is thus also responsible for the regulation of the Dutch energy sector. Increasingly, 
the Minister is issuing policy rules, so-called beleidsregels, which render an 
interpretation of statutory regulations in the energy sector.
In 1998, two new divisions were added to the Ministry of Economic Aff airs, the 
Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit or NMa) and the 
energy sector regulator DTe (Directie Toezicht Energie).1281 Today, the latter, 
which is responsible for supervising the compliance of both the electricity and 
the gas sector with the E-wet and the G-wet and for establishing the regulatory 
framework for the operation of the energy networks and TPA1282, operates as a 
branch of the former, which acquired the status of an independent agency in 
1280 At subordinate level, delegated legislation may be issued by provinces and municipalities by 
way of secondary legislation.
1281 DTe in fact is a creation of the E-wet, and it was confi rmed as regulator for gas in the G-wet as 
well.
1282 See Aarts, n. 1264, no. 12.13. Th e energy transportation tariff s are set according to a form of 
incentive regulation, see in detail Aarts, n. 1264, Roggenkamp, n. 1263. GTS applies its gas 
transportation tariff  to an entry-exit-system at about 50 entry and 1,100 exit points of its 
network. At these points, capacity can be bought in order to physically inject gas at a specifi c 
point and withdraw it elsewhere from the network system, see further at www.gasunie.nl. Th e 
electricity transportation tariff  is a postage stamp rate, i.e. it is independent of the distance 
between the point of connection where electricity is fed into the grid and the take-off  point. 
Consequently, one fl at rate per contract gives access to the entire electricity network. 
Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.230.
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2005.1283 Th e Board of NMa issues instructions with respect to the tasks and 
powers assigned to the Director of DTe under the E-wet and G-wet.1284
Framework for energy sector regulation
Th e regulatory framework of the Dutch energy supply sector has over time 
developed on an ad hoc basis, and, as has already been said, gradually moved 
from decentralized regulation to national regulation.1285 Today, this is refl ected 
in the E-wet and the G-wet, which explicitly stipulate that municipalities and 
provinces (as subdivisions of the State) are not entitled to regulate energy 
supply.1286 It can also be inferred from the requirement of the energy supply 
undertakings and their shareholders to hold or acquire the legal ownership of the 
energy networks in case of any privatization.1287 National regulation is largely the 
result of developments at EC level and the consequent implementation of the 
Energy Directives. Consequently, it is only since the end of the last millennium 
that the entire energy sector is regulated by national legislation. And it is only 
since 1995 that the reorganization, mainly in the form of liberalization, of the 
Dutch energy supply sector has begun.1288 Th e original E-wet implemented the 
Electricity Directive 96/92/EC in 1998 and the original G-wet the Gas Directive 
98/30/EC in 2000.
Unbundling
Under the E-wet 1998, Sep and its shareholders, the generation companies, and 
the energy supply undertakings also operating networks, were obliged to transfer 
1283 Th e Management of NMa does, however, act on behalf of the Minister of Economic Aff airs as 
regards exercising its powers under the E-wet and G-wet. Th e powers comprise, inter alia, 
appointing the network operators, awarding supply licenses and taking any measures relating 
to the privatization of energy supply activities. DTe sets the network tariff s and advises the 
Minister on all aspects concerning the energy market.
1284 On 31 August 2001, the Director-General (directeur-generaal) of the NMa also enacted policy 
guidelines (beleidsregels) demarcating the competencies of NMa from those of DTe under the 
E-wet and G-wet (Stc. 2001, nr. 168 / pag. 41). Further, both institutions jointly run a monitoring 
system, the Market Surveillance Committee, and NMa’s legal department prepares DTe’s 
decisions on any objections against initial decisions.
1285 Roggenkamp, n. 1263.
1286 Article 83 E-wet, Article 62 G-wet; see also M Roggenkamp, ‘De privatisering van 
energiebedrijven en de eigendom van kabels en leidingen’, (2002) NTE 4.
1287 Which follows from the absolute privatization ban according to Article 93 E-wet and Article 85 
G-wet. Consequently, it appears that when the so-called cross-border leases end, the 
municipalities or energy supply companies, which granted these leases to American investors 
have to acquire legal ownership of the networks subject to these leases, see specifi cally nn. 
1311, 1314 and accompanying text.
1288 See Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.16.
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operation and management of the electricity networks to separate legal entities.1289 
In 2000, the G-wet required legal unbundling only for the operation of gas 
distribution networks because it was said that energy distribution is better suited 
for the promotion of competition. As most gas supply companies holding gas 
distribution networks were horizontally integrated with electricity distribution 
and supply, the legal unbundling provisions of the G-wet resemble those of the 
E-wet. Th e impact of gas distribution unbundling was thus limited as most of the 
undertakings concerned had already complied with the unbundling provisions of 
the E-wet.1290 What is important for understanding the motives behind the 
introduction of the splitsingswet discussed below is that in the course of 
implementing legal unbundling in the sector, the Minister of Economic Aff airs 
agreed to the establishment of so-called “slim” network operation companies 
instead of insisting on so-called “fat” network operators.1291 To become “fat” 
operators, the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking would have had to 
transfer the economic “ownership” (explained below) of the networks it either 
owned or held the economic “ownership” of itself to the integrated network 
operation undertaking.
1289 See Article 10 E-wet. According to Article 10(2) E-wet, control over the national transmission 
network and the interconnectors was transferred to TenneT B.V. as a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Sep. Since the appointment of TenneT as network operator, the ownership of TenneT 
changed in that three out of four electricity generation companies, i.e. UNA, EZH and EPON 
(see also n. 1270), were substantially privatized. Since this would have led to the majority of 
shares in TenneT being held by foreign energy companies, the Dutch State purchased all shares 
in TenneT from NEA B.V. (the renamed Sep) for €1,157,000 in 2001, see Roggenkamp, n. 1263, 
no. 11.220. Since then, the E-wet states that the State must hold all shares in TenneT, Article 93a 
E-wet, now through TenneT Holding B.V., which holds all shares in the network company 
TenneT TSO B.V. In the meantime, the Dutch State has also purchased all shares in the gas 
transmission company Gasunie, see n. 1272. TenneT also acquired all shares in TZH, a regional 
150 kV network company owned by the generation company EZH, which now is E.ON Benelux. 
See in more detail, Aarts, n. 1264, no. 12.05.
1290 Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.144. As a consequence, network operation subsidiaries responsible 
for operating the gas and electricity distribution networks were established. Whereas the 
shares in the holding companies of the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings are 
held by Dutch provinces and municipalities, the holding companies themselves hold the shares 
in the network operation companies.
1291 Establishing “slim” network operation subsidiaries enables the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings to display the network assets on the balance sheet of the integrated 
undertaking (normally its holding company), which holds the ownership or economic 
“ownership” of networks, which is, see in this respect also M Koppenol-Laforce, B de Wit, 
‘Economisch eigendom en splitsing’, (2004) NTE 100, 101. “Fat” means that all fi nancial and 
operational activities have to be conducted independently from the remainder of the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertaking so that, for instance, the network operation undertaking 
would also have suffi  cient fi nancial resources available to decide independently about the 
maintenance and investments into the networks they operate. A “fat” network operator would 
hold the economic “ownership” of the energy networks; they would then be part of its balance 
sheet.
Part 2. Fundamental Rights
352 Intersentia
Because of this development, the Minister of Economic Aff airs wanted to install 
a stronger requirement for independence of integrated network operators. In the 
context of implementing the 2003 Energy Directives, the E-wet and the G-wet 
were thus amended and now explicitly require that the integrated network 
operator holds the economic “ownership” of all networks it operates.1292 Th is 
requirement, however, only entered into force together with the splitsingswet 
discussed below.
Th is, however, did still not suffi  ce in the eyes of the then Minister of Economic 
Aff airs, Brinkhorst, so that aft er more than 2 ½ years of extensive debate1293, the 
reorganization of the energy sector in the Netherlands culminated, at the end of 
2006, in the passing of the so-called splitsingswet by both Chambers of Parliament. 
Without going too much into detail at this point on the reasons why this law was 
enacted, the objectives of this piece of legislation are, fi rst, to separate the 
competitive energy supply activities from the network activities for competition 
and consumer protection reasons and, secondly, to ensure that the networks and 
their operation will continue to be held and conducted by the current circle of 
public entities or publicly-owned legal persons for public interest reasons.
Consequently, the splitsingswet comes down fi rst of all to ensuring that legal 
ownership of the energy networks and their operation remains or returns into 
the hands of the current public shareholders of the energy supply companies or 
these companies themselves. What is not clear, however, is who exactly owns the 
energy networks in question (i.e. the electricity and gas distribution networks 
and the electricity supply networks from 110 kV not yet owned by the national 
electricity network operator TenneT), the vertically integrated energy supply 
companies or their public shareholders, Dutch municipalities and provinces.
According to the recent Article 20(2) of the Fift h Book of the Dutch Civil Code 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boek 5) which was added in 2006, a net, which consists of 
one or more cables, wires or pipelines, and which is assigned to the transport of 
solid, liquid or gaseous material, of energy or of information, which is or is going 
1292 With the I&I-wet mentioned in n. 1258. Th e I&I-wet also introduced the prohibition on using 
the networks or income therefrom as security in order to attract fi nance other than such as is 
attracted for the purpose of the operation and management of the networks themselves, which 
does, however, not extend to third party security rights existing at the time, Article 93b E-wet, 
Article VI(12) I&I-wet, such as in the context of cross-border leases, see in greater detail 
infra.
1293 Initiated by the Minister of Economic Aff airs, Brinkhorst, with letter (brief ) of 31 March 2004, 
‘Liberalisering energiemarkten’, Tweede Kamer, 2003–2004, 28982, nr. 18, and letter (brief ) of 
11 October 2004, ‘Liberalisering energiemarkten’, Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005, 28982, nr. 29.
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to be built in, on or above the land of someone else, belongs to the constructor 
(aanlegger) of the net or its legal successor.1294
As regards the current energy distribution networks underground, it seems that 
the energy supply companies do not own them legally.1295 Only in the case of 
those parts of the networks which have recently been built do these companies 
thus have a right in rem (opstalrecht), and thus can they be certain that they own 
them legally. For the remainder of these networks, they in fact only possess a 
right of use1296, or, as soon as these networks appear in the balance sheets of such 
companies, the economic “ownership”.1297 Economic “ownership” (as the Dutch 
term is translated into English) is defi ned in Article 1(1)(aa) E-wet and Article 
1(1)(u) G-wet as “entitlement based on a legal relationship to all rights and 
competences with respect to a good, with the exception of the right to deliver, 
and the responsibility for all obligations with respect to that good including the 
assumption of the full risk of change in value or total loss of the good, without 
the good having been delivered (to them).” Economic “ownership” thus means 
more than the mere right to use the energy networks but stops short of conferring 
the legal ownership title to the network (which, consequently, does not have any 
great value any more); where such title lies is, as has just been shown, far from 
clear.1298
Because of this uncertainty and in order to achieve the separation of commercial 
energy supply (electricity generation and energy supply to customers) from the 
network activities of the vertically integrated energy supply companies, the E-wet 
and the G-wet prescribe1299:
– First, that the national electricity transmission network operator TenneT is 
the operator of all electricity networks from 110 kV upwards from 1 January 
1294 So-called horizontale natrekking, which is the exception to the so-called verticale natrekking in 
Article 20(1); as regards the coming-into-being of this provision, see Memorie van toelichting 
of 30 August 2005, Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005, 30212, nr. 3; as regards the analysis of the legal 
problems before this provision was added to the law, see Roggenkamp, n. 1286.
1295 See Roggenkamp, n. 1286.
1296 Ibid.
1297 See in this respect also Koppenol-Laforce/de Wit, n. 1291.
1298 Th is is the more true since according to Articles 10(3) E-wet, 2(1) G-wet the network operators 
are appointed by those persons who have the right to use the networks, see Koppenol-Laforce/
de Wit, n. 1291. Consequently, the appointment is eff ected by the economic “owners” of the 
network, i.e. the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings. Th e wording of the before 
named Articles are, however, not entirely clear in this regard when they state that “[d]egene 
aan wie een […] net toebehoort, wijst voor het beheer van dat net […] netbeheerder aan 
(emphasis added).”
1299 Th ereby enforcing the already existing I&I-wet and the splitsingswet, n. 1258.
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2008 by operation of law.1300 Th e vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings thus have to surrender the task of operation of these networks, 
for which they have the right of use (stemming from their economic 
“ownership” or even full ownership), to TenneT.1301 As these undertakings 
remain owners or economic “owners” of the networks in question, they thus 
receive interest on the capital invested in the assets now operated by TenneT.1302 
According to Article 16(1)(c) E-wet, TenneT has the task of investing in the 
networks it operates, and according to Article 16(6) E-wet, every network 
operator holding the right of use of a network operated by TenneT must 
cooperate with TenneT so that it can pursue its tasks (which includes the 
responsibility for investment) properly.
– Secondly, that from 1 July 20081303, every energy network operator other than 
the national electricity transmission system operator TenneT1304 must have 
the economic “ownership” of the networks it operates, which follows from 
Article 10a E-wet and Article 3b G-wet. For all electricity networks from 110 
kV upwards, which are from 1 July 2008 in the economic “ownership” of the 
network operators but operated by TenneT, TenneT pays “capital interest”.1305
– Th irdly, (in Article 10b E-wet) that from 1 July 20081306 no legal entity, which 
is part of the current vertically integrated energy supply holding companies, is 
allowed to hold any shares in network operation undertakings to be appointed 
from 1 July 2008 as electricity distribution network operator (and holding 
from 1 July 2008 the economic “ownership” of the electricity distribution 
networks).1307 Similarly, Article 2c G-wet stipulates that from 1 July 2008 no 
1300 Th e phased entry into force of the splitsingswet and thus the amendments of the E-wet and the 
G-wet is governed by the Decree (Koninklijk Besluit) of 28 December 2006, (2007) Stb. 13.
1301 Th is does not hold for the respective networks of Eneco and Continuon-Randmeren (part of 
Continuon, the network operation company of Nuon), which are subject to cross-border leases, 
see the decision of NMa of 21 December 2007 (Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, Besluit als bedoeld in artikel 41C, eerste Iid van de Elektriciteitswet 
1998, Zaaknummer: 102876, ‘Overgangsbesluit maximum nettarieven elektriciteit voor 
aangeslotenen op Hs-netten’, Stc. 2007, nr. 249 / pag. 55), in particular nos 13, 14. See also n. 
1321.
1302 See TenneT’s website at the bottom of www.tennet.org/projecten/OverdrachtBeheer/index.
aspx (‘Eigendom’).
1303 As to the Decree governing the phased entry into force of the splitsingswet, see n. 1300. Th e 
date of 1 July 2008 applies to network operators already in place at the time of entering into 
force of the splitsingswet.
1304 TenneT already has the economic “ownership” of the parts of the national transmission 
network legally owned by the Dutch (central) State, see Aarts, n. 1264, no. 12.54 and n. 108 
there.
1305 See previous bullet point.
1306 As to the Decree governing the phased entry into force of the splitsingswet, see n. 1300.
1307 According to Articles 10(3), 10a(1) E-wet, it seems that the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings can retain the economic “ownership” of the electricity networks from 110kV 
they still hold, even aft er the groepsverbod takes eff ect.
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legal entity, which is part of the current vertically integrated energy supply 
holding companies, is allowed to hold any shares in the network operation 
undertakings to be appointed from 1 July 2008 as gas transport network 
operator1308 (and holding from 1 July 2008 the economic “ownership” of the 
gas transport networks); for both electricity and gas network operation 
undertakings already appointed on 1 July 2008, splitsing must be enforced on 
1 January 2011 by the latest. Th us acutal separation (splitsing or groepsverbod) 
is achieved by these provisions.
As regards the groepsverbod, it should be emphasized that the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings only have to make sure that the operation of the 
networks ceases to reside within the vertically integrated structure. How this is 
to be achieved is left  to the undertakings to decide.
Another aspect to add in the context of the groepsverbod is that originally the 
splitsingswet passed the Eerste Kamer (Upper House of Parliament, which 
convenes members who are not directly elected) subject to the condition that the 
provisions dealing with the groepsverbod would not enter into force until certain 
events occur, such as the introduction of similar provisions on the European level 
or the a fi nding by the Dutch regulator DTe that the vertically integrated network 
operation undertaking, which holds the economic “ownership” of the networks it 
operates, is not in fact not operating them independently. An indicator of such 
failure to operate independently would be that the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertaking undertakes investments internationally, which could be 
interpreted as not using its means to invest suffi  ciently into networks in the 
Netherlands.1309
At the end of 2006, the Dutch multi-utility Delta, which horizontally integrates 
vertically integrated electricity and gas supply activities with, inter alia, water 
supply, waste disposal and the provision of telecommunication, television and 
internet service, acquired of the Belgian waste disposal company Indaver. In 
April 2007, this prompted the Minister of Economic Aff airs, van der Hoeven (as 
a member of the Dutch government following the government responsible for the 
1308 To be distinguished from the national gas transport network operated by GTS.
1309 See Motie van de leden Doek en Sylvester, 14 November 2006, Eerste Kamer, 2006–2007, 30212, 
H, and Brief (letter) van de Minister van Economische Zaken, de Wijn, of 17 November 2006, 
Eerste Kamer, 2006–2007, 30212, I, in which he confi rmed that the outgoing government 
would respect these conditions and would request from any succeeding government and 
Minister of Economic Aff airs to also respect the wish of the Eerste Kamer. See also Roggenkamp, 
n. 1263, no. 11.28.
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splitsingswet), to establish that an event as described in the previous paragraph 
had occurred, and to enact the groepsverbod (aft er informing Parliament).1310
Municipalities and provinces as the public shareholders of the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings, which have until 1 January 2011 to 
enforce splitsing, can, however, as has already been indicated above, privatize the 
commercial supply activities in the meantime as long as the retain or obtain the 
legal ownership of the networks and the network operation activities as outlined 
above.
Splitsing and cross-border leases (CBL)
One of the most hotly debated issues in the context of the costs and benefi ts of 
splitsing or the groepsverbod are the so-called cross-border leases (CBL). Although 
they have been heavily used by the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings 
concerned by the changes of 1 January and 1 July 2008, their exact terms have 
never been made public for confi dentiality reasons.1311 Consequently, the degree 
of risk involved has always been subject to uncertainty.1312
CBLs have been entered into between 1995 and 2002 in order to take advantage 
of tax saving opportunities in the U.S.1313 Th ey are transactions whereby a Dutch 
energy company grants an American investor a lease of its gas or electricity 
network for a period of up to 150 years. As consideration, the Dutch company is 
1310 NRC.nl, ‘Energiebedrijven moeten splitsen’, 03–04–2007; Brief (letter) van de Minister van 
Economische Zaken, van der Hoeven, of 7 June 2007, Staten-Generaal, 2006–2007, 30212, L en 
nr. 56, p. 4; Decree (Koninklijk Besluit) of 21 July 2007, (2007) Stb. 273.
1311 But see as regards the core elements of the typical CBL used in the current context, the report 
(rapport) of the Commissie Kist of 20 March 2006, Tweede Kamer, 2005–2006, 30212, nr. 17, 
pp. 28–30. See also NauthaDutilh, ‘Client memo leases’, Energy & Utilities, 04 November 2005, 
and Chadbourne & Parke LLP, ‘Response to request of the Committee on Economic Aff airs of 
the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament to analyze a representative number of U.S./
Dutch cross-border lease transactions’, 1 February 2006.
1312 Th is is why in the current context the provisions made in the splitsingswet, n. 81, to avoid any 
confl icts with CBLs are reviewed here only ih the context of the degree to which they are 
successful in avoiding such confl ict. Th ey are not given too much weight in the discussion of 
whether the State has acted within its legitimate margin of appreciation nor whether the 
measures taken suffi  ciently obey a fair balance between the general and private interests. In the 
end, only if one comes to the conclusion that compensation is to be paid to the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings involved, the issue of claims arising in the context of 
CBLs would then become relevant. As a matter of fact, the network operators of Eneco and 
Nuon (only Continuon Randmeren) have been exempted from the transfer by law of the right 
to operate its networks of 110 kV and higher to TenneT, see n. 1300 and accompanying text.
1313 Th e following paragraphs are largely based on M Roggenkamp, ‘Ownership Unbundling of 
Energy Distribution Companies: the Netherlands’, (2006) I.E.L.T.R. 240; see also Raad van 
State, n. 588.
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paid a lump sum.1314 Th e investor then leases the energy network back to the 
Dutch company for a defi nite period of time. As consideration, the Dutch 
company pays annual rent to the American investor; at the end of the lease, the 
Dutch company can then (and as a result of the splitsingswet would have to) 
exercise a contractual option and buy the network back for a predetermined 
price.
Th e transaction has been construed in such a manner because the Dutch energy 
company under Dutch law remains legal owner (or economic “owner”) of the 
networks and can thus continue to depreciate them in its accounts.1315
Th e CBLs contain change-of-control clauses, according to which the legal and 
benefi cial ownership of the networks and of the shares in the Dutch energy supply 
undertakings1316, which are parties to such CBLs, must stay with the public 
shareholders, i.e. the municipalities and provinces, at least as regards the majority 
of the shares.1317
Th e splitsingswet might confl ict with CBLs in three respects:
First, the requirement to transfer economic “ownership” of the networks to the 
vertically integrated network operator (to make it “fat”) might raise a problem 
for such energy companies as have not transferred economic “ownership” to the 
1314 Which includes a share of the tax savings made by the investor.
1315 See also Koppenol-Laforce/de Wit, n. 1291, and Delta’s 2006 accounts (jaarverslag), p. 87, 
available at www.delta.nl. As the term of the lease of the networks from the Dutch company to 
the American investors exceeds the normal (economic) life of the network, the American 
investors are also able to depreciate the network as co-owners under American law. 
Consequently, the American investors pay less tax in the U.S. Th is construction is nothing 
more than a loan to the Dutch energy company leaving the economic and fi nancial risk for the 
network with the Dutch company.
1316 Which, however, must always relate to the actual ownership position the Dutch energy supply 
undertakings have with respect to “their” networks. If they are an economic “owner” only 
(according to what has been explained supra) and not the legal owner, any requirement to 
oblige them to be legal owner is naturally impractible. “Benefi cial” ownership as phrased in 
Roggenkamp, n. 1313, can only mean benefi cial ownership according to the common law trust 
law concept, which is likely to have been applied in the cross-border lease agreements with 
American investors, and then only with respect to the legal ownership of the shares in the 
Dutch energy supply undertakings. In the context of the energy networks where it is not 
necessarily clear where the legal title lies, benefi cial ownership would either relate to the legal 
ownership of the networks if known, or, otherwise, to the economic “ownership” of the 
networks; benefi cial ownership of economic “ownership” obviously is a lesser right compared 
to the benefi cial ownership of legal ownership. Additionally, the energy companies also agreed 
not to transfer their assets to another legal person. All of these are provisions to ensure that no 
collateral or security, which are the essential bases for the CBL transactions, are withdrawn.
1317 Th is, again, is another argument for the distinction of organizational from substantial 
privatization.
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operators before 1 July 2008. Th e transfer of economic “ownership” had, however, 
already been provided for but not yet enforced in the E-wet 1998 and the 
G-wet.1318 Although these provisions found their way into the two Acts at the 
end of the period in which the conclusion of CBL was still allowed or even shortly 
aft er, there has been suffi  cient time for the parties to the CBLs to inform 
themselves about the consequences and work out solutions or to make any 
claims.
More importantly, in particular when it comes to the actual splitsing, i.e. 
separation of the network operator from the energy company which is to come 
under direct control of the municipalities and provinces (as the public 
shareholders of the energy companies), the predominant provision all CBLs seem 
to have in common is that the public shareholders remain in direct or indirect 
control of the networks and the network operators.1319 In this respect, it appears 
that the complete ban on privatization of the networks and their operation should 
actually be supportive for the operation of CBLs.
Th e ban and the requirement that economic “ownership” must pass to the 
network operator can however confl ict with CBLs if they provide for the 
American investors to obtain, upon termination of the lease, the benefi cial 
ownership of the grid.1320 Articles VI-VID of the splitsingswet however provide 
1318 Th e fact that the Dutch government may appoint another network operator should the 
incumbent operator no longer fulfi ll its legal duties should not play too great a role here as this 
is a reasonable and predictable behavior of the State to secure security and reliability of energy 
supply.
1319 Complications might also arise from the fact that some vertically integrated energy supply 
companies have not only concluded CBLs on energy networks but also on generation plants. 
Th e entering into force of the groepsverbod as of 1 July 2008 results in diff erent owners of the 
networks and generation, which confl icts with CBL provisions that energy companies are not 
allowed to transfer all or substantially all their assets. Th is however should not cause too great 
a headache either because, at least until commercial activities are sold, ownership does only 
change with respect to direct and indirect control of either the energy networks or generation, 
both of which, for the time being remain in the sphere of the public shareholders of the energy 
companies concerned.
1320 Which would only appear to happen should, theoretically, the Dutch party not exercise its 
contractual option and not buy the network back for the predetermined price. Th e Dutch 
legislature was advised, mainly because of the negative tax consequences for the American 
investors, which could lead to them claiming compensation, not to introduce a provision 
requiring the Dutch parties to the CBLs to exercise their buy back option, see the advice 
(advies) of Universiteit Utrecht of 15 May 2006, Tweede Kamer, 2005–2006, 30212, nr. 47. As 
regards benefi cial ownership compared to legal ownership or economic “ownership”, see n. 
1316. It is submitted that a confl ict would be unlikely to arise because the Dutch energy supply 
companies are not allowed to transfer their rights to the networks elsewhere; it is to be assumed 
that provision has been made in the CBL agreements in case ownership rights have by law to 
be moved to subsidiaries.
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for these eventualities by way of transitional provisions.1321 In the context of the 
mandatory transfer of economic “ownership”, Article VI(4) also provides for 
compensation to be paid in equivalent to its market value. It therefore appears 
that the only problems, which can arise in this context, are that, on the one hand, 
additional collaterals or securities have to be provided (which the above Articles 
also deal with) and tax advantages might be lost.1322 Compensation payments, on 
the other hand, do not seem to play too great a role1323, at least as long as the 
CBLs can be interpreted on the basis of a salvatory clause, which is usually 
contained in commercial agreements.
What is more worrying in the context of CBLs however is the fact that legal 
clarifi cation as to the identity of the persons owning the networks has only 
recently been provided.1324 As a result, it is necessary to check whether the energy 
networks were transferred in the way everybody thinks they were, or whether 
persons other than the energy companies entering into the CBLs hold some 
ownership rights, which the parties to the CBLs thought lay with the energy 
companies. Th is might then have repercussions with respect to the competence 
of the energy companies to enter into such agreements and consequently also 
with respect to the change-of-control clauses of the CBLs. Th is, however, is less of 
a problem of the splitsings legislation than of the legislature at the time that it 
clarifi ed the legal situation concerning network ownership.1325
1321 Article VIA, for example, deals with the relationship between CBLs and the transfer of the 
right to operate 110 kV (and higher) networks to TenneT. Th e decision of NMa of 21 December 
2007, n. 1301, concerning the determination and charging of network operation tariff s by 
TenneT shows how in practice obligations arising from CBLs, to the extent they are known, 
have been taken into consideration. According to NMa, Eneco and Continuon Randmeren can 
continue to operate all networks from 110 kV and higher and charge customers connected to 
such networks themselves whereas for all the other networks of this voltage, whose right to 
operation was transferred to TenneT by law from 1 January 2008, the charging is also taken 
over by TenneT. See also TenneT’s website at www.tennet.org/projecten/tennext/Overdracht_
beheer.aspx.
1322 Th e latter might be signifi cant, see Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38, p. 23.
1323 For the consequences, should these nevertheless and unexpectedly become due, see section 
V(4) infra.
1324 See n. 1294 and accompanying text.
1325 Th e Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) rendered a qualitative social cost 
& benefi t analysis of the groepsverbod, see Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37. It concluded that 
CBLs may result in one-off  costs attributable to the groepsverbod but they may not be as a high 
as expected. Th e qualitative analysis of CPB has however been severely and substantially 
questioned by SEO, see Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38, which carried out a quantitative social cost & 
benefi t analysis. Th e Dutch government also brought in outside experts to advise on its plans 
and on the costs involved in the groepsverbod: Sequoia, ‘Waardering van de Nederlandse 
Energiedistributiesector’, 16 November 2005, analyzed the eff ects on shareholder value, 
Deloitte, ‘Reorganisatiekosten Splitsing Energiebedrijven’, 7 April 2005, looked into the static 
reorganization costs whereas Roland Berger, ‘Reorganisatiekosten van splitsing in dynamisch 
perspectief ’, 4 August 2005, looked into the dynamic reorganization costs, Merchant Bank 
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Interconnector capacity allocation
Th e E-wet prohibits any priority reservation of capacity on electricity networks 
and interconnectors.1326 Since 2001, as regards electricity interconnection, 
interconnector capacity for imports and exports is auctioned on a daily, monthly 
and yearly basis by a subsidiary of the TSO TenneT, TSO Auction B.V., which has 
been commissioned jointly by the Dutch, Belgian and German TSOs to conduct 
the auctions.1327 Th e auctions are governed by the public law Network Code1328 
whereas the legal relationship between TSOs and the bidders is subject to private 
contract law which is set out in auction rules.
What is important here is that in contrast to most other Member States, the 
Netherlands has opted for a direct relationship between the power exchange and 
the allocation mechanism for interconnector capacity. Parties who acquire 
interconnector capacity at the daily auction run by TSO Auction B.V. for imports 
into the Netherlands that day must use the capacity acquired for settling 
electricity spot market transactions at APX in Amsterdam.1329 Capacity may also 
be traded between parties1330 and any capacity that has not been traded or 
returned to TSO Auction must be used or is lost according to the so-called “use-
it-or-lose-it” principle.
Kempen & Co., ‘Indicatieve waardeverdeling van Essent en Nuon over de bedrijfsonderdelen’, 
1 August 2005, and ‘Gevolgen van splitsing voor kosten van Letters of Credit voor Essent and 
Nuon’, 4 August 2005, studies the value division of Essent and Nuon and the costs for these 
companies should they have to provide additional letters of credit, EIM, ‘Administratieve 
lasten splitsing energiebedrijven’, 10 February 2005, analyzed the administrative costs the 
groepsverbod might involve, and CapGemini, ‘Onderzoek naar de werkgelegenheidseff ecten 
van liberalisering, splitsing en privatisering’, January 2006, looked into the way liberalization, 
splitsing and privatization aff ects employment. Finally, a Commission was established, the 
so-called Commissie Kist, n. 1311, in order to look into the cost eff ects of the groepsverbod and 
to validate the governments conclusions, including with respect to the CBLs.
1326 Th e ECJ also ruled in C-17/03 – Vereinigung voor Energie, Milieu en Water and Others v 
Director of Energy, (2005) ECR I-4983, that any priority reservation of interconnector capacity 
to Sep was discriminatory.
1327 Cross-border transmission itself remains in the remit of the TSOs.
1328 DTe has issued this code, which contains special rules for the allocation of cross-border 
interconnector capacity.
1329 Amsterdam Power Exchange Spot Market B.V. is held by TenneT and Gasunie, see Roggenkamp, 
n. 1263, no. 11.216. See also Kühling/Hermeier, n. 481, who detect potential confl icts of market 
coupling in the form of implicit auctioning run by an Auction Offi  ce which auctions a 
combined product of electricity and interconnector capacity with legal unbundling. In the 
Dutch context, however, these concerns are of lesser relevance as the managers of this form of 
market coupling, TSO Auction and APX, both belong to the state owned, ownership unbundled 
network operators, TenneT and Gasunie.
1330 Any party can only hold up to 400 MW in interconnector capacity unless, for instance, an 
exemption from TPA for new infrastructure has been granted according to Article 86c E-wet.
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New infrastructure
Investment in new infrastructure is facilitated by Article 22 of Gas Directive 2003 
and Article 7 of Regulation 1228/2003 (on cross-border trade of electricity) which 
provides for a possible exemption from the regular access regime for new 
infrastructure in order to attract investment. An exemption can be obtained if (a) 
the investment enhances competition and security of supply (in related markets), 
(b) the exemption is not detrimental to the liberalization of the internal energy 
market, (c) the company responsible for the infrastructure to be exempted is 
legally separate from the operator(s) of the network to which the new infrastructure 
is connected, (d) if an exemption was not granted the investment would not take 
place, and (e) the users of the new infrastructure are charged for their use.
Th e E-wet and the G-wet in Articles 86c and 18h, respectively, which resemble 
these provisions, provide the Minister of Economic Aff airs with a power to grant 
an exemption for new infrastructure from regulated TPA. An exemption can also 
be granted where a signifi cant increase in existing infrastructure is to be achieved. 
When granting an exemption, the Minister may adopt rules for interconnector 
management and capacity allocation, and may impose time restrictions.
In the gas sector, the so-called Bacton-Balgzand Pipeline (BBL) and several LNG 
projects are based on this exemption regime.1331 Th e construction of BBL and the 
likelihood of more gas from Russia transported to the UK via the North European 
Gas Pipeline1332 and BBL will require the expansion of the Dutch onshore gas 
networks, for which GTS is under the obligation to take all measures necessary 
1331 BBL is an interconnector between the Netherlands and the UK and a link between the Dutch 
and the UK gas transmission networks, which are operated by GTS and National Grid Transco, 
respectively. Th is interconnector is operated by a company, VOF, which is legally separate 
from both network operators. VOF was established in July 2004 under Dutch law and is jointly 
owned by Gasunie BBL B.V. (60%), E.ON Ruhrgas BBL B.V. (20%) and Fluxys BBL B.V. (20%); 
Russian Gasprom will receive up to 9% from Gasunie’s 60% share in BBL in consideration for 
granting Gasunie a share of up to 9% in the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP). Th e 
shareholders have been selected on the basis of a so-called open season procedure, according 
to which interested parties can bid for capacity rights in new infrastructure (see also n. 290). 
Apart from becoming shareholders, these interested parties also enter into transport 
agreements with VOF as “their” company operating the interconnector. BBL applied for an 
exemption under Article 18h G-wet and Article 7ZA (UK) Gas Act 1986 in December 2004, 
which was granted aft er amendments were made to the exemption which were required by the 
European Commission in August 2005. BBL commenced operations in December 2006 and is 
exempted from regulated TPA for the periods of 10 and 15 years for two diff erent quantities of 
capacities of physical forward fl ow from the Netherlands to the UK (thus no exemption for any 
fl ows from the UK to the Netherlands), applying the so-called use-it-or-lose-it obligation, see 
n. 199. See in greater detail, Roggenkamp, n. 1032, pp. 173 et seq.
1332 See also the cooperation between Gasprom and Gasunie, ibid.
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to ensure the availability of suffi  cient transport capacity.1333 GTS used an open 
season procedure1334 to assess the extent of expansion needed.1335
In the electricity sector, two interconnector investments have taken place.1336 In 
May 2008, the NorNed sub-sea interconnector went into operation, connecting 
the Netherlands to Norway, which is operated on a regulated TPA basis (Dutch 
tariff s on the Dutch part and Norwegian tariff s on the Norwegian part of the 
cable).1337 Th e other cable is a commercial or merchant interconnector, BritNed, 
connecting the UK to the Netherlands, for which an exemption from regulated 
TPA for 25 years was granted by the Dutch and UK regulators on 27 June and 
11 July 2007, respectively. BritNed Development Limited is a joint venture of 
100% subsidiaries of the UK TSO National Grid plc and TenneT Holding B.V., 
National Grid International Limited and NLink International B.V., respectively. 
Customers will have open access to the capacity via a combination of implicit 
auctions (of a combined product of electricity and interconnector capacity) 
facilitated by APX and short-term explicit auctions (of interconnector capacity 
only).
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Th e decentralized structure of the Netherlands is refl ected in its constitution, the 
Grondwet1338, both in Article 81, which provides for the joint determination of 
legislation by the Dutch government and the Parliament (Staten-Generaal)1339, 
and in Part 7 (hoofdstuk 7), which deals with provinces, municipalities 
(communes), water boards and other public bodies. Article 92 Grondwet provides 
for the possibility of transferring by way of a treaty legislative, executive and 
judicative competences to organizations established according to public 
international law; this provision is thus the constitutional basis for the Dutch 
participation in the European Union. When transferring competences to, for 
1333 According to Articles 10 G-wet and 16 E-wet the network operators are responsible for the 
reliability of the energy networks, which means for their maintenance, effi  cient operation and 
any investments necessary in order to maintain suffi  cient spare capacity for the transmission 
and distribution of electricity and gas.
1334 Explained in n. 1331.
1335 Roggenkamp, n. 1263, no. 11.196.
1336 According to Balmert(Brunekreeft /Gabriel, n. 47, interconnector investment is to be treated as 
additional generation capacity investment rather than a mere electricity network investment.
1337 In greater detail on the NorNed cable, see van der Lippe/Meijer, n. 44.
1338 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 August 1815 as amended.
1339 Which consists of two Chambers, the Tweede Kamer, which is directly elected by the Dutch 
people, and the Eerste Kamer, which consists of representatives of the Dutch provinces, see 
Articles 50 et seq. Grondwet.
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instance, the European Union, this can happen contrary to the principles of the 
Grondwet if the law confi rming the transferring treaty is approved by the two 
chambers of Parliament (Article 91(3) Grondwet). In contrast to the Federal 
Republic of Germany with its Article 79(3) GG, there is thus no mechanism, 
which secures the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Netherlands. 
In this context, it is worthwhile to note that Dutch constitutional law and its 
application is in full compliance with EC law and the ECJ case law1340, according 
to which EC law takes precedence or primacy over the Dutch Grondwet should 
the latter not be in accordance with the former: Article 94 Grondwet confi rms this 
by stating that within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, legislative provisions, 
which include the provisions of the Grondwet1341, are not applicable if their 
application is not compatible with provisions of Treaties and of decisions of 
organizations established under public international law, which are binding for 
everybody.1342
1. STATUS OF MUNICIPALITIES AND PROVINCES 
WITHIN THE DECENTRALIZED UNITARY STATE
Th e Netherlands is a decentralized Unitary State.1343 Decentralization means the 
spreading of duties and competences over subordinate public bodies, which are 
managed by representative organs. Because municipalities and provinces are, as 
territorial public bodies of general administrative character, part of the framework 
of the Unitary State, they are subject to administrative supervision. Th e signifi cant 
diff erences between a federation of states or a Federal State and a decentralized 
Unitary State become clear if one compares the position of a state within a 
federation or a federal state to the position of a province within a decentralized 
Unitary State. A state of the former possesses its own sphere of competences and 
1340 ECJ, C-106/77, Simmenthal, n. 824.
1341 See P Kooijmans, Internationaal publiekrecht in vogelvlucht, 2002, ch. 5, p. 86.
1342 Th e Dutch legal system can be classifi ed as a monistic legal system, in contrast to the German 
and the British legal system, which are said to be dualistic. Th e latter means that between the 
national and the international legal system, there is a strict distinction to be made, which 
means that international legal norms are only binding within the national legal system if they 
are incorporated or transformed into the national legal system. A monistic legal system such 
as the Dutch, by contrast, means that there is no distinction to be made between the national 
and the international legal system in that international legal norms are automatically part of 
the national legal system. See in greater detail, Vlemminx/Boekhorst, ‘Inleiding 
Artikelen 90–95: De Internationale Rechtsorde’, in Koekkoek, de Grondwet, 3rd ed., 2000, 
p. 444. Concerning the Dutch constitutional discussion whether the Dutch legal system is in 
fact only to a limited extent to be regarded as monistic, which some infer from Article 93 
Grondwet, see Kooijmans, n. 1341, pp. 86, 88, Vlemminx/Boekhorst, ibid., pp. 444–5.
1343 Holterman, ‘Inleiding Hoofdstuk 7: Decentralisatie’, in Koekkoek, de Grondwet, 3rd ed., 2000, 
p. 557.
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powers, which is constitutionally safeguarded; it also has its own trias politica, i.e. 
legislature, government or executive and judiciary, and is also represented on 
federal level in a chamber of Parliament such as a senate or, as is the case in 
Germany, in the Bundesrat, which usually has signifi cant infl uence on legislative 
matters touching upon the federal states’ sphere. By contrast, a province within a 
decentralized Unitary State does not have any of these. Th e Eerste Kamer of the 
Staten-Generaal, the bi-cameral Parliament of the Netherlands, albeit elected by 
the representatives of the provinces, does not have any federal function; it does 
not represent the concerns of the provinces.1344
Th e Dutch Grondwet confers some important powers on the Dutch provinces 
and municipalities, the most notable being the right to set up their own budget. 
As a result, legislative and administrative functions are exercised on a central, 
regional and municipal level. Although the provinces and municipalities are 
relatively autonomous public institutions, they are subject to various types of 
central control. Th e Constitution does not clearly defi ne their tasks and 
responsibilities but only that matters of central government such as defense and 
foreign aff airs fall outside the competence of the decentralized authorities. 
Matters related to the energy sector such as energy supply are not mentioned in 
the Constitution. Consequently, the regulation and operation of the energy sector 
can be dealt with on all three levels of the state organization. Th is is well refl ected 
in the Dutch energy sector: by the end of the nineteenth century, electricity and 
gas supply was predominantly regulated by provinces and municipalities. Due to 
technical developments and the ever growing importance of the energy sector for 
society, however, the national government has ever since been increasingly 
involved in regulating the sector via central legislation. As a matter of fact, 
nowadays the Dutch Parliament exclusively regulates the Dutch energy sector1345, 
which shows that the central State can take over any task it pleases.1346
Th e Dutch Grondwet deals with public bodies lower in the state hierarchy than 
central state institutions in Articles 123 et seq. Grondwet. According to Article 
123 of the Grondwet, provinces and municipalities can be established or dissolved 
by a simple Act of Parliament, and the wording of this Article also allows the 
Parliament to delegate the decision about the determination of the borders of 
municipalities or provinces.
On the other hand, the Dutch Grondwet contains some safeguards for the 
independence of existing subordinate public bodies. Tasks, competences, 
1344 See, for a good general overview with respect to diff erent state organizations and their 
comparison, Koekkoek, ‘Algemene inleiding’, in Koekkoek, de Grondwet, 3rd ed., 2000.
1345 See already supra.
1346 As long, obviously as it based on a formal Act of Parliament.
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administrative organization and supervision have to be regulated by or on the 
basis of a formal Act of Parliament. Th eir ruling bodies1347 cannot be forced to 
take on administrative tasks, which public bodies ranking higher in the hierarchy 
of the administration want to confer on them (so-called medebewind1348 as 
opposed to autonomous tasks) unless by or on the basis of a formal Act of 
Parliament.1349 With respect to municipalities and provinces, the Grondwet 
contains further safeguards. Th e most important one has already been mentioned, 
which is the competence of these territorial public bodies to pass regulations with 
regard to and manage their own budget (huishouding). Other autonomous 
competences are, for example, public order and health as well as local traffi  c 
installations and recreational and cultural installations. On the other hand, these 
provisions do not hinder higher public bodies from taking over a task or parts of 
it, which has so far been pursued by a lower public body autonomously.1350 As a 
consequence, the autonomous sphere of lower public bodies in the Netherlands 
has steadily been eroded. Many of the tasks, which have previously been counted 
towards the budgetary competence of such bodies and thus to their autonomous 
competences are now exercised in medebewind1351, i.e. as a task, which has been 
taken over by the central state or a higher public body, and whose management 
or administration has been conferred back to the lower public bodies.
And lastly, the embeddedness and lack of independent status and own 
standing1352 within the state hierarchy and organization of Dutch subordinate 
public bodies such as municipalities and provinces also shows when one makes 
1347 Th e mayors (burgermeester) and the commissioners of the Queen (commissarissen van de 
Koningin) of the municipalities and the provinces, respectively, who manage the day-to-day 
business are nominated by the central government.
1348 To some extent comparable to the German communal administrative law concept of 
Übertragener Wirkungskreis.
1349 Article 124(2) Grondwet.
1350 Article 132(1) Grondwet provides for the administrative organization of the provinces and 
municipalities, and the range and the competences of their government to be regulated by a 
formal Act of Parliament. Provincial and communal law in the Netherlands includes two 
repressive types of supervision: in theory, all provincial and municipal resolutions can be 
revoked or declared void by the central government if they contravene the law or the general 
interest, see Article 132(4) Grondwet, in practice there are some exceptions for reasons of legal 
certainty. Further, according to Article 132(5) Grondwet, a formal Act of Parliament can pass 
any measures necessary if the management or administration of a municipality or province 
neglects its responsibilities. Th is stands in contrast to, for instance, Germany where according 
to Article 37 GG, the Bundesrat, the parliamentary representation of the German federal 
states, the Länder, must approve of such measures.
1351 Kraan, ‘Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden’, in L Prakke, C Kortmann (eds), Het staatsrecht van 
de landen van de Europese Unie, 5th ed., 1998, pp. 579 et seq.
1352 Municipalities and provinces have some limited possibilities of seeking protection against 
some supervisory measures before the administrative law courts, see Koekkoek in Koekkoek, 
n. 1344, pp. 33–5.
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a direct comparison with German municipalities: whereas in German 
municipalities can, according to Article 93(1) no. 4(b) GG, complain to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht claiming that their (institutional) right to self-
government according to Article 28 GG has been violated1353, no such procedural 
right exists for Dutch municipalities and provinces. Th ere, the central State can 
only be held responsible for illegal measures with respect to lower public bodies, 
which, however, is merely an expression of the principle of the legality of public 
administration.1354
2. ACTS OF PARLIAMENT: ECHR AND EC LAW AS 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
According to Article 120 of the Nederlandse Grondwet the judiciary is not allowed 
to review formal Acts of Parliament and treaties with respect to their compatibility 
with the Grondwet.1355 On the other hand, Article 94 Grondwet stipulates that 
legislation (which also includes the Grondwet) eff ective within the Kingdom is 
not applicable as long as it its application confl icts with a generally binding 
provision of Treaties or resolutions of organizations established by public 
international law, such as the ECHR.1356 Accordingly, the Dutch judiciary can 
apply public international law to an Act of Parliament and, if necessary, declare 
such legislation non-applicable if it is in breach of public international law.1357
Article 1 ECHR stipulates that the signatories have to guarantee the rights and 
freedoms of the ECHR to everybody on their respective territories. Further, the 
case law of the ECtHR is binding according to Articles 32 and 46 ECHR in that 
1353 So-called Kommunalverfassungsbeschwerde.
1354 In September 1996, for instance, an Amsterdam court has declared the passing of a regulation 
which contravenes the law, as being illegal with respect to lower public bodies, in the case in 
point a municipality. Th e principle of the legality of public administration would oblige the 
State to refrain from passing any legislation, which compels illegal actions, see Rechtbank 
Amsterdam, Acciardi v gemeente Amsterdam, 11 September 1996, (1996) JB 237.
1355 Any other legal provision ranking below formal Acts of Parliament can, however, be measured 
against the Grondwet by the judiciary, see Kraan in Prakke/Kortmann, n. 1351, pp. 538 et seq.
1356 Kraan in Prakke/Kortmann, n. 1351, pp. 538 et seq.; Bax, ‘Artikel 120’, in Koekkoek, de 
Grondwet, 3rd ed., 2000, pp. 544–8.
1357 According to Kooijmans, n. 1341, pp. 87–88, this also applies to public international customary 
law, even against the explicit will of the Dutch government. See also Bax in Koekkoek, n. 1356, 
545–7, on Dutch case law prohibiting measuring Acts of Parliament against general principles 
of law, emphasizing the de facto abolition of the prohibition on measuring formal Acts of 
Parliament against the fundamental rights of the Dutch Grondwet by the direct applicability 
of the ECHR, which according to the monistic legal order of the Netherlands is to be treated as 
national law, which also applies to the EU Treaty. See extensively M Houten, Meer Zicht op 
wetgeving – Rechterlijke toetsing van wetgeving aan de Grondwet en funamentele rechtsbeginselen, 
1997, pp. 241–259.
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the national judge always has to construe national law in the light of the ECHR 
and to determine its compliance with the ECHR. Not only the judiciary but also 
the executive and legislature are bound to observe this constitutional principle.
Th e supremacy or primacy of EC law over national law established by the ECJ in 
its Costa/Enel judgment1358 does not cause any frictions under the monistic legal 
order of the Netherlands.1359 Consequently, primary EC law, which includes the 
fundamental freedoms such as the free movement of capital according to Article 
56 EC, and any secondary EC law, which is directly applicable, supersedes Dutch 
national law, and Dutch national law must be construed in conformity with EC 
law. Article 6(2) EU, according to which the European Union respects the 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, also points at the applicability 
of the ECHR in the Netherlands.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES ARISING IN 
CONTEXT OF FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
LEGISLATION
As has already been explained, new provisions have been introduced in the E-wet 
and the G-wet at the end of 2006 with respect to the further unbundling of 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings operating energy supply 
networks in the Netherlands1360, which are to be scrutinized for whether they 
comply with the fundamental right to property as set out in Article 1 of the First 
Protocol of the ECHR.
1. ARTICLE 1 OF 1ST PROTOCOL ECHR
Th e general discussion in the same section of the previous chapter 5 on Great 
Britain on the subject-matter of protection and on deprivation as well as on the 
margin of appreciation1361 and fair balance also apply here.
1358 ECJ, C-6/64 – Costa v. ENEL, n. 824.
1359 In contrast to Germany, see there.
1360 See in greater detail, nn. 1300–1309 and accompanying text.
1361 With respect to the ECtHR considering national authorities best equipped to know about the 
needs of their society in order to establish what is necessary in the general interest, one should 
think that the Dutch courts are better equipped to scrutinize whether the Dutch legislator 
pursued legitimate objectives of general interest by passing the splitsingswet. However, the 
Dutch judiciary seems to be very reluctant to interfere with the conscious political choice 
made by the legislative when passing legislation, the examination of which would draw the 
judiciary unduly into politically contentious issues. Consequently, on the basis of the Dutch 
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In particular in the context of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR, which 
protects the right to property, and the situation in the Netherlands, it needs to be 
emphasized that historically the ECHR has assumed that nationalization policies 
are suffi  ciently in the public or general interest1362 and thus within the margin of 
appreciation the ECtHR leaves to the signatory States of the ECHR with respect 
to the decision as to how to organize their system of property ownership. 
Accordingly, it can be concluded e contrario that the (substantive) privatization 
of formerly national economic sectors is a suffi  cient general interest covered by 
the margin of appreciation of States wishing to legislate in this regard.
2. PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS AS SUBJECT OF 
PROTECTION?
Before it can determined whether the provisions of the E-wet and G-wet at issue 
here are in confl ict with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, the question 
of who is protected, or in ECHR terms who is or can be the victim of state 
interference, requires clarifi cation. In this respect, the discussion in the previous 
chapter on Great Britain generally also applies here.
Th e Dutch government, however, claims that the question of protection according 
to Article 1 can only be posed with regard to the shareholders of vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings, and that, consequently, the holding 
companies of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings are irrelevant as 
subjects of protection of Article 1 so that such holding companies are not 
competent to rely on the ECHR. Because the holding companies of vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings are owned by public entities, it is claimed 
that these public undertakings are organizations related to public administration 
and that for that reason they are to be regarded as governmental organizations 
according to Article 34 ECHR. Th us, in addition to the discussion in the context 
of Great Britain, the question of whether such publicly controlled undertakings 
can be subject to protection is also dealt with here.
Grondwet, the judiciary has so far put great emphasis on the separation of powers when 
demarcating the competences of the judiciary from the ones of the legislative. See in greater 
detail, Bax in Koekkoek, n. 1356, pp. 547–8, with further to reference to relevant case law.
1362 Th us justifying an individual’s private compensation at less than market value, see Dignam/
Allen, n. 1145, p. 270. Th is historical stance is similar in EC Law, see Part 1 Chapter 3 when 
assessing Article 295 EC. Dignam, ibid., also claims that “[i]n this regard, the ECtHR has 
refl ected the intentions of the framers in the 1950s in promoting socialist policies and doctrines 
in preference to the economic ‘rights’ of individuals.”
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Although there is hardly any case law of the ECtHR, which deals with 
undertakings with public entities as shareholders, some indications of the Court 
can be taken as arguments in favour of the ability of such undertakings to invoke 
the ECHR. In Agrotexim v Greece (in detail referred to in section IV(2) of chapter 
5 on Great Britain) the Court established that it is not the rule to disregard the 
legal personality of a company as corporate body, but an exception to the rule; 
the legal person of the company is thus dealt with separately from its shareholders 
(which is also the case in the Netherlands, see below). Consequently, if, as is the 
case with the Dutch energy supply undertakings, which are subject to the 
amendments to the E-wet and G-wet discussed here, an undertaking possesses 
the status of a legal person according to national law, it does in principle enjoy 
the protection of the ECHR.
In the Netherlands, the NV (naamloze vennootschap), the legal form in which the 
holding companies of the vertically integrated energy network operators are 
incorporated, fulfi ls the prerequisites of legal personality necessary in the context 
of the application of the ECHR. Corporate entities or (public or private) limited 
companies are bodies corporate separate from their incorporating shareholders, 
i.e. independent institutions with their own organization and competences.
In the Netherlands, this structural separation is further deepened by the so-called 
structuurregime or structuurregeling, which applies to public limited (liability) 
companies of a certain size, which includes large energy supply undertakings 
such as Nuon and Essent.1363 Until the end of 2004, one consequence of this 
regime was that the supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen) was not only 
largely independent of the general meeting of shareholders but also had a much 
greater infl uence on the undertaking’s management than in the case of corporate 
entities not falling under this regime.1364
1363 See M Roggenkamp, ‘Splitsing energiebedrijven en de gevolgen voor gemeenten en provincies’, 
(2006) Gst. 383, 385–6. Th e size of company the structuurregime applies to is prescribed in the 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code), Boek 2 (Rechtspersonen (legal persons)), Articles 152 
et seq. (Titel 4: Naamloze vennootschappen) and Articles 262 et seq. (Titel 5: Besloten 
vennootschappen met beperkte aansprakelijkheid).
1364 Th e corporate governance of Dutch public limited liability companies (Naamloze 
Vennootschappen or NVs) consists of a two-tier board structure with a management board 
(Raad van Bestuur) in charge of the day-to-day operations of the fi rm and a supervisory board 
(Raad van Commissarissen). Th e supervisory board’s scope of infl uence varies substantially 
depending on which organizational regime the fi rm adopts. Th e structuurregeling applies to 
the majority of NVs listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Until the end of 2004 when the 
law was changed, two of the main functions of the supervisory board were the appointment 
and dismissal of the members of the management board, and the approval of, for example, 
acquisitions and disposals. Until then, members of the supervisory board were appointed by 
the incumbent members of the supervisory board. In practice, the management board had a 
very large infl uence on appointments to the supervisory board. Under the structuurregime as 
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In July 2004, the Eerste Kamer approved a bill revising the structuurregeling, 
which entered into force in autumn 2004. As a result, the shareholders gained 
greater control, in particular in companies governed by the structuurregime. Th e 
general meeting of shareholders now has the right to appoint and dismiss the 
supervisory board. Resolutions of the managing board of an N.V. leading to 
important changes in the identity or character of the company or business now 
require the approval of the general meeting. Th is applies in particular to 
resolutions transferring most or the entire business of the company, entering or 
terminating long-term co-operations such as joint ventures, and acquiring or 
disposing of a company interest with a value of at least one third of the balance 
sheet total. Th e rule that the supervisory board appoints and dismisses the 
managing directors remained unchanged.1365
Th e corporate governance1366 of a NV includes diff erent bodies with their own 
competences and the corporate entity’s own interest is distinguished from the 
interest of its shareholders. Th e distribution of competences depends on what is 
provided for by the law and the constitution of the company (statuten). It can 
thus be the case that the board of directors can hold competences which are 
it stood at the time the shareholders, apart from exerting informal infl uence were able to 
exercise their infl uence at the annual meeting of shareholders (Algemene Vergadering van 
Aandeelhouders) only on few important issues: they could vote on the fi nancial statement 
draft ed by the supervisory board without amending it and they could nominate supervisory 
board members but the actual election was made by the incumbent members of the supervisory 
board. Th e Dutch annual meeting diff ered in this respect radically from its German and UK 
counterparts, where, in principle, shareholders have a powerful eff ect on the course of events 
(and on the management) primarily by electing the supervisory board (or board of directors) 
and voting on important matters brought before shareholders. See in greater detail, R Chirinko, 
H Garretsen, E Sterken, ‘Corporate Control Mechanisms, Voting And Cash Flow Rights, And 
Th e Performance Of Dutch Firms’, CCSO Working Papers, University of Groningen, January 
2003.
1365 See in greater detail, F Buijn, M van Olff en et al., ‘Change of ‘structure regime’ – statutory basis 
for Corporate Governance Code’, Legal Alert, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, 7 July 2004. 
Th e structuurregime is certainly one reason why the Dutch municipalities and the provinces as 
the public shareholders and thus owners of the energy supply companies concerned have so far 
not exerted too great an infl uence on the management of these undertakings. Another reason 
has already been indicated supra, which is that since the beginning of the liberalization 
process, the provincial and municipal governments have not been allowed (according to 
Article 83 E-wet 1998 and Article 62 G-wet) to exert any infl uence on the functioning of the 
Dutch energy sector by way of secondary legislation, which has ever since then been the 
responsibility of the Dutch central government. Moreover, the Articles of Association (statuten) 
of the large energy supply companies limit the powers of the shareholders even further as 
regards the ability to distribute profi t and to change the Articles, see Roggenkamp, n. 1363, 
p. 385. With regard to the distribution of profi ts, see further infra where compensation issues 
are discussed. Th e, at times, wide shareholder base (albeit usually with one or two dominant 
shareholders) has also not been helpful with respect to exerting infl uence on the energy 
undertaking’s running of its business.
1366 See n. 1364.
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usually in the remit of the owners, i.e. the shareholders of the NV, such as the sale 
of subsidiaries. An example of a confl ict between shareholders and their company 
was the sale by ABN AMRO Holding of its subsidiary, LaSalle:
“[It has rightly been established] (i) that the determination of the strategy of the 
company and the undertaking connected thereto in principle is a matter for the 
management of the company, (ii) that the supervisory board control such matter and 
(iii) that the general meeting of the shareholders can express its opinion on this matter 
by exercising its rights conferred upon it by law and the company’s constitution. In 
general, the latter means that the management of a company is accountable for its 
decision to the general meeting of shareholders but it is, save where the law and the 
company’s constitution provide otherwise, not obliged to ask the general meeting in 
advance of its decisions if such decisions are made within the scope of the management’s 
competences.”1367
Th is means that the board of directors of a company is, under certain 
circumstances, competent to sell fi nancial participations in the company such as 
shareholdings. Accordingly, because the management has its own competences, 
the personality of the shareholders of a company should not be confused with 
that of the company they own.1368 Consequently, the holding of a vertically 
integrated energy network undertaking can in principle be subject of the 
protection off ered by Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR.1369
However, the holding of a Dutch vertically integrated energy supply company 
can only invoke the ECHR if it is not a governmental organization in the sense of 
Article 34 ECHR. From Article 34, when read in conjunction with Article 1 
ECHR, it can be inferred that state institutions and their organs are not allowed 
to invoke the ECHR. Whether a (legal) person or institution is to be regarded as 
part of the state sphere can best determined if such person or institution possesses 
or exercises public authority and/or is embedded in the state organization.1370
1367 Hoge Raad (HR), LJN: BA7970, paragraph 4.3, 13 July 2007, (2007) NJ 434 (with comments 
Maeijer), and (2007) Rechtspraak Ondernemingsrecht (RO) 472 (with comments Wenk); 
additions and English translation by author.
1368 But see Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 182, 190–1.
1369 It should be noted though that the Dutch State as sole “shareholder” of the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings operating energy networks (via Dutch municipalities and 
provinces as subordinate parts of the Dutch State), by amending the E-wet and G-wet (at least 
with the absolute prohibition on privatizing energy networks and their operation) makes it 
clear that the management of the formally privatized undertakings may not transfer energy 
networks and their operation to private parties. Th e Dutch State thus changes the coordinates 
for the organization of legal persons, see further n. 1192 and accompanying text, by securing 
or extending the rights of the shareholders in the energy supply undertakings. To some extent, 
the Dutch State is therefore expanding the post-2004 structuurregime, see n. 1365 and 
accompanying text, for energy supply undertakings.
1370 Barkhuysen/vanEmmerik, n. 1170, p. 16.
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Although the case law seems to be rather fragmented, what is clear is that an 
organization does not lose its non-governmental status if it pursues aims which 
are also pursued by the State, or when it exercises functions, which the State 
claims are in the general interest.1371
Whereas the supply and distribution of electricity and gas had indeed always 
been perceived as a state task par excellence, this picture has, however, now 
changed decisively in that it is now recognized that within certain limits, such 
tasks can also be exposed to market forces. With the E-wet and the G-wet, the 
legislator voted for the gradual liberalization of the energy markets. One 
component of this liberalization process was the (organizational) privatization of 
energy supply undertakings in order to participate in the competitive 
process.1372
Th e formal autonomy1373 of the energy supply undertaking is further reinforced 
by the fact that each of the vertically integrated Dutch energy supply undertakings, 
which are subject to the new provisions in the E-wet and G-wet discussed here 
and thus might be able to claim victim status (i.e. to assert rights) under the 
ECHR, is held by several public shareholders, i.e. provinces and municipalities 
which do not necessarily speak with one voice but have divergent budgetary 
interests.1374
As a result of what has just been established, it is indeed diffi  cult to assume that 
the Dutch energy supply undertakings owning energy networks possess public 
authority. Consequently, these undertakings are not to be assumed to be 
1371 ECtHR, Holy Monasteries, n. 1169. Th e Dutch State arguably felt responsible for energy supply 
(although the law has never conferred this responsibility upon the State), and with this goal in 
mind set up the energy supply undertakings in question here. See also ECtHR, Ayuntamiento 
de Mula v Spain, no. 553346/00, ECHR 2001-I, where the Court considers local authorities as 
governmental organizations because they fulfi l public tasks. Th e Court also refers to 
international law where “governmental organizations” do not only mean the State itself but 
also non central authorities.
1372 See nn 1268–1270 and accompanying text where the issue of privatization is discussed.
1373 Which seems to be in the mind of the ECtHR when stating that the “lift ing of the corporate veil 
[happens] only in exceptional circumstances.” See n. 1190 and accompanying text. But see also 
Dignam/Allen, n. 1145, pp. 182, 190–1.
1374 Th is argument is, however, weakened to some extent because all the shareholders belong to one 
of the layers of the decentralized unitary Dutch State and thus to the same sphere (much more 
than, for instance, in the federal state Germany, which aff ords its municipalities a special 
institutional guarantee). Th e European Commission, however, seems in its recent unbundling 
proposal to consider diff erent layers of state administration independent enough (albeit not 
distinguishing between diff erent types of state organization) when it calls unbundling and 
transferring energy transmission networks held by state run energy supply undertakings to a 
diff erent part of the state organization “ownership” unbundling, see in greater detail, infra 
chapter 7 on the European Union, section II(3).
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embedded in the state structure to the extent that would make them governmental 
organizations in the sense of Article 34 ECHR.1375 Th e fact that the energy supply 
undertakings in question here are held (in private legal form) by decentralized 
state institutions does not lead to excluding them from claiming victim status 
according to Article 34 ECHR in order to rely on the protection of their right to 
property as set out in Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. Pre-
liberalization, it might have been easier to classify such undertakings as 
governmental organizations. Th is has, however, changed now that the energy 
supply sector is (or is in the process of being) liberalized, which is only possible if 
energy supply is no longer perceived as a task to be exclusively pursued by the 
State.1376
V. APPLICATION TO FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
MEASURES
Th ree of the new provisions introduced in the E-wet and G-wet with respect to the 
further unbundling of vertically integrated energy supply undertakings operating 
energy networks, require closer scrutiny here1377:
Th e fi rst issue to be examined is the transfer by law of the operation of all 
electricity networks from 110 kV upwards to the national electricity transmission 
system operator TenneT from 1 January 2008, which also takes over the task of 
investing in the networks it operates. Th e second issue is that from 1 July 2008, 
every integrated energy network operator other than the national electricity 
transmission system operator TenneT must have the economic “ownership” of 
the networks it operates. Th e third issue is the enforcement of the groepsverbod 
from 1 July 2008, according to which no legal entity which is part of the current 
vertically integrated energy supply holding companies, is allowed to hold any 
shares in network operation undertakings, which are appointed as energy 
distribution network operators from 1 July 2008; for both electricity and gas 
network operation undertakings already appointed on 1 July 2008, splitsing must 
be enforced on 1 January 2011 by the latest.
Th e transfer to TenneT and the groepsverbod both concern vertically integrated 
energy undertakings, which possess the right to use energy networks. Th e 
question of where exactly the ownership of the energy networks lies (i.e. with the 
1375 Which does, however, not mean that they are to be assumed to be substantially privatized.
1376 If at all the State bears a residual responsibility in this respect as a result of which it continues 
to supervise (certain features of) energy supply by way of regulation. On this issue, see chapter 
4 on Germany.
1377 See in greater detail, nn. 1300–1309 and accompanying text.
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public bodies or shareholders of the vertically integrated undertakings, the Dutch 
municipalities and provinces, or with the vertically integrated undertakings 
themselves) is therefore not relevant here.1378
What follows fi rst is the determination, for each of these three issues separately, 
of the question of whether and if so to what extent they are deprivations of 
property according to Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR (1–3). Th is 
section will then conclude with some discussion of whether the Dutch State has 
acted within its margin of appreciation when introducing these further 
unbundling measures and whether a fair balance has been struck between the 
general interest and the rights of the energy undertakings concerned (4).
1. TRANSFER OF ECONOMIC “OWNERSHIP”
Irrespective of whether the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking, 
which holds the economic “ownership” of the energy networks to be transferred 
to the integrated network operation company1379, is also the legal owner of the 
networks or not, the economic “ownership” is an economic interest. However, 
depending on whether legal ownership also lies with the current holder of the 
economic “ownership” or not, the economic interest is either independently 
protected or merely a part of the more comprehensive right, i.e. the legal ownership, 
which then is the subject-matter of protection.
In any event, as regards the forced transfer of economic “ownership”, one cannot 
assume a deprivation of property in the form of expropriation or de facto 
expropriation. Th is is because the right to dispose of the economic “ownership” 
is not lost (completely), but has merely converted to a diff erent form, i.e. from 
immediate possession to intermediate possession (meaning mediated through its 
position as (sole) shareholder of the integrated network operation company).
Th us, the forced transfer of economic “ownership” is a deprivation of direct use 
(or non-use)1380 or control, which means a reorganization of the vertically 
integrated undertaking’s structure or the regulation of an individual competence 
which forms part of the right to property in the form of legal ownership or 
economic “ownership” of the energy networks concerned.1381
1378 See nn. 1294–1297 and accompanying text.
1379 In order to create so-called “fat” integrated network operation companies, see n. 1291.
1380 Th e right to property comprises of the positive and the negative right to use, i.e. to do or not to 
do with one’s property whatever one pleases.
1381 Consideration is to be paid according to Article 10a(3) E-wet and Article 3b(3) G-wet in order 
to compensate for this deprivation in the form of a reorganization of the property rights in the 
energy networks, and for the “loss” of assets in the balance sheets. Th is sort of regulation most 
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2. TRANSFER OF NETWORK OPERATION
Th e amended E-wet further transfers the right to operate all electricity networks 
from 110 kV upwards, for which the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings still hold the economic “ownership” (which includes the right to 
use), to the national electricity network operator TenneT as of 1 January 2008.1382 
Th ese networks are legally owned by those undertakings or their public 
shareholders; economic “ownership” does not have to be transferred thus leaving 
the network assets on their balance sheet.1383
Th e right to operate such networks is an economic activity, which is normally 
protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. Th e operation of these 
networks or, in other words, the ability to control their use is, however, an 
individual competence which is a part of the right of economic “ownership” or 
legal ownership of the network property (as the case may be), which, as has just 
been said, does not have to be transferred.
Th us, looking at the boundary between deprivation of property and the control/
regulation of its use, the case at hand is to be classifi ed as the latter1384, in 
particular since the vertically integrated energy undertakings concerned receive 
a capital interest from TenneT1385 and do not have to bear the responsibility for 
and thus the risk of investment.1386
resembles the extent of interference admissible under Article 9(2) GG, which is the German 
constitutional law protection of the fundamental right of association; see further chapter 4 on 
Germany.
1382 Th is does not apply to the Dutch vertically integrated energy supply undertakings Eneco and 
Nuon (with its network operation Continuon Randmeren), which obtained an exemption for 
those networks encumbered with cross-border leases; both continue to operate and invoice for 
the use of the respective networks themselves. See also nn. 1301 and 1321 and accompanying 
text.
1383 See in this respect, n. 1297 and accompanying text.
1384 To give up network operation and leave it to an independent TSO regulates or determines the 
substance of network ownership because the network owner is not able to make full use of its 
property (or economic “ownership”) any more; it can, however, not be classifi ed as an outright 
expropriation (full deprivation of property) because the network owner retains its network 
property or at least the economic “ownership”.
1385 See n. 1302 and accompanying text.
1386 Th e ISO model of TenneT not only confers upon it the competence to operate the electricity 
transmission networks. TenneT must also assume the fi nancial responsibility for investing 
into the electricity grids on its own account. Th is form of independent system operation diff ers 
from the European Commission model of independent system operation, which includes the 
power for the ISO to make investment decisions which the network owner has to implement; 
see the extensive discussion in chapter 4 on Germany. Th e Dutch model, however, fulfi ls the 
ownership unbundling requirements of the Commission’s proposals, which, for vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings in public hands, only demand legal unbundling: both, 
TenneT and the energy supply companies are private legal persons entirely owned by the Dutch 
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3. GROEPSVERBOD
Th e groepsverbod prohibits electricity and gas distribution network operators 
from being part of a vertically integrated energy supply undertaking pursuing 
competitive activities such as production, generation, supply or trade of electricity 
and gas. Th is means that undertakings in the Netherlands pursuing distribution 
network operation activities (through legally separate network operation 
subsidiaries holding the economic “ownership” of the networks they operate) 
have a choice of giving up either their network operation activities1387 or the 
remaining competitive activities by transfer to another legal person outside the 
current vertically integrated holding structure. Th ereaft er, the two legal persons 
pursuing the network and competitive activities, respectively, will either share 
the same ultimate public shareholders1388 or, in case the competitive activities are 
directly sold to private parties, belong to public shareholders and private parties, 
respectively.
Since the competitive and network operation activities are already being pursued, 
or, in other words, the freedom to pursue a business or to use or operate the 
distribution networks are already exercised, it is clear that the groepsverbod 
interferes with the existing economic rights and interests of the energy supply 
undertakings concerned and that these represent a suffi  ciently certain economic 
value.
Th e competitive activities are legally owned by the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings. As regards the distribution network activities, these are 
either in their economic “ownership” only (without being legal owners), which 
allocates them a legal (and not only fi nancial) sphere (and rights) independent of 
the actual legal owners, or these undertakings are indeed the legal owners.
State and its subdivisions, the municipalities and the provinces. Th e consequence of the Dutch 
ISO model is that no tension can arise between the competence to operate the networks and 
the fi nancial risk because there is no separation between the investment decision maker and 
the bearer of the risk held responsible or fi nancially liable if the investment proves to be a 
commercially fl awed decision. Th is is also alleviated by the fact that TenneT does possess 
major assets because it operates the state-owned grids under its economic “ownership”, see 
TenneT’s 2003 accounts (jaarverslag).
1387 By either closing their network operation companies down and appointing a new network 
operator thereby selling the economic “ownership” of such companies or by selling the entire 
network operation business.
1388 Which as shareholders of the holding company belong(ed), strictly speaking, to the group 
structure of the vertically integrated energy supply undertaking so that the energy networks 
and their operation, albeit leaving the holding structure, “merely” shift  within the group 
structure.
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By requiring the surrender of the commercial activities, the groepsverbod would 
result in a deprivation of property in the form of a straightforward expropriation 
of commercial property and of an economic activity.
Surrendering the economic “ownership” (without having the legal ownership) of 
the networks would mean a deprivation of property in the form of an economic 
interest independent of the “main” right (i.e. the legal ownership of the networks), 
and an economic activity, i.e. the operation of the energy distribution networks.
Surrendering the economic “ownership” (as legal owner) of the networks, the 
groepsverbod would lead to a deprivation of property in the form of a de facto 
expropriation of network property because it leaves the legal right or title to the 
network ownership as an “empty shell” (with the formal right to sell the property 
as a mere relic) without any value, which becomes even more apparent if one 
considers that the legal owner is not competent to appoint the network 
operator1389 and that the prohibition of substantive privatization1390 additionally 
extremely limits the range of potential purchasers and thus the purchase price to 
be achieved very likely to stay far below market value.1391 Th e groepsverbod would 
here also lead to a deprivation of property in the form of a straight-forward 
expropriation of an economic activity, i.e. the operation of the energy distribution 
networks.
It is questionable though whether the groepsverbod can be interpreted as a 
deprivation of property at all in the sense of a forced transfer of ownership in a 
legal sense because the groepsverbod does not demand the surrender of a specifi c 
property thus leading to a specifi c deprivation, but leaves some leeway (as just 
described) for its enforcement. Th e only thing the groepsverbod makes clear is 
what is not allowed to happen, which is that the network operator remains part of 
a group of companies containing other corporate legal persons which generate 
1389 See n. 1298 and accompanying text.
1390 See nn. 1276, 1279 and accompanying text.
1391 De facto expropriation is likely to be successful here, against the trend, see Müller-Michaels, n. 
535, pp. 75–6, because no sensible alternative way of using the network property would be left  
to the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings legally owning the networks; the only 
sensible use of the networks is and can be made by the economic “owners” of the networks. It 
is the economic “ownership” or use of the networks (which is the subject matter of the 
depriavation) which is the only basis for the determination of the value of the network property. 
Nor is the preservation of the property value as alternative use applicable here because the 
value of the network property shift s to the economic “owner”, and the legal title in itself is 
worthless. At the time that the energy supply undertakings were formally privatized, see n. 
1268 and accompanying text, and/or became legal and/or economic owner of the energy 
networks, the groepsverbod and thus the deprivation was not foreseeable either, a factor to be 
taken into consideration when assessing whether a de facto expropriation has taken place, see 
Müller-Michaels, ibid. See also nn. 559, 1161.
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electricity, produce gas or supply energy.1392 Th is means that there is no forced 
transfer of property of any kind to the State, the originator of the expropriating 
legislation (except for the fact that network ownership and operation must stay 
within the state sphere (prohibition of substantive privatization); State sphere 
means the members of the current circle of state entities holding shares in the 
energy supply undertakings with integrated network operation companies).1393 
Th is is so because the groepsverbod can equally well be fulfi lled by selling the 
commercial activities to private parties directly (thus leading to a substantive 
privatization in this respect).
However, the sale or transfer of property to private parties is indeed to be regarded 
as deprivation of property under the ECHR despite the fact that it is not a forced 
transfer of property to the State. Th is is because the transfer is imposed by a state 
measure and not based on free will; the fact that there is a choice between 
alternatives is not relevant because ultimately, one or the other property must be 
surrendered, both the alternative choices leading to a deprivation of property.
Th is view is supported by the ECtHR according to which it seems to suffi  ce that 
the State has ordered the sale in order to invoke Article 1 of the First Protocol of 
the ECHR in a case like this. Th is can be inferred from Kanala1394 where the 
Court establishes that an execution ordered by a judge cannot be regarded as an 
expropriation by the State but nevertheless leads to a deprivation of the applicant’s 
property.1395
To sum up, the groepsverbod is to be classifi ed as deprivation of property 
(expropriation or de facto expropriation) rather than a deprivation of the right to 
use, control, let or sell (regulation of ownership). Th e property protected here is 
either
– the commercial property and economic activity or
– the independent economic interest (stand-alone economic “ownership”) and 
the economic activity or
– the legal ownership of the networks (by way of de facto expropriation).
1392 What the groepsverbod in essence requires is that not only do the current vertically integrated 
energy undertakings have to dispose of “their” economic “ownership” but also that the legal 
owner is likely to have to approve of the disposal according to the new structuurregime in place 
since the end of 2004, see n. 1365 and accompanying text. Consequently, should a vertically 
integrated energy undertaking not be the legal owner of “its” energy networks, then the public 
shareholder(s) who is (are) the legal owner(s) of the energy networks would also have to 
participate in the disposal of the economic “ownership” of the energy networks.
1393 As defi ned in the Regeling (Regulation) eigendom energienetten van de Minister van 
Economische Zaken van 25 januari 2008, nr. WJZ 8008859, Stc. 2008, nr. 42 / pag. 9.
1394 ECtHR, Kanala, n. 1196.
1395 See n. 1197 as regards the German terminology in this respect.
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In all three cases, a deprivation of property also takes place with respect to a 
straightforward expropriation of an economic activity, either as regards the 
deprivation of commercial activities or the deprivation of the operation of the 
distribution networks.1396
Further, the economic “ownership” of the energy distribution networks must be 
carved out of the current holding structure and must remain within the current 
circle of the public shareholders, which is in eff ect a prohibition of substantive 
privatization of the energy distribution networks and their operation. On the 
other hand, the commercial activities can be sold directly to private parties thus 
permitting substantive privatizations in this regard.
As the property transfer is enforced by a state measure, i.e. by the relevant 
legislation, and has thus been ordered by the State, the State can be held 
responsible for the deprivation of property, one way or the other. In principle, the 
Dutch State would therefore have to make provision (in or by law) for just 
compensation, a question however, which is discussed below.
4. MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND FAIR BALANCE
All three legislative measures discussed before have to pass the fair balance test 
which the ECtHR applies in all cases of interference with the rights conferred by 
Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR, no matter which sort of deprivation is 
at stake. What needs to be borne in mind though is that the fair balance test rarely 
results in a state intervention being declared illegal.1397 Th is normally only 
happens in cases where the State has evidently overstepped its margin of 
appreciation with respect to whether a general interest justifi es the measure 
constituting the state interference, or in other words if the motives of the state for 
pursuing certain measures are manifestly unreasonable. Th e ECtHR considers 
this margin to be rather wide as long as the state measure complained about is in 
the general interest, which local governments are supposed to know best1398, a 
1396 As already mentioned supra, Article 1 of the First Protocol is extensively interpreted by the 
ECtHR whereas in Germany, the protection of the right to property according to Article 14 GG 
is unlikely to cover the economic activity as well, see n. 1198.
1397 See chapter 5 section IV(1)(c).
1398 Th e ECHR does not distinguish between various types of general interest, i.e. whether they are 
of economic or non-economic nature, which may play some role in the justifi cation of 
impediment of EC fundamental freedoms such as Article 56, see R Streinz, Europarecht, 8rd 
ed., 2008, no. 833. But even if such a distinction were to be made, the functioning of the 
(internal) market and undistorted competition (albeit on the face of it economic general 
interests) serve the functioning of the economy and thus society as a whole so that they also are 
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principle of deference to national government which is followed by the Dutch 
judiciary. Th ey thus test these objectives rather cautiously.
Th e degree of reasonableness of the general interest justifi cation becomes relevant 
when weighed against the private interests of the complainant in order to fi nd 
out whether a fair balance has been struck between the general interest and the 
private interest, or, in other words, whether the measures taken are proportionate 
to the aims pursued. Where the fair balance or proportionality test (which is part 
of the assessment of the margin of appreciation and the question of lawfulness 
which turns on matters such as the predictability of state measures) shows, 
however, that there are less intrusive means available to achieve the general 
interest objectives, this usually only infl uences the amount of compensation to be 
paid (instead of the state measure being struck out as disproportionate).1399
Th us, the measures discussed here will only briefl y be assessed as to whether they 
are appropriate and necessary to achieve the general interest objectives of the 
Dutch legislator. Of greater if not predominant signifi cance in the particular 
Dutch scenario is the issue of the compensation the energy companies receive for 
their breaking-up.
Th e case of the Netherlands is particular because here a rather paradoxical 
situation arises. On the one hand, it can be argued that the energy companies 
concerned are victims according to the ECHR and can thus rely on fundamental 
rights protection, on the other hand, any compensation payable is only on the 
face of it a remedy for these companies as they will not benefi t from it in 
substance.
Margin of appreciation
Starting with the margin of appreciation, there is no cause for doubt that in 
principle the general interest for introducing further unbundling legislation 
includes legitimate aims. Th e government sets out their objectives as follows1400:
– defi nitive independence and integrity of the Dutch energy network;
– guaranteed level playing fi eld for all energy suppliers active in the Netherlands 
for the benefi t of consumers; and
– reducing the burden imposed by the supervision and regulation of the energy 
sector.
to be seen as non-economic general interest, which are, in any event, imperative reasons of 
general interest.
1399 See in greater detail, chapter 5 section IV(1)(c).
1400 Letter of 7 June 2007, n. 1310, summarizes the objectives of the splitsingswet.
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Th ese further broad objectives were detailed in previous offi  cial documents1401:
– creating transparency in energy markets: the Dutch government claims that 
vertical integration can lead to cross-subsidies, exchange of information, and 
favoured treatment (both fi nancial and non-fi nancial) of the integrated supply 
business, which harms transparency and the level playing fi eld;
– guaranteeing security and reliability of supply and thus public order and 
security by ensuring that the operation of the energy networks is pursued 
independently and under public control; and
– protecting network customers and consumers: customers are supposed to 
benefi t from the groepsverbod by way of more transparency, greater choice and 
the expected introduction of new and innovative services.1402
1401 See, for instance, the original motives or legislative memorandum (memorie van toelichting), 
n. 1294, p. 43, and the further elaboration on the motives of legislation in the nadere memorie 
van antwoord of 31 October 2006, Eerste Kamer, 2006–2007, 30212, F, pp. 32–3.
1402 Th ese objectives fi nd some support in the motives of the current EC Energy Directives and the 
proposals of the European Commission of 19 September 2007 to revise the current energy 
legislation; in the context of the latter, the Commission in its Explanatory Memorandum of 
19 September 2007, n. 15, refers to the experience (doubtful and in parts rebutting the 
conclusions drawn from this experience, Pielow, n. 11) with integrated TSOs where it claims 
that three problems would arise: First, the TSO might treat its affi  liated companies better than 
competing third parties by using its network assets to make entry more diffi  cult for competitors. 
For this claim, the Commission refers to economic theory, according to which legal and 
functional unbundling did not solve the fundamental confl ict of interest within integrated 
companies, whereby the supply and production interests aim to maximise their sales and 
market share while the network operator is obliged to off er non-discriminatory access to 
competitors. Th is inherent confl ict of interest would make it almost impossible to control the 
problem by regulatory means as the independence of the transmission system operator within 
an integrated company would be impossible to monitor without an excessively burdensome 
and intrusive regulation. Secondly, the Commission claims that under the current unbundling 
rules, non-discriminatory access to information could not be guaranteed as there would be no 
eff ective means of preventing transmission system operators releasing market sensitive 
information to the generation or supply branch of the integrated company. Th irdly, the 
Commission claims that investment incentives within an integrated company were distorted. 
Vertically integrated network operators had no incentive for developing the network in the 
overall interests of the market and hence for facilitating new entry at generation or supply 
levels; on the contrary, it claims, they had an inherent interest in limiting new investment 
when this investment would benefi t its competitors and bring new competition onto the 
incumbent’s “home market”. Instead, the investment decisions made by vertically integrated 
companies tended to be biased to the needs of supply affi  liates. Such companies would seem 
particularly disinclined to increase interconnection or gas import capacity and thereby boost 
competition in the incumbent’s home market to the detriment of the internal market. In 
conclusion, the Commission contends that a company that remains vertically integrated has an 
in-built incentive both to under-invest in new networks (fearing that such investments would 
help competitors to thrive in “its” home market) and to privilege its own sales companies when 
it comes to network access. Th is would damage the EU’s competitiveness and its security of 
supply and prejudice the attainment of its climate change and environmental objectives.” See 
already Part 1 Chapters 1 and 2.
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Th e Raad van State1403 as the institution of the Dutch government which provides 
independent advice did not fi nd any cause to question these reasons of general 
interest put forward by the Dutch government1404:
“In the motives (Memorie van Toelichting), it is outlined that the legislation on the 
unbundling of the energy supply undertakings [splitsingswet] aims at safeguarding 
the structural independence of the network operators and related thereto the 
transparency on the energy market. Th e Raad is of the opinion that these are general 
interests, which can justify the unbundling. In this context, it refers to the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ where such aims albeit not yet explicitly recognized as legitimate imperative 
reasons [imperative reasons of general interest or rule of reason-exceptions in the 
context of Article 56 EC] can be inferred from. Th e ECJ has decided in its Golden 
Share cases that ensuring the stocking of energy (for the reason of security of supply) 
can be regarded as a reason of public security, which can justify an impediment of the 
free movement [of capital]. Other aims of general interest, which the Treaty and the 
ECJ recognize as legitimate imperative reasons are the public order and the protection 
of consumers.”1405
In addition to what have been put forward as general interest reasons for the 
introduction of further unbundling measures, the absolute prohibition of 
privatization of energy networks and their operation also appears to be a 
legitimate aim of the Dutch legislator; it aims at retaining the network part of the 
energy sector entirely in national ownership, an aim which was accepted as 
1403 Th e Raad van State is the most important advice institution of the Dutch government. Its tasks 
are set out in Articles 73–75 of the Dutch Grondwet. One of these tasks is the giving of advice 
on legislative bills, which are checked with respect to their quality and enforceability, and their 
compatibility with the Grondwet and other laws and treaties. Th e Raad must always be involved 
before a bill goes to Parliament. It either approves of it (1), does not have any (grave) concerns 
and recommends amendments to the motives or bill itself (2 & 3), does have objections to one 
or more parts of the bill, which can in most cases be rectifi ed (an advice which was given in the 
case of the splitsingswet) (4), or it does have gave objections, which are diffi  cult or impossible to 
rectify and recommends not sending it to Parliament (5 & 6). In the case of the last three 
outcomes of an advice, the bill must be submitted to the Ministry of Justice and approved by 
the cabinet of Ministers before it can be sent to Parliament. Th e advice of the Raad van State is 
of great importance for the subsequent debate in Parliament.
1404 See the advice of the Raad van State, n. 588, p. 10 (translation by the author), in the context of 
assessing any unjustifi ed interferences with Article 56 EC. According to the author, the 
evaluation of the general objections is valid; the author does not, however, consider Article 56 
EC applicable in the context of the further unbundling legislation discussed here now that it 
has ultimately been decided to prohibit any privatization, see further infra. Th e Raad van State 
gave its advice at a time when partial privatization (in the form of a minority stake for private 
investors) was still considered an option.
1405 Additions by the author. With respect to the general interest objectives given by the Minister 
of Economic Aff airs, the Raad van State in its recommendations only expands on them and on 
the further reasons named by the Raad van State in the motives of the splitsingswet bill but 
other than that did not have any concerns about or objections to the objectives pursued by the 
Minister.
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falling outside the remit of the ECHR when the Convention was fi rst 
established.1406
Further, these additional unbundling measures do not go beyond the Dutch 
legislator’s margin of appreciation just because they exceed current and proposed 
European unbundling requirements as set out in the 2003 and proposed Energy 
Directives.1407 In this respect, there is not much to add to the following statements 
of the Dutch government on 31 October 20061408:
“From the case law [of the ECJ] it can […] be inferred that in as far as a Member State 
wishes to introduce a measure which exceeds a European Directive, and where no 
complete harmonization exists as yet, the compatibility of such a measure must be 
checked against the general principles of the EC Treaty as interpreted by case law 
[reference is made to ECJ, 14 December 2004, C-309/02, Radlberger, nos 52–83]. Only 
if the measure to be introduced impedes the eff ective working of the applicable 
Directive or contains a deviation from what the Directive intends to harmonize is 
there a special obligation to justify the introduction of the measure. [Articles 95(4) and 
(5) EC are not applicable] just because […] a national measure is concerned which 
exceeds a community minimum harmonization. Article 95(4) and (5) EC are instead 
targeted at a situation where a Member State wishes to establish a national provision 
which deviates from a community harmonization measure, for instance, in the area of 
environmental protection. […].”1409
Th e measures at issue here do not contravene the harmonization eff orts of the 
current or proposed Energy Directives just because they exceed the minimum 
harmonization eff orts of the current European legislation and deal with energy 
distribution network unbundling, whereas the tabled proposals are only 
concerned with energy transmission network unbundling.1410
1406 See n. 1362 and accompanying text with respect to nationalizations and, a contrario, 
privatizations in the context of the ECHR. See also, in the context of the European Union and 
by way of comparison, the interpretation of Article 295 EC, Part 1 Chapter 3 supra; in the EU 
once substantive privatizations have taken place, the EC Treaty provisions are fully 
applicable.
1407 Th e 2003 Energy Directives explicitly provide for the possibility of further unbundling 
measures, see Articles 10(1), 15(1) Electricity Directive 2003, Articles 9(1), 13(1) Gas Directive 
2003.
1408 See the nadere memorie van antwoord, n. 1401, p. 32.
1409 Additions and translations by the author.
1410 With respect to the reasons as to why no further unbundling measures have been taken as yet 
as regards the energy distribution networks, see Recitals 16 and 15 of the Commission’s 
proposals for Gas and Electricity Directives of 19 September 2007, n. 15.
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Predictability of the groepsverbod
Th e groepsverbod was included by the spiltsingswet in the E-wet and the G-wet 
and has thus become part of the legislation in a formal sense. Th e enforcement of 
the groepsverbod was initially delayed until certain conditions are satisfi ed.1411 In 
this context, it was left  to the Dutch government and the Minister responsible to 
determine the satisfaction of such conditions and consequently to enforce the 
groepsverbod.
As already stated above, the lawfulness or legality of state actions is normally not 
the decisive factor with respect to whether a fundamental right has been breached 
or not. Legal certainty and the predictability of legal provisions can however play 
a role when it comes to the appreciation of whether a fair balance has been struck 
between the general and private interests. Th e question here is whether the 
enforcement of the groepsverbod on 1 July 2008 was predictable for the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertaking concerned.1412
Th e request (motie) by Members of the Eerste Kamer that the outgoing Minister 
of Economic Aff airs, de Wijn1413, confi rm in writing that, until certain conditions 
had occurred, the part of the splitsingswet which contains the groepsverbod, 
would not be enforced1414, was the consequence of the fact that according to 
Article 85 Grondwet, the Eerste Kamer is not allowed to amend legislation 
forwarded to it by the Tweede Kamer. It can only pass or reject it as a whole. Th e 
motie also requested that before enforcement the two chambers of Parliament 
were to be “consulted”, which did not, however, require any approval of the 
Parliament.1415
From Article 86 Grondwet it follows that a bill can always be withdrawn before it 
has passed both chambers of Parliament. Further, any bills, which are still in the 
parliamentary procedure when a new Parliament is elected, do not count as 
1411 See nn. 1309 and 1310 and accompanying text.
1412 See nn. 1309 and 1310 and accompanying text with respect to the details of the conditions and 
the reasoning of the subsequent Minister of Economic Aff airs, van Hoeven, for enforcing the 
groepsverbod.
1413 Th e Minister of Economic Aff airs, de Wijn, left  offi  ce because general elections took place in 
November 2006 and consequently a new government with a new Minister of Economic Aff airs, 
van Hoeven, came into power in February 2007. Minister de Wijn confi rmed in writing that he 
would comply with the entire Motion and “promised” to explicitly bring this confi rmation to 
the attention of his successor as Minister, see in more detail nn. 1309 and 1310 and 
accompanying text.
1414 By Royal Decree (koninklijk besluit), which in the current context is in the sole remit of the 
government.
1415 See nn. 1309 and 1310 and accompanying text.
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withdrawn, i.e. these bills survive elections in the state they were left  when 
Parliament dissolved. Th is can be inferred from the fact that a law which was 
submitted by a Member of Parliament who has not been re-elected to the new 
Parliament, can continue to be promoted in the new Eerste Kamer by a Member 
of the Tweede Kamer. Further, a government cannot be bound by a previous 
government; this can be inferred e contrario from the fact that a new government 
can withdraw a bill submitted by the former government as long as it has not 
been passed by both chambers of Parliament.1416
As a consequence, the question of predictability does not arise here. An Act of 
Parliament, which could have caused such expectations/belief (that the 
groepsverbod would not be enforced), has never been passed. It does thus not 
matter in this context whether one or all of the conditions established by the 
motie of the Eerste Kamer were fulfi lled at the time the groepsverbod was enforced 
because the new government was not bound by its predecessor’s confi rmation of 
the motie.
Fair balance or proportionality test
For the three legislative measures discussed above not to be in breach of the 
fundamental right to property according to Article 1 if the First Protocol of the 
ECHR, they need to strike a fair balance between the State’s objectives in the 
general interest and the private interests of the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings subject to these three measures.
Th e measures have to be suitable to achieve the general interest aims. On the face 
of it, all three measures assist in achieving the objectives laid out above. However, 
some doubts do arise when considering the suitability of the groepsverbod:
First, the Netherlands appear to be only the second country so far, aft er New 
Zealand, to introduce such far reaching unbundling requirements for its 
distribution networks.1417 Th e development of competition in New Zealand 
failed, however, with the consequence that there, the ownership unbundled 
energy industry structure was abolished gradually over a period of some years 
with ex-ante sector regulation being tightened.1418
1416 See nn. 1309 and 1310 and accompanying text.
1417 New Zealand has forced ownership unbundling of the transmission and distribution networks 
onto its energy sector, see already n. 1226.
1418 On the New Zealand experience and reference thereto, see nn. 319, 1227 and accompanying 
text.
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Another New Zealand experience which is confi rmed by DTe and by developments 
in the EU, and which is related to the increase in (household) customer prices, is 
that aft er the separation of the retail businesses from the distribution networks, 
most of these businesses became vertically integrated in the fi ve large generators. 
Retail competition stopped as soon as vertical integration by the generators was 
fi nally accomplished in 2001. Th is process quickly foreclosed any subsequent 
retail entry, an eff ect, which would certainly corroborate the fi ndings of the 
energy sector enquiry conducted by the European Commission1419, which 
confi rmed that the energy market was consolidating and suff ering from a lack of 
new market entry.1420 Th e DTe had also already found in 2004 that ownership 
unbundling would lead to a higher concentration in electricity generation and 
wholesale, and the energy supply markets, with negative consequences for the 
functioning of the energy markets.1421
Secondly, Dutch economists have shown in a quantitative social cost and benefi t 
analysis that the groepsverbod is likely to result in a negative balance1422, i.e. that 
this measure is likely to be ineffi  cient from an economic point of view.1423 It has 
also been shown that distribution network ownership unbundling can be 
detrimental to the development of distributed generation.1424
1419 N. 3.
1420 Th e Commission’s policy on vertical and conglomerate mergers needs to be considered in the 
light of its ongoing concern about the increasing level of concentration in the EU’s gas and 
electricity markets. Th e Commission regards it as essential to ensure that large-scale mergers 
do not undermine the liberalisation process by creating an oligopolistic and non-competitive 
market structure. Critical in this regard, however, Th omas, nn. 317, 1105.
1421 See Brief (letter) van de Dienst uitvoering en toezicht Energie aan de Minister van Economische 
Zaken, Brinkhorst, ‘Advies onafh ankelijkheid netbeheer’ (advice on network operation 
independence), 15 April 2004, pp. 4–5.
1422 See Baarsma/de Nooij, n. 38.
1423 Th is analysis was provided in response to a “mere” qualitative social cost and benefi t analysis 
of CPB whose outcome had been ambiguous, see Mulder/Shestalova/Lijesen, n. 37. For further 
guidance on how ownership unbundling interferes with the current technical structure of the 
sector, see Finger/Künneke, n. 38. With particular focus on the further unbundling of the 
Dutch electricity distribution networks, see also R Künneke, T Fens, ‘Ownership unbundling 
in electricity distribution: Th e case of Th e Netherlands’, (2007) Energy Policy 1920. See also 
more generally and extensively with respect to the ineffi  ciency of further unbundling measures, 
the discussion in Part 1 Chapter 2.
1424 See for more detail, Brunekreeft /Ehlers, nn. 8, 38. Distributed generation (more particularly 
CHP) contributes a large share towards electricity generation in the Netherlands, see n. 1270, 
and is clearly on the Commission’s agenda, see the Commission’s Communication ‘An Energy 
Policy for Europe’, n. 6, pp. 6 (par. 3.1), 15 (par. 3.6). Further, the more electricity generation is 
not only pursued “top down” but also “bottom up” (network interdependence), the more 
intensive cooperation and coordination between (central as well as decentral) generators and 
the (distribution as well as transmission) network operators is needed. Th is is stressed by 
Pielow/Ehlers, n. 35.
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And lastly, it is also doubtful whether the general interest in creating a level 
playing fi eld for all energy suppliers active in the Netherlands for the benefi t of 
consumers is really supported by the groepsverbod. Th is is because no answer has 
been provided to the question of how such a “level playing fi eld” can be created if 
some energy suppliers are either horizontally integrated (such as multi-utilities) 
or possess energy networks abroad, and are cross-subsidized by such means.
Be that as it may, the necessity of the groepsverbod also appears doubtful, i.e. 
there is uncertainty as to the answer to the question of whether there exist less 
intrusive but similarly eff ective means to achieve the general interest objectives 
of the Dutch legislator:
First, some market defi ciencies, which are supposed to be put and end to by the 
groepsverbod, have never been proved, such as the claim that vertically integrated 
distribution network companies impede third party access to its networks.
Secondly, the NMa established in June 2007 that the groepsverbod is not necessary 
to safeguard the independence of the operation of the energy networks. Although 
it would be the most certain means to ensure the independence from vertical 
integration, the groepsverbod can also not fully exclude the risks to the operation 
of energy supply networks in an effi  cient, fi nancially stable and market facilitating 
manner, which ensures their quality and reliability.1425
Th irdly, the NMa has established, also in June 2007, that currently, no cross-
subsidization is taking place in the Dutch energy supply sector1426, and that the 
chances of cross-subsidization in the future are rather small.1427
Lastly, the DTe announced in April 2004, and repeated in June 2007, that 
alternatives to the groepsverbod do indeed exist in the form of further legislation 
and regulation, which weakens the claim that the general interest lies in less 
1425 NMa, ‘Onderzoeksrapport inzake publiek en onafh ankelijk netbeheer’, no. 102680 / 23, 4 June 
2007, pp. 4, 32. Th e NMa makes it also clear, however, that the stricter application of legal 
unbundling as agreed between the Dutch energy supply undertakings concerned and the 
Director of Energy of the Ministry of Economic Aff airs in order to prevent the introduction of 
splitsing would not be far reaching enough, see NMa, ibid., p. 3. As this proposal to a 
considerable extent resembles the so-called “Th ird way” of “Eff ective and effi  cient unbundling” 
proposal of France, Germany and six other EC Member States in the context of the revision of 
the current Energy Directives, the fi ndings of the NMa also have some relevance to this.
1426 With respect to the doubtful relevance of cross-subsidies in electricity sector regulation, see 
Willems/Ehlers, n. 2.
1427 NMa, n. 156.
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excessive regulation.1428 In this context it should be noted that one signifi cant 
benefi t of vertical integration has already been abolished, and this is that 
according to Articles 93b E-Wet and 85b G-wet energy networks are not to be 
used any more as collateral or security for fi nancing the integrated competitive 
activities.
By way of preliminary summary, it can be said that the groepsverbod seems not to 
be conducive to achieving those objectives of general interest which are mainly 
targeted at remedying the claimed defi ciencies of vertical integration, not even 
the one which aims at retaining the networks and its operation in public hands 
since for the latter the absolute privatization ban would have suffi  ced and would 
have led to the breaking-up of the vertical integration (in any event as soon as the 
commercial parts of the energy supply undertakings are substantively 
privatized).
Compensation
Turning to the actual proportionality or the weighing or balancing of the general 
against the private interest, the main focus of attention here is the question of 
compensation payable.1429
As has been shown, compensation must in principle be paid to the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings concerned because the transfer of the 
economic “ownership” of the networks they are operating amounts to a 
deprivation in the form of an expropriation.1430 Compensation for the 
1428 See letter of 15 April 2004, n. 1421, where it says on p. 3 that requiring integrated network 
companies to be “fat” would be suffi  cient. See also p. 4, where alternatives to splitsing are 
discussed. See also NMa, n. 1425, p. 32.
1429 Th e question whether the groepsverbod can be regarded as a normal economic risk, which was 
to be expected by the energy supply undertakings aff ected, is not discussed further here. It 
suffi  ces to indicate that the formal privatization of the energy supply undertakings concerned 
originally happened with a view to substantively privatizing them at some stage. Th ey were, 
however, for the time being retained in complete state ownership (by municipalities and 
provinces), which was tentatively confi rmed by the announcement that substantive minority 
privatization of energy networks might be made possible. Importantly though, substantive 
privatization always required the consent of the Dutch government. When liberalization 
started, and with it the introduction and tightening of the unbundling rules, it was not at all 
clear how far the unbundling would go. It is thus arguable whether the energy supply 
undertakings concerned could legitimately expect not to be subjected to a groepsverbod. More 
generally on this issue, see the ECtHR in re Fredin, n. 1152.
1430 As regards the transfer to TenneT of the right to operate the networks of 110 kV and above 
which they were operating, which amounts to a deprivation of the right to use such networks 
and thus to a regulation of the right to property, TenneT already makes capital interest 
payments (to maintain the value of the assets) to the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings concerned; it is likely that this is regarded as suffi  cient by the ECtHR to reach a 
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groepsverbod is, however, not provided for by general law or by the legislation 
introducing the groepsverbod. On the other hand, this should not be too great an 
issue because, fi rst, the shareholders are likely to have to approve the sale of one 
or the other activity and, secondly, compensation payable would be merely 
circular within the public sphere or the state organization anyway.1431
As regards the (de facto) expropriation as a result of the groepsverbod, it is also 
clear that compensation is to be paid by the receiving parties because they are 
benefi ting directly from the expropriations, i.e. the transfer of property to them; 
receiving parties in the current context are the public bodies holding the energy 
supply undertakings expropriated.1432 Th e transfer of the economic “ownership” 
of the networks is to be treated similarly to a private transaction – one exception 
being that because of the general interest and public budgets involved, one might 
come to the conclusion that less than the full market value should be 
reimbursed.1433 What also needs to be reimbursed are the additional (but 
unlikely) consequential losses arising from the expropriation, i.e. any claims as a 
result of a potential breach of cross-border leases.1434
fair balance between the general and the private interest. Th us, no further assessment is 
necessary in this respect.
1431 However, the conversion of integrated “slim” to integrated “fat” network operators before the 
deadline for the groepsverbod at the end of 2010 already leads to some compensation becoming 
payable according to Articles 10a(3) E-wet, 3b(3) G-wet. According to Koppenol-Laforce/de 
Wit, n. 1291, all companies concerned by the groepsverbod have chosen for “slim” operators 
from the outset so that the conversion results in a replacement in the balance sheet of the 
energy supply holding of the value of the network assets whose economic “ownership” is 
transferred to the integrated network companies with the compensation set out in the above 
mentioned Articles.
1432 It has been established above that a deprivation of property in the form of a formal expropriation 
does not necessarily have to be the result of a transfer made to the State but can also be the 
result of a transfer for the benefi t of third parties. In fact, here the public bodies are not even to 
be regarded as third parties because they are part of the state organization.
1433 See in this respect also n. 1362. An expropriation without compensation corresponding to the 
market value can normally, however, be regarded as disproportionate. Even when a “mere” 
regulation of ownership is at stake, compensation might have to be paid in exceptional 
circumstances; in this respect, see the discussion refl ected in the decision of the German 
BVerfG in re Denkmalschutz, n. 551. A valuable hint as to what might be an appropriate amount 
of compensation, which also shows the appropriateness of the assumption here that the transfer 
should be treated in a similar way as a “normal” market transaction between private parties, 
can be inferred from ss. 10a(3) and 3b(3) E-wet and G-wet, respectively, where the amount of 
consideration to be paid for the transfer of economic “ownership” of the networks to an 
integrated network operator is stipulated, see already n. 1431.
1434 Th is is because in a private transaction, the buyer usually also has to pay for expenses such as 
those associated with rights in rem or other entitlements of third parties with respect to the 
good transferred. Delta’s balance sheet, for instance, confi rms that the legal and economic 
ownership of the networks which are the subject of cross-border leases remains with Delta, see 
already n. 1315.
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To explain why the payment of compensation would be merely circular within 
the state organization, it should be noted fi rst that there are several ways of 
transferring the economic “ownership” from the undertakings concerned to their 
shareholders or to legal persons held by them (outside these undertakings). Th e 
straightforward options are transferring the shares in the network company 
(holding the economic “ownership” of the networks) or in the competitive energy 
supply companies (generation or energy supply) or executing a so-called split-off  
(juridische splitsing).1435 One option for the transfer of the shares in the 
competitive activities is the transfer directly to another (private) market 
party.1436
Both ways (i.e. share transfers and split-off ) would have the advantage that no 
money had to change hands.
As regards a split-off , the municipalities and provinces as shareholders would 
receive shares in the companies established as a result of the split-off  and thus 
would not have to pay any purchase price. However, it has been established here 
that compensation is payable in principle as result of the deprivation of economic 
“ownership”, the amount of which should be measured according to a formula 
based on market value, such as, it appears, the formula set out in ss 10a(3) and 
3b(3) E-wet and G-wet, respectively.1437 On the other hand, as regards a share 
transfer money still does not have to change hands if a split-off  is eff ected.
In the case where the share transfer option is pursued, the shares which the 
energy supply holding company owns in its network operation company (which 
is the economic “owner” of the networks), or, as the case may be, in its competitive 
energy supply company or companies (if separate for electricity generation and 
energy supply) would be transferred to the public shareholders or a holding 
company they have established for that purpose.1438 In order not to have to 
transfer the purchase price in consideration, the municipalities and provinces 
1435 For the latter, see ss. 234 et seq. of the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, Boek 2). See in greater detail, in particular with respect to the complications a split-
off  would entail, Roggenkamp, n. 1313, p. 245, and n. 1363, p. 388.
1436 It has already been outlined that, in this respect, privatization is not prohibited. Another way 
of structuring such a transfer would be by way of an asset deal where only the assets are 
transferred to a newly incorporated legal person and the “old” legal vehicle would be 
wound-up.
1437 See already n. 1431.
1438 As already indicated, the purchase price (or compensation) would have to be in line or at least 
come close to the market value of the economic “ownership” of the energy networks in 
operation or the commercial activities pursued by the company/-ies whose shares are 
transferred.
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can set off  the price against dividends to be paid by the transferring 
undertaking.
In the case of a split-off  as just discussed above, the undertaking against whose 
dividend the purchase price could prima facie be set off  would be the company 
pursuing the commercial energy supply activity. Th is is prima facie so because it 
is the original aim of the groepsverbod to ensure that independent network 
operation is pursued by the public sector and on publicly owned energy networks. 
Th e victims, on the other hand, are the vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings whose economic “ownership” of the energy networks has been 
expropriated (as has been established above). Th us the remaining part of the 
formerly vertically integrated energy supply undertaking which pursues the 
competitive energy supply activities has to be compensated for the expropriation 
of this economic “ownership”. Consequently, this compensation (entitlement) 
should then be set off  against dividends paid by this undertaking (entitled to such 
compensation).1439 On the other hand, should liabilities arise such as for claims 
in the context of fi nancing arrangements such as cross-border leases, these 
would, following the reasoning above, increase the purchase price so that the 
dividend payment would be (further) deferred.
VI. ARTICLE 56 EC
What remains is the question whether the groepsverbod is compatible with two of 
the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty, the free movement of capital 
according to Article 56 EC and the freedom of establishment according to Article 
1439 Alternatively, the public shareholders could opt for paying the purchase price, which would 
then be returned to them by way of (interim) dividends. For this and for the problems this 
option might encounter, see Roggenkamp, n. 1435. For example, the articles of association 
must provide for such interim payments and there must have been suffi  cient reserves built 
up.
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43 EC.1440 Th is was one of the main subjects of debate during the legislative 
process leading to the passing of the splitsingswet.1441
Th e compatibility of the groepsverbod with EC law was, however, criticized at a 
time when the Dutch government still considered a “minority privatization” (i.e. 
a privatization by way of allowing the private sector a minority stake) of the 
network operators feasible1442, and in legal terms the debate focused primarily on 
the interpretation of Article 295 EC.
It is indeed necessary to distinguish between a situation where the network 
operator is in the sole ownership of public shareholders where any privatization 
at all is prohibited by law and the situation where at least a minority privatization 
is possible according to the law. Th is fl ows from the fact that EC law leaves it to 
the Member States to decide whether they want to assume an activity and retain 
it in state ownership. Th is at any rate is the consequence of the reading of Article 
295 EC as understood here and as understood by the European Commission.1443
1440 See R Streinz, Europarecht, 8rd ed., 2008, nos 895 et seq., as to their distinction, in particular in 
cases, as here, which are concerned with a combination of investment and privatization issues. 
In particular in the so-called Golden Share cases of the ECJ, which are concerned with special 
rights in substantively privatized companies which Member States reserve to themselves, the 
ECJ assesses restrictions to the free movement of capital according to Article 56 EC, thereby 
only incidentally assessing restrictions of the freedom of establishment, which are inevitably 
linked to the former. Consequently, here only Article 56 EC will be discussed, if at all. See in 
greater detail also Part 1 Chapter 3 section V(4) on Article 56 EC, in particular n. 571. With 
respect to the scope of Article 56 EC, see also S Grundmann, F Möslein, ‘Die Goldene Aktie’, 
(2003) ZGR 317, 325 et seq.
1441 Most prominently, the Raad van State and Professor P Slot have delivered opinions. For the 
former, see n. 588, for the latter, see his opinion ‘opinie inzake de voorgenomen splitsing van 
geïntegreerde energiebedrijven en beperkte privatisering van netbeheerders’, Universiteit 
Leiden, 8 September 2006.
1442 Both, the Raad van State and Professor Slot have delivered their opinions against this 
background. In all of Professor Slot’s examples and ECJ case law, which he uses in his Report 
to support his assumption that the free movement of capital according to Article 56 is 
(potentially) inhibited, it becomes clear or can be inferred that they are built upon the belief 
that (minority) privatization will take place in the very near future, based on legislation [“aft er 
network operators are allowed to become entirely or partly privatized” (no. 11) or “future 
freedom to invest in the operation of networks” (no. 13)]. Professor Slot, for instance, refers to 
the so-called “Golden Shares” case law of the ECJ, all of which deal with special rights of the 
State in substantially (part) privatized companies, and uses in his examples terminology 
typically used in a privatized commercial setting, such as “investors” (nos 12, 13), “want to 
invest” (no. 14) or “(before privatization) […] potential market entrants” (no. 15). Or he looks 
at the other side of the same coin when speaking about “obstacles in attracting capital” or 
reverse discrimination of today’s shareholders in Dutch network operators whereby his Report 
is still based on the assumption that German private company RWE is still one of this class of 
shareholders; this has, however, changed in the meantime so that there are only and exclusively 
Dutch public shareholders left .
1443 For the fi rst, see Part 1 Chapter 3 section V(1). For the latter, see, for instance, its ‘Communication 
on certain legal aspects concerning intra-EU investment’, OJ 1997 C 220/15, 19.7.1997, where 
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As regards the issue of privatization of energy supply network companies in the 
Netherlands, it has already been explained that as it stands now, this can only be 
permitted with the consent of the Dutch Parliament; in democratic systems, 
there is no stricter hurdle for a (economic) policy issue to overcome. Th us, 
privatization of network companies is prohibited in the Netherlands until the 
legislature as sovereign changes its mind.
It is thus questionable whether there would be an interference with the free 
movement of capital even before the government together with the Parliament 
have resolved whether or not a (minority) privatization of network operators 
should be allowed. Th e claim that minority privatization of Dutch network 
companies might become possible in the future and the restrictions inherent in 
the splitsingswet are said to have an “infl uencing eff ect” on the readiness of 
investors to invest in the Dutch energy market, and are thus deemed to interfere 
with the free movement of capital can not be considered relevant in this context. 
Apart from the fact that the development of policy and regulatory uncertainty 
are political considerations, and that uncertainty is inherent in the Parliament’s 
legislative or decision making process in democratic societies this claim would 
confl ict with the sovereignty which Article 295 EC leaves to the Member States in 
the area of property ownership and deprive Article 295 EC of its applicability.
in note 1, it says: “It should be stressed, in this respect, that the movement of a fi rm from the 
public to the private sector is an economic policy choice which, in itself, falls within the 
exclusive competence of Member States, stemming from the principle of neutrality in the 
Treaty vis-à-vis the system of property ownership, established in Article 222 EC [currently 
Article 295 EC, Article 345 aft er the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force; both with the same 
wording; emphasis and comment added].” In the Communication of the Commission, ‘White 
Paper on services of general interest’, Communication, COM(2004) 374 fi nal, Brussels, 
12.5.2004, p. 22 (n. 42), “public sector” is defi ned as covering “all public administrations 
together with all enterprises controlled by public authorities [emphasis added].” On page 23 of 
the same document, “public undertaking is normally also used to defi ne the ownership of the 
service provider. Th e Treaty provides for strict neutrality. It is irrelevant under Community 
law whether providers of services of general interest are public or private; they are subject to 
the same rights and obligations [emphasis added].” In Communication from the Commission, 
‘Service of General Interest in Europe – Executive Summary’, OJ 2001 C 17/4, 19.1.2001, no. 21, 
it is emphasized that “[n]eutrality as regards the public or private ownership of companies is 
guaranteed by Article 295 of the EC Treaty. On the one hand, the Commission does not 
question whether undertakings responsible for providing general interest services should be 
public or private. Th erefore, it does not require privatization of public undertakings [which 
refl ects the interpretation of privatization as outlined above]. On the other hand, the rules of 
the Treaty and in particular competition and internal market rules apply regardless of the 
ownership of an undertaking (public or private) [emphasis added].” Th us, where the State or its 
subdivisions are invested in private legal entities to a degree where the amount of rights of 
disposal gives them economic control over the undertaking, this private legal entity is classifi ed 
as public undertaking in the EU.
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Th e scope of Article 295 EC has already been discussed extensively in Part 1 
Chapter 3.1444 To the extent relevant here, it has been established that Article 295 
EC is supposed to ensure that fundamental decisions of economic policy stays in 
the remit of the Masters of the Treaty, i.e. the Member States, that the national 
systems of property ownership are to be left  untouched, and that the fundamental 
decisions to nationalize or socialize private sector market activity or, e contrario, 
to privatize public sector market activity fall into the competences of the Member 
States and not the EC. As measures which are in principle a type of property 
ownership allocation (i.e. a decision of the State to allocate certain rights, 
obligation or requirements to certain categories of property), such decisions do 
not fall under the Treaty rules and thus do not infringe Article 56 EC. Article 295 
EC therefore has the eff ect of barring any decisions of the Community to 
nationalize, socialize or privatize. Th is argument is supported by the fact that the 
EC does not distinguish between public and private undertakings as market 
actors, which is an indication that the EC is not interested in shift ing undertakings 
from the private into the public sphere or vice versa.1445 As soon, however, as 
such a fundamental decision is not recognizable anymore as being a property 
ownership allocation, such as would be the case in situations of part or minority 
privatization, or as soon as the fundamental decision of privatization of any kind 
has taken place and been enforced, property ownership has been allocated and 
the exercise of property ownership becomes relevant again and falls under the 
Treaty provisions, in particular under Article 56 EC.
As far as the analysis of whether Article 56 EC is applicable to the Dutch 
groepsverbod is concerned, it follows from this interpretation of Article 295 EC 
that the competence to take fundamental decisions in economic policy such as a 
privatization belongs to the Dutch State, and only if the Netherlands has decided 
to undertake a privatization, even if it just entails minority privatization, the law 
enforcing such privatization falls under the Treaty rules and can be judged 
against Article 56 EC. Only then, i.e. when (part) privatization is made possible, 
will all the concerns with respect to the obstacles this might cause to the free 
movement of capital in the European Union be considered in order to determine 
how such privatization should be pursued. Because the Dutch legislature has 
taken the decision not to substantively privatize the energy companies owned by 
the Dutch State and its municipalities and provinces, which can only be reversed 
by the Dutch Parliament itself (and not by the Dutch government) based on a law 
1444 It may be recalled that Article 295 EC contains a bar on the exercise of competences conferred 
upon the EC according to which the “Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member 
States governing the system of property ownership.”
1445 See further infra, chapter 7 on the European Union.
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which specifi cally provides for privatization1446, Article 56 EC does thus not 
apply.1447
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Historically, energy supply in the Netherlands is state-dominated, energy 
distribution and supply to consumers is traditionally run by municipalities and 
provinces as subdivisions of the Unitary Dutch State, which do not possess an 
institutional guarantee similar to comparable subdivisions in a Federal State such 
as Germany.
Only from the perspective of the public shareholders of the energy supply holding 
companies can the groepsverbod be perceived as an alternative form of organizing 
property and thus as a mere regulation of property, which is to be regarded as a 
form of legal unbundling requiring the breaking-up of the holding companies 
and arranging the separate parts diff erently; from such a viewpoint, Dutch 
municipalities and provinces as ultimate owners would indeed not be deprived of 
“their” property (i.e. property they hold as administrators of the State).1448 As the 
holding companies are, however, the (potential) complainants in this context, 
this perception is irrelevant here. Th e Dutch public shareholders can, however, 
not claim victim status (i.e. fundamental rights protection) under the ECHR and 
are not institutionally protected as comparable public institutions in Federal 
States such as Germany are, which would be able to take legal action against such 
interferences of the State.1449
1446 Even under conditions set out in such a law, which are not under parliamentary control.
1447 Contra the Rechtbank ’s Gravenhage, n. 574, which subjects every state measure, which 
organizes property ownership (i.e. is allocation as well as its regulation) to the EC Treaty rules 
and thus also to Article 56 EC. Th e Court does, however, not suffi  ciently refl ect the aspects 
considered here in the context of the discussions of Article 295 EC and Article 56 EC.
1448 Th is is the offi  cial view of the Dutch government, as a result of which no compensation was 
provided for in the splitsingswet, see memorie van toelichting, n. 1294, pp. 44–5 (no. 7.3).
1449 In Germany, a privatization ban or a general privatization of municipality owned vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings would probably be justifi able if it was in the general 
interest, even though municipalities enjoy institutional protection according to Article 28(2) 
GG. In the case of interferences with the institutional rights conferred by Article 28 GG, the 
BVerfG applies a “Vertretbarkeitsprüfung”, which is a “reduced” test compared to a fully 
fl edged proportionality test applied if fundamental rights are at stake. Th e privatization of 
energy networks only would probably not pass this test if private vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings were allowed to retain their energy networks. A general privatization is, 
however, unlikely to take place because if it turned out to be a failure the German State might 
have to undo it because of its residual (“last resort”) responsibility to guarantee energy supply 
(“Gewährleistungsverantwortung”).
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Th e case of distribution ownership unbundling is a highly political one, which 
does not lend itself to fundamental rights claims. Th e assumption followed here 
that undertakings with legal personality owned or controlled by public 
institutions can claim victim or complainant status is used to show that in 
principle these undertakings enjoy the same protection under the ECHR when 
participating in (competitive) market activities as every private undertaking.
In the special case of the Netherlands, aff ording the holding companies of the 
Dutch publicly owned energy supply undertakings victim status under the ECHR 
is, however, of no practical use for them1450 and shows the artifi ciality of the 
discussion as to whether a private legal entity in 100% state or municipal 
ownership should be able to rely on fundamental rights protection (without an 
institutional protection of their municipal shareholders similar to Article 28 
GG).1451 Th is is because undertakings wholly owned by a Unitary State such as 
the Netherlands (or its subdivisions) would not be able to recover or, better, to 
keep compensation payable and thus to receive an adequate substitute for the 
assets they have been deprived of; any compensation paid would only be shift ed 
back and forth within the state organization and be eff ectively cancelled out.
To avoid the sale of the energy networks and their operation to foreign parties, it 
would have been suffi  cient just to enforce the absolute prohibition of privatization 
without imposing the groepsverbod, as has been done (inconsistently) with 
respect to the electricity networks from 110 kV upwards, the economic 
“ownership” (or even legal ownership) of which can continue to stay with the 
energy supply undertakings. Th e prohibition of privatization without the 
groepsverbod in those cases results in such networks remaining in public 
ownership upon the sale of the commercial energy supply activities.
As regards the other objectives of general interest, it appears doubtful whether 
the groepsverbod helps in achieving them. Even the objective of creating a 
so-called level playing fi eld, i.e. that no undertaking active in competitive energy 
supply in the Netherlands is allowed to hold and operate energy networks, is 
unlikely to be achieved by enforcing the groepsverbod. Not only do the networks, 
albeit not vertically integrated, remain owned by the same shareholders who own 
the holding company of the (remaining) vertically integrated energy supply 
undertaking, i.e. the municipalities and provinces, but also it was not suffi  ciently 
1450 Th e Rechtbank ’s Gravenhage, n. 574, ruled that Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR is 
not infringed by the splitsingswet. Although this is in accordance with the fi ndings of this 
work, the underlying reasoning appears to be highly questionable.
1451 It is also of no avail because although they can, again in principle, rely on Article 56 EC, 
Article 56 EC is not applicable according to the reading of Article 295 EC followed here.
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taken into consideration that market concentration and vertical integration with 
respect to generation and supply is likely to increase, and that horizontal 
integration, for instance, in a multi-utility setting, can lead to cross-subsidizing 
competitive energy supply activities (for example by the use of assets, which are 
not related to energy networks, as security for the fi nancing of these competitive 
activities).
Th e Netherlands are a good case study in another respect, however, and this is 
that the ongoing construction of and the opening of new gas and electricity 
interconnectors, partly regulated and partly merchant, in combination with the 
development of the regional northwest European gas and electricity markets and 
the Pentalateral Forum, are practical steps towards an internal market for energy 







Th is chapter on the protection of fundamental economic rights in the European 
Union will be kept rather short because the area of jurisprudence which it covers 
largely resembles that of the ECHR as construed by the ECtHR, which has already 
been discussed in the previous chapters.
However, important diff erences in detail such as the explicit recognition by the 
ECJ of the freedom to pursue an economic activity or to pursue a trade or business 
and the corresponding stipulation in the European Charta of Fundamental 
Rights of the freedoms to choose (and pursue) an occupation and to conduct a 
business will be discussed on this chapter. Th e question of whether public law 
corporations or private undertakings controlled by public entities enjoy 
protection under EC law will be answered. Further, the compliance of the 
Commission’s proposals with the general principle of equality in the context of 
labelling the transfer of energy transmission networks from such vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings as ownership unbundling, which are 
controlled by the State or other public entities to organisationally separate public 
entities will be discussed in greater detail.
Th e extent to which the proportionality principle is applied by the ECJ will also 
be an issue to look into more extensively, in particular in comparison with the 
judicial deference paid by the ECtHR to the signatories of the ECHR. In the 
context of dealing with the proportionality principle, the allocation of the 
responsibility to provide for compensation for fundamental rights interferences 
liable to compensation will also be briefl y discussed there. Further, as has already 
been explained in the context of the proportionality of further unbundling 
measures by way of competition law enforcement, the principles discussed there 
will also apply to the further unbundling measures introduced by EC legislation 
and thus the elaborations in this regard kept rather short.1452
1452 Th e economic analysis of competition law enforced divestiture of individual energy supply 
networks and their operation when controlled by vertically integrated energy supply 
undertakings is similar to such an analysis in the context of ownership unbundling imposed 
on the entire sector by way of sector-specifi c regulation. Th is is so because of the natural 
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II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES ARISING IN 
CONTEXT OF FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
LEGISLATION
Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ECFR) of 7 December 
20001453, which the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
European Commission have declared binding on themselves, has explicitly been 
accepted by the ECJ as interpretation tool.1454 Accordingly, not only will the case 
law of the ECJ be referred to in the course of this chapter but also reference will be 
made to the ECFR.1455
1. RIGHT TO PROPERTY
Th e fundamental right to property has long been recognized by the ECJ as one of 
the general principles of Community law1456, based on Article 1 of the First 
Protocol of the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States.1457 Th e right to property is also set out in Article 17 ECFR.1458
monopoly character of such networks and the fact that energy transmission networks and 
their operation, which would be the target of divestiture and regulatory ownership unbundling, 
are controlled by one or only very few undertakings in each Member State, and interconnectors 
normally only by one undertaking.
1453 OJ C 303/1, 14.12.2007.
1454 ECJ, C-540/03 – Parliament v Council, (2006) ECR I-5769, nos 38, 58. As regards the level of 
protection of fundamental rights, a high standard of protection such as, for instance, in 
Germany should be respected instead of relying on the lowest common denominator of the 
diff erent levels of fundamental rights prteoction available in the Member States. Th is 
contention seems to be by Article 53 ECFR, which states: “Nothing in this Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely aff ecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
recognised, in their respective fi elds of application, by Union law and international law and by 
international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and 
by the Member States’ constitutions (emphasis added).”
1455 For the relationship of the rights guaranteed by the ECFR and the ECHR, see Article 52(3) 
ECFR: “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. Th is 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.
1456 ECJ, C-44/79, n. 536; C-280/93, n. 241, nos 77 et seq.; C-293/97 – Queen v Secretary of State for 
the Environment, (1999) ECR I-2603, no. 54; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 – Queen v 
Secretary of State for Health, (2005) ECR I-6451, no. 126.
1457 See now also Article 6(2) EU: “Th e Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[…] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law.”
1458 Article 17(1) states: “Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her 
lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
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Th e Community right to property protects the possession of an acquired or 
existing legal position in the hands of the rights owner and the rights to use to 
dispose of such possessions or legal positions.1459 Th e acquisition of property is 
not protected until a secured entitlement to acquire property exists.
As property rights are conferred to their owners by law, the extent of such legal 
positions depends on the relevant provisions in national and Community law.1460 
Further, only such legal positions are protected as can be allocated to their holders 
and fi nd their basis in the law. Th us, mere commercial interests such as (the 
preservation of) market shares and prospects, chances in the market and 
opportunities to earn money are not included.1461
As regards the latter, these are usually protected by other economic fundamental 
rights such as the freedom to choose and pursue an occupation or the freedom to 
pursue an economic activity or to conduct a business.1462 On the other hand, 
legal positions, the enjoyment of which can be legitimately expected 
(Vertrauensschutz), are also likely to be protected by the right to property.1463
a. Subject-matter of protection
Based on a broad defi nition of property, any proprietary rights and interests 
(assets resulting from legal entitlements) are protected1464, which can be attributed 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair 
compensation being paid in good time for their loss. Th e use of property may be regulated by 
law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.” Th ere are some diff erences in formulation 
but not in substance compared to Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR; the same is true 
for the issue of compensation, which is explicitly set out in the ECFR but not in the ECHR 
where, however, the ECtHR has developed similar principles, see chapters 5 and 6 on Great 
Britain and the Netherlands. See in greater detail, H Jarass, ‘Der grundrechtliche 
Eigentumsschutz im EU-Recht’, (2006) Neue Zeitschrift  für Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 1089, 
1090.
1459 See also Introduction, also as regards the control of property. See also Jarass, n. 1458, pp. 1091–
2.
1460 See Jarass, n. 1458, p. 1092.
1461 ECJ, C-4/73, n. 536, no. 14, Joined Cases C-154, 205, 206, 226 to 228, 263 and 264/78, 31, 39, 83 
& 85/79 – Ferriera Valsabbia v Commission, (1980) ECR I-907, no. 89.
1462 ECJ, C-280/93, n. 241, nos 79.
1463 See ECtHR, Pine Valley, n. 1157, no. 51; Cremer in Marauhn/Grote, n. 928, ch. 22, no. 30.
1464 ECtHR, Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v Th e Netherlands, 23 February 1995, Ser. A 
306-B, no. 53: “Th e Court recalls that the notion “possessions” […] in Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 (P1-1) has an autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of physical 
goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property 
rights”, and thus as “possessions”, for the purposes of this provision (P1-1). In the present 
context it is therefore immaterial whether [the] right to the concrete-mixer is to be considered 
as a right of ownership or as a security right in rem. In any event, the seizure and sale of the 
concrete-mixer constituted an “interference” with the applicant company’s right “to the 
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to a person in such a way that this person is competent to exercise all powers 
related to such rights and interests on his own authority and for his very own 
private benefi t. Only legitimately acquired and valid rights and interests are 
protected.1465 Such rights and interests cover physical assets and other rights in 
rem and relative rights such as contractual claims of any value, which, however, 
have to be enforceable.1466 Th e latter rights thus also include capital participations 
such as shareholdings and similar entitlements such as other rights of participation 
in companies by way of company law.1467
Th e right to an undertaking in its entirety (Recht am eingerichteten ausgeübten 
Gewerbebetrieb), which not only includes the protection of individual assets of an 
undertaking such as machines but also the goodwill or the customer base1468 (or 
more broadly, the going concern of an undertaking), an essential part of which is 
the legitimate expectation of a certain level of profi t from one’s property1469, 
seems also likely to enjoy protection.1470 Th is can be inferred from statements of 
the ECJ in re Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen I, which seem to accept the right 
to make a profi t as part of the right to property.1471
b. Deprivation
Similar to Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR, Article 17 ECFR distinguishes 
between the deprivation of property and the regulation of the use of 
property.1472
peaceful enjoyment” of a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-
1).” See in greater detail Jarass, n. 1458, pp. 1089, 1090.
1465 ECtHR, van Marle, n. 1155, nos 40–1; see in greater detail Jarass, n. 1458, pp. 1089, 1090.
1466 See ECJ, C-84/95 – Bosphorus Airways v Minister for Transport, (1996) ECR I-3953, nos 19 et 
seq.
1467 Although there is no corresponding case law of the ECJ on this issue, the ECtHR in re Lithgow, 
n. 1179, no. 107, has granted such protection, which thus bears relevance for EC law according 
to Article 6(2) EU. See also Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 468.
1468 Recognized by the ECtHR in Olbertz (tax consultant) v. Germany, no. 37592/97, not published 
but referred to in (2001) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift  (NJW) 1558 (translation available in 
the Court’s database HUDOC), which relates to the fact that the ECHR does not include the 
right to choose and pursue an occupation or the right to pursue an economic activity. See also 
ECtHR, van Marle, n. 1155, and Latridis, n. 1152, n. 54. Th e ECJ, on the other hand, seems to 
extend the protection of the right to property to undertakings whose very existence is under 
threat, see ECJ, C-363/01, n. 512, nos 55, 58; C-2/92 – Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, (1994) 
ECR I-955, no. 14.
1469 See, however, nn. 1459 et seq. and accompanying text.
1470 See chapters 5 and 6 on Great Britain and the Netherlands. See also Jarass, n. 1458, p. 1091.
1471 ECJ, C-363/01, n. 512, no. 55: “As to the right to property, the [prohibition] to collect an access 
fee does not mean […] that [there is a deprivation] of the possibility of profi ting from the 
economic services that [are provided] on the groundhandling market to which […] access [is 
to be granted].” Similar also ECJ, Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, n. 241. See also n. 1505 
and accompanying text.
1472 See also section IV(1)(b) of chapter 5 on Great Britain.
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Th e deprivation of property is the complete and permanent loss of ownership, 
which can happen either by way of formal expropriation where the ownership of 
a certain property is transferred to the State or third parties1473, or by way of de 
facto expropriation where the formal ownership position remains intact but 
where the owner loses all rights attached to his position resulting in a de facto 
loss of ownership; to establish such de facto expropriation, however, it requires 
that the owner is excluded from any meaningful use of, or disposing of, his 
property (otherwise it would be a mere regulation of the use of property).1474 
Accordingly, the ECJ by taking a rather formalistic view has rejected a claim in 
respect of deprivation of property in the context of an extensive restriction of the 
use of property because the owner was still able to dispose of his property albeit 
for a much reduced purchase price.1475
Further, Article 17 ECFR deals with the regulation of the use of property. Such 
regulation of use are sovereign measures, which mandate or prohibit a certain 
use of property1476, and diff ers from the deprivation of property in that it does 
not require the transfer of ownership.1477 It can thus be said that the regulation of 
1473 ECtHR, Sporrong & Lönnroth, n. 1183, no. 63. Cremer in Marauhn/Grote, n. 928, ch. 22, no. 88. 
Th e destruction of the entire infected fi sh stock such as in Booker Aquaculture, however, is not 
regarded as a deprivation of property, and can even happen without payment of compensation, 
see ECJ, Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, n. 241, nos 79 et seq. Th e deprivation of prooperty 
for the benefi t of private parties is possible if it also serves the public interest, see ECtHR, 
James, n. 1163, nos 41, 45, Cremer in Marauhn/Grote, n. 928, ch. 22, no. 129. Because of the 
political, economic and social relevance, the legislature possesses a margin of appreciation for 
its judgement as to whether a deprivation of property serves the public interest, see Jarass, n. 
1458, p. 1093. See also infra.
1474 ECtHR, Sporrong & Lönnroth, n. 1183, no. 63, Fredin, n. 1152, no. 45, Papamichalopoulos, n. 
1160, nos 43 et seq. See also Cremer in Marauhn/Grote, n. 928, ch. 22, no. 95. For a mere 
regulation of the use of property, see ECJ, C-44/79, n. 536, no. 19, ECJ, Joined Cases C-20/00 
and C-64/00, n. 241, and Joined Cases C-172 & 226/83, Hoogovens Gröp v Commission, (1985) 
ECR 2831, no. 29.
1475 ECJ, C-44/79, n. 536, no. 19. De facto expropriation under EC law thus is much narrower than 
the German interpretation of expropriation, which is much more orientated at the loss of 
substance of the ownership position. In this respect, see Pielow/Ehlers, n. 35, and Jarass, n. 
1458, p. 1092. See also the German BVerfG’s view in BVerfGE 58, 137, 147 et seq., and in re 
Denkmalschutz, n. 551, on the type of regulation of ownership (Inhalts- und 
Schrankenbestimmung), which amounts to a complete or substantial deprivation of property 
similar to an expropriation.
1476 Th e right to property is not an absolute right but must be considered in relation to its social 
function, see ECJ, Joined cases C-248/95 & C-249/95 – SAM Schiff ahrt v Germany, (1997) ECR 
I-4475, no. 72; C-368/96 – Queen v Licensing Authority, (1998) ECR I-7967, no. 79; C-295/03 P 
– Alessandrini v Commission, (2005) ECR I-5673, no. 86. Restrictions of the right to property 
must be in the general interest, ECJ, C-295/03 P, ibid., no. 86; the regulation of the use of 
property is also possible in order to protect the rights and freedoms of third parties.
1477 If, however, regulation led to an equivalent eff ect, de facto expropriation would be the 
consequence.
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the use of property is a deprivation of certain limited ownership competences but 
not a deprivation of the entire ownership position.1478
c. Subject of protection
Both natural persons and legal persons can be entitled to fundamental rights 
protection, the latter, however, only to the extent that the essence of the 
fundamental right in question can be applied to them. Particularly questionable 
in the context of economic fundamental rights protection is whether public 
entities and legal persons, in which public entities hold stakes, can enjoy 
fundamental rights protection. Th is issue has already been discussed extensively 
in the chapters on Germany and the Netherlands. Below, it will therefore be 
explored whether such entities and legal persons can enjoy protection under EC 
law.
aa. Private subjects
Any natural person (no matter of which nationality he is) is entitled to protection 
of the right to property as protected under EC law. Further, following Article 1(1) 
of the First Protocol of the ECHR, private (corporate) legal persons are also 
protected under EC law.1479 Th e entitlement of private legal persons to fundamental 
rights protection is not problematic as long as their shares are held by private 
(natural or legal) persons1480, who are themselves protected as regards their 
shareholdings.1481
1478 See also n. 1474 and accompanying text.
1479 In this regard also ECJ, C-265/87, n. 238, nos 13 et seq. ; Joined Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89 – 
Zuckerfabrik Suederdithmarschen v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe & Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Paderborn, (1991) ECR I-415, nos 72 et seq. ; C-200/96 – Metronome Musik v 
Music Point Hokamp, (1998) ECR I-1953, nos 21 et seq.; C-368/96, n. 1476, nos 61 et seq.; Joined 
Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, n. 241, nos 66 et seq. See also Article 48 EC, which is concerned 
with the EC fundamental freedom of the right to establishment as set out in Articles 43 et seq. 
EC, and which is a refl ection of the fundamental right to pursue an economic activity. Article 48 
EC reads: “(1) Companies or fi rms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered offi  ce, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural 
persons who are nationals of Member States. (2) ‘Companies or fi rms’ means companies or 
fi rms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other 
legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profi t-making 
(emphasis added).”
1480 L Crones, Grundrechtlicher Schutz von juristischen Personen im europäischen Gemeinschaft srecht, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2002, p. 175; M Nauschütz, Das Unbundling integrierter 
Erdgasunternehmen – rechtliche Grenzen europäischer Wirtschaft sregulierung, Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2005, p. 234.
1481 In this regard, see also n. 905.
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bb. Public subjects
More diffi  cult to answer, however, is the question of whether vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings are protected if they are either Eigengesellschaft en1482 
of the state or other public entities such as municipalities or public law corporations, 
or private undertakings, in which the State of other public entities hold 
stakes.1483
In principle, public entities, legal persons or corporations under public law and 
private legal persons wholly owned by such public entities are not able to invoke 
fundamental rights such as the right to property if their property is at stake. Th e 
State and its subdivisions are only addressees of fundamental rights, which 
means they are under the duty to respect such rights.1484
On the other hand, public entities or private entities controlled by public 
entities1485, which do not have any sovereign powers or are not competent to 
exercise state authority1486, and which are to a large extent autonomous, might be 
in a diff erent situation, i.e. subject to protection of their right to property.1487
1482 See chapter 4 on Germany, n. 789 and accompanying text, and n. 935 on the question of 
whether in a German context wholly publicly owned undertakings such as Eigengesellschaft en 
and other forms of legal persons in complete public ownership should enjoy fundamental 
rights protection if they take part in competitive energy supply.
1483 Public private undertakings or gemischt-wirschaft liche Unternehmen, see chapter 4 on 
Germany.
1484 See chapter 4 on Germany, n. 921 and accompanying text.
1485 See Article 48(2) EC and n. 1479.
1486 Energy supply does not entail the necessity to exercise sovereign powers, see chapter 4 on 
Germany, n. 935. Many formerly exclusive tasks of the State and the public administration 
have been privatised. See also BVerfGE 107, 59, 93 et seq., which confi rms that services of 
general (economic) interest do not necessarily have to be performed by the State. In the area of 
energy, economic activity subject to special public service obligations are, for example, 
connection and access to energy networks and supply and other universal service obligations. 
With respect to both, in Germany, for instance, there is a general obligation to connect 
according to s. 18 EnWG and/or the obligation to provide basic supply of energy 
(Grundversorgungspfl icht) according to s. 36 EnWG; in greater detail, see chapter 4 on Germany, 
n. 760. Private entities, shares of which are (directly or indirectly) held by foreign public 
entities, such as EnBW where state owned French EDF is invested, naturally do not have any 
sovereign powers in Germany, and they are not regarded as German public shareholders and 
thus not bound to obey fundamental rights as German public entities are, see already chapter 
4 on Germany, nn. 651, 943 and accompanying text, n. 961.
1487 See chapters 4 on Germany and 6 on the Netherlands. See also ECtHR, Holy Monasteries, n. 
1169, no. 52; Cremer in Marauhn/Grote, n. 928, ch. 22, no. 61; Jarass, n. 1458, p. 1092. According 
to Fehling, n. 910, p. 92, undertakings should be able to rely on fundamental rights protection 
as long as they do not pursue an objective which can solely be fulfi lled by the State and its 
administration (Verwaltungsmonopole), but which participate in competition like privately 
controlled undertakings and which are bound by the same competitive obligations. See also 
chapter 4 on Germany.
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Th e ECJ has not yet ruled on the entitlement of such public undertakings to 
fundamental rights protection.1488 It is likely, however, that the Court would 
recognize such an entitlement.1489 Th is is so because the EC Treaty’s character is 
primarily economic in nature and there are several provisions in the Treaty 
which indicate that EC law relies on a functional understanding of 
undertakings.1490
Accordingly, in order for undertakings to be entitled to fundamental rights 
protection, ownership entitlements with respect to such undertakings are not 
important but only their participation or activity in the market in the same way 
as every (other) private undertaking.1491 Only those undertakings, which fulfi l 
1488 Th e EC Treaty is strictly neutral towards public and private ownership of economic actors. Th e 
question of whether an undertaking is public or private is not decided by formal terminology 
but by economic reality. In this respect, the State is treated like every private investor: Th e 
‘Communication of the Commission on certain legal aspects concerning intra-EU investment’, 
OJ 1997 C 220/15, 19.7.1997, in note 1 says: “It should be stressed, in this respect, that the 
movement of a fi rm from the public to the private sector is an economic policy choice which, in 
itself, falls within the exclusive competence of Member States, stemming from the principle of 
neutrality in the Treaty vis-à-vis the system of property ownership, established in Article 222 
EC [currently Article 295 EC, Article 345 aft er the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force; both with 
the same wording; emphasis and commentary added].” In the Communication from the 
Commission, ‘White Paper on Services of General Interest’, Communication, COM(2004) 374 
fi nal, Brussels, 12.5.2004, p. 22 (n. 42), “public sector” is defi ned as covering “all public 
administrations together with all enterprises controlled by public authorities [emphasis 
added].” On page 23 of the same document, “public undertaking is normally also used to 
defi ne the ownership of the service provider. Th e Treaty provides for strict neutrality. It is 
irrelevant under Community law whether providers of services of general interest are public or 
private; they are subject to the same rights and obligations [emphasis added].” In the 
Communication from the Commission, ‘Service of General Interest in Europe – Executive 
Summary’, OJ 2001 C 17/4, 19.1.2001, no. 21, it is emphasized that “[n]eutrality as regards the 
public or private ownership of companies is guaranteed by Article 295 of the EC Treaty. […] Th e 
rules of the Treaty and in particular competition and internal market rules apply regardless of 
the ownership of an undertaking (public or private) [emphasis added].” Th us, where the State or 
its subdivisions are invested in private legal entities to a degree which gives them economic 
control over the undertaking, this private legal entity is classifi ed as a public undertaking in 
the EU. See chapter 6 on the Netherlands, nn. 1269, 1443. In the so-called Edison case, the ECJ 
recognized that both private and public undertakings are protected by the freedom of the free 
movement of capital, Article 56 EC, see ECJ, C-174/04 – Commission v Italy, (2005) ECR I-4933, 
no. 32. More extensively the position of the Commission, which emphasizes in the last sentence 
of its Communication on Services of General Interest cited (and emphasized) before that not 
only the competition and internal market rules of the Treaty apply to both private and public 
undertakings but the complete body of rules of the EC Treaty.
1489 In C-363/01, n. 512, nos 55, 59, the ECJ has in principle accepted the entitlement of public 
private undertakings (gemischt-wirschaft liche Unternehmen) to fundamental rights protection 
when evaluating whether the airport’s right to property (and the freedom of economic activity) 
had been infringed.
1490 See Nauschütz, n. 1480, p. 235, and Crones, n. 1480, pp. 176 et seq.; Müller-Michaels, n. 535, 
p. 43.
1491 See n. 1488. See also Nauschütz, n. 1480, p. 235, and Crones, n. 1480, pp. 178 et seq.
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exclusively sovereign state tasks, would not enjoy fundamental rights protections. 
Since liberalization energy supply is no longer a task genuinely conferred upon 
the State1492, and vertically integrated energy supply undertakings would thus 
generally be entitled to fundamental rights protection.
Other voices, however, based on the view that the State as addressee of 
fundamental rights protection cannot at the same time also be subject to 
fundamental rights protection, insist that the entitlement to fundamental rights 
protection does indeed depend on who holds an interest in such undertakings. 
Undertakings controlled by the State or other public entities (even where there is 
private sector participation) would accordingly not enjoy EC fundamental rights 
protection.1493 Th ey argue1494 that should public undertakings be aff orded 
fundamental rights protection, EC Member States would favour themselves, 
which contravened the purpose of (economic) fundamental rights as a defence 
against state interference. Against the background of the high density of economic 
regulation in the EU, a clear separation of the sovereign powers of the Member 
States from those of the EU would not exist and thus the danger of confusion as 
to who is entitled to fundamental rights protection and who is the addressee of 
such protection would continue to exist. Th e argument that any undertaking 
competing in the common market is subject to the same rules and thus the same 
interferences with their legal rights is true to the extent that competition law is 
part of the legal order, which all state authorities and institutions are bound to, 
and accordingly all legal persons controlled by the Member States and their 
sovereign powers are also so bound. To construe an entitlement to fundamental 
rights protection based on the obligation to comply with the legal order, however, 
ignores that the State remains the State even if it pursues its tasks through 
undertakings controlled by it. In this respect, the State cannot escape its 
obligations by participating in private energy supply undertakings. It is also 
argued that public undertakings (in particular those, which are public law 
corporations) do not fully benefi t from the EC fundamental freedoms such as the 
right to establishment and free movement of services in that these freedoms do 
not confer upon those undertakings the right (to be enforced against the 
respective Member States as “owners” in the case of public law corporations) to 
1492 Except, for instance, energy network activities in the Netherlands.
1493 See, for instance, D Ehlers, ‘Verbot der Diskriminierung wegen der Staatsangehörigkeit’, in D 
Ehlers (ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 2nd ed., 2005, § 13. According to 
those (other) voices, EC fundamental rights protection is to be distinguished from the 
protection by the EC fundamental freedoms, see with regard to the latter, n. 1488 and, 
mentioned there, ECJ, C-174/04.
1494 For an overview of the arguments to follow, see Blanke in Tettinger/Ster, Kölner 
Gemeinschaft skommentar zur Europäischen Grundrechte-Charta, 2006, Article 16, nos 15 et 
seq., with further references.
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exit the market, as they do for private undertakings. Further, because public 
undertakings, it is argued, do not benefi t from fundamental rights protection, 
those rights cannot be restricted by law (in contrast to the scope of their functions, 
which is established by law). Another argument against the entitlement of public 
undertakings to fundamental rights protection is based on Article 36 ECFR, 
according to which the EU recognises and respects the right to access to services 
of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in 
accordance with EC law. It is claimed that such services are normally provided by 
public undertakings, which are obliged to grant access to such services according 
to national law; they would thus not be able to invoke fundamental rights 
protection.
Aside from the arguments in favour of the protection of fundamental rights of 
public undertakings set out earlier in this subsection, the arguments of the 
opposition to such protection should not be followed for several reasons: Member 
States cannot give themselves an unfair advantage because the undertakings they 
control participate in the market like everybody else and are subject to the same 
rules. Further, private undertakings with public shareholders do have enforceable 
rights, which they are able to claim against “their” public shareholders/owners.1495 
Further, there is indeed a clear separation between the sovereign powers of the 
Member States and the sovereign powers of the EU as can, for instance, be 
recognized when looking at the competition law enforcement powers of the 
Commission or the fact that the Member States have to apply or implement EC 
legislation. In this context, a clear distinction must be made between the State 
acting in its sovereign function and the State participating and competing in the 
market as every other (private) market player. Th e opponents of fundamental 
rights protection for public undertakings, while claiming that the addressee of 
fundamental rights protection cannot at the same time be entitled to such 
protection, do not take into account that there are also tasks which no longer fall 
into the sole remit of the State, such as energy supply.1496 It further needs to be 
borne in mind that the EC legal order does not distinguish between private and 
public undertakings, and that private and public actors competing in the common 
market are both bound by the same (competition) rules. Th us, the alleged 
“escape” of the State into private law does not change anything with respect to 
the obligations of all competitors in the common market to abide by the EC legal 
order, even if they are States actors. Th e opponents of protection for public 
undertakings also seem to misconceive the rules of company law, according to 
which the shareholders, and thus also public shareholders, determine the entry 
and exit of “their” (private) undertakings. Although it is correct that the market 
1495 As has been shown in the chapter 6 on the Netherlands.
1496 See already at n. 1486.
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entry of public undertakings in the form of public law corporations is established 
by law (enacted by their public “owners” or the competent legislatures) this 
economic activity can equally be terminated by law (by those public “owners” or 
legislatures).1497 Relying on the gist of Article 36 ECFR does not work for energy 
supply because ever since energy supply has been liberalized private undertakings 
have also provided energy supply as a service of general economic interest and 
are normally equally obliged in the same way as public undertakings to provide 
such services.1498
In conclusion, it appears likely that public entities or private undertakings, in 
which public entities participate, are able to rely on EC fundamental rights 
protection of the right to property and the right to pursue an economic activity 
when they carry on the business of energy supply. However, they can only rely on 
these fundamental rights as long as they pursue the economic activity of energy 
supply, i.e. as long as it has not been legitimately terminated (or privatized) by the 
State. Th us, in this respect public energy supply undertakings enjoy the right to 
continuance (Bestandschutz), which preserves the status quo, to a lesser extent 
than their private competitors.
Another important aspect to consider in the context of fundamental rights 
protection of public undertakings from the point of view of EC law is that private 
undertakings in one Member State, which are owned by shareholders controlled 
by another Member State (such as French EDF as shareholder of EnBW and 
Swedish Vattenfall as owner of Vattenfall Europe in Germany)1499 would have an 
advantage over the “native” public energy supply undertakings if such private 
undertakings enjoyed protection but the public undertakings did not. Th is would 
be in breach of the general principle of equality, which is another general principle 
of EC law, and which is further discussed in a slightly diff erent context below.
d. Margin of appreciation and proportionality
Th e proportionality principle is one of the general principles of Community 
law1500, which is also enshrined in Article 5 EC and in the Protocol on the 
1497 Issues such as the lack of the ability to use insolvency procdures on the part of public entities 
are a matter of enforcing the EC State Aid rules according to Articles 87 et seq. EC. Whether, 
how and when legal persons under public law (are allowed to) pursue an economic activity 
depends on the relevant legislation. Limitations imposed on such economic activity can 
normally not be fended off  by invoking fundamental rights protection. See chapter 4 on 
Germany, n. 934.
1498 And as can, for instance, be observed under German law, see n. 1486.
1499 See chapter 4 on Germany, n. 943 and accompanying text, n. 961.
1500 ECJ, C-265/87, n. 238, nos 21, 22: “(21) Th e Court has consistently held that the principle of 
proportionality is one of the general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, 
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application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty1501, and set out Article 52 ECFR1502; it largely follows the 
proportionality principle developed in Germany.1503
According to the standard formula used by the ECJ as the basis on which, 
formally, the proportionality assessment of restrictions of the economic 
fundamental rights such as the right to property and the freedom to pursue a 
trade or business (freedom to pursue an economic activity) is made, such rights 
as general principles of Community law are not absolute “but must be viewed in 
relation to their social function”1504 and, thus, “may be restricted, particularly in 
the context of a common organization of a market, provided that those 
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the 
Community and do not constitute [with respect to the aim pursued] a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of 
the rights guaranteed.”1505
measures […] are lawful provided that the measures are appropriate and necessary for meeting 
the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question. Of course, when there is a 
choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be used and the 
charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. (22) However, with regard 
to judicial review of compliance with the abovementioned conditions, it must be stated that 
[where] the Community legislator has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political 
responsibilities imposed by [the EC Treaty] […], the legality of a measure […] can be aff ected 
only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the 
competent institution intends to pursue […] (emphasis added).”
1501 Protocol (No 30), n. 599.
1502 Article 52 (Scope and interpretation of rights and principles) reads: “(1) Any limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. (2) 
Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised 
under the conditions and within the limits defi ned by those Treaties. (3). In so far as this 
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. Th is provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” See also J Schwarze, ‘Der 
Grundrechtsschutz für Unternehmen in der Europäischen Grundrechtscharta’, (2001) EuZW 
517, 521.
1503 See Pache, n. 234, pp. 1035–6.
1504 Th is bears some resemblance to the German property right “doctrine” of Sozialbindung, see 
chapter 4 on Germany.
1505 ECJ, C-280/93, n. 241, no. 78. See also Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, n. 241, no. 68; 
C-265/87, n. 238, no. 15; C-5/88, n. 1124, no. 18; C-177/90 – Kühn v Landwirtschaft skammer 
Weser/Ems, (1992) ECR I-35, no. 16; C-22/94 – Th e Irish Farmers’ Association v Minister for 
Agriculture, (1997) ECR I-1809, no. 27. Th e protection of “the very substance” of (economic) 
fundamental rights (see also ECJ, C-22/94 – Irish Farmers Association, ibid., no. 26, and 
C-491/01 – Th e Queen/Secretary of State of Health, [2002] ECR I-11453, no. 150), which is also 
referred to in Article 52 ECFR, is critically reviewed by von T von Danwitz, ‘Eigentumsschutz 
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An application by the ECJ of the principle of proportionality to fundamental 
rights restrictions as a result of legislation, which is both nuanced and systematic, 
seems, however, not to have taken place so far.1506 Such a defi cit in the enforcement 
of fundamental rights protection can be inferred from the fact that the ECJ has 
so far never explicitly determined that EC legislation violated the right to property 
or any other (economic) fundamental right such as the freedom to choose and 
exercise an occupation or to pursue an economic activity.1507
Th e ECJ merely reviews restrictive legislative measures for manifest 
inappropriateness, and also with respect to the legitimacy of the objectives 
sought.1508 Further, the review of the necessity of restrictive legislative measures 
is usually very brief and the ECJ regularly defers to the discretion of the 
in Europa und im Wirtschaft svölkerrecht’, in T von Danwitz, O Depenheuer, C Engel, Bericht 
zur Lage des Eigentums, 2002, pp. 215, 266, 281; P Huber, Recht der Europäischen Integration, 
2nd ed., 2002, § 8 no. 71; S Heselhaus, ‘Schutz von Unternehmen durch das Eigentumsrecht im 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft srecht’, in T Buha, C Nowak, H Petzold (eds), Grundrechtsschutz 
für Unternehmen im europäischen Binnenmarkt, 2004, pp. 97, 117 et seq.; Schmidt-Preuß, n. 
241, p. 472. It may be recalled that the very substance of the economic fundamental right to 
property was also the core of the above discussions on Article 295 EC. In C-5/88 – Wachauf, 
ibid., no. 19, the ECJ established that the very substance of the right to property is not interfered 
with and a regulation of the use of property is permitted if the owner receives a remuneration, 
which covers his costs and enables him to make some profi t; in this respect, see also n. 1471 and 
accompanying text. Another important issue in the context of the right to property is the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (Vertrauensschutz), which also seems to 
be part of the balancing test which forms part of the assessment of whether the right to property 
has been violated, see ECJ, C-295/03 P, n. 1476, no. 89. Th e protection of legitimate expectations 
in the context of the protection of the right to property fi nds its equivalent in the so-called 
continuation guarantee (Kontinuitätsgewähr) applied by the German BVerfG, see BVerfGE 
101, 239, 257; 76, 220, 244 et seq.; 75, 78, 104; 71, 1, 11 et seq. See in greater detail, Schmidt-
Preuß, n. 241, p. 473.
1506 Which diff ers from the application of the proportionality test to executive measures, see only 
the extensive discussions in this regard in re Alrosa, n. 242, analysed in Part 1 Chapter 2 on EC 
competition law enforcement. Some hints of balancing in the context of fundamental rights 
restrictions can be found in ECJ, C-84/95, n. 1466, nos 25 et seq., C-274/99 P – Connolly v 
Commission, (2001) ECR I-1611, no. 48 (in the context of freedom of expression), and C-112/00 
– Schmidberger v Austria, (2003) ECR I-5659, nos 80 et seq. (in the context of the free movement 
of goods). Only isolated violations of the proportionality principle including the principle of 
legitimate expectations (Vertrauensschutz), see ibid., have so far been established, see in greater 
detail, Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 470. Although the general comparability of the fundamental 
rights protection at Community and national level was confi rmed by the BVerfG in its seminal 
Solange II decision, BVerfGE 73, 339, 378 et seq., 387 (see also BVerfGE 102, 147, 162 et seq., and 
chapter 4 on Germany), there exists an apparent defi cit in enforcement of fundamental rights 
protection in the EU, see only Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 470; Huber, n. 1505, § 8 no. 67; Pache, 
n. 234, p. 1035; Jarass, n. 1458, p. 1089.
1507 Th e latter rights are set out in Articles 15 and 16 ECFR and are discussed infra.
1508 See, for instance, ECJ, C-280/93, n. 241, no. 90; C-265/87, n. 238, nos 21, 22. It is true that in 
Germany, the legislature also possesses a margin of appreciation with respect to appropriate 
restrictions; this margin, however, seems to be reviewed more strictly and systematically, see 
only BVerfGE 50, 290, 341 – Mitbestimmung. See already chapter 4 on Germany.
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legislature.1509 An evaluation of alternative measures hardly ever happens.1510 
Th e actual balancing (or proportionality) of the right holder’s interest and the 
burdens imposed by restrictive legislative measures as against the benefi t for the 
general interest seems also not to be fully developed in the ECJ’s case law if it 
takes place at all.1511
It can thus be said that judicial review of restrictions of fundamental rights in the 
area of economic activity in general and thus also with respect to the right to 
property is considerably underdeveloped in view of the density and depth of 
control of the legislature.1512 Against the background of the need for an eff ective 
fundamental rights protection, it is therefore questionable whether it is right for 
the ECJ to impose the burden of proof on the party seeking protection both when 
reviewing the appropriateness and the necessity of a restrictive legislative 
measure.1513 As regards the latter, i.e. where it is claimed that the existence of 
milder, less intrusive means are available to achieve the objective, the ECJ even 
goes as far as requiring the substantiation that the alternative measures proposed 
are practicable and consistent with the objectives to be achieved.1514
1509 See, for instance, ECJ, C-306/93 – SMW Winzersekt GmbH v Rheinland-Pfalz, (1994) ECR 
I-55555, no. 21; see also Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 470.
1510 Such as in ECJ, C-491/01, n. 1505, no. 139.
1511 See, for instance, ECJ, Joined Cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 – Di Lenardo Adriano v Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Commerce, (2004) ECR I-6911, nos 84 et seq.; C-491/01, n. 1505, nos 122 et 
seq. Critically H-J Papier, ‘Die Rezeption allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsätze aus den 
Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten durch den Gerichtshof der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft en’, (2007) EuGRZ 133, 134; Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 471; T von Danwitz, ‘Der 
Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit im Gemeinschaft srecht’, (2003) EWS 393, 395, 399 et seq.; 
see, however, H-W Rengeling, P Szczekalla, Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union, 2004, nos 
442 et seq., who seem to regard the application of the proportionality principle as comprehensive. 
Article 52(1) ECFR, which the ECJ has accepted as an interpretation tool, actually explicitly 
requires balancing to take place. See also D König, ‘Der Schutz des Eigentums im Europäischen 
Recht’, in Depenheuer (ed.), Eigentum, 2005, pp. 113, 128, and von Danwitz, ibid., p. 396, with 
respect to the indispensability of balancing where the confl icting interest, such as the right to 
property as opposed to eff ective competition, are weighed against each other. More generally, 
Schwarze, n. 1502. In this regard, the fair balance test as applied by the ECtHR, see chapters 5 
and 6 on Great Britain and the Netherlands, serves as an example where the court undertakes 
a fully fl edged means-ends analysis.
1512 Similar Jarass, n. 1458, p. 1094.
1513 See, for instance, ECJ, C-280/93, n. 241, no. 95; C-317/00 P(R) – “Invest” Import und Export 
GmbH v Commission, (2000) ECR I-9541, no. 61; contra von Danwitz, n. 1511, p. 396, and 
Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 470.
1514 See ECJ, C-317/00 P(R), ibid.; C-44/94 – Queen v Minister of Agriculture, (1995) ECR I-3115, no. 
55; C-368/96, n. 1476, no. 79; C-295/03 P, n. 1476, no. 86.
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e. Compensation
According to Article 17 ECFR, compensation must be paid if a deprivation of 
property takes place.1515 Although the regulation of the use of property does not 
in principle entail the obligation to pay compensation, such regulation can, in 
exceptional circumstances require the payment of compensation in order to fulfi l 
the requirements of the principle of proportionality because “in the absence of 
compensation, the restrictions on the right to property […] constitute a 
1515 Th e amount of compensation payable must be adequate but not necessarily amount to full 
market value. Th e adequacy of the amount of compensation payable can be inferred from 
ECtHR case law, see only Papachelas v Greece, no. 31423/96 (GC), ECHR 1999-II, no. 48, which 
was settled by granting just satisfaction on 4 April 2000: “Th e Court reiterates that an 
interference with peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a “fair balance” between the 
demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of 
the individual’s fundamental rights (see, among other authorities, the Sporrong and Lönnroth 
v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 26, § 69). Compensation terms 
under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment whether the contested measure 
respects the requisite fair balance and, notably, whether it does not impose a disproportionate 
burden on the applicant. In this connection, the taking of property without payment of an 
amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference 
that cannot be justifi ed under Article 1 (of the First Protocol of the ECHR, which guarantees 
the right to property). Th at Article does not, however, guarantee a right to full compensation in 
all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of “public interest” may call for less than 
reimbursement of the full market value (see the Holy Monasteries v. Greece judgment of 
9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A, pp. 34–35, §§ 70–71) (emphasis and comments added).” 
According to Lithgow, n. 1179, nos 121, 125, compensation must be reasonably related to the 
value of the property, which normally equals its market value: “121. [T]he taking of property 
without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would normally constitute a 
disproportionate interference which could not be considered justifi able under Article 1 [of the 
First Protocol of the ECHR]. Article 1 […] does not, however, guarantee a right to full 
compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of “public interest”, such as 
pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social 
justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value (see […] James and 
Others judgment, Series A no. 98, p. 36, para. 54). […] Th e valuation of major industrial 
enterprises for the purpose of nationalising a whole industry is in itself a far more complex 
operation than, for instance, the valuation of land compulsorily acquired and normally calls 
for specifi c legislation which can be applied across the board to all the undertakings involved. 
Accordingly, provided always that the […] fair balance is preserved, the standard of 
compensation required in a nationalisation case may be diff erent from that required in regard 
to other takings of property. […]. 125. Parliament decided to base compensation on the value 
of the shares in the nationalised companies. […] Th e principal alternative would have been to 
base compensation on the value of the underlying assets […]. […] [V]aluing a business which 
is to continue to operate as a going concern earnings may oft en be a more important factor 
than assets (emphasis and comments added).”
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disproportionate and intolerable interference.”1516 Th is is normally the case for de 
facto expropriations.1517
Should compensation be payable, the question is whether the European Union as 
initiator of restrictive legislative measures is liable for its payment or the Member 
States, which, where such measures are prescribed in Directives, have to 
implement them. EC Directives normally leave some leeway to the Member States 
as to how to achieve the objectives of such legislation. Depending on the choice 
the Member States make, e.g. in the case of the Commission’s proposals (of 
19 September 2007) for third generation Energy Directives whose objective it is 
to achieve complete independence of energy transmission networks from 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, Member States would have the 
choice between ownership unbundling or the introduction of (“deep”) ISOs (with 
powers to invite tenders for investment).1518 Consequently, either expropriation1519 
or mere regulation of ownership could be the result, the fi rst of which would 
defi nitely require compensation to be paid and the latter would be likely to 
require compensation (see in greater detail below). Th us, if all options available 
in a Directive entailed the obligation to pay compensation, i.e. without other 
implementation options1520 not requiring compensation, adequate compensation 
mechanisms would have do be provided by the European Union.1521
1516 ECJ, Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, n. 241, no. 79, states: “As to whether, taking into 
account the objective sought and in the absence of compensation, the restrictions on the right to 
property resulting from those measures constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference 
impairing the very substance of the right to property, it must be observed that those measures 
are urgent and are intended to guarantee that eff ective action is implemented […] (emphasis 
added).” See also ECJ, C-347/03 – Tocai, (2005) ECR I-3820, nos 122 et seq.
1517 Jarass, n. 1458, p. 1095; this also bears similarities to the fair balance test as applied by the 
ECtHR, see chapters 5 and 6 on Great Britain and the Netherlands, and to the German Inhalts- 
und Schrankenbestimmung, which in exceptional circumstances also carries the obligation to 
pay compensation, see the seminal decisions of the BVerfG in BVerfGE 58, 137, 147 et seq., and 
BVerfGE 100, 226, 241 et seq. – Denkmalschutz on the kind of regulation of ownership requiring 
compensation. See further Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 473. Such regulation only entails the 
obligation to provide for compensation if the eff ect of the interference with the right to property 
is similar to a complete deprivation of property, which in turn can be regarded as the German 
equivalent to de facto expropriation under ECHR and EC law. See also chapter 4 on Germany.
1518 See Introduction.
1519 By way of forced sale. In greater detail and based on ECtHR case law, see the Introduction and 
chapter 6 on the Netherlands as regards both the fact that forced sale amounts to expropriation 
and the fact that even if there is the option to transfer either competitive energy supply or 
energy supply network (operation) activities, an expropriation would still take place.
1520 Such as, in the context of the Directives at issue, the third option agreed on 9 October 2008 by 
the EC Council of Energy Ministers to be included in the upcoming third generation Energy 
Directives, see Introduction and chapter 4 on Germany.
1521 I.e. on the assumption that the prescription of ownership unbundling and/or the introduction 
of “deep” independent system operation would only become proportionate if adequate 
compensation (not necessarily amounting to full market value) was paid, which would mean 
that the EU could exercise its competence to impose these measures, which includes the EU’s 
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If the national legislation implementing Directives of that kind are enforced, the 
EU would also be liable to pay compensation.1522 On the assumption that at least 
one of the options set out in a Directive carrying the obligation to pay 
compensation is otherwise legitimate1523, this is so because, fi rst, the principal 
decision of a Directive is mandatory for Member States to follow, which in the 
case of the Energy Directives at issue is that control of the energy networks must 
be independent and thus be surrendered by the vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings, and thus the eff ects of enforcement are causally linked to 
the EU.1524 Secondly, there is no alternative not requiring compensation. Th irdly, 
the eff ect of such a Directive would be similar to a directly applicable and 
enforceable Regulation, of which the eff ects are, again, always causally linked to 
the EU: the Directives (and thus an action by the EU) would be the cause of the 
otherwise legitimate expropriation or regulation of ownership, which do not 
leave Member States the choice of implementing an option which would not be 
liable to trigger compensation.
compliance with Article 56 EC, and on the further assumption that the Member States opting 
for these measures would not be breaching their respective constitutional laws. Under EC law, 
provision for compensation does not have to be contained in the same law which requires the 
deprivation of property. Further, the ECJ has regarded it suffi  cient that the administration can 
award compensation as it sees fi t, i.e. that it possesses a degree of discretion, see ECJ, C-5/88 
– Wachauf, n. 1505, no. 22, C-2/92 – Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, n. 1468, no. 14. As 
Directives are implemented by the Member States, the national law obviously also has to 
contain compensation provisions; however, the principal liability for comepnsaion belongs to 
the EU, see also the elaborations, which follow.
1522 Similar Schmidt-Preuß, n. 241, p. 473; cf. Storr, n. 512; as regards the amount of compensation, 
see n. 1515. Compensation payable by the EU would be residual in nature: the state or private 
parties to whom assets are transferred in the course of (de facto) expropriation would have to 
pay adequate compensation (not necessarily the market value), see chapter 5 on Great Britain. 
As the transfer is happening in the context of a forced sale, the purchaser is normally not pre-
determined, which means that negotiations about the purchase price would have to be 
conducted. Th e market for energy supply network assets is, however, likely to be a purchasers’ 
market, i.e. there is not a suffi  cient number of potential buyers in the market and/or assets have 
to be sold by a specifi ed time in the future, which puts potential buyers in a stronger bargaining 
position than the seller. Th us, adequate compensation may not be obtainable, either because of 
diff erences in valuation and/or because (potential) purchasers do not want to pay an adequate 
purchase price; consequently, either the State would have to take over the assets in question or 
would have to approve of the sale for less than the adequate price and pay the adequate price if 
the fi rst scenario applied or the shortfall below the adequate price if the second scenario 
applied.
1523 And could become proportionate if adequate compensation was paid.
1524 As regards the distinction between mandatory principal objectives and the range of tools 
available for Member States to achieve these objectives, see also F Schorkopf, ‘Eigentums-
rechtliche Entfl echtung aus verfassungs- und europarechtlicher Sicht’, in W. Löwer (ed.), Neue 
rechtliche Herausforderungen für den Strommarkt, Bonner Gespräch zum Energierecht, Band 
3, 2008, pp. 117 et seq., 119, 120; see further the chapter 4 on Germany as regards the question 
of what situation EC fundamental rights are solely applicable and where national fundamental 
rights standards are also (or only) applicable.
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Moreover, even if the least intrusive option is chosen by one Member State, which 
might in principle entail less compensation payable, full compensation would 
have to be provided by the EU if legislation gave rise to consequences, which had 
an expropriatory eff ect entailing full compensation. For example, this could be 
the case for the current draft  of the Energy Directives because as has already been 
outlined in Part 1 Chapter 3 on Article 56 EC, they (although to a lesser extent 
than the Commission’s proposals of September 2007) suggest that “companies 
engaged in the production or supply of gas or electricity [should be prohibited] 
from exercising control over a transmission network operator of a Member State 
that has opted for full unbundling.”1525 Th is would mean that energy generation 
or production and supply undertakings (i.e. exclusive of TSOs) whether vertically 
integrated or not, would either have to give up their (shareholdings in) energy 
transmission networks (including any network operations) in Member States 
which have opted for ownership unbundling or not be allowed to acquire such 
interests or control. Similar to ownership unbundling, this would mean that 
existing transmission network (operation) activities would have to be sold or that 
such generation/production and supply undertakings would be prevented from 
establishing an economic activity in the area of transmission networks in 
Member States which have opted for ownership unbundling. Such a prescription 
in (EC) legislation amounts to a forced sale, which, as has already been shown, 
amounts to a deprivation of property, which in turn requires adequate 
compensation to be paid.
2. FREEDOM OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Unlike the ECHR, EC law includes the fundamental right of the freedom to 
pursue an economic activity (“trade or business”) and the freedom to choose and 
pursue an occupation.1526 Not only has the ECJ long recognized these freedoms 
1525 See Council of the European Union, nn. 372 et seq. and accompanying text, also with regard to 
the approval by the European Parliament in April 2009 and the Commission’s proposals of 
September 2007. According to the draft  Electricity and Gas Directives as agreed by the Council 
such undertakings are also not allowed to own transmission networks in such Member States. 
Th e agreed proposals do not refer to vertically integrated companies in this context any more 
as opposed to the more far reaching intentions expressed by the Commission in its original 
proposals, n. 15. Th us, vertically integrated TSOs (not vertically integrated generation/
production and supply undertakings!) in Member States which opt for the ISO alternative or 
the 3rd way (see Introduction for more details) seem to be able to control TSOs or own 
transmission networks in Member States which have opted for ownership unbundling.
1526 As to the boundaries between these two fundamental rights, see Blanke in Tettinger/Stern, 
Kölner Gemeinschaft skommentar zur Europäischen Grundrechte-Charta, 2006, Article 16, nos 
3, 20. Th e ECtHR has, however, applied the right to property broadly so as to include some 
aspects of these rights as well, see chapters 5 and 6 on Great Britain and the Netherlands.
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as being general principles of Community law1527, but they are also explicitly set 
out in the ECFR.1528
As has already been outline above, the right to property protects what has been 
acquired or acquired rights, i.e. the substance of the property owned, whereas the 
freedoms at issue here protect the (process of) acquisition or the action of 
economic activity.1529 When applying both, the ECJ usually does not make this 
distinction.1530 Th e Court also considers (as in the case of the right to property) 
the right to conduct business not as absolute but in relation to its social 
function.1531 Th e assessment by the ECJ of an interference with the right to 
property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity and its proportionality 
follows exactly the same patterns.1532 Th us, as the right to property is the main 
economic fundamental right interfered with by further unbundling measures, 
the freedom to pursue an economic activity is not further discussed here. All 
relevant issues in the context of this freedom have already been discussed in the 
previous chapters and are similarly valid here.
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY
As has already been outlined above, Article 295 EC refl ects the neutrality of the 
EC Treaty as regards property ownership and thus leaves the decision as to 
whether economic undertakings should be private (privatized) or in public 
ownership (nationalization) to the Member States. It has also already been 
established that the mere regulation of ownership, which does not result in a de 
facto expropriation or does not have the eff ect of an expropriation, can in principle 
be imposed by European legislation; accordingly, the imposition of independent 
system operation or unbundling which does not go so far as to require (de facto) 
1527 ECJ, C-4/73, n. 536, nos 12–14; C-44/79, n. 536; C-234/85 – Keller v Staatsanwaltschaft  Freiburg, 
(1986) ECR 2897, no. 8.
1528 Article 15(1) ECFR (Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work) states: 
“Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation.” 
Article 16 ECFR (Freedom to conduct a business) states: “Th e freedom to conduct a business in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised.” Th e EC fundamental 
freedoms of the right of establishment and the free movements of persons, goods and services 
(and capital) are expressions of these fundamental freedoms.
1529 When both aspects are aff ected, both fundamental rights are applied in parallel 
(Idealkonkurrenz). See in greater detail, chapter 4 on Germany, also as regards the applicability 
of these freedoms in the context given.
1530 See only ECJ, Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95, n. 1476, nos 72–75; C-200/96, n. 1479, nos 
21 et seq.; C-317/00 P(R), n. 1513, no. 58.
1531 See, e.g., ECJ, C-280/93, n. 241.
1532 See, e.g., ECJ, C-104/97 P, Atlanta v Council & Commission, (1999) ECR I-6983, no. 12; 
C-265/87, n. 238, no. 15.
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expropriation is likely to be in compliance with Article 295 EC. Th is has however 
confronted the Commission with an insurmountable dilemma as regards its plans 
to impose ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks because 
publicly owned vertically integrated energy supply undertakings owning and 
operating energy transmission networks could not be forced to sell their networks 
to private undertakings. Th e proposals of the Commission of 19 September 2007 
and the draft  Energy Directives as agreed by the European Council in October 
2008 (and approved by the European Parliament on 22 April 2009) thus used a 
“trick” and simply classifi ed the provision for the transfer of networks owned by 
publicly owned energy supply undertakings to other public law entities or 
organizationally separate state units or divisions as ownership unbundling.1533
Th e view of the Commission and the Council that such structural separation can 
be classifi ed as ownership unbundling, is fl awed, however, because the competitive 
energy supply activities on the one hand, and the energy supply network activities 
on the other would continue to be owned and operated by the State as one and 
the same person, no matter whether both activities are “integrated” in one 
organizational unit or separate in two units. Th is is so because diff erent 
organizational layers, units or subdivisions of a State are perceived as one entity 
under EC law, no matter whether they are state authorities or undertakings.1534
1533 Th e Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission’s proposals of 19 September 2007, n. 15, 
state on p. 6: “In keeping with Article 295 EC, the proposal applies in the same way to publicly 
and privately owned companies. Th is means that irrespective of its public or private nature, no 
person or group of persons would be able alone or jointly to infl uence the composition of the 
boards, the voting or decision making of both transmission system operators or the supply or 
production companies. Th is ensures that where supply or production activities are in public 
ownership, the independence of a publicly owned transmission system operator is still 
guaranteed; but these proposals do not require state owned companies to sell their network to 
a privately owned company. For instance, to comply with this requirement, any public entity 
or the State could transfer the rights (which provide the “infl uence”) to another publicly or 
privately owned legal person. Th e important thing is that in all cases where unbundling is 
carried out, the Member State in question must demonstrate that in practice, the results are 
truly eff ective and that the companies operate entirely separate from one another, providing a 
real level-playing fi eld across the whole of the EU. It is on that basis that the Commission will 
assess whether in individual cases the distinct public bodies fulfi ll the unbundling requirements 
set out in this Directive [emphasis added].” Article 9(6) of the draft  Electricity and Gas 
Directives of 22 April 2009 (fi nally adopted unamended by the Council of the European Union 
on 25 June 2009), n. 33, which deals with ownership unbundling, states: “For the implementation 
of this Article, where the person referred to in paragraphs 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d) is the Member 
State or another public body, two separate public bodies exercising control, on the one hand, 
over a transmission system operator or over a transmission system and, on the other hand, 
over an undertaking performing any of the functions of production or supply, are deemed not 
to be the same person or the same persons.”
1534 Kahl in Calliess/Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, Article 10, no. 18. Th e only exception might 
be municipalities in a federal state such as Germany because (similar to national company 
law), national constitutional law such as Article 28(2) GG confers a particular status 
(institutional guarantee) on such (public law) entities. In this respect, EC law might recognize 
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Because private and public undertakings are treated diff erently, the general 
principle of equality might be violated. Th e general principle of equality belongs 
to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and to the general 
principles of Community law as recognized by the ECJ, according to which 
“similar situations shall not be treated diff erently unless diff erentiation is 
objectively justifi ed”.1535 Further, the general principle of equality is also set out 
in Article 20 ECFR, which applies both to equal treatment by the legislature and 
the executive.1536
For there to be a violation of the general principle of equality, there must be a 
diff erence in treatment of comparable situations, which is not justifi ed. Th e 
situations to be compared must at least in essence be similar.1537 In the context of 
the draft  Energy Directives at issue here, there are no reasons why private and 
public energy supply undertakings should not be comparable.1538 Th e further 
unbundling measures are, according to the Commission’s opinion1539, only 
eff ective if all energy supply undertakings have to surrender control of their 
energy transmission networks. Th us, the rationale for the draft  legislation 
concerns both private and public energy supply undertakings. Both types of 
undertakings pursue network and competitive energy supply activities and 
compete with each other. Further, the EU’s neutrality towards the national 
property orders according to Article 295 EC and the equal treatment of 
undertakings active in rendering services of general economic interest according 
institutional distinctions made in federal states in a way similar to its recognition of the 
national company law “decision” that an undertaking is a legal person. Consequently, following 
the view taken in this work that public undertakings are also eligible to claim fundamental 
rights protection in the specifi c context of energy supply, requiring municipalities or vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings in which they participate to transfer their networks or 
remaining energy supply activities might amount to ownership unbundling. As currently 
“only” energy transmission networks are subject of the new Energy Directives, “only” 
undertakings such as RWE and EnBW of Germany would be concerned; as regards energy 
distribution networks, see n. 1540 infra.
1535 Rossi in Calliess/Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, Article 20 GrCh, no. 2; see also, for instance, 
ECJ, Joined Cases C-117/76 and 16/77 – Ruckdeschel & Ströh v Hauptzollamt Hamburg St.-
Annen and Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, (1977) ECR 1753, no. 7.
1536 Calliess, n. 509, p. 95; Callliess, ‘Article 6’, in Calliess/ Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, no. 22. 
As regards the entities entitled to rely on the general principle of equality, the discussion in the 
context of the right to property is applicable here.
1537 See Calliess, ibid., (2007) et 92, 96, with further references.
1538 Th e judgment of the ECJ, Joined Cases C-188/80 and C-190/80 – France, Italy & United 
Kingdom v Commission, (1982) ECR 2545, no. 21, cannot be regarded as indicating a lack of 
comparability because in this judgment state internal issues were at stake whereas here, market 
entry is an issue outside the state sphere, see Calliess, n. 1536, (2007) et 92, 96.
1539 See n. 10, p. 13.
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to Articles 16, 86(2) EC, no matter whether they are public or private, are further 
indications that public and private undertakings are comparable.1540
Unequal treatment results from the fact that the proposed Energy Directives only 
force private undertakings, and not also public energy supply undertakings, to 
surrender their control over energy transmission networks.1541 Further, the 
disadvantage resulting from unequal treatment1542 is refl ected in the fact that 
only the State will in the future be allowed to own and operate energy supply 
networks together with competitive energy supply activities in one person1543 
whereas private energy supply undertakings do not have this opportunity any 
more and can thus no longer earn network charges.1544
It is questionable whether this detrimental unequal treatment can be objectively 
justifi ed. Article 295 can not serve as justifi cation because it would contradict the 
neutrality of the EC law towards the national property orders that this provision 
is supposed to embody.1545 Further, the assumption that public undertakings 
would treat all (potential) market participants as equal is also not valid. EC 
provisions such as Article 86 EC would otherwise not make sense.1546
In conclusion, it can be said that the general principle of equality coupled with 
Article 295 EC requires that the EC legislature can only order further unbundling, 
which treats private and public undertakings as equal.
1540 See also Calliess, n. 1536, (2007) and 92, 96, according to whom the situation in the area of 
energy distribution networks appears to be similar, with some peculiarities with respect to 
German municipal energy supply undertakings, see already n. 1534.
1541 Forcing public energy supply undertakings (for the defi nition, see n. 1488) to surrender to 
privately controlled energy supply undertakings (for the defi nition of substantive privatizations, 
see chapter 6 on the Netherlands) would be in breach of Article 295 EC as understood here; as 
regards focing private undertakings to surrender is in itself, i.e. apart form the issue discussed 
here, in breach of Article 295 as understood here, see Part 1 Chapter 3.
1542 Required by the ECJ, Joined Cases C-17/91 and C-20/61 – Klöckner-Werke and Hoesch v High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, (1962) ECR 325, 345.
1543 Th e unbundling requirement in the draft  Directives is thus only functional or organizational 
in nature. In the Netherlands, for instance, GTS is the state-owned gas transport incumbent 
and Gas Terra, the incumbent gas supply undertaking, is jointly owned amd controlled by the 
Dutch State (50%) and Shell and Exxon Mobile (50%). See already chapter 6 on the Netherlands, 
in particular n. 1272.
1544 Assuming that the operation of the networks can be pursued profi tably, such network charges 
are likely to be higher than the profi ts resulting from the capital interest earned from the 
purchase price received for the forced sale of the networks, see Calliess, n. 1536, (2007) and 92, 
97.
1545 See in greater detail, Calliess, n. 1536, (2007) and 92, 97.
1546 French state owned EDF whose abusive behaviour has been ruled on several times by French 
courts and the European Commission, serves as example that such an argument is indeed 
invalid as does the determination that French state controlled electricity networks do no 
necessarily enable non-discriminatory market access, see Calliess, n. 1536, (2007) and 92, 97, 
for further details.
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III. APPLICATION TO FURTHER UNBUNDLING 
MEASURES
Th e further unbundling measures assessed here, i.e. ownership unbundling and 
independent system operation as proposed by the Commission on 19 September 
2007, are supposed to ensure the independence of energy transmission network 
operations from the remaining energy supply activities.1547
Th e objectives the independence of energy transmission networks are supposed 
to achieve are extensively discussed in Part 1 of this work and are in principle 
legitimate. Further, it may be recalled that Article 95 has been accepted as 
suffi  cient legal basis for further unbundling measures. However, it has also been 
established that the exercise of this competence with respect to the introduction 
of ownership unbundling is prohibited and that the prohibition on certain 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings of one Member State owning 
and operating energy transmission networks in Member States which have 
implemented ownership unbundling violates Article 56 EC. Further, it has been 
concluded that the introduction of further unbundling from a competence point 
of view is contrary to the subsidiarity principle and disproportionate. Th us, the 
points which follow are made for the sake of completeness and as an essential 
basis for the comparative conclusions to follow.
1. OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING
Outright ownership unbundling as well as its seemingly milder version, the 
so-called share split, are deprivations of property of the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings under EC law.1548
Further, the draft  Energy Directives prohibit (although to a lesser extent than the 
Commission’s proposals of September 2007) “companies engaged in the 
production or supply of gas or electricity […] from exercising control over a 
1547 Th e so-called “Th ird Way” or “Eff ective and Effi  cient Unbundling” as third option contained 
in the proposals for Energy Directives as agreed by the European Council in October 2008 are 
not discussed further here. In this regard, see Introduction and chapter 4 on Germany. Similar 
to the analysis there, this option can also be qualifi ed as “mere” (proportionate) regulation of 
the right to property under EC law, for which the EU possess an enforceable competence. In 
the draft  Directives as agreed by the European Council in October 2008, this option is called 
ITO (Independent Transmission Operator), see Recital 12, Articles 9(8), 17 et seq. (chapter V) 
of the draft  Electricity and Gas Directives.
1548 Th e discussion of the diff erent scenarios and options in relation to fulfi lling the ownership 
unbundling requirements in the chapters 4 and 5 on Germany and Great Britain also apply 
here.
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transmission network operator of a Member State that has opted for full 
unbundling.”1549 As has already been explained, this would mean that energy 
supply undertakings (i.e. exclusive of TSOs) whether vertically integrated or not, 
would either have to give up their (shareholdings in) energy transmission 
networks (including any network operations) in Member States, which have 
opted for ownership unbundling or not be allowed to acquire such interests or 
control. Similar to ownership unbundling, this would mean that existing 
transmission network (operation) activities would have to be sold or that such 
energy supply undertakings would be prevented from establishing an economic 
activity in the area of transmission networks in Member States, which have opted 
for ownership unbundling. Such a legislative prescription would amount to a 
forced sale, which, as has already been shown, is a deprivation of property, 
initiated by EC law.
As has been established in the discussion in the chapter on Germany with respect 
to the interference with the freedom to pursue an economic activity, and given 
the fact that under EC fundamental rights protection as applied by the ECJ, 
which assesses both the right to property and the freedom to pursue an economic 
activity in the same manner when both rights are at stake, the freedom to pursue 
an economic activity is also interfered with.
2. “DEEP” INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATION
Th e Commission’s alternative proposal of introducing Independent System 
Operators (ISO) with powers to take investment decisions and to invite tenders 
for investment1550 would result in the creation of an ISO, which became solely 
responsible for investment planning and decisions, requiring the approval of 
national regulatory agencies’ (NRA).1551 If the energy transmission network 
owners were not prepared to make the investment ordered by the ISO themselves, 
the ISO could then invite tenders for such investment in the market on its own 
initiative and under its own authority. Th e owners would be “downgraded” to 
mere service providers maintaining and rendering technical services for their 
own grids (in particular in the context of investment put out to tender) or investors 
in their own grids. Th ey would not only not be able to decide about investments 
1549 See nn. 33, 372, 466 and accompanying text.
1550 Th e points which follow are similar to those in the chapter 5 on Great Britain, For the idea 
behind introducing “deep” ISO and the problem of strategic investment withholding, see also 
in that chapter.
1551 See Article 10(5) and (6) of the Electricity Directive as proposed by the Commission, n. 15, and 
Article 13(5) and (6) of the draft  Electricity and Gas Directives, n. 33.
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in their own grids and they would also be compelled to accept investments by 
third parties in their grids.1552
Th us, further unbundling in the form of forcing network owners to also surrender 
their investment decision (and tendering) powers over their networks to an ISO 
should also be classifi ed as a deprivation of property in the form of a de facto 
expropriation of network property, rather than a deprivation of the right to use, 
control, let or sell (regulation of ownership). All property competences1553 would 
have to be transferred to the ISO, which results in leaving the legal right to 
network ownership as an “empty shell” (with only the formal right to sell the 
property remaining). One of the most important competences of legal ownership 
is taken away, i.e. the decision to deal with one’s property freely, which includes 
the competence to use or not to use one’s property as one pleases. Th e owner is 
left  with the mere physical property without being able any longer to decide about 
its use or non use or to decide whether to permit certain uses and users any 
more.
For the vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, which own the 
networks, there would no sensible alternative use of the network property be left ; 
sensible use of the networks can only be made by those who actually dispose of 
1552 Th e Commission proposals, n. 15, and the draft  Energy Directives, n. 33, do not contain any 
indications of whether investments required by the ISO have to be economic let alone profi table, 
an omission, which might lead to overinvestment, see Th e Brattle Group, n. 191. See Th e Brattle 
Group, n. 1194, p. 71, defi ning “economic” investments as investments to reduce the costs of 
persistent congestion. Although investment decisions and invitations to tendering for 
investment are subject to approval of the national regulatory agency, the criteria for such 
approvals are not known, at least with respect to whether investments have to be economic or 
profi table. Th e only time effi  cient and economic investment is mentioned (and only in the draft  
Energy Directives) is where the draft s set out as one of the tasks of the regulator in Article 36(3)
(d) to “ensure that network access tariff s collected by independent system operators include a 
remuneration for the network owner or network owners that provides for an adequate 
remuneration of the network assets and of any new investments therein, provided they are 
economically and effi  ciently incurred [emphasis added]”. It is unclear, however, whether the 
network owner has to “suff er” for uneconomic investment decided and approved by the ISO 
and the regulator, respectively, or what else is meant by this provision, see further n. 1554. It 
only becomes clear that the regulator checks and approves the investment decisions or 
tendering processes conducted by the ISO, see Article 10(5) and (6)(b) proposed Electricity 
Directive, Article 13(4) and (5)(b) draft  Directives, against the non-binding European-wide 
10-year network development plan, Article36(1)(f) draft  Directives, and the multi-annual 
network development plan presented on a yearly basis by the independent system operator, 
Article 36(3)(c) draft  Directives. All of this does not, however, necessarily protect the network 
owners against uneconomic or unprofi table investments. A network owner would only be able 
to refuse to invest himself, which would lead to a tendering process for such investment, which 
in turn would result in the “downgrading” to a mere service provider as explained in the main 
text.
1553 See Introduction.
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the networks (which includes operation and investment decision powers). Th e 
current network owners would lose every aspect of their ability to deal with the 
networks as their (apart, obviously, from selling them) and in particular the 
ability to decide (at least jointly with others) about network investment. Th e TSO 
can order the network owners to do whatever it needs to operate the grid 
including the maintenance of “their” grid. Th e network owners are downgraded 
to mere and exchangeable providers of service on their own grids, which does 
not give them any economically benefi cial use of their property but only out of 
their economic activity as service provider.
Th e loss of use and control of the networks are the decisive factors for the 
determination of the value of the network property. Th e right to use property for 
one’s own purposes, which is the fundamental function of property (apart from 
serving the general interest (social function)), would be converted to a right to 
receive a mere monetary consideration in return for putting property at the 
disposal of the ISO, which in any event is determined by the regulator. Th is 
regulated nature of the return further contributes to the almost complete 
devaluation of the network assets.1554
In the current context, there would not even be a fair conversion to a mere 
monetary consideration, which might in itself (if fair) be considered to be a 
suffi  cient compensation for the loss of the right to (a sensible alternative) use the 
networks. Th ere would also be a deprivation of the last major right, i.e. to the 
right to decide what to do with one’s property, or what not to do. Th is “negative” 
competence forms part of the right to property and in this context means the 
“negative” freedom not to invest.
Th e preservation of the value of the network property, which could be considered 
to be a sensible alternative use of such property, is also not applicable here. Th is is 
1554 Th e uncertainty as to under which circumstances the network owner receives an adequate 
compensation, see n. 1552, must in principle be resolved by the EC legislator according to the 
principle that interferences with fundamental rights require a suffi  cient legal basis. Th is 
principle can be inferred from Article 52 ECFR and seems to have been accepted by the ECJ, 
for instance in re Booker Aquaculture, n. 241, no. 64 (with respect to compensation) and in re 
Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen I, n. 512, no. 56 (with respect to the quality of provisions of 
a Directive, which require fees for infrastructure access to be determined “according to 
relevant, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria”), see also ECJ, C-46/87 – 
Hoechst v Commission, (1989) ECR 2859, no. 19. Th e determination of the details of adequate 
compensation and the circumstances under which such compensation is payable, on the other 
hand, have to be left  to the Member States because they depend on the choice made by the 
Member States and their respective legal systems. Jarass, n. 928, § 6 nos 36 et seq., and § 22 nos 
27 et seq., and Kingreen in Calliess/Ruff ert, EUV/EGV, 3rd ed., 2007, Article 52 EU-GrCh, seem 
to assume that it is not suffi  ciently clear yet whether an interference initiated by the EU requires 
a legal basis in EC law or whether it suffi  ces that Member States’ legislation provides for such a 
legal basis.
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because assuming that the book value of the network assets remained on the 
balance sheet of the legal network owners, their trading value is lost for the 
reasons set out above; if, for accountancy reasons, the assets appeared in the 
balance sheet of the ISO, this would be a further indication that the introduction 
of this further unbundling measure should be considered a deprivation as 
opposed to a regulation of property.
3. MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND PROPORTIONALITY
As outlined above, the legislative measures of ownership unbundling and “deep” 
independent system operation have to pass the proportionality test as outline 
above. Th e objectives to be achieved1555 are within the margin of appreciation of 
the EC legislature, i.e. not manifestly unreasonable, and thus in principle 
legitimate.
Both legislative measures would, however, disproportionately interfere with the 
network owners right to property as well as with the freedom to pursue an 
economic activity as protected by the European Union.1556
For ownership unbundling, this can be inferred from the analogous application 
of the proportionality test in the competition law enforcement context as set out 
in Part 1 Chapter 21557; the arguments used in the chapter on Germany in the 
1555 Further unbundling of energy supply undertakings aims at safeguarding the structural 
independence of the network operations and related thereto increasing the transparency of the 
energy markets, which is considered to contribute to the achievement of the establishment and 
promotion of an internal market for energy supply (greater market integration), the promotion 
and protection of competition in energy supply throughout the EU and the safeguarding of 
supply security and reliability; in order to achieve all these aims, and to achieve them for the 
benefi t of the consumer, suffi  cient investment in energy transmission and interconnection 
network capacity is considered a sine qua non condition by the European Commission. See in 
greater detail the chapter 5 on Great Britain and Part 1 Chapter 1.
1556 As regards the role a social cost and benefi t analysis should play in the context of the 
proportionality test and which outcome is required to justify further unbundling measures 
such as ownership unbundling and “deep” independent system operation, see chapter 5 on 
Great Britain and Part 1 Chapter 2.
1557 Th e corresponding evaluations there also apply here analogously, see Part 1 Chapter 2. Th e 
structure of the proportionality test applied in the context of fundamental rights protection 
follows or is similar to the structure of the proportionality tests as applied in a competition law 
enforcement context, and in the context of the ECHR and German constitutional law. EC 
competition law is enforced by the Commission as part of its executive function and thus the 
margin of appreciation is narrower, see Part 1 Chapter 2. Th e (wider) margin of appreciation of 
the (EC) legislature as regards the objectives sought with further unbundling measures is not 
disputed here.
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context of the compliance of ownership unbundling with the German constitution 
are also applicable here.
As regards the envisaged introduction of “deep” independent system operation, 
its disproportionality has already been set out in the chapters on Great Britain 
and Germany.1558 On the other hand, the introduction of an ISO model along the 
lines of what is currently in place in Scotland can be regarded as proportionate as 
long as suffi  cient judicial protection is available against (fi nal) decisions of 
regulatory agencies and as long as ISOs do not have direct investment (tendering) 
decision powers as against the network owners.1559
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It has been established in this chapter that in theory the fundamental rights 
protection in the EU in general, and against legislative measures introducing 
further unbundling measures in particular, which includes the test of the 
proportionality of these legislative measures, is similar in structure and content 
to the protection given by the ECHR and German constitutional law. However, in 
practice, the level of protection in the area of economic fundamental rights 
protection is almost non-existent, in particular when it comes to applying the 
proportionality test. Th is is the more surprising because Article 53 ECFR, which 
has been recognized by the ECJ as an interpretation tool, provides that fundamental 
rights protection in the EU is not a “race to the bottom” but respects the “human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised […] by the Member States’ 
constitutions.”
It has further been explained that public undertakings as defi ned by EC law are 
likely to enjoy fundamental rights protection in the EU. Diff erentiating between 
1558 Th e elaborations made there are also applicable here. Th e arguments used in the British context 
are of particular relevance as the Commission regards the UK as a shining example of 
successful energy supply industry unbundling and liberalization, see Part 1 Chapter 2. As 
regards the special social function of network property as a justifi cation for more far-reaching 
restrictions of the EC fundamental rights at issue here and thus the particular balancing and 
weighing undertaken in relation thereto, see the chapter 4 on Germany in the context of the 
justifi cation of TPA; the discussions made there are analogously applicable here.
1559 It is important to note that private parties such as privately held ISOs cannot, other than on the 
basis of private law contracts, oblige other private parties such as privately held network 
owners to act in a certain way. It may be recalled that the introduction of an ISO model as 
briefl y set out in the main text and in the chapter 4 on Germany is the furthest extent to which 
the competence of the EU can be exercised according to the results presented in this work, see 
Part 1 Chapter 3. One of the reasons is that Article 295 EC as interpreted here only allows the 
EU to regulate ownership but not to expropriate; the introduction of “deep” ISOs would lead 
to a de facto expropriation as has just been established.
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private and public undertakings to the extent that the fi rst have to give up 
ownership of their networks whereas the latter can simply shift  them within the 
state organization, infringes the general principle of equality as protected by EC 
law. Further, if the EC legislature passes legislation, which contains measures, all 
of which carry the obligation to provide for compensation, it has been established 
that the EU indeed is liable for its payment.
Coming to the question of whether further unbundling complies with EC 
fundamental rights protection, it has been established that ownership unbundling 
would indeed be unlawful. Th e introduction of ISOs, on the other hand, might 
not be, as long as they are not “deep”. Where they are “deep”, much will depend 





Th is work has analyzed the legitimacy of energy supply network unbundling 
measures (exceeding the current legal unbundling requirements) as threatened 
or proposed by the European Commission on the basis of European economic 
regulation competences.
Apart from threatening to order the divestiture of energy networks of individual 
vertically integrated energy supply undertakings, the Commission originally 
proposed to either impose energy transmission network ownership unbundling 
(OU) or “deep” independent system operation (“deep” ISO), which would give 
independent energy transmission system operators exclusive investment decision 
and commissioning (tendering) powers. In addition, the current draft  Electricity 
and Gas Directives contain as a third option the implementation of independent 
transmission operators (ITOs).
Th is third option has not been the subject of the analysis as to what extent the 
further legislative unbundling measures (OU and “deep” ISO) – if introduced in 
isolation – would be in breach of economic fundamental rights, in particular the 
right to property, as protected in Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
the European Union. Introduced in isolation means without including further 
options with a lesser impact on fundamental rights such as the ITO option, which 
is merely a stricter form of legal unbundling and as a mere regulation, or 
deprivation of one part, of the right to property is still in compliance with the 
fundamental right to property.
A. EC COMPETENCES IN COMPETITION LAW 
AND SECTOR REGULATION
Th e Commission’s threat to order the divestiture of individual vertically integrated 
energy supply networks by using its competition law enforcement powers is based 
on the results of a sector inquiry, which analysed the data and the case presented 
by the industry as they stood at the end of 2005.
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Th e view has been taken here, however, that such a competition law based 
measure would not only be ultima ratio but actually disproportionate to the 
objective sought, which is to restore competition in an internal energy supply 
market. One main basis for this view is the results of economic analysis, which 
raises serious doubts about the analysis and case studies used by the Commission 
to support its case.
A recently conducted social cost benefi t analysis, which is equally applicable in 
the context of the proportionality of competition law based measures and further 
unbundling measures introduced by legislation, shows that legal ownership 
unbundling or divestiture and “deep” independent system operation of energy 
supply networks would, if at all, only be of marginal benefi t to consumer welfare. 
For electricity, the benefi t largely depends on the existence of suffi  cient generation. 
With respect to gas, it has been shown that regulation in tandem with competition 
law enforcement suffi  ces. Further, as energy transmission network ownership 
unbundling does not necessarily require less regulation, the cost of regulating 
vertically integrated energy supply networks would not be signifi cantly higher 
than the cost of regulating completely separate network businesses.
Should divestiture nevertheless be ordered by the Commission the European 
courts would apply a test of proportionality to such an executive measure which 
is stricter than the test they would apply in the course of reviewing the compliance 
of EC legislation introducing further unbundling measures with fundamental 
rights as protected on EU level.
With regard to EC legislation as second leg of EC economic regulation, assuming 
that it was in principle legitimately based on the harmonization competence of 
Article 95 EC to introduce further unbundling measures as originally proposed 
by the Commission, the EC legislature would in fact not be allowed to exercise 
this competence for several reasons.
Th e primary reason is that it would be in breach of Article 295 EC and be likely to 
violate the EC fundamental freedom of free movement of capital as guaranteed 
by Article 56 EC. Th ere would be a breach of Article 295 EC because the EU is not 
competent to legislate in the area of property ownership allocation, which 
ownership unbundling and “deep” independent system operation as (de facto) 
expropriation would belong to. Article 56 EC or the fundamental freedom of the 
free movement of capital would be compromised because the current draft 
Directives in prohibiting vertically integrated energy production and supply 
undertakings of one Member State from investing into ownership unbundled 
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energy transmission network operators of other Member States cannot be 
justifi ed with public policy and security reasons or overriding interests.
Such legislation would also be likely to be in breach of the subsidiarity principle 
as set out in Article 5(2) EC. Th e exercise of the competence as conferred by 
Article 95 would further be disproportionate (Article 5(3) EC) to the objectives 
sought, which are to promote competition in an internal market for energy 
supply and to promote security and reliability of energy supply.
In this context, the Commission proposals confi rm its role as motor of European 
integration when trying to enlarge the European Union’s infl uence over the 
European energy industry. Th e Commission’s activism, however, seems to have 
impaired its role as guardian of the EC Treaty, which also includes taking care 
that all European institutions live up to the rule of law and obey the protection 
granted by the Treaty such as the protection of fundamental rights and the 
guarantee of the fundamental freedoms. As an executive institution, which is at 
the same time part of the EC legislature in that it initiates EC legislation such as 
the legislation at issue here, its conduct is of questionable legality.
Not only has it produced a regulatory impact assessment, which is incomplete 
and wrong in places, in order to justify its proposals but it also insisted that it is 
mainly the separation of the energy transmission networks which would promote 
cross-border energy trade, although it knew at the time of its proposals that it is 
actually suffi  cient generation in the right places which is needed. Th is insistence 
probably stems from the fact that the EU does not have a competence to regulate 
generation, or more generally, the general structure of supply in the Member 
States.1560
As regards the issue of subsidiarity and the proportionality of the exercise of the 
competence of Article 95 EC, the successful evolution of (regional) cooperation 
and coordination of national regulatory agencies and of Transmission System 
Operators, in particular in the area of market coupling, has apparently not been 
suffi  ciently taken into account. Th e 2003 Energy Directives were also not given 
suffi  cient time to take eff ect before the proposal were tabled or early success has 
1560 Th e Commission was further misinformed when it proposed the so-called share split as a 
seemingly less intrusive form of legal ownership unbundling, which it actually is not. Another 
misconceived decision is the concession to allow vertically integrated energy transmission 
networks owned by public entities to be transferred from the department responsible for the 
vertically integrated energy supply undertaking as a whole to another department of that same 
public entity, which does not amount to the same degree of separation of legal ownership as 
required of vertically integrated energy transmission networks in private hands. Th e latter 
issue will be referred to again in section C infra.
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simply been neglected as can be seen in the case of Germany, which as recently as 
summer 2005 installed a regulatory authority which has operated with ever 
growing success ever since.
Coming back to the issue of whether the competence to introduce further 
unbundling measures as proposed by the Commission can actually be exercised, 
it is admitted that this discussion is of a rather theoretical nature; its main aim is 
to contribute to the development of the interpretation of EC law. Should this ever 
become an issue before the ECJ, it will, however, be unlikely to be given much 
weight as experience has shown that competence issues rarely induce the ECJ to 
invalidate EC legislation under judicial review.
On the other hand, in spite of this discussion’s limited practical relevance it may 
serve a purpose: because further unbundling legislation is such a far-reaching 
and substantial interference with (economic) fundamental rights and because of 
the energy supply industry’s fundamental importance for the economic 
performance of the EU, the judicial review of such legislation off ers a golden 
chance to continue to develop the eff ectiveness of fundamental rights protection 
in the European Union (see further section C below).
B. EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 
OF ENERGY SUPPLY SECTORS IN GERMANY, 
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS
It has become clear that the energy supply sectors in Germany, Great Britain and 
the Netherlands have developed rather distinctly and display rather diverging 
stages of energy network unbundling. In order to understand the diff erences, one 
fi rst has to understand the evolution, structure and regulation of the energy 
supply sectors in the Member States under review here.
Th e Netherlands are and remain a natural gas exporting country for the time 
being. Th e Dutch energy supply industry has always been (predominantly) state-
owned (i.e. including municipalities and provinces); all energy networks are 
state-owned and as such subject to regulation. New legislation has recently been 
passed ensuring that this remains the case for the time being. Only electricity 
generation and energy supply (retail) has been shared with the private sector for 
about a decade (with the major energy supply undertakings still in the hands of 
municipalities and provinces).1561
1561 Very recently, Nuon (exclusive of its energy supply networks) was bought by Vattenfall and 
Essent by RWE (again without the energy supply networks); both acquisitions are still subject 
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Th e UK has only recently turned from a natural gas exporting to an importing 
country. Th e energy supply industry in England, Wales and Scotland (Great 
Britain) is equipped with suffi  cient electricity generation and was privatized some 
two decades ago, the electricity sector in England and Wales vertically separated 
ab initio (at least with respect to transmission) and the gas sector in Great Britain 
vertically integrated but separated voluntarily about a decade aft er privatization. 
Although being one of the pioneers of energy supply sector regulation in Europe, 
a great deal of work was needed before regulation began to work eff ectively (in 
particular in the gas sector but also in electricity wholesale). Since privatization, 
it has not forced further unbundling upon its energy sector except for creating an 
independent GB electricity transmission system operator with some infl uence on 
investment.
Germany, which compared to the Netherlands and the UK as never possessed 
signifi cant natural gas resources, has always been heavily reliant on coal as 
primary energy source. Germany’s energy supply sector has always been in 
private hands or in the hands of municipalities, which enjoy a certain degree of 
autonomy as a result of Germany’s federal structure. Because of the basically 
private structure of the sector, Germany has never been able (unlike the 
Netherlands and the UK) to impose regulation or enforce rapid restructuring in 
the sector. Liberalization has taken almost a decade culminating in the late 
introduction of a sector-specifi c regulatory authority in July 2005, which has 
made considerable progress ever since (with incentive regulation to be introduced 
in 2009). Th is progress is, however, not yet refl ected in the Commission’s sector 
inquiry. In contrast to the UK, which faces vertical reintegration of energy 
wholesale and retail and thus tighter wholesale markets, and which is, as a result 
of its being (since only recently) no longer self-suffi  cient in energy supply, still in 
the process of ensuring suffi  cient energy supply security, Germany has only 
recently legislated for easier connection of generation plant to the networks (in 
order to promote independent generation) and has a mechanism for the 
promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) and combined heat power (CHP) 
in place, which is conducive to supply security (compare this to the UK, which 
has a more short-term competition orientated support mechanism in place 
because it only fairly recently had to start making provision for energy supply 
security); the four German electricity transmission operators (also owning the 
networks) are currently considering the creation of a national electricity 
transmission system operator (under club ownership).
to approval of the competition authorities. See Spiegel, ‘Vattenfall kauft  Nuon für 8,5 Milliarden 
Euro’, 23 February 2009, and ‘RWE will niederländischen Energiekonzern kaufen’, 12 Januar 
2009.
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Th is brief factual comparison already shows why the markets of the three 
countries under review are structured so diff erently. Th e second distinction of 
primary importance for the diff erent development in market structure is certainly 
the contrasting constitutional settings of Germany, the UK and the Netherlands 
and the diff erences in fundamental rights protection.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS PROTECTION
In the UK and the Netherlands, the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) is in principle the fundamental rights standard, against which national 
legislation is to be measured. In the UK and the Netherlands directly applicable 
EC legislation is to be measured against EC fundamental rights.
Th e UK and the Netherlands are distinct in that the UK is a dualistic legal order 
whereas the Netherlands is a monistic legal order. Accordingly, in the UK the 
ECHR is only (to a limited extent) applicable via the HRA whereas in the 
Netherlands the ECHR is part of the national legal order as is, in principle, EC 
law.
In Germany as a dualistic legal order such as the UK, national legislation is 
measured against the requirements of the German Constitution (and ultimately 
also against the ECHR, which in the context of this work might, however, only be 
relevant with respect to the protection of public undertakings, see further below); 
directly applicable EC legislation as well as EC Directives are not measured 
against German constitutional law as long as they live up to a similar fundamental 
rights standard as is aff orded by the German Constitution.1562
Th e fundamental diff erence between these two countries, apart from the fact that 
Germany possesses a codifi ed constitution, the Grundgesetz, whereas the UK’s 
constitutional law is not codifi ed, is the position of the judiciary in both 
countries.
In the UK, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has historically led to the 
submission of the judiciary to Parliament to the extent that Acts of Parliament 
1562 Which, by the way, is similar, from the viewpoint of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) with respect to the relationship between the ECHR and EC fundamental rights 
protection, see in re Bosphorus, chapter 4 on Germany, n. 824, and chapter on 5 Great Britain, 
n. 1145. Both positions, i.e. the German and the ECtHR’s, are in direct opposition to the ECJ’s 
doctrine of the primacy of EC law.
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are not reviewed under English law. A further consequence of this doctrine is the 
acceptance that fundamental rights have always been subject to unfettered 
interference by Parliament normally based on political bargaining. Th is 
constitutional setting has certainly been conducive to the success of UK style 
energy supply sector regulation. On the other hand, the British courts also act as 
European courts (on the basis of an authorization by Parliament); consequently, 
national legislation (or even directly applicable EC legislation) might ultimately 
land on the tables of the ECtHR.1563
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgericht, which 
safeguards the German Constitution and thus also reviews Acts of Parliament, 
has developed and enforced a rather detailed fundamental rights protection, 
which directly infl uences German style (energy supply) sector specifi c regulation, 
which focuses stricter on the rule of law than on regulatory bargaining.
Th e Netherlands fi nds itself positioned half-way between the UK and Germany 
in that national legislation can also be reviewed albeit only against the standard 
of the ECHR and not against the standard of the national constitution 
Grondwet.
Fundamental rights protection
In Germany, the analysis of the applicability of fundamental rights to further 
unbundling measures as proposed by the Commission, or more specifi cally, any 
possible implementation of such measures into German law, have led to the 
conclusion that ownership unbundling would be a disproportionate expropriation 
and “deep” independent system operation would be a regulation of ownership 
amounting to expropriation, which would also be disproportionate. Th e 
maximum possible in terms of further unbundling would be the introduction of 
an independent system operator model without investment decision and 
commissioning powers such as is currently in place in Scotland; the ITO model 
now contained in the draft  Directives would in principle be in compliance with 
the German constitution if implemented.
Th e BVerfG would review German implementing legislation against the German 
Grundgesetz.
1563 On the basis of a corresponding complaint. Such a situation might lead to a confl ict for the UK 
as to which law to follow, i.e. the ECHR or EC law. See in greater detail chapter 5 on Great 
Britain.
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In the UK, the complete transfer of the investment decision and commissioning 
powers of the two vertically integrated electricity transmission network owners 
in Scotland, which are to date shared with the national transmission system 
operator, would mean a deprivation of property in the form of a de facto 
expropriation while complete ownership unbundling would be a deprivation of 
property in the form of an expropriation according to Article 1 of the First 
Protocol of the ECHR as applied in the UK via the HRA.
Th e ECtHR would ultimately review English implementing legislation (and with 
it implicitly also the underlying EC legislation introducing further unbundling 
measures) against the standard of the ECHR.1564
In the Netherlands as the only Unitary State amongst the three EC Member States 
under review here, the vertical integrated energy supply undertakings wholly 
owned by municipalities and provinces in principle enjoy fundamental rights 
protection under the ECHR whereas the public shareholders do not. It has, 
however, been shown that any recourses to such protection would be of no avail. 
Th is is because under the ECHR, the deprivation of property in the form of (de 
facto) expropriation of the vertically integrated energy distribution networks 
would be unlikely to be classifi ed as disproportionate as long as suffi  cient 
compensation is paid, which however would be of no use to the vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings owned by subdivisions of the Dutch State 
given that such compensation would just circulate within the (Unitary) state 
organization.
Dutch courts review the legislation imposing the groepsverbod and other 
unbundling measures on the basis of the ECHR, and probably in a stricter 
manner than the ECtHR, which shows greater deference to decisions taken at 
Member State or local level.
Measuring the two original Commission proposals if passed in isolation against 
the fundamental rights protection as aff orded by the ECJ, ownership unbundling 
is classifi ed as a deprivation of property in the form of an expropriation and 
“deep” independent system operation a deprivation of property in the form of a 
de facto expropriation, both of which would be disproportionate (in particular 
for the reasons explained in section A above).
Further, the acceptance in the Commission proposals (and also, by the way, in 
the current draft  Directives) that the mere transfer of publicly owned energy 
1564 Which might lead a confl ict with the ECJ’s interpretation of EC law. See further chapter 5 on 
Great Britain.
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transmission networks to a part of the state organization separate from the part, 
which is responsible for the publicly owned vertically integrated energy supply 
undertaking would fulfi l the unbundling requirements of the new legislation 
amounts to a manifest breach of the principle of equality because it would 
signifi cantly disadvantage private undertakings in a comparable situation.
Th e ECJ would review further unbundling legislation on the basis of its own case 
law, which it has developed over the years.
As regards the question of whether public owners and shareholders and vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings (partly) owned or controlled by public 
institutions such as municipalities and provinces can claim fundamental 
protection, one has to distinguish between the situation in Germany, that under 
the ECHR and that under EC law.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, it has been argued here against rather old 
case law of the BVerfG but on the basis of recent indications by the Court that its 
position might change.1565 Accordingly, it is argued here that both municipalities, 
which possess a special status within the federal state organization because their 
institutional existence is constitutionally guaranteed, and the vertically integrated 
energy supply undertakings (partly) owned by them (in public and public private 
undertakings of public and private law) would enjoy protection of their 
(economic) fundamental rights under the German Constitution in the specifi c 
context of pursuing a competitive economic activity of energy supply.
Under the ECHR, it has been established that municipalities as governmental 
organizations according to Article 34 ECHR are not protected. It has, however, 
further been argued here that vertically integrated energy supply undertakings 
would be protected if they possess legal personality (no matter whether under 
public or private law) as long as their legal personality is recognized under 
national law and as long as they do not exercise public authority; both 
characteristics distinguish them from belonging to the state organization.
Consequently, should the German BVerfG refuse incorporated vertically 
integrated energy supply undertakings with public shareholders fundamental 
rights protection (although their legal personality is recognized in Germany), the 
ECtHR would be likely to grant such undertakings (not their public owners) a 
right of standing (locus standi).1566
1565 But see, however, n. 940.
1566 However, the ECtHR would probably not declare any further unbundling of vertically 
integrated energy supply networks disproportionate as long as suffi  cient compensation is 
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In the EU, fundamental rights protection solely depends on whether undertakings 
seeking such protection pursue an economic activity and take part in the 
competitive process, no matter whether they possess legal personality. Th us, 
public undertakings (controlled by public institutions) and private undertakings 
(with or without public (non-controlling) participation) are likely to enjoy 
protection.
Th e diff erence between the position the ECHR and EC law take on this issue 
consists of the fact that the former seems to be more formalistic, i.e. to put more 
emphasis on legal personality and the exercise of public authority in order 
distinguish such undertakings from the state organization. Th e approach under 
EC law, on the other hand, seems to be more functional.
When it comes to eff ective fundamental rights protection, it seems that the 
German BVerfG off ers the higher standard compared to the ECtHR and in 
particular the ECJ.
Th e proportionality test as applied by the BVerfG in Germany, has been developed 
into a very detailed and elaborate process of balancing the various opposing 
interests at stake in the case of interference with fundamental rights and has been 
strictly and eff ectively applied in Germany also in the context of reviewing 
parliamentary legislation.
Th e fair balance test used by ECtHR by contrast albeit similar in structure to the 
proportionality test rarely considers fundamental rights interferences 
disproportionate, which as has been explained before seems to be attributable to 
two reasons: fi rst, to date the provision of adequate compensation appears to have 
had a signifi cant infl uence on the proportionality of state measures under 
review1567 and, secondly, the Court accepts that the Member States and local 
authorities are usually better equipped to judge the proportionality of 
fundamental rights interferences of measures they enforce.
Although EC (case) law includes a proportionality test similar in structure to the 
test applied in Germany, on the basis of the case law under review here, of the 
three courts the ECJ seems to aff ord the least eff ective fundamental rights 
protection because it hardly ever fi nds fundamental rights interference 
granted. In the case of Germany, this would indeed make sense, in contrast to the Netherlands, 
see supra, since compensation payable would ultimately end up with the municipal owners or 
shareholders, which are a distinct part of the federal state organization.
1567 As has been explained in chapter 7 on the European Union, if further unbundling measures as 
originally proposed by the Commission entered into force, the EU would ultimately be liable 
to pay such compensation.
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disproportionate, particularly so in the area of economic fundamental rights 
such as the right to property. Th is approach of the ECJ to fundamental rights 
protection is certainly an issue of concern for German style fundamental rights 
protection as has been explained in the context of the review of the Solange case 
law of the BVerfG.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK
Further unbundling is such heavy weaponry to achieve the objective sought that 
it requires comprehensive justifi cation. Such justifi cation has, however, not be 
provided to date. On the contrary, economic (and technical) evidence shows that 
more eff ort should be put into promoting (independent) generation, which if done 
properly would even make the extension of energy transmission network 
interconnection less urgent, which in turn would weaken one of the main 
arguments put forth in favour of further unbundling.
Th us, as an in-depth justifi cation is required to justify such heavy interference, it 
is not only the eff ectiveness of a remedy, which is important. At least equally 
important is its (economic) effi  ciency.
From a theoretical economic point of view, it indeed appears to be true that 
further unbundling would lead to a market structure, which comes closer to what 
economic theory considers an ideal market structure – at least more ideal than 
what is currently in place.
However, when one looks into what further unbundling does for the European 
energy supply markets, it has been shown that energy transmission network 
ownership unbundling delivers only marginal benefi ts for the creation of an 
internal and competitive energy supply market and the consumers’ benefi t. In 
addition, its benefi ts for increased investment are, to say the least, unclear. 
Security of energy supply is better served by other policies, namely by installing 
more (independent) generation capacity, which also has a greater impact on the 
development of competition than further network unbundling. What is more, 
further energy transmission network unbundling would, contrary to its purpose, 
unlevel the playing fi eld in the European energy supply markets even further.
Looking at ownership unbundling or similar far-reaching unbundling measures 
enforced by competition law and by sector-specifi c legislation solely as regards 
their impact on the creation of a so-called level playing fi eld in the European 
energy supply markets, breaking up incumbents by way of enforcing competition 
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law would put such undertakings at an irreversible competitive disadvantage 
compared to their peers, which somehow seems not to have been spotted by the 
Commission’s radar. Individual break-ups would thus disturb the economic 
balance of the European energy supply sector, at least in the short term. 
Ownership unbundling in individual cases thus seems only possible, if at all, 
when enforced in markets, which feature one monopolist or near-monopolist 
(such as for instance Microsoft ) or a dominant undertaking within a concentrated 
oligopolistic market; although vertically integrated energy transmission networks 
are natural monopolies, in a European context there are several “national 
champions”, which feature such natural monopolies, which if broken up in 
individual cases only would lead to a disturbed economic balance as just 
described.
Such individual unbundling would naturally also be less eff ective in achieving 
sector-wide unbundling in order to create an internal energy supply market and 
suffi  cient competition. Th e competition law remedy of further network 
unbundling would thus for economic and sector-specifi c reasons not be 
proportionate (to the interference it causes to (economic) fundamental 
rights).1568
But further unbundling measures as envisaged by the original Commission 
proposals and even more by the current draft  Directives, i.e. inclusive of the ITO 
model, also “unlevel” the level playing fi eld. Further network unbundling is likely 
to intensify vertical integration of energy production and retail as can be seen in 
the UK and New Zealand energy supply markets. Th e third energy package 
deepens regulatory diff erences in the Member States; diff erences in energy supply 
market structure in the various Member States might become even greater. 
Further network unbundling of public and private vertically integrated energy 
supply undertakings carries the same label (“ownership unbundling”)1569, but 
could eff ectively mean less intrusive unbundling for public undertakings thus 
leading to unequal treatment of the public and private energy supply companies 
(and thus unequal interference with their respective economic fundamental 
rights), which would also aff ect their investment opportunities in Member States 
which have enforced ownership unbundling. And, as has already been indicated, 
if suffi  cient volumes of further (independent) generation capacity are not added 
(either on the national level where the actual competence in this respect lies or on 
1568 Instead of actively enforcing such a structural remedy, the recent E.ON and RWE cases, see n. 
252 have shown that the threat of heft y fi nes for anti-competitive beaviour can actually also 
achieve the desired results.
1569 Th is formally equal treatment on the remedial side refl ects the one-size-fi ts-all or egalitarian 
approach taken by the current draft  Directives as sector-wide regulatory measures.
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the basis of the European Commission’s “quasi-regulatory” competition law 
enforcement powers when accepting corresponding undertakings of energy 
supply undertakings such as recently provided by E.ON1570) this would also make 
it more unlikely that the creation of a level playing fi eld is going to be achieved.
Th us, the economic reasons indicated above and the likelihood that further 
unbundling legislation will not level the playing fi eld contribute to the 
disproportionality of such legislative measures (with respect to the interference 
with (economic) fundamental rights).
It has, however, also been shown that properly regulated TPA implemented via 
competition law enforcement, which may also include the connection of 
(independent) generation, is one of a combination of measures, which can achieve 
the goal of a more competitively working internal energy supply market in a 
proportionate way.
Another such measure is the use of its “quasi-regulatory” powers by the 
Commission in the area of merger control to carefully control the ever growing 
vertical integration of energy production and retail in the European energy 
supply sector.
A further such measure is the release of gas and/or electricity generation, as again 
shown in the late E.ON case1571, considering that liquid energy wholesale markets 
or independent generation and independent import contracts (hub trading) with 
gas producers combined with access to gas import pipelines (pipeline capacity 
trade independent of gas take obligations) are actually more eff ective and effi  cient 
than energy transmission network ownership unbundling to achieve an internal 
and competitive energy supply market and also considering that the European 
Union does not have the competence to regulate in this area as it falls into the 
remit of the Member States’ to regulate their national energy production sectors.
Another such measure is the tightening of the regulatory regime already in place 
in order to clarify ambiguities and to narrow down margins of interpretation; 
eff ective and uniform regulation in all European energy supply markets with a 
strict implementation of legal unbundling of energy transmission and distribution 
networks, which requires more time than has been allowed for the implementation 
of the current unbundling measures, is the condition sine qua non for enhanced 
competition in energy retail, which should be combined with stricter 
informational obligations bearing in mind that network monopolists do not 
1570 N. 252.
1571 N. 252.
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really have a need for confi dentiality. Further, uniform requirements for the 
extension of electricity and gas transmission interconnectors in all Member 
States and the promotion of merchant transmission, including by way of 
predictable and uniform licence conditions to enhance the availability of energy 
throughout the European Union1572, are another prerequisite for the development 
of energy supply competition in the EU. Further, stronger regional cooperation is 
required as envisaged by the current draft  Directives including the strengthening 
of ERGEG.
From the analysis of the legality of further unbundling of the European energy 
supply industry, which includes an evaluation of its economic reasonableness, 
the following lessons can be learnt with respect to the development of fundamental 
rights protection in the European Union and the cross-fertilization1573 resulting 
from the introduction of further unbundling measures in the European Union 
and its Member States.
First, contrary to the belief of the European Commission, the imposition of 
further unbundling measures on the European energy supply industry with such 
far-reaching consequences for the (economic) fundamental rights of the intended 
targets of such measures cannot be done by simply disregarding the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States or merely assuming the application 
of the “lowest common denominator” of fundamental rights protection. On the 
contrary, the European Commission as motor and guardian of the EC Treaty 
should not only be committed to establishing a competitive internal market but 
also to respecting the common constitutional traditions of the Member States.
Secondly, further unbundling legislation is passed by a legislature, which consists 
of a Council of 27 Member States’ government ministers, which is mainly 
involved in political bargaining and oft en whose members are oft en rather 
detached from the control of their national parliaments, and by the European 
Parliament which naturally has a clear focus on EC objectives but no great 
concern for defending the subsidiarity principle.
It is against this background that the ECJ should eff ectively develop and enforce a 
fundamental rights standard in the European Union1574, which is based on the 
1572 See n. 158 as regards principal diff erences in licensing and authorization operations in the 
Member States and in particular in the three countries under review here.
1573 See n. 1577.
1574 It has already been pointed out that the ECJ is likely to be lenient on the question of whether a 
competency of the EU can be exercised. Th e Court should, however, become more vigilant as 
regards how such competency is exercised thus helping fundamental rights protection to 
achieve its eff et utile.
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common constitutional traditions of the Member States.1575 As the 
“constitutional” court of the European Union with corresponding judicial 
powers, which are supposed to ensure the compliance of EU institutions with EC 
law including EC fundamental rights, its role is more akin to that of national 
courts than to that of the ECtHR.1576
Th e ECtHR lacks judicial powers such as the ECJ possesses and thus has to rely 
on the cooperation of the Convention’s signatory countries. Although it rightly 
defers to the wide margin of appreciation of the national governments as regards 
the legitimacy of the objectives of measures which interfere with the fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, it nevertheless applies the proportionality 
principle to restrict and control the margin so granted. It does so with the aim of 
developing a European fundamental rights standard even though it does not have 
the means the ECJ has at its disposal.
Th e reluctance of the ECJ to eff ectively enforce the rule of law and thus also 
fundamental rights protection in the European Union is unfortunate, in 
particular considering the rather questionable conduct of the Commission and 
the very reduced democratic legitimacy of the Council acting as the main EC 
legislative institution.
Eff ective fundamental rights protection by the ECJ would in turn enhance the 
national acceptance of the supra-national legal order, which would in turn 
enhance the democratic functioning of the EU, and would encourage greater 
cooperation at EU level with respect to the completion of the internal market.1577 
1575 EC fundamental rights must necessarily be diff erent (at least as regards the way in which they 
are protected and any possible limitations to these rights) from the fundamental rights as 
protected at Member State level, which are limited to the area and reach of the Member States’ 
sovereignty. More important is the methodology and structure of protection applied by the 
European courts, in particular as regards the application of the proportionality principle as 
well as the procedural enforceability of fundamental rights.
1576 Th e European legislature is split into a European Parliament and the Council of the Member 
States’ governments (consisting of the executive organs of the Member States), which is similar 
to the federal structure of Germany (Bundestag and Bundesrat, the latter of which also consists 
of representatives of the executive organs of the Länder). What is diff erent though is that 
unlike in Germany the Council enjoys dominance, which makes judicial supervision even 
more urgent than in Germany.
1577 As theoretic underpinning for this interdependency, van Gerven has developed the so-called 
cross-fertilization model, see W van Gerven, ‘Mutual Permeation of Public and Private Law at 
the National and Supranational Level’, (1998) MJ 7, and High Level Group (chaired by W Kok), 
‘Facing the Challenge – the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment’, Report, November 
2004, p. 41. According to this model, the laws of the Member States feed into the development 
of EC law, which in this case means the common constitutional traditions of the Members 
States as regards the eff ective protection of fundamental rights. In turn, EC law infi ltrates the 
national laws of the Member States, leading to changes within these legal sytems. Th e national 
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It would further secure the rule of law at EC level by restraining political 
bargaining, which is sometimes far removed from its democratic foundations. It 
would also make the Commission and the Parliament aware of their role in not 
only guarding the Treaty’s objective to of constructing the internal market but 
also the Treaty’s other objective, which is to respect common constitutional 
traditions.
Similar to the signifi cant infl uence which the UK approach to energy supply 
sector regulation has had on EC energy supply sector regulation, the German 
approach to a structured (economic) fundamental rights protection should 
signifi cantly assist the EU in making its approach to fundamental rights 
protection more robust and eff ective.
As EC law establishes an ever growing integration of the national (energy supply) 
markets, the application of national standards of fundamental rights protection 
and the interpretation of the boundaries of EC competences and their exercise 
should lead to an ever improving level of fundamental rights protection and 
European integration, which in turn should result in an ever growing support for 
the assumption and exercise of competences by the EU.1578
application of EC law leads to new insights in terms of law and its application, and with regard 
to policy choices, which in the current case would include the acceptance of the fact that energy 
supply has become an issue with a European dimension, which is to be conducted in a secure 
and competitive manner throughout the European Union. Th e experience of Member States 
feeds again into EC law to refi ne it further, such as through ever growing regulatory 
coordination and cooperation. Th is is a dynamic process theoretically leading to an increased 
quality in the law, both in terms of eff ectiveness and of policy.
1578 See in this respect also Di Fabio, n. 539. On 30 June 2009, the BVerfG (2 BvE 2/08, 5/08, 1010/08, 
1022/08, 1259/08, 182/09) ruled that although the ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty is compliant 
with the GG, a parliamentary law accompanying the ratifi cation, which sets out the rights of 
paricipation of the German federal legislature in the European legislative process, is not in that 
it does not suffi  ciently allow for (national) palriamentary control of such process. Th e Court 
establishes that the Lisbon Treaty leads to a further and far-reaching transfer of competences 
to the European Union; the detachment of the decision making process from national 
legislative participation thus requries an eff ective ultra vires control of European legislative 
acts when applied in the jurisdiction of Germany.
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SAMENVATTING
Dit werk geeft  een analyse van de rechtsgeldigheid van op basis van Europese 
economische reguleringsbevoegdheden toe te passen (dreigende) maatregelen tot 
ontvlechting van energieleveringsnetwerken en analyseert in het bijzonder of 
deze maatregelen in strijd zijn met in Duitsland, Groot-Brittannië, Nederland en 
de Europese Unie beschermde fundamentele economische rechten.
A. EG-BEVOEGDHEDEN OP HET GEBIED VAN 
MEDEDINGINGSRECHT EN SECTOR-
REGULERING
Het opleggen van splitsing van verticaal geïntegreerde energieleveringsnetwerken 
op basis van de mededingingsrechtelijke handhavingsbevoegdheden van de Com-
missie staat niet in verhouding tot het beoogde doel, namelijk het herstel van 
mededinging in een interne energieleveringsmarkt. Ontvlechting of splitsing van 
eigendom en onafh ankelijk systeembeheer (“deep independent system operation” 
of “deep ISO”, waarbij de systeembeheerders exclusieve bevoegdheden tot invest-
eringen en aanbesteden krijgen) van energieleveringsnetwerken zal geen of hoo-
guit een marginaal voordeel opleveren voor de consumentenwelvaarticle Voor 
wat betreft  elektriciteit hangt dat voordeel hoofdzakelijk samen met voldoende 
opwekking. Met betrekking tot gas is in dit onderzoek bewezen dat regulering in 
combinatie met mededingingsrechthandhaving voldoende is.
Met betrekking tot (nieuwe) EG-wetgeving, ervan uitgaande dat deze rechts-
geldig is gebaseerd op artikel 95 van het EG-verdrag, is de Europese wetgever 
beperkt in de uitvoering van deze bevoegdheid op grond van artikel 295 van het 
EG-vedrag. Bovendien zou het fundamentele recht van het vrij verkeer van kapi-
taal op basis van Artikel 56 van het EG-verdrag in gevaar komen.
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B. DE ONTWIKKELING VAN DE ENERGIE-
LEVERINGSSECTOR IN DUITSLAND, GROOT-
BRITTANNIË EN NEDERLAND
De energieleveringssectoren in Duitsland, Groot-Brittannië en Nederland heb-
ben zich ieder afzonderlijk ontwikkeld en vertonen grote verschillen op het gebied 
van ontvlechting van energienetwerken.
Nederland is een exporteur van aardgas en zal dit voorlopig ook blijven. De Ned-
erlandse energieleveringsindustrie is van oudsher (hoofdzakelijk) in handen van 
de Staat. Recent aangenomen nieuwe wetgeving garandeert dat dit met betrek-
king tot de Nederlandse energieleveringsnetwerken voorlopig zo zal blijven.
Het Verenigd Koninkrijk is pas recent veranderd van een exporteur van aardgas 
in een importeur daarvan. De energieleveringsindustrie in Groot-Brittannië 
heeft  voldoende opwekkingsvermogen voor elektriciteit en is circa 20 jaar geleden 
geprivatiseerd, waarbij de elektriciteitssector in Engeland en Wales vanaf het 
begin verticaal werd gescheiden (in ieder geval met betrekking tot transmissie) 
en de gassector in Groot-Brittannië verticaal was geïntegreerd, maar circa tien 
jaar na de privatisering vrijwillig werd gescheiden. Sinds de privatisering heeft  
zich geen andere grote ontvlechting meer voorgedaan, behalve dan dat een onaf-
hankelijke elektriciteit-transmissiesysteembeheerder voor Groot-Brittannië met 
enige invloed op investeringen is opgezet.
Duitsland is van oudsher in overwegende mate afh ankelijk geweest van steenkool 
als primaire energiebron en de in grote mate verticaal geïntegreerde energie-
leveringssector is in particuliere handen of in handen van gemeenten.
C. CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT EN BESCHERMING 
VAN GRONDRECHTEN
De verschillen in ontwikkeling van de marktstructuren zijn ook het gevolg van de 
verschillende constitutionele kaders in Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en 
Nederland, evenals van de verschillende wijzen van bescherming van grondrech-
ten.
In het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Nederland is het Europees Verdrag tot bescherm-
ing van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden (EVRM) in princ-
ipe de standaard voor grondrechten waar nationale wetgeving aan getoetst dient 
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te worden. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Nederland dient rechtstreeks toepas-
selijke EG-wetgeving getoetst te worden aan EG-grondrechten.
In Duitsland wordt nationale wetgeving getoetst aan de vereisten van de Duitse 
Grondwet. Rechtstreeks toepasselijke EG-wetgeving en EG-richtlijnen worden 
niet getoetst aan Duits constitutioneel recht, zolang op Europees niveau een geli-
jkwaardige grondrechtenbescherming wordt geboden als in de Duitse Grond-
wet.
In het Verenigd Koninkrijk heeft  de doctrine van parlementaire soevereiniteit 
geleid tot de onderwerping van de rechterlijke macht aan het Parlement in die zin 
dat wetten niet worden getoetst onder Engels recht. Een andere consequentie van 
deze doctrine is de aanvaarding dat grondrechten altijd onderworpen zijn gew-
eest aan vrije inmenging door het Parlement, welke inmenging gewoonlijk wordt 
gebaseerd op politieke onderhandelingen. Dit grondwettelijke kader heeft  zeker 
bijgedragen aan het succes van de regulering van de energieleveringssector in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk.
In Duitsland heeft  het federale constitutionele Hof, het zogenaamde Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, dat ook wetten toetst, een zeer gedetailleerde bescherming van 
grondrechten ontwikkeld en toegepast, die van directe invloed is op de Duitse 
sectorgerichte regulering en meer de nadruk legt op de letter van de wet dan op 
regulerende onderhandelingen.
Nederland bevindt zich tussen het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland in: de 
nationale wetgeving kan door de rechter getoetst worden, zij het alleen aan de 
EVRM-standaard en niet aan de nationale Grondwet.
In Duitsland zou de implementatie van eigendomsontvlechting een dispropor-
tionele onteigening zijn en zou onafh ankelijk systeembeheer (“deep ISO”) een 
regulering van eigendom zijn die zou neerkomen op onteigening, wat ook dis-
proportioneel zou zijn.
In het Verenigd Koninkrijk zou de volledige overgang van de bevoegdheden tot 
investering en aanbesteding van de eigenaren van de twee verticaal geïntegreerde 
elektriciteitstransmissienetwerken in Schotland een ontneming van eigendom 
betekenen in de vorm van een feitelijke onteigening, terwijl volledige eigendom-
sontvlechting een eigendomsontneming zou zijn in de vorm van een onteigen-
ing.
In Nederland genieten de verticaal geïntegreerde energieleveringsondernemingen 
die volledig eigendom zijn van gemeenten en provincies in principe bescherming 
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van grondrechten op basis van het EVRM, in tegenstelling tot hun publieke aan-
deelhouders. Eigendomsontneming in de vorm van een (feitelijke) onteigening 
van de verticaal geïntegreerde energiedistributienetwerken zal naar alle waarsch-
ijnlijkheid niet als disproportioneel worden aangemerkt zolang voldoende ver-
goeding wordt betaald; dit is echter niet zinvol voor de verticaal geïntegreerde 
energieleveringsondernemingen die eigendom zijn van lichamen van de Neder-
landse Staat, aangezien een dergelijke vergoeding slechts zou gaan circuleren 
binnen het staatsapparaat.
Bij de toetsing van verdere ontvlechtingsmaatregelen aan de bescherming van 
grondrechten zoals verschaft  door het Europese Hof van Justitie, wordt eigen-
domsontvlechting aangemerkt als eigendomsontneming in de vorm van een 
onteigening en wordt onafh ankelijk systeembeheer (“deep ISO”) aangemerkt als 
eigendomsontneming in de vorm van een feitelijke onteigening; beiden zijn dis-
proportioneel.
De aanvaarding dat met de enkele overgang van de in staatseigendom zijnde 
energietransmissienetwerken naar een onderdeel van de staatsorganisatie dat 
afgescheiden is van het deel dat verantwoordelijk is voor de verticaal geïnteg-
reerde energieleveringsonderneming voldaan zou zijn aan de ontvlechtingsvere-
isten van de nieuwe EG-wetgeving, komt neer op een manifeste inbreuk op het 
gelijkheidsprincipe, aangezien particuliere ondernemingen hier aanzienlijk door 
benadeeld zouden worden.
Voor wat betreft  de vraag of publieke eigenaren en aandeelhouders alsmede ver-
ticaal geïntegreerde energieleveringsondernemingen die (deels) eigendom zijn 
van of gecontroleerd worden door publieke instellingen zoals gemeenten en pro-
vincies een beroep kunnen doen op grondwettelijke bescherming, dient voor wat 
betreft  Duitsland een onderscheid gemaakt te worden tussen de situatie naar 
EVRM-maatstaven en naar EG-recht.
In Duitsland wordt geargumenteerd dat zowel gemeenten, die een zekere mate 
van autonomie hebben als gevolg van de Duitse federale structuur, als de verti-
caal geïntegreerde energieleveringsondernemingen die (deels) eigendom zijn van 
deze gemeenten bescherming zouden genieten van hun (economische) gron-
drechten onder de Duitse Grondwet in de specifi eke context van het nastreven 
van een concurrerende economische energieleveringsactiviteit.
Onder het EVRM is vastgesteld dat gemeenten, als zijnde overheidsorganisaties, 
niet worden beschermd op basis van Artikel 34 EVRM. Er wordt hier echter ver-
der beredeneerd dat verticaal geïntegreerde energieleveringsondernemingen 
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beschermd zouden zijn wanneer zij rechtspersoonlijkheid zouden bezitten, 
zolang een dergelijke rechtspersoonlijkheid wordt erkend door nationaal recht en 
zolang zij geen publieke bevoegdheden uitoefenen.
In de EU hangt bescherming van grondrechten slechts af van de vraag in hoeverre 
ondernemingen die een dergelijke bescherming nastreven een economische 
activiteit uitoefenen en deelnemen aan het concurrentieproces, ongeacht of zij 
rechtspersoonlijkheid bezitten. Daarom is het waarschijnlijk dat publieke en par-
ticuliere ondernemingen bescherming zullen genieten.
Voor wat betreft  eff ectieve bescherming van grondrechten, lijkt het Duitse Bun-
desverfassungsgericht een hogere standaard te bieden dan het Europees Hof van 
de Rechten van de Mens en in het bijzonder het Europese Hof van Justitie.
De proportionaliteitstoets zoals toegepast door het Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
Duitsland heeft  zich ontwikkeld tot een zeer gedetailleerde en uitvoerige proce-
dure van afweging van de verschillende tegengestelde belangen die aan de orde 
zijn in geval van vermeende schending van grondrechten en wordt ook in de con-
text van toetsing van parlementaire wetgeving nauwkeurig en eff ectief toegepast.
De fair balance-test die wordt toegepast door het Europees Hof van de Rechten 
van de Mens in plaats van de proportionaliteitstoets, ofschoon beide gelijksoortig 
in structuur zijn, beschouwt inmenging in grondrechten zelden als dispropor-
tioneel, waarvoor twee redenen lijken te zijn: ten eerste blijkt het verschaff en van 
voldoende vergoeding tot op heden een aanzienlijke invloed gehad te hebben op 
de proportionaliteit van de getoetste staatsmaatregelen en ten tweede accepteert 
het Hof dat de Lidstaten en lokale autoriteiten meestal beter in staat zijn een oor-
deel te vellen met betrekking tot de mate van proportionaliteit van grondrech-
tenschendingen die worden veroorzaakt door hun eigen maatregelen.
Hoewel EG-recht en EG-jurisprudentie een proportionaliteitstoets inhouden die 
qua structuur gelijksoortig is aan de toets die wordt toegepast in Duitsland, lijkt 
op basis van de in deze studie getoetste jurisprudentie het Europese Hof van 
Justitie de minst eff ectieve grondrechtenbescherming te bieden van de drie 




D. CONCLUSIES EN VERWACHTINGEN
Economisch (en technisch) bewijs laat zien dat er meer inspanningen verricht 
zouden moeten worden ter bevordering van opwekking, wat - indien optimaal 
uitgevoerd- de uitbreiding van interconnectie van energietransmissienetwerken 
minder urgent maakt, als gevolg waarvan één van de hoofdargumenten voor ver-
dere ontvlechting wordt verzwakt.
Eigendomsontvlechting van energietransmissienetwerken levert voor de 
ontwikkeling van een interne en concurrerende energieleveringsmarkt en dus 
voor de consument slechts marginale voordelen op. Bovendien is het nut daarvan 
met betrekking tot verhoogde investeringen op zijn zachtst gezegd onduidelijk. 
Betrouwbaarheid van energielevering is meer gebaat bij ander beleid, namelijk 
door de installatie van meer opwekkingscapaciteit, wat een grotere invloed heeft  
op de ontwikkeling van concurrentie dan verdere ontvlechting van netwerken. 
Daar komt nog bij dat verdere ontvlechting van energietransmissienetwerken, in 
strijd met het beoogde doel, de Europese energieleveringsmarkt nog meer uit bal-
ans zal brengen.
Verdere ontvlechtingsmaatregelen zullen waarschijnlijk een intensivering tot 
gevolg hebben van de verticale integratie van productie en detailhandel op het 
gebied van energie. Het derde energiepakket zal de verschillen in regulering 
in de Lidstaten vergroten; ook de verschillen in structuur van de energie-
leveringsmarkten in de Lidstaten kunnen toenemen. Verdere netwerk ont-
vlechtingen van publieke en particuliere verticaal geïntegreerde energie leverings-
ondernemingen worden weliswaar aangeduid onder dezelfde naam 
(“eigen domsontvlechting”), maar zouden in de praktijk minder indringend kun-
nen zijn voor publieke ondernemingen; dit resulteert in ongelijke behandeling 
van de publieke en de particuliere energieleveringsbedrijven en levert daarmee 
een ongelijke inbreuk op hun respectievelijke economische grondrechten op; ook 
zou dit hun investeringsmogelijkheden kunnen aantasten in Lidstaten die eigen-
domsontvlechting hebben opgelegd.
Er is in dit onderzoek echter aangetoond dat behoorlijk gereguleerde toegang van 
derden (“Th ird Party Access”), geïmplementeerd door middel van mede-
dingingsrecht, welke ook de verbinding van opwekking zou kunnen omvatten, 
één maatregel is uit een pakket waarmee het doel van een meer concurrerend 




Een dergelijke maatregel is ook het vrijgeven van gas- en/of elektriciteitsopwek-
king, evenals het aanscherpen van het reeds bestaande reguleringsregime, zodat 
onduidelijkheden worden opgehelderd en marges voor interpretaties worden 
verkleind. Uniforme vereisten voor de uitbreiding van interconnectoren voor ele-
ktriciteits- en gastransmissie in alle Lidstaten en het stimuleren van transmissie 
door derden (merchant transmission) zijn een ander noodzakelijke voorwaarde 
voor de ontwikkeling van concurrentie op het gebied van energielevering in de 
EU. Tenslotte is sterkere regionale samenwerking gewenst zoals omschreven in 
de huidige Ontwerprichtlijnen, waaronder de versterking van de ERGEG (Euro-
pean Regulator’s Group for Electricity and Gas).
Het opleggen van verdere ontvlechtingsmaatregelen aan de Europese energie-
leveringsindustrie met zulke ingrijpende gevolgen voor de (economische) gron-
drechten van de door dergelijke maatregelen getroff en partijen kan niet uit-
gevoerd worden als daardoor de gemeenschappelijk grondwettelijke tradities van 
de Lidstaten simpelweg worden genegeerd of slechts de laagste gemeen-
schappelijke noemer op het gebied van bescherming van grondrechten wordt 
toegepast.
Het Europese Hof van Justitie zou een standaard voor grondrechten in de EU 
moeten ontwikkelen en toepassen die is gebaseerd op de gemeenschappelijke 
grondwettelijke tradities van de Lidstaten. Als zijnde het constitutionele Hof van 
de Europese Unie met bijbehorende gerechtelijke bevoegdheden, die geacht 
worden de nakoming door de EU-instellingen van EG-recht inclusief de EG-
grondrechten te verzekeren, lijkt de rol van dit Hof echter meer op die van de 
nationale rechtbanken dan op die van het Europees Hof van de Rechten van de 
Mens.
Eff ectieve bescherming van grondrechten door het Europese Hof van Justitie zou 
bovendien de nationale acceptatie bevorderen van de supranationale rechtsorde, 
waardoor op haar beurt het democratisch functioneren van de EU wordt bev-
orderd en tevens meer samenwerking op EU-niveau wordt gestimuleerd om de 
interne markt te voltooien. Het zou de rechtsstaatgedachte op EG-niveau zeker 
stellen door het beperken van onderhandelingen op politiek niveau, wat soms 
weinig meer te maken heeft  met de democratische fundamenten daarvan. Het 
zou tevens de Commissie en het Parlement meer bewust maken van het feit dat 
zij niet alleen bewakers zijn van het doel om een interne markt op te zetten, maar 




De benadering in het Verenigd Koninkrijk met betrekking tot de regulering van 
haar energieleveringssector heeft  aanzienlijke invloed gehad op de Europese reg-
ulering van de energieleveringssector. Op diezelfde manier zou de Duitse bena-
dering met betrekking tot de gestructureerde bescherming van (economische) 
grondrechten aanzienlijk kunnen bijdragen aan het versterken en eff ectiever 
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